


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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

III

Nos. 98-109, 110-121

1916 - 1917

American Assoc. for Internat. Conciliation
New York City

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE LAND WHERE HATRED EXPIRES



BY

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JANUARY, 1916

No. 98

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American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City
1915

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

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no. 98-121

THE LAND WHERE HATRED EXPIRES

THE NEW ARGONAUTS.

Never shall I forget a stormy autumn crossing on the old French liner *La Touraine*, nearly nine years ago. It was my first voyage to America. A magnetic influence drew me to the forward part of the ship, as far as we were allowed to go, and there, lashed by the sharp salt wind, I would spend long hours, alone, peering into the cold and pale horizon, towards that mysterious Western land which was to become my country. Twenty feet below, on the main deck, there swarmed and seethed a crowd of steerage passengers, unkempt, sordid, cheerful withal; they too were straining their eyes, although they knew that nought was to be seen for several days, towards the lure of the setting sun. A full shipload of human freight—reeking, ignorant, worse perhaps, but all illumined by an unconquerable hope: America! America, the land of promise, the land of freedom, the land of opportunity; America! A new heaven and a new earth. Each throb of the mighty engine brought us nearer to that land of our dreams, across the wilderness of heaving and tossing waters, now somber, now strangely pale under the gray sky. The infinite anguish and the secret exhilaration of that lonely crossing will never fade in my memory.

Young people who but yesterday were at school, members of the graduating class, you remind me of us, the new Argonauts, the latter-day pilgrims. You stand to-day as we stood then, peering with eager eyes into the same horizon—the promise of American life. You are, as we were, candidates for citizenship. Your journey has been

smoother than ours, over sunlit seas and with merry companions. But, because they come to you as a matter of course, may you never forget the promise, and the wonder, and the responsibilities, of that call to American citizenship! Perhaps we, who have known other conditions, may help you realize your blessings and your duties. I hope you will not resent the paradoxical form of the statement: but I firmly believe that it is we, the newcomers, the immigrants, who are at heart the true Americans. Others may happen to be born between the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande; we came because we heard the distant call of the American spirit, and because it struck a deep note of response in our own hearts. We who left the old home of our own accord, not without a wrench, to seek a free life, we are the true descendants of the discoverers and pioneers of old, adventurers and missionaries, Spanish conquistadores, French Jesuits or Coureurs des Bois, Pilgrim Fathers or Quakers. We were not born in America; that was a mistake perhaps; but we were born Americans, and we came home as soon as we knew where to find our home. And this is why a man who spent a quarter of a century on the other side is so bold as to address you to-day, and to interpret before you the spirit of America.

THE BLENDING OF TRADITIONS.

A motley crowd were we, cabin passengers and steerage alike, on the good ship *La Touraine*; stolid and stocky folk from Central Europe, swarthy men and women from the Southlands, Jews from Poland and Rumania. And by this time we are Americans, one and all. We have given up our native speech for the wonderful tongue of Shakespeare, W. J. Bryan and George Ade; the picturesque garb of ancient villages has been discarded for the plain and sensible uniform of American civilization; titles and dynastic allegiance have been left, as undesirable, at the

gateway of Ellis Island; and our very habits of thought have undergone a radical change. But do you believe that we have dropped like a burden all the immemorial traditions of our home lands? We have not, and it would be a thousand pities if we had. For the primal glory of the American spirit is that it is a blend of all that Europe has to offer. A blend, not a mosaic. I recognize no sub-nationalities under the Stars and Stripes. I hate the look and the sound of such words as French-American, English-American, German-American. Local prejudices ought not to be imported from over the water. But I have no respect and no sympathy for the man who turns in anger and in derision against the land of his birth. It is only good Frenchmen, good Germans, good Russians, that will make good Americans. The wonderful range of America is due to the very facts that from the most varied corners of Europe, strong men and women have come, each with his or her potentialities. It would be suicidal for America to ignore that fact, which ought to be her pride. We are a composite nation, and our duty, as we become more and more American, is not to forget our own ancestors, not to limit our traditions to the hundred and forty years of independent national life, but to trace all the roots of the mighty American tree to the various transatlantic soils where they first grew. Let us—if you will forgive the familiarity of the expression—first let us pool our ancestors—let us all be heirs to all! The greatest privilege of American citizenship is just that blending of traditions. I feel now as if my two grandfathers had bravely fought against each other at Gettysburg; I know it was partly for me that Washington displayed his quiet heroism and his serene wisdom.

THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH HERITAGE OF AMERICA.

But that is not all. I feel as though the whole glorious past of England were mine, as it is yours—England, dear

old England, that has given us her speech, the unrivaled treasure of her literature, her indomitable spirit of adventure, her passionate desire for freedom and fair-play, her sound practical sense, and her deep-seated belief in our responsibility before a Power not of this world. Your English heritage is now mine; and that of all my fellow passengers on the *Touraine*—a priceless possession. But I want you to remember that all Americans are French to a certain degree. Was it not the ideas of XVIIIth century French philosophy, grafted on the sturdy old English tradition, that flowered in the American revolution? Have you not received from France, and preserved to this day, a hatred for caste and privilege, a love for logic and simplicity, a healthy radicalism of mind, a generous faith in human nature, which bids us look forward and not back? Is not all that traditionally French rather than English or German? Is not your art, I would not say an offshoot, but a younger and flourishing branch of French art, striving towards the same ideal? It is well-known that good Americans, when they die, go to Paris. Some good Americans must have reached Paris alive, for even before this war, Americans were by far the most popular foreigners in the French capital, and the United States is the only country where a Frenchman feels immediately at home.

OUR DEBT TO GERMANY.

And I do not want you to forget that we Americans are all the sons of Germany too, even those of us in whose veins there flows not one drop of Teutonic blood. Our ten million fellow citizens of German extraction have colored the whole American soul. They have brought with them the old German qualities of steady labor, cleanliness, thrift, the love of home and the fear of God. We are all

the beneficiaries of the German Reformation, yea, even the Roman Catholics among us, for without Martin Luther the Church would not have reformed herself at Trent. We are all beholden to the great philosophers, poets, scientists and musicians of the German past, to Goethe and Schiller, to Kant and Hegel, to Beethoven and Wagner. Those names mean infinitely more to us than those of many of our most prominent compatriots. Whatever folly or crime our kinsfolk may be committing at this hour, and under whatever flag, it is our privilege and it is our mission, as Americans, to cherish and preserve, more truly perhaps than they themselves, the treasures of their splendid cultural tradition.

ITALY, SPAIN, RUSSIA, JAPAN.

And I want you to love and respect Italy too. Italy, twice the mistress or leader of the world, at the time of the Roman Empire and at the time of the Renaissance; Italy, laden with such a burden of historical glory that it seems as though any nation would sink under it; and yet she lives and grows, energetic, self-confident, joyous, conscious of her past greatness, but not awed, and thus proving herself worthy of a still greater future; Italy, oldest and youngest of great nations, still as of old the breeding-ground and the Mecca of innumerable artists; Italy, well to the fore in science, and making giant strides in good government. I want you to remember and love the chivalrous and mystic spirit of old Spain, gloomy and ferocious at times, but which wrote for us the grandest epic of discovery and conquest; I want you to seek and love the vast, vague and mighty spirit of Holy Russia, the land of sorrow, whence came such words of peace and love, through the lips of Tolstoy, as the world had not heard for many hundred

years. I want you to know and love the smiling heroism and the artistic witchery of the Japanese. America is heir to all the world. Do not cut off any part of what is rightfully yours. Do not fear lest this Pantheon of many national ideals should turn into a Pandemonium—for the American spirit is large enough to harmonize them all.

THE LAND WHERE HATE EXPIRES.

For this is indeed "the land where hate expires," the land of universal reconciliation. This is the land where all are given a fair chance, and where Englishmen, Frenchmen, Austrians, Russians, Germans can meet on a common ground of democracy, justice and good fellowship; where they have at last a chance of becoming acquainted with one another, and, knowing one another, to appreciate and love. For hatred is but the child of ignorance; all education consists in unlearning hatred. One of my very good friends on the Rice faculty is a fiery young Prussian. If we were both in Europe we would be hurling at each other bombs, shrapnels, hand grenades, asphyxiating gases, and other inventions of the Father of Wars; here, we do not hurl even epithets at each other's heads, but meet socially, and even are able to discuss with tolerable coolness the philosophy of the present conflict. There is something in the American atmosphere which is deadly to hatred. Just as the veterans of Gettysburg can be friends, the veterans of Gravelotte and Mars-la-Tour, remember nought but the heroism, and forget the bitter animosity of their old quarrels. Only perhaps under the Stars and Stripes will men who fought on opposite sides at Liege, Charleroi, the Marne or Tannenberg be able to shake hands as men and brothers. For generations France has been the "Erbfeind," the hereditary foe, of Germany; for nearly half a century she has

nursed a fierce desire for revenge; Germany is singing to-day: "We shall never forego our hate—we have one foe and one alone: England!" And even Christian ministers greet each other with the sinister wish: God punish England!—Oh! What a blessing it is to live in this land which bears malice to none, this land which recognizes no hereditary foes but sin, ignorance and disease, this land where hate expires!

And what is the reason for this wonderful privilege of America? Is there something in our soil, in our climate, in the air we breathe, that is physically uncongenial to the dark flower of hatred, which blooms so rankly in the blood-sodden fields of Europe? Evidently not. The men who are so fiercely fighting in the old countries are our kinsmen; our climate is not milder than theirs, nor is our soil more fruitful; their culture is fully abreast of ours. What then is the key to this strange contrast?

PRINCIPLES VS. TRADITIONS: THE DEAD HAND OF THE PAST IN EUROPE.

The reason for America's sanity as a nation, the unique power which enables her to welcome men from all parts of the world and to turn them into loyal citizens, is that America is a country that looks forward instead of backward—in other terms, a country whose ideals are *principles* instead of *traditions*. Allow a professional student and teacher of history to state the fact quite frankly: Europe is suffering from an overdose of the historical spirit; Europe lacks the healthy radicalism, the youthfulness, I had almost said the boyishness, of the American mind. When you travel in dear old Europe, you are delighted with the quaint villages, the churches and castles hoary with centuries, the bright costumes of the peasant women,

the narrow, crooked lanes of medieval cities, the pomp of court functions and military pageants. History is beautiful for the poet, the artist, and even for the casual traveler. But Europe is choked up with history. The German imagination has been so filled with thoughts of the middle ages that, with them, history amounts to an obsession, to a mental disease. For a long time the French would hark back to ancient Gaul, with the Rhine as its Northeastern boundary. The French and the Germans are still fighting out the consequences of the treaty of Verdun in 843. Traditions, customs, institutions, dynasties, have cast their potent spell over the minds of our European friends. They are haunted with memories of the gorgeous and tragic past; and, in the shadowy world in which they live, they have lost the sense of actual values. Do not believe that I do not feel the poignant charm, the secret and subtle appeal of the undying past. But, for Heaven's sake, do not mix up archeology and poetry with present-day politics; let bygones be bygones, let the dead bury their dead, do not allow fossils to obstruct the path of living men! Historical traditions, at present, are the last frontiers, the only barriers between nations. From the point of view of science, of commerce, of industry, of philosophy, Europe is one, the whole Western world is one, and very soon the whole world, East and West, will be one. Even soldiers of contending nations are more and more alike in uniform, armament and spirit. But whilst all the thousand streams of modern civilization are converging into one mighty river, historical culture reverses the process; it looks backward, towards the head waters of each rivulet; it preserves and emphasizes differences which, if left to themselves, would soon disappear in the broad current of modern thought. The nationalistic, traditionalist education of Europe fosters exclusiveness, diffidence, hatred. Hence the strange

paradox that the best educated of all European nations is also the most bigoted in its pride and selfishness; that the hateful prejudices which have caused the present war have been kept up, not by the common people, but by poets, politicians and University professors. All of us, when we come to America, are welcome to preserve our sentimental and artistic traditions; but we are expected to leave behind all the hereditary jealousies which are the warp and woof of European history. What Europe needs is a similar experience, a great unlearning, a mighty revolution against the dead hand of the past that still oppresses her. The past is past! Let us cherish the fine old stories of our fathers' heroic deeds. But let us settle all present and future differences as men of the twentieth century. If we could but conjure away that incubus of historical traditions, peace would be at hand.

OUR IDEALISTIC PATRIOTISM.

Many Europeans believe that those very traditions—a war-stained history, a nobility, a dynasty—are essential to a nation. They despise the dead level of our democracy, the uninteresting record of our party struggles, barely relieved by two or three wars, one only waged on a large scale. They call us sordid materialists, because our ideal is not to glorify wholesale murder. Materialists, we! It is Germany, England, Russia, even France, that are materialists in their worship of a certain territory, of certain institutions, of certain men. We are idealists, for the unity of our nation is based on nothing material; it is based on principles. The race and the speech of our people might gradually change beyond recognition; our constitution might be altered in such a way as to puzzle those that framed it; yet, so long as we remain true to certain guiding ideas, America would be herself still.

DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE.

And what is the first and greatest of these idéas? Is it democracy? Is it liberty? No; it is justice. Liberty is but a negative ideal at best; we know that liberty has limits; there is no limit to justice. Where perfect justice reigns, there true liberty will rule also. Not democracy: democracy is a vague term. If by democracy you mean universal suffrage, you will find that democracy is but a means of assuring better justice, of doing away with the hereditary injustices of caste and autocracy, of maintaining fair play in the political field. America is the land where we strive to give every man according to his deserts: the normal man full liberty, the lunatic and the thief an asylum or a jail, the murderer an electric chair. We believe in justice, we love justice, as the one essential element of the American ideal.

Now, it would not do for us to pat ourselves on the back and say: "What fine fellows we are!" There are as fine fellows as any of us on the other side; but they suffer from handicaps and limitations that we have been able to shake off. Superiority is no justification for self-complacency and a pharisaical attitude. Superiority spells responsibility. If it be true that the American spirit stands for justice, then there is a huge task before us, and appalling dangers.

THE AMERICAN IDEAL AND THE RACE QUESTION.

You will have, men and women of the South, to apply your American principles to the race question. There we see the advantage of adopting "justice" rather than "democracy" as our watchword. A crude misinterpretation of democracy placed the South, for a few years, at the mercy

of a totally unprepared electorate; and you have been shuddering at the memory of those dark days for two generations. The time has come when you can afford to be just—to frame such laws that the illiterate, the drunkard, the criminal, be excluded from the privileges of active citizenship; whilst all desirable citizens, whatever may be their sex, race, color or previous condition of servitude, will be welcome to the full exercise of American liberty. I do not know whether these words of mine will not be resented. I am no platform virtuoso, and I have not come here to sing old words to an old tune. Think for yourselves, young men and women: do not allow your grandfathers to do your thinking for you. Your grandfathers were all right—at least I suppose they were. But you have to face the problems of this generation. Do not be hypnotized, like the people in Europe, by the injustices and miseries of a dead past. Be Americans; the future is before you; the future is yours.

AMERICA THE APOSTLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.

Not only must we keep America true to the American spirit in home affairs, but we must make her a missionary, an apostle among nations. A historical tradition is exclusive and incommunicable: you cannot expect a German to be loyal to the memory of Richelieu, Carnot and Gambetta; or a Frenchman to worship Frederick the Great and Bismarck. But if we stand for a principle, if we think of the future rather than of the past, of the generations for whose destiny we are partly responsible rather than of the ancestors who have framed our own destinies—then we can bid the whole world to commune with us. European patriotism may be in direct and tragic conflict with the dictates of humanity; the men who sank the

Lusitania were in all likelihood Christians and gentlemen. Sane and good men may be so led astray as to repeat the barbaric words: "My country, right or wrong!" American patriotism is no shadowy replica of French, German or British patriotism; it is of a different kind altogether. It cannot conceivably be opposed to the interests of humanity, for it is based on humanitarian principles. An American cannot consistently say, "My country, right or wrong!" for his first concern, his highest duty is that his country should be right, rather than victorious in battle. Victory! World-wide Empire! The one supremacy that America desires is to be a leader in the cause of international as well as national justice. And the supreme achievement of American patriotism, the American conquest of the world, will be the day when the jealous patriotism of European countries has died, when all nations are united in the bonds of democracy and peace, under the ægis of justice.

Sons of the discoverers, the conquerors, the pilgrims and the pioneers! The task is not done. There are more strange and lonely seas for your ships to plough. Never have such infinite horizons been revealed to the eyes of any generation. Go forth, in the spirit of high adventure; discover for yourselves, and organize for all future generations the new America, the promised land that we, your elders, dreamed of and shall never see, the universal commonwealth founded on justice and love.

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Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

AMERICAN OPINIONS OF THE WORLD WAR

AS SEEN BY A GERMAN



BY


EDUARD BERNSTEIN

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN MEZ

FEBRUARY, 1916

No. 99



American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

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PREFATORY NOTE

Eduard Bernstein is one of the foremost members of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, a veteran author and publicist, an international figure. Born in Berlin sixty-six years ago, the son of a locomotive engineer, he attended the Prussian schools and from 1866 to 1878 held various positions in a bank. Becoming a Social Democrat in 1872—the year following the proclamation of the present German Empire—he was made to feel the weight of the rigorously repressive laws which Bismarck directed against the Socialists from 1878 to 1890. Practically exiled from his own country, Bernstein lived from 1878 to 1888 in Switzerland. Thence expelled through the efforts of Bismarck, he took up his residence in London. From 1881 to 1890 he edited the *Social Democrat*, and for many years he has contributed largely to *Neue Zeit* and other publications of the German Social Democracy.

It was a series of articles by Bernstein in *Neue Zeit* in 1898 which proved epochal in the history of Socialism. In brief, Bernstein demanded that the Social Democrats cut loose from the dogmas of Karl Marx. He frankly rejected the Marxian conception of history as inadequate to explain modern social evolution; he regarded the Marxian labor theory of value as untenable; and through careful statistical studies he endeavored to show that the prediction of Marx regarding the extinction of the middle class through concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands had been disproven by the course of events. Against Karl Kantsky and the dominant school of German Socialists, he urged all the democratic elements in his country to work together for the democratization of the German Empire and the securing of radical social reforms.

Though assailed by Kantsky, Bernstein was suffered to remain within the Social Democratic Party and his right to disagree with Karl Marx was actually upheld. In 1901 he returned to Germany, and in 1902 was elected a member of the Reichstag as a representative from Breslau. Losing his seat in 1907—the year in which the Emperor William II and the Chancellor von Bülow made their great appeal to the country on the issue of colonialism and world politics—he was triumphantly re-elected in 1912.

Bernstein has published almost innumerable articles and books. Two books—his edition of the speeches and writings of Ferdinand Lassalle and his attack on Marxism—have been translated into English. Since the beginning of the present war, Bernstein has co-operated with Kantsky and Liebknecht in opposing the annexation to Germany of any newly conquered territory.

AMERICAN OPINIONS OF THE WORLD WAR

By EDUARD BERNSTEIN

The war has brought forth a flood of articles of all descriptions, both in the neutral and in the belligerent countries. In magazines and in pamphlets, the pros and cons of the justness of the belligerent coalitions have been discussed over and over, polemically as well as apologetically, both from the viewpoint of the more or less interested sympathizers of the respective governments and by such writers whose judgment may be considered impartial. It is self-evident that we are especially interested to learn the views of the latter kind, provided, of course, that they truly reflect or influence the sentiments of a considerable part of the nation.

But since these views are represented by the daily press mostly for specific political purposes whereby the reports are always more or less colored, it seems desirable, omitting all one-sided tendencies, to present an impartial summary of these publications of prominent men who have influenced the American public in one way or the other. For an adequate appreciation of and conclusion on the attitude of the American people in this matter can only be obtained by being correctly informed as to the viewpoints of the various classes towards the war. With this in view those utterances are of especial interest which were published before the agents of the great political bodies of the United States have attempted to control this matter. There has, however, been no lack of such expressions of opinion uninfluenced by party considerations.

Thus, President Charles W. Eliot, of Harvard University, discusses, in the *New York Times* of October, 1914, what, in his opinion, has been essential in forming public opinion in the United States toward the belligerents. His views, some of which at that time have also been published in Germany, have since then, almost without exception, been endorsed by the presidents of other universities. This implies that his views, in truth, represent the sentiments of a large body of the American public.

The American scholar to-day has much more authority than we generally assume. We Germans are only too apt to look upon the great republic across the Atlantic merely as the country of graft-politicians, trust-barons and their kind—hunting for the dollar. But, as a matter of fact, besides these influential classes, there are large numbers of productive and industrial elements of all sorts not less respectable than

the majority of the middle classes and proletarians of the Old World, grown up, after all, with the traditions of a republican community, the history of which, among its most important events, records two great struggles for liberty. Between ideals and actual conditions, there is always a deep gulf. But the difference between what a nation believes itself to be, and what it really is, is certainly not greater with them to-day than with us who want to be regarded as the nation of idealists; although few may be found who could appreciate the right of self-government of another nation, if this would conflict with the supposed interests of power of one's own country.

In the above-mentioned article, Professor Eliot, after asserting that he and his countrymen are in no way prejudiced against Germany or the German people, enumerates many attributes and achievements of Germany which they, on the contrary, highly esteem, and asserts that it is their earnest desire to continue to live in friendship with Germany. But, in the present war, with all the strong feeling tending to make the Americans sympathetic with the German people in good times or bad, in peace or in war, the whole weight of American opinion, according to Eliot, is on the side of the Allies.

Why this? It is interesting to note that Professor Eliot, who wrote this letter at a time when America suffered from the war both financially and commercially, should consider, as the fundamental cause of the anti-German feeling, the contrast between the political conceptions of the American and, as he calls it, "certain German national practices of great moment—practices which are outgrowths of Prussian theories and experiences that have come to prevail in Germany during the past hundred years."

He then discusses, in detail, the particular questions on which, in his opinion, these views differ. We must confine ourselves to some of his statements which are of special import in this connection.

It is but natural that the citizen of the United States should be opposed to all personal, individual régime in foreign politics and in questions relating to war and peace. "The fact that Germany's mobilization was ordered three days in advance of the meeting of the Reichstag confounds all American ideas and practices about the rights of the people, and the proper limits of the executive authority." The citizens of the United States, in spite of not being without military history, have never, in all their history, organized what could be called a standing or conscripted army; and they have seen their country develop economically and culturally, and from this they judge the importance of the relation between military force and national greatness.

Therefore, they are, as Eliot explains, "strongly opposed to the extension of national territory by force contrary to the wishes of the

population concerned." This opposition he calls "the inevitable result of democratic institutions."

"The American people," he writes, "have been faithful to this democratic opinion under circumstances of considerable difficulty, as, for example, in withdrawing from Cuba, the rich island which had been occupied by American troops during the short war with Spain in 1898; and in the refusing to intervene, by force, in Mexico, for the protection of American investors when that contiguous country was distracted by factional fighting."

In the light of these events, they judge the former annexations of Germany, and, at present, the question of Belgium. Americans are strenuously opposed to "the violation of treaties between nations on the allegations of military necessity or for any other reason whatsoever."

"They believe that the progress of civilization will depend in future on the general acceptance of the sanctity of contracts or solemn agreements between nations and on the development, by common consent, of international law. . . .

"The United States has proposed and made more of these agreements than any other power, has adhered to them, and profited by them. Under one such agreement, made nearly one hundred years ago, Canada and the United States have avoided forts and armaments against each other, although they have had serious differences of opinion and clashes of interest—and the frontier is 3,000 miles long and, for the greater part, without natural barriers.

"Cherishing the hope that the peace of Europe and the rights of its peoples may be secured through solemn compacts which should include the establishment of an international court supported by an international force, Americans see in the treatment, by the German Government, of the Belgium neutralization treaty as nothing but a piece of paper, which may be torn up on the ground of military necessity, evidence of the adoption by Germany of a retrograde policy of the most alarming sort.

"That single act on the part of Germany—the violation of the neutral territory of Belgium—would have determined American opinion in favor of the Allies, if it had stood alone.

"American public opinion, however, has been greatly shocked in other ways by the German conduct of the war." Eliot mentions a number of methods of warfare, as the dropping of bombs in cities and towns chiefly inhabited by non-combatants, the strewing of floating mines, etc. His list closes with the enacting of ransoms from cities and towns under the threat of destroying them, and the holding of unarmed citizens as hostage for the peaceable behavior of a large population, under threat of summary execution of the hostages in the case of any disorder.

To Americans all these methods of warfare seem unnecessary, sure

to breed hatred and contempt toward the nation that uses them and, therefore, to make it difficult for future generations to maintain peace and order in Europe. They cannot help imagining the losses civilization would suffer if the Prussians should ever carry into Western Europe the kind of war which the Germans are now waging in Belgium and France. They have supposed that war was to be waged in this country only against public armed forces and their supplies and shelters.

The statement of Eliot concerning the responsibility of personal régime, secret diplomacy and militarism for having brought about the war need not be repeated here. Compared with other articles by Americans, they are remarkably moderate and careful. "All experienced readers on this side of the Atlantic," says Eliot, "are well aware that nine-tenths of all the reports they get about the war come from English and French sources, and this knowledge makes them careful in their judgments"; but their fundamental opinion stands firm.

"American sympathies are with the German people in their sufferings and losses, but not with their rulers or with the military class or with the professors and men of letters who have been teaching for more than a generation that Might makes Right." "That short phrase," according to Eliot, outlines "the fundamental fallacy which for fifty years has been poisoning the springs of German thought and German policy on public affairs."

"The dread of the Muscovite does not seem to Americans a reasonable explanation . . . except so far as irrational panic can be said to be an explanation. Against possible, though not probable, Russian aggression, a firm defensive alliance of all Western Europe would be much better protection than the single might of Germany.

"It were easy to imagine also two new 'buffer States'—a reconstructed Poland and a Balkan Confederation." It is very significant that our American critic should say: "As to French 'revenge,' it is the inevitable and praiseworthy (sic!) consequence of Germany's treatment of France in 1870-71."

"The great success of Germany, in expanding her commerce during the past thirty years, makes it hard for Americans to understand the hot indignation of the Germans against the British," and could not (fail to) justify the attempt of Germany to seize supreme power of Europe. His letter ends with the words: "Finally, Americans hope and expect that there will be no such fatal issue of the present struggle as the destruction or ruin of the German nation. On the contrary, they believe that Germany will be freer, happier, and greater than ever, when once she has got rid of the monstrous Bismarck policies and the Emperor's archaic conception of his functions, and has enjoyed twenty years of real peace."

These last words alone were sufficient to invite protests from the

advocates of the German cause. His letter, however, also contains many other remarks which could not remain unanswered, and, indeed, they were replied to from that quarter; among others, even Mr. Dernburg (who was in the United States at that time) considered it worth while to oppose Mr. Eliot. In a lengthy letter, published in the *New York Times*, of October 5, 1914, he discusses Eliot's political statements in detail, and contrasts them with the German viewpoint.

As I am concerned here, not with the investigation of the truth of these statements, but with the characterization of the general attitude, and as Dernburg's letter at that time has also been published in Germany, it is unnecessary to repeat the former German Colonial Minister's statements.

Even he who dissents from Mr. Dernburg, must admit that he has represented the standpoint of the German Government with great ability; perhaps even more ably than this has been done in various publications sent out from Berlin itself. After complimenting Eliot, whose authority is recognized on both sides of the Atlantic, he exposes some weak points in Eliot's letter, and shows that everything of which Eliot accuses the Germans had also been committed by the Allies, either at the present time or in the past.

Among the American scholars who have sided with Official Germany, I wish to mention another professor, John W. Burgess, of Columbia University, sometime exchange-professor at the University of Berlin, who has warmly defended Germany in several newspapers and magazines. He especially shields the Kaiser against the accusation that his love for peace has merely been theatrical, and he endeavors to show that Germany had been forced to act against Belgium as she did, by the attitude of England, and that there had been no violation of a real neutrality.

Burgess lays the blame on England, because Grey had refused to assure Belgium of England's neutrality in the prospective war between Germany and France, as against the promise of Germany eventually to respect the neutrality of Belgium; and, because, on August 4, 1914, Grey informed the Belgian Government that his Government expected Belgium to resist a pressure exercised by Germany with all means in its power, when a million German soldiers stood at the Belgian frontier, and because England promised help to Belgium, which was only given much too late and entirely inadequately.

On another occasion, Burgess expresses the view that Belgium, on account of the increase of its population, has outgrown the size of a nation whose neutrality had to be guaranteed by its neighbors, and had become ripe for self-protection. A summary of his article containing these statements has been published in the *Cologne Gazette*, December, 1914.

Another president of an American university, who has entered upon the discussion of the Belgian Question, is Professor John Grier Hibben, President of Princeton University. He was aroused by the manifesto of the ninety-three German intellectuals, because this manifesto declares that "it is not true" that Germany had violated Belgian neutrality, and states that it had been "proved" that, on the contrary, France and England had resolved on such a trespass, and that Belgium had agreed in their doing so.

Professor Hibben wrote a letter to one of the authors of the manifesto, Professor Eucken, of Jena, whom he knows personally, and published this letter in the *New York Times*, of November 25, 1914.

In this letter, Hibben explains, courteously but very definitely, that they expected a more scholarly method in the treatment of subjects in dispute by men of science:

"It is naturally to be expected of a group of scholars that where reference is made to proof, some citation should be given both of the sources of the proof and of its nature. . . . In your appeal, however, the most important statement, by far, which you make, and the one bearing most intimately upon the honor and integrity of your nation, is left without even the attempt to support it, save the bare assertion by you and your colleagues. In the interests of a fair understanding of Germany's position, I feel that it is incumbent upon you to give us, who are under such a deep debt of gratitude to German scholarship in our own lives, the opportunity of a full knowledge of all the facts which definitely bear on this present situation."

At the same time, Hibben wrote to a friend of his—the master of Christ's College, Cambridge—asking him if he could get some authentic material from the British Foreign Office. He received an elaborate memorandum of the British Foreign Office, which, of course, emphatically denied that statement, and, among other enclosures, a lengthy communication of the Belgian Minister, Davignon, who attempts to show that the German reports of conversations of British officers with high officials of the Belgian Ministry of War, concerning the sending of troops into Belgium in case of an Anglo-French war against Germany, could not prove what the German Government concluded from them. This document also was published in the *New York Times*.

Much stronger terms than those of Hibben and Eliot are used by the President of the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh, Mr. S. Warden Church, in his open letter dated November 9, 1914, addressed to Professor Fritz Schaper, in Berlin, who had sent him the manifesto. Like the above-mentioned, Mr. Church begins with a eulogy on German art, science and industry, refers to his friendly relations to a number of prominent Germans,

and expresses in warm terms the sympathies of the Americans for the German people and the German Empire.

"Why, the very texture of our nation would make us true to Germany in all her moral rights, because we have at this moment eight million people of German birth or German parentage in our population, and these citizens are among the very best in this country." . . .

"But in the same way, we cherish the people of all other races, except, alas, those from Asia; and, one day, in God's own time, we shall grow big enough in a spiritual sense to receive the children of Asia with equal hospitality. But we are a cosmopolite nation . . . our blood and fibre comprises the whole human family.

"Our excellent President Wilson . . . has charged us all to maintain an impartial neutrality, and that, I believe, we are earnestly striving to do. At the same time, we are likewise earnestly striving to find the right and to condemn the wrong, because neutrality can never mean indifference."

"In your letter you say that your enemies 'by their lies and calumnies are endeavoring to stain the honor of Germany in her hard struggle for existence—in a struggle which has been forced upon her.' . . . But Germany need have no fear that American public opinion will be perverted by the lies and calumnies of her enemies.

"We are all going deeper than the surface in our search for the truth. Your letter speaks of Germany as being in a struggle 'which has been forced upon her.' That is the whole question; all others are subsidiary. If this struggle was forced upon Germany, then indeed she stands in a position of mighty dignity and honor, and the whole world should acclaim her and succor her, to the utter confusion and punishment of the foes who have attacked her. But if this outrageous war was not forced upon her would it not follow in the course of reason that her position is without dignity and honor, and that it is her foes who should be acclaimed and supported to the extreme limit of human sympathy?"

"I believe, dear Doctor Schaper," Mr. Church continues, "that the judgment on this paramount question has been formed. That judgment is not based upon the lies and calumnies of the enemies of Germany, nor upon the careless publications contained in the newspapers, but upon a profound study of the official correspondence in the case. This correspondence has been published and disseminated by the respective Governments concerned in the war; it has been reprinted in full in our leading newspapers, and with substantial fullness in our magazines, and has been republished in a complete pamphlet form in one huge edition after another by the *New York Times*, and again by the American Association for International Conciliation; and the public demand for this in-

disputable evidence has not yet been satisfied, although many millions of our people have read it."

"I cannot help wondering," Mr. Church writes, "whether they have been circulated in Germany; I cannot help wishing that the German people might have the opportunity which my countrymen have had of reading these state papers in their fullness."

This question must induce us to make a rather melancholy consideration. Should it be based upon the supposition that these documents could not be spread in Germany on account of external difficulties we can state that this is not so; the documents in question are accessible to the German people; what, however, does not exist in the same measure as abroad is the interest in or the demand for them. This is an extremely good illustration of the difference between a nation which at least believes itself to be self-governing, and a nation that lacks that belief entirely up to now. Americans are used to being informed in every way about important questions of their politics or to be asked their opinion on them. They do not relinquish that habit in important issues, not even before it affects them seriously. With us, however, whose very destiny is at stake, the desire to study independently the obtainable documents for personal judgment is extremely weak. Even people who consider themselves educated show very little interest—they still adhere to the habit criticized so severely by Lassalle of judging by hearsay. On account of this many unpleasant things which by outsiders are attributed to a moral defect of Germans may be explained as due to an intellectual mistake.

One might object that the official publications are unreliable because they are altogether deficient and because the governments without exception omit everything which might expose their hand in a compromising manner.

This may be fully admitted; the attentive reader of the white, blue, yellow, etc., books soon realizes that they withhold much of what would be absolutely necessary for the formation of an exhaustive judgment. But the reader may obtain more from them than from the Press, or he may at least compare with them the reports of the Press, and besides, to a certain extent the publications of one government check those of the others. That they are only of limited value is no reason why they should be ignored.

It is questionable, however, whether it is justifiable to deduct from them a judgment concerning the war such as Mr. Church and some of his countrymen apparently have done. The deeper motives which have destined the actions of the governments are certainly not expressed in diplomatic documents of this kind. They merely deal with aspects of formal nature. In not having considered this in his letter published later in pamphlet

form, Mr. Church and other Americans have committed an unpardonable mistake.

Although articles like that of Mr. Church do not give a final judgment as to the guilty party they nevertheless remain important as expressions of American sentiment. The President of the Carnegie Institute at Pittsburgh, at any rate, speaks for a large section of his countrymen. The attitude of a great majority of the people of the United States towards the methods of the belligerents in so far as the interests of America are affected thereby allows no doubt as to this. As far as England is concerned there have been only mild apprehensions and theoretical objections, whereas German complaints have been repeatedly refuted rather strongly. Formally neutrality has been carefully maintained, but nothing was done to prevent this formal attitude of neutrality from working favorably for England and unfavorably for Germany.

This is shown in an article entitled "The Ship, the Flag, and the Enemy," by an American professor of international law and diplomacy at Columbia University, Professor Ellery C. Stowell, published in the *Outlook* February 17, 1915, in which he states that by a decision of the Orders in Council, the British government had stretched the rule of contraband of war and interfered with the trade of the United States to a larger degree than was necessary for the United States to tolerate.

"The United States has been patient in the face of these serious interferences with her neutral rights because she still had a good market in Great Britain and France, and because this country was stirred to its very depths by Germany's violation of the most fundamental principles of international law by her invasion of Belgium. By maintaining a complaisant attitude towards these British infringements of the rights of the United States, public opinion in this country has given an unconscious expression of its real feeling that the nations of the world should co-operate with the Allies to enforce respect for the fundamental principles of international law. In applying to the transgressor of international law the only effective sanction which exists among the nations as now organized—that is, condemnation by the public opinion of the civilized world—the transgressor is penalized by a force indirect but none the less crushing."

It would be futile to deny that similar thoughts have also been playing a serious part in forming the decisions of other neutral countries. This feeling, however, cannot be changed by simply denying what has been done, a method adhered to by the German Chancellor in delivering his speech before the Reichstag on August 4, 1914. How much the prestige of Germany has suffered from this very method of procedure is clearly shown by the letter of President Church. This criticism would not have been half as severe if in their manifesto the professors, authors

and artists would have followed the example given by Herr v. Bethmann-Hollweg.

With their stereotyped "It is not true" they have merely effected that those things they tried to deny have all the more been emphasized and criticized. President Church undertakes to do this by referring to the White Book of the German Government, various of its circular notes, telegrams of the German Emperor; the impression thus created may be realized from some quotations of such parts of his letter as can be published under present conditions in Germany:

In the manifesto of the German professors, among other things this had been said:

"It is not true that we trespassed in neutral Belgium."

To which the American replies:

"Have these ninety-three men studied well the letter they have signed? Could intellects so superbly trained deliberately certify to such an unwarranted declaration? . . . Has any one of my ninety-three honored correspondents read the guilty statement made by Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag on August 4th?"

He then quotes the well-known statement of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg of August 4th, and a less known statement contained in a letter of August 15th, addressed to an American press agency, in which he said:

"Necessity forced us to violate the neutrality of Belgium, but we had promised emphatically to compensate that country for all damage inflicted."

It goes without saying that by thus confronting these two statements the manifesto of the professors is not only deprived of its force but may even be used to prove the absolute lack of good judgment of its authors.

What the American thinks, moreover, about the happenings in Belgium is shown by one of the comparatively mild passages of the open letter addressed to Professor Schaper, which reads as follows:

"'The wrong that we are committing.' Worst of all, when the desperate and maddened populace, seeing their sons slain and their homes in flames, fired from their windows in the last instinct of nature, your troops, with barbaric ferocity, put them to the sword without distinction of age or sex! The wrong! Why do you deny it against the shameful acknowledgment of the official voice of Germany? Oh, Doctor Schaper, if these conditions should ever be reversed, and these foreign soldiers should march through the streets of Berlin, would not you, would not all of my ninety-three correspondents, if they saw their homes battered in ruins and their sons dead in the streets, would not they, too, fire from their windows upon the merciless invaders? I am sure I would do so! When our American troops were recently dispatched to Mexico, not to conquer, not to make war, but to restore peace and good order and the authority

of law, some of the people of Vera Cruz fired at them from their windows, and twenty-three of our young soldiers were killed. At last, they fired back at the sharpshooters, but they did not destroy the city, nor kill the innocent, and even those among the sharpshooters who were captured were not executed, but were admonished to good behavior, and set free. I almost wish that America had the power and the will to go into Belgium and France, to thrust back these wicked invaders, and restore peace and good order and the authority of law there. Such a power is surely going to be organized, one of these days, by the humane people of all the world, and after that a nation which undertakes to prepare death and hell for all mankind . . . will be restrained as a public enemy."

The statement of the manifesto that the German troops "have not treated Louvain brutally," Mr. Church disproves by quoting the following words of the Emperor: "My soldiers have destroyed Louvain because of the trespass of the people, and the lives and property of many innocent persons have been sacrificed. My heart bleeds for Louvain!"

I quote the following passage which is a typical expression of American spirit:

"And right here, dear Doctor Schaper, may I say that the statesmanship of Germany has been constructed upon one false principle which is mainly responsible for all the woes that this German war has brought upon the world? Your military rulers have inculcated in the hearts of your people the belief that the German flag must follow Germans in their emigration. Hence you claim to require colonies. Then your Emperor tells his people that Germany is above all—have you not a song to those words?—he teaches them that they are above the rest of our poor humanity, and they believe it. Well, there are, as I have said, eight million Germans in America who do not require the German flag in order to insure their utmost felicity. There are other thousands of them in Canada, in Brazil, in Argentina, and elsewhere around the globe, always safe and happy without the German flag. When Americans adopt other countries, they do not carry our flag with them. Is it not absurd and mischievous, then, to hold to the doctrine that Germans henceforth must continue to live under the German flag, wherever they go? Is not the wild dream of Pan-Germanism at the bottom of this great crime? Is there not a higher destiny, to be born, perhaps, out of this war, that humanity is greater than any race, and that governments in conflict with that destiny must perish?"

As in this passage, the reference to Pan-Germanism repeatedly occurs in Mr. Church's letter. This also proves how wrong it is to underestimate the Pan-German propaganda. Mr. Church is not quite clear in his statements; he talks too much to be taken for an impartial critic; he represents, so to speak, "the man in the street," which, however, gives political

interest to his utterances. For in the politics of a country like the United States, the opinions of men of his type are of the greatest influence. Little as his utterances may please the German reader, it is more important to take cognizance of them than of those which flatter, especially when we consider that they are but the views of a negligible minority.

Let us, however, turn from this author representing the American man in the street to an American scholar. An article by Carlton Hayes, professor at Columbia University, published in the December number, 1914, of the *Political Science Quarterly*, entitled "The War of the Nations," impresses us infinitely more agreeably in every respect. Instead of pathetic phrases, by which Mr. Church repeatedly distorts even quite rational thoughts, we find in Mr. Hayes' article a way of dealing with the subject, which presents even the most uncomfortable criticisms with such argumentation and in such forms as not even to excite the nerves of the most sensitive reader.

Mr. Hayes discusses the issues of the present war from the viewpoint of the historian, quoting eight books, four of German, three of English and only one of American origin. The American book "Men Around the Kaiser; the Makers of Modern Germany," concerns us less here. It is the work of an able journalist, Mr. Fr. W. Wile, who for many years was the representative of the Associated Press Agency, at Berlin. It consists of thirty-four vivid sketches of the best-known personalities of the present Germany, lacking, however, all criticism of the best-known personalities of Germany of to-day. Mr. Hayes treats it adequately, letting it give an unintended testimony of itself but passing over all expressions of opinion.

Two of the English books are directly connected with the present war: "How the War Began," by the reporter of *The Daily Telegraph*, John Kennedy; and "Why We Are at War," by the six Oxford historians. The third, "Germany and England," by the late Professor J. A. Cramb, forms a counterpart to the two books of General F. von Bernhardi, published before the outbreak of the war, which aroused more discussion in the Anglo-Saxon world than in Germany. The American editions of these two books and "Imperial Germany," by Prince von Bülow, published in New York, 1914, and Professor Hugo Münsterberg's "The War and America," designed primarily to change the attitude of Americans, are the four works of German origin which Mr. Hayes discusses and to which he gives greatest prominence.

Hayes comments less favorably on the writings of the two English scholars, while he speaks with a good deal of appreciation of the German military strategist.

For Münsterberg had proceeded in a similar way as the ninety-three intellectuals, and, therefore, the American refutes courteously but not

less definitely this question dealt with in such a manner by calling the essay:

"So impressionistic and so replete with errors and misrepresentations—of which, by actual count, there are at least twenty-nine—that it is likely to do the German cause more harm than good."

But concerning Bernhardi, he writes:

"Bernhardi is positively charming. He writes exceedingly well—clearly, straightforwardly and frankly, as befits his soldierly calling. He knows a good deal of history, is usually logical, and possesses a large fund of common sense. Not only does he know thoroughly the modern science of warfare, but he knows how to write intelligibly for his lay readers. 'How Germany Makes War' is wholly devoted to the technic of his subject, and provides a useful key to the German strategy and methods in the present war. 'Germany and the Next War'—the first of the two books to appear in print, and the one that has aroused the chief discussion—is at once a frank exposition of the doctrine that might makes right and an earnest plea for the shaping of all German institutions, political, social, economic, ecclesiastical, and educational, so as to secure for the German nation the utmost might. It is difficult, after reading Bülow's book, to perceive why Bernhardi should not be taken seriously in Germany."

This refers to the fact that German-Americans defending the German cause have repeatedly assured the American public that Bernhardi's writings were "not taken seriously in Germany." The frank statements of this General, of course, could not correspond to the manner of representation by which they intended to win over the anti-militaristic Americans, and which had been worked out according to the principle to deny even the most self-evident if it seemed unfavorable. But Prince von Bülow's book equally does not harmonize with that kind of white-washing.

Too frequently the predecessor of Bethmann-Hollweg had conducted foreign politics according to the taste of Bernhardi, and he was experienced enough as to know what could be presented to people capable to judge for themselves without making oneself ridiculous.

He does not therefore attempt to depict Germany as the innocent being which would avoid any friction under any circumstances. Mr. Hayes, therefore, continues: "A sincere and logical apostle of Bülow would normally be a Bernhardi. And it might be added—this is now the main point—a Bernhardi would normally produce a whole crop of Bülows. If *Bernhardi is not taken seriously in Germany*, it must be for some personal reason that escapes his American reader."

The American historian does not overlook the actual facts involved. His essay shows that he is at home in German history and historical literature, and capable of treating history intelligently; although, in

general, being rather concerned with explaining the interrelation and the working of political currents, Mr. Hayes does not omit equally to emphasize the economic background and the motives resulting therefrom.

He refers to the book of the English Social-Liberal, Mr. J. A. Hobson; *Imperialism*, "setting forth with a wealth of supporting facts the doctrine that the capitalists and manufacturers of industrial states are ever on the outlook for the acquisition by their governments of under-developed regions which may provide ready markets for surplus manufactures and furnish fields for the favorable investment of surplus capital."

If this doctrine is sound—and there appears little to disprove it in the history of the nineteenth century—it is but natural that the new industrial Germany not only should develop a world-trade but also should seek to establish colonies, and that it should find the best part of the colonial field embarrassingly pre-empted by older industrial states like Great Britain and France.

On this account the combination of nationalism and militarism, the historical product of the method by which the German Empire has been built up, had received a new emphasis—according to Mr. Hayes—a plant whose wondrously luxuriant growth for forty odd years has culminated in the poisonous fruitage of the present war.

The professor admits, however, that in consequence of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine after 1871 in the mutual competition between Germany and France, also from the French side a cause for setting a new pace in the race of armaments had been given and the Oxford Apology affords clear proof that it was the French "Boulanger Law" of 1886 which had brought it about.

But in the main Mr. Hayes declares that the character of French militarism was strictly defensive against the threat of German militarism which was inconsistent with a truly liberal form of government—a remark which is quite natural for a citizen of the United States.

It must, however, be admitted that it is those very German authors who furnished the incentive for such remarks. This even Prince Bülow emphasizes in his boast that Prussia attained her greatness as a country of soldiers and officials, and as such she was able to accomplish the work of German union and this she still is to this day. "In the German view," says Professor Münsterberg, "the state is not for the individuals, but the individuals for the state," and he, as well as Bülow and, of course, Bernhardi, consider the German people incapable of mastering their political destiny. Against this diminution of German intelligence the American author advances the particular historical conditions which prevented a unification of German unity on a democratic basis. He seems to have been greatly surprised that even Prince Bülow should express himself as

so strongly opposed to the parliamentary form of Government. In view of Prince Bülow's present political position it is not uninteresting to learn what views about the Social-Democrats he has expressed in his book:

"The Social Democratic movement is the antithesis of the Prussian State."

With its present program and aims it cannot be placed on the same level as those parties which take their stand on the existing political system, and a decrease in their votes had to be attained, which "under suitable guidance" would not be impossible. But let us hear Bülow. "For the Social-Democratic movement does not only threaten the existence of one party or another; it is a danger to the country and the monarchy. This danger must be faced and met with a great and comprehensive national policy, under the strong guidance of clear-sighted and courageous governments which, whether amicably or by fighting, can make the parties bow to the might of the national idea."

Mr. Hayes adds to this quotation the following remark: "Imagine like language from a twentieth-century Englishman who had been prime minister of his country for nine years!"

But Mr. Hayes finds more in Bülow's book; he quotes from it a pronouncement of nationalistic politics: "It is not the duty of the government in the present time to concede new rights to Parliament, but to rouse the political interest of all classes of the nation by means of a vigorous and determined national policy, great in its aims and energetic in the means it employs."

Not ineffectively Hayes contrasts Bülow's friendship for Russia with the pathetic anti-Russianism of the German intellectuals which, however, with the most of them to-day belongs to the past.

"*Not even the 'Slavic Peril' ruffles Bülow.* He implies that the German tariff law of 1902, which imposed heavy duties on the importation of agricultural products from Russia, increased the economic rivalry between Russian and Prussian farmers—possibly an economic interpretation of the 'Slavic Peril'—but he is strongly of opinion that no real enmity can exist between the governments of two such splendidly conservative states as Russia and Germany. In view of the calm attitude of a distinguished man like Prince von Bülow, it is well-nigh mirth-provoking to read Professor Münsterberg's plea to the American people to believe that Germany had 'to trust in her sword and in her prayer,' unless the 'half-cultured Tartars' and 'the Cossacks with their pogroms were to crush' civilization (pages 9, 30, 98). In fact, Bülow maintains that at least to Asia 'Russia is justified as a bearer of higher civilization.'" One sees how little home-made catch words impress foreigners who know something.

Then Mr. Hayes proceeds to depict from Bülow's book how the predecessor of Bethmann-Hollweg glories in the Agadir incident and claims

that it was himself who inspired the Kaiser "to make that melodramatic entry into the Moroccan question."

He describes him as exulting in the Austrian Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and boasting that German threats of war sufficed to "secure Russian acquiescence in that high-handed violation of the Treaty of Berlin." He sees Bülow taking pride in the German "world policy" of recent times and remaining remarkably oblivious of the danger of German international isolation, as discounting the strength of the Triple Entente and insisting that self interest will cause Italy to fight in the next war on the side of Germany and Austria.

Hayes says verbally:

"From what we now know of the diplomatic developments in July, 1914, it would seem as though Bethmann-Hollweg was a most literal disciple, as well as official successor, of Prince von Bülow." Apparently not a very favorable circumstance in his opinion.

When dealing with the history of the changes in the groupings of the European Powers since Bismarck's retirement, Hayes makes some very characteristic remarks concerning England's departure from her traditional policy of "splendid isolation" and the establishment of the *entente cordiale* between England and France. Our German authors, he says, generally assign the credit—or the debit—for this change to Edward VII. But this he considers entirely mistaken.

"But that is quite as far-fetched as the conviction in the minds of many ill-informed persons that the present war was caused by William II. No one individual made the war; nor did any one individual fashion the *entente cordiale*. Edward VII was undoubtedly fond of Paris, and Frenchmen liked Edward VII. But the British Government under whose auspices the *entente* was consummated and likewise the Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed, was a Unionist government, a government that particularly represented the British imperialists—Joseph Chamberlain, Rudyard Kipling, Cecil Rhodes, and even our Professor Cramb—a government that prosecuted the Boer War and that was morbidly aware of the significance of German competition in industry, commerce, navy, and colonies. It was in the very nature of things that the governing class of Britain should discuss with France possible future action against the common enemy."

The mutual distrust had increased, especially on account of the increase of the German navy since von Tirpitz's appointment and since the foundation of the Navy League, with the proclamations of Emperor William II.—"The trident must be in Michel's hand," etc. "Neither the fair words of conspicuous members of the Liberal government of Great Britain since 1906 nor the laudatory policy of the German government in sending such conciliatory diplomats to London as Marschall von Bieberstein or Prince

Lichnowsky proved antidotal to the sentiment of nationalism when applied practically to militarism on the seas and to imperialism beyond the seas."

"If there be one man who deserves special mention for the newer diplomatic developments, it is not, however, an Englishman but a Frenchman, *the persevering, tactful Delcassé*. *It is surprising to find no reference to him in the British apologies, and only fugitive mention in the German works.* Yet he appears on the diplomatic stage of the last fifteen years as a veritable Nemesis of Bismarck, taking nice advantage of changed circumstances to effect an isolation of Germany almost as complete as the isolation to which Bismarck formerly condemned France.

"*Remaining ever a staunch advocate of the Dual Alliance, Delcassé participated in the negotiations that removed the Fashoda incident of 1898 from the field of national conflict between France and Great Britain and signed the various conventions of 1904 which settled all outstanding colonial disputes between the two powers.* With consummate statesmanship he weathered the storm and stress of 1904-5, when the war between Russia, the ally of France, and Japan, the ally of Great Britain, threatened the recently inaugurated *entente*. And the comparatively lenient terms of peace imposed upon Russia by Japan were due quite as much to M. Delcassé as to Mr. Roosevelt.

In a similar way the Triple Entente had been made possible, which, however, was not the only object dear to the heart of Delcassé. "To weaken the Triple Alliance by means of improving the relations between Italy and France became his secondary purpose, with such successful issue as appears in the present war."

"*Naturally the new diplomatic situation caused apprehension in Germany.* It was no longer a question merely of defending East Prussia and Alsace-Lorraine; it was a question of world power," and thus it is precisely Bernhardi who has drawn the logical conclusions from the spirit of the majority of the Germans who with increasingly popular support accorded to the army bills of 1912 and 1913.

There is no need for commenting on these statements. Even who dissents in essential points will have to admit that it contains as much impartiality as may be fairly expected from an historian. It is slightly colored but it does not distort facts. At the end of his article Hayes, in turning over towards the discussion of political history and philosophy, states that both in English and German books there is an inadmittable application of the biological theories of evolution as to sociological problems, which in Germany is supplemented by that extraordinary cult of the State as taught by historians like Treitschke. In exposing the influence of Treitschke upon the intellectual class of modern Germany Hayes agrees with the Oxford historians who have treated the subject in a special chapter. When one sees how Bernhardi constantly quotes Treitschke,

how Bülow starts out with a quotation from Treitschke and Münsterberg also holds fast to the faith of Treitschke, one understands how it is that the British and Americans should consider the German mind controlled by the doctrines of Treitschke; and so far as the middle classes are concerned it is true that Treitschke's influence has not been small.

The Oxford historians may, however, according to Hayes, be accused of one important fact, i.e., that they altogether leave out of consideration the parallel thoughts which may be found in Great Britain and France. The exaggerations as to the world mission of one's own nation is "not a peculiarity of Germans." In the volume by the late Professor *Cramb* the intellectual atmosphere of Germany is presented as one in which the doctrines of Bernhardi found expression. With the exception of a few exaggerations it is a creditable presentation of his views.

"But the amazing thing about Professor Cramb is that he makes no attempt to combat these ideas or to maintain that any other ideas should find lodgment in England." This English scholar proves to be a nationalist of nationalists, a militarist of militarists, an imperialist of imperialists. The late Tory-statesman, Lord Salisbury, is his ideal, and he bewails among liberals now in office in Great Britain "the defect of even second rate statesmen." "The friendship of nations," according to Cramb, is "*an empty name; peace is at best a truce on the battlefield of Time; the old myth or the old history of the struggle for existence is behind us, but the struggle for power—who is to assign bounds to its empire, or invent an instrument for measuring its intensity?*"

"If the German Bernhardi is the mufti of the Religion of Valor," says Hayes, "the Englishman Cramb is its dervish. It is Cramb, not Bernhardi, who rises to mystical heights." Verbally Cramb writes:

"In war and the right of war man has a possession which he values above religion, above industry and above social comforts; in war man values the power which it affords to life of rising above life, the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue the Ideal. In all life at its height, in thought, art and action, there is a tendency to become transcendental; and if we examine the wars of England or of Germany in the past we find governing these wars throughout this higher power of heroism, or of something, at least, which transcends reason."

To which Hayes, in concluding his essay, remarks:

"Transcends reason! This is real obscurantism with a vengeance. This is the truest reason for the War of the Nations, something that 'transcends reason.' Until such pseudo-scientific obscurantism be dispelled from the minds of the so-called intellectual classes of all the nations, the end of war is not in sight."

* * *

Whereas the name of this scholar who thus criticizes the English and the Germans betrays his British descent it sounds different from the pen of an American Journalist whose name is of German descent. I have in mind an essay by the lawyer James M. Beck, of New York, which has been spread in more than one million copies over England and America and also has been translated into various foreign languages. It cannot be overlooked as the author is a leader of the New York bar—he was assistant Attorney-General of the United States. Beck is of German descent, his family being from Thüringen, and shortly before the outbreak of the war he was in Germany to visit the places where his ancestors had lived. He might be expected, therefore, to be prejudiced in favor of Germany and, indeed, as far as the German people are concerned, he shows strong sympathies with them. Nobody could possibly more highly esteem the German achievements in science, art and industry and hold heartier feelings than he does. Entirely different, however, is his judgment of Germany's responsibility for the present war.

Mr. Beck calls his essay "In the Supreme Court of Civilization." He assumes that "in this year of disgrace" there exist a supreme court of civilization and a recognized international morality which looks upon war as a crime against civilization. Which of the two contending powers would be held responsible for the "crime of the present war" by such a court? He further supposes that the respective governments with their White books, Blue books, etc., had submitted their evidence, and analyzes this from a lawyer's viewpoint, and states what would be the judgment of the court of civilization in "the case of Dual Alliance vs. Triple Entente." This is his decision:

"These are *the facts* as shown by the record, and upon them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following judgment:

"1. That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

"2. That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.

"3. That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.

"4. That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.

"5. That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war."

A critical investigation of the methods by which Mr. Beck comes to this categorical statement cannot be made here; it is unnecessary to do so, because we do not, of course, quote this judgment as a proof but simply as a symptom worth our attention, representing as it does the opinions of American citizens of German descent, of which Mr. Beck is a typical representative, as distinct from Americans of Anglo-Saxon origin. It may also be pointed out that Mr. Beck, as a lawyer, essentially sticks to the *formal* side of the question involved, by which method a final judgment in political matters cannot be obtained. It must be admitted that this "justice of civilization" in the case of Austria also mentions its material complaints against Serbia and in order to avoid detailed investigation simply accepts them as proved. He entirely ignores the conflict of interests existing between Austria-Hungary and Germany on one side and Russia on the other, concerning the Balkans and Asia Minor. To the reader of his publication the procedure of the two first-mentioned nations must therefore appear not only legally unjustified but absolutely senseless. Germany's action against Belgium and the Belgians he condemns with the greatest rigor which, however, is easily explainable by the fact that he is a citizen of the United States. This procedure to him is "simply Borgiaism amplified ten thousandfold by the mechanical resources of modern war."

On that issue the supreme court of civilization could have no ground for doubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be "speedy and inexorable."

The conclusions of Mr. Beck, which I can only give in part, are some sort of a prophecy:

"The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more he admires the magnificent courage with which the German nation, beset on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as a

nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any considerations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the German nation has been plunged into this abyss. . . .

"In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should therefore distinguish between the military caste, which precipitated this great calamity, and the German people. . . .

"War is not merely 'a crime against civilization,' *but also against the deceived and misled German people.*"

But—and this is Mr. Beck's prediction:

"One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble and peace-loving nation into this abyss of disaster."

This implies a little more than we are able to admit at present. But even though a just judgment of the spiritual disposition of the German people is not to be expected from a native citizen of the United States, his prediction nevertheless is interesting in one respect, viz.: in so far as it enables us to draw a conclusion as to the sentiment of the rest of that class of Americans to which Mr. Beck belongs. Like Mr. Church, he belongs to the wealthy *bourgeoisie* and in spite of this he does not hesitate to look for revolutionary outbreaks for vengeance, which in this case, however, would be a radicalism not imperilous to its adherents and far off in the future, but nevertheless a radicalism which reflects the mind of a community which owes its existence to a revolution fought in the name of the proclamation of the rights of men.

Far more restricted is the verdict of guilty or unguilty, or more or less guilty, of the war of the Americans belonging to societies working for international disarmament, extension of international law and arbitration, etc. They dislike to see expressions of partial opinion interfering with the possibility of the United States acting as peace mediator. They are concerned with investigating what institutions, general tendencies and conceptions of law may have caused the war rather than with investigating the actions of the various governments or with determining questions of guilt. One of the most prominent representatives of this type of Americans is President Nicholas Murray *Butler*, of Columbia University. He, too, has repeatedly expressed his views about the war in the *New York Times* and they have also been published in pamphlets. In one of his articles, published in the *New York Times* of October 18, 1914, we find right at the beginning these sentences: "If such reserve is necessary in my case it seems to me that it also is necessary for the country as a whole. The attitude of the President has been impeccable. That of the whole American press and people should be the same. . . . Even the free expression of

views criticizing particular details of the war, which might in fact, deserve criticism, might destroy one's chance of future possible usefulness. A statement which might be unquestionably true may also be remembered to the damage of some important cause later on."

What decided him to give this advice apparently was the desire to see the United States act as peace mediators as soon and as effectively as possible. In his pamphlet entitled "The United States of Europe" he tries to show that the war might finally lead to the formation of a "Federation of the Nations of Europe." The objection that the formation of such federation would be impossible on account of racial differences is dispelled by the experiences of the United States, where Celts and Germans, Latins and Slavs live together in peace.

"The Old World antagonisms," we read, "have become memories. This proves that such antagonisms are not mysterious attributes of geography or climate, but that they are the outgrowth principally of social and political conditions. . . .

"Under the influence of the free institutions of the United States, where no nationality is suppressed, the hyphen tends to disappear from American terminology. The German-American, the Italo-American, the Irish-American all become Americans. . . . There is in this a lesson which may well be taken seriously to heart by the leaders of opinion in Europe when this war ends."

The hope, however, that this will be done is not too great. At present we rather see that many are trying to transfer the racial and other differences from the Old World to America in the interests of certain political groups. President Butler hopes that Europe will grow wise in the school of experience. The losses which Europe is suffering on account of the war will lead to a realization of the advantage of substituting for alliances of separate groups of nations a Federation of the United States of Europe.

"The cataclysm is so awful that it is quite within the bounds of truth to say that on July 31st the curtain went down upon a world which never will be seen again.

"This conflict is the birth-throe of a new European order of things."

This war will prove to be "the most effective education of 500,000,000 people which could possibly have been thought of, although it is the most costly and most terrible means which could have been chosen." Step by step the unification of Europe will be accomplished by the development of a new international law. There is the probability of some dislocation of territory and some shiftings of sovereignty after the war ends, but these will be of comparatively minor importance.

"Dislocation of territory and the shifting of sovereigns as the result of international disagreements are mediæval practices. After this war

the world will want to solve its problems in terms of the future, not in those of the outgrown past." •

"Conventional diplomacy and conventional statesmanship have very evidently broken down in Europe. . . . A new type of international statesman is certain to arise, who will have a grasp of new tendencies, a new outlook upon life." The realization of the interdependence of the nations will educate the people to feel internationally, a thought developed by President Butler already in 1912 in his interesting book, "The International Mind," and now summarized in the categorical imperative "Learn to Think Internationally."

All these are excellent thoughts, whose realization can be desired and must be promoted. We cannot deny, however, that the American apparently underestimates the obstacles which exist in our old Europe, with its many historical traditions and deeprooted prejudices. We fear that among the average Germans there are but few who would subscribe to the following sentences of President Butler: "The nation whose frontier bristles with bayonets and with forts is like the individual with a magazine pistol in his pocket. Both make for murder. Both in their hearts really mean murder. The world will be better when the nations invite the judgment of their neighbors and are influenced by it. . . .

"One of the controlling principles of a democratic State is that its military and naval establishments must be *completely subservient to the civil power.*"

The attitude of President Butler is expressed in his belief that the belligerent nations of Europe wanted to convince the United States of the righteousness of their cause because of their conviction that "we are the possessors of sound political ideas." Europe has realized that the United States exercise a great moral force in the World which among other things has been increased because the United States have repealed the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption Act in June, 1913. "Who would have cared for our opinion," he asks, "in the matter of a treaty violation if, for mere financial interest or from sheer vanity, we ourselves had violated a solemn treaty?"

Five months of observation will have taught the President of Columbia University a different lesson. European thought to-day is controlled by "Real-Politik" above everything else, and whether a nation has acted morally or immorally as long as she has served her interests is not a matter of consideration. It can only affect us melancholically that Butler concludes:

"When Congress repealed the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption Act it marked an epoch in the history of the United States. This did more than the Spanish war, than the building of the Panama Canal, or than anything else I can think of, to make us a true world power.

"As a nation we have kept our word when sorely tempted to break it. We made Cuba independent, we have not exploited the Philippines, we have stood by our word as to Panama Canal tolls.

"In consequence we are the first moral power in the world to-day. Others may be first with armies, still others first with navies. But we have made good our right to be appealed to on questions of national and international morality. That Europe is seeking our favor is the acknowledgment of this fact by the European nations and their tribute to it."

In a world in which foreign politics and moral interests are superseded by interests of power this is certainly true, and happy the nation which can show such a record. One would also wish that another word of President Butler will remain true. In a second pamphlet "The Preparedness of America," published in December, 1914, Butler opposes the movement which demands that the United States prepare in view of the possibility of becoming involved in the European war. He writes:

"Our type of true defence is the undefended boundary line between the United States and Canada and not a heavily fortified and blood-stained line like that running from Belfort to Liege."

The main agitator for the preparedness of the United States is ex-President Theodore Roosevelt. In his recent articles published by Murray in London under the title "America and the World War" Roosevelt even demands an aggressive action on the part of the United States in order to fight for the sanctity of treaties defied by the Central powers. Two quotations from his book characterize his attitude:

"The kind of Neutrality which seeks to preserve 'peace' by timidly refusing to live up to our plighted word and to denounce and take action against such wrong as that committed in the case of Belgium is unworthy of an honorable and powerful people. . . . Peace is ardently to be desired but only as the handmaid of righteousness; the only peace of permanent value is the peace of righteousness. There can be no such peace until well-behaved, highly civilized small nations are protected from oppression, subjugation," and somewhere else he says:

"From the international standpoint the essential thing to do is effectively to put the combined power of civilization back of the collective purpose of civilization—to secure justice. This can be achieved only by a World League for the peace of righteousness which would guarantee to enforce by the combined strength of all the nations the decrees of a competent and impartial court against any recalcitrant and offending nation. Only in this way will treaties become serious documents."

The writings of Beck and Church prove that the ambitious Mr. Roosevelt, always inclined to all sorts of adventure, meets very cleverly a special part of American sentiment which to-day is very strong. This ought to impress all those of us who disagree with the attitude of strict neutrality,

as maintained by President Wilson, who constantly is attacked by Roosevelt. Butler, on the other hand, shows that armaments would not only be deplorable but that they would mean the certainty of national disaster. They are unnecessary, he says, for not one of the belligerents will be able to attack any other country for a generation if it wanted to:

"The European nations that had on so elaborate a scale prepared for war have gotten exactly what they prepared for, with the result that they are impoverishing themselves and wrecking their several civilizations for centuries to come, while no two of them can agree as to what the war is about, or what is at stake or what caused it."

The United States have no reason to follow the footsteps of Europe but every reason not to enter upon the competition in armaments. When we "begin to measure our strength in terms of military and naval units against the military equipment of the nations of Europe, we have entered upon the fatal path of militarism." And this he considers the great danger which must be avoided. It must not be forgotten that militarism has its origin in a state of mind and that in reality it is a state of mind. Shall we never learn the full meaning of Lowell's fine line and cease trying to

"Attempt the Future's portal with the Past's blood-rusted key?"

an advice which to a far higher degree should be followed by non-Americans!

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION


Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION

BY

JOHN BASSETT MOORE

An Address Delivered Before the Twenty-first Annual Lake Mohonk Conference



THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW

BY

ELIHU ROOT

An Address Delivered Before the Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law

MARCH, 1916

No. 100

American Association for International Conciliation

Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)

New York City

1916

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

It is the aim of the Association to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on page 30.

INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION

The Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration assembles this year in the midst of the greatest catastrophe that has befallen the world since the close of the Napoleonic Wars a hundred years ago. This unfortunate situation inculcates the importance of facing candidly the realities of life and the grave problems which they involve. The tendency of the human mind, running in advance of results, to treat as an accomplished fact that which it desires to bring about, may often exert in the affairs of life a useful and helpful influence; but when, following the "illusions of hope," it bids us close our eyes to actual conditions and to rely in comfortable security upon safeguards that either do not exist or are so defective as to be practically non-existent, it may become a peril as well as a hindrance to wise and essential effort.

We do not meet today for the purpose of discussing the rights or the wrongs of the present appalling conflict. It is upon us, and nothing that we can say can allay or retard it. But, apart from the merits of the cause of any particular belligerent, it does teach us the necessity of something in the direction of international coöperation more far-reaching than has heretofore been tried, if the part which war has played in international affairs is to be appreciably diminished. I say international coöperation; for, after all is said and done, there is no device by which peace can be preserved unless nations coöperate in mak-

ing it effective. Sixteen years ago, when the nations agreed to the establishment of the permanent Court at The Hague, it seemed to many that the millennium had come; and they certainly were justified in thinking that a great step forward had been taken. Gradually the whole world was brought into the arrangement; but, with the lapse of time, it became apparent that, although a "world court" had been established, the spirit of coöperation was lacking to make it thoroughly effective. Wars broke out without resort to it and when it was sought to render the resort obligatory, nations were found to be indisposed to bind themselves to submit questions of serious importance, such as were likely to produce a conflict.

In view of the abundant, constant warnings which history furnishes against relying upon any one device for the prevention of war, I propose today to make a general survey of the international situation with a view to ascertain the fundamental conditions with which, in our efforts after peace, we are obliged to deal, and the nature of the measures which we must devise in order to meet them.

The record of man on earth, as we know it, relates to the activities of various tribes, peoples and nations, and, until a comparatively recent time, is concerned chiefly with their wars one with another. During the past two hundred years a marked development had taken place in the conception of nationality. International law, since it came into systematic existence, has assumed as its foundation the principle of the independence and equality of nations. This principle, as expounded by Grotius and his followers, represented a progressive and enlightened sentiment, which was intended to assure, even to the feeblest member of the family of nations the preserva-

tion of its rights. As the great Swiss publicist, Vattel, eloquently declared: "Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom." Or, to employ the graphic phrase of our own John Marshall: "Russia and Geneva have equal rights."

But, with the principle of independence and equality, there was associated another principle antagonistic and potentially fatal to it. This was the principle that every independent nation had the right to declare war, for any cause deemed by it to be sufficient; and that, having declared war, it immediately acquired all the rights pertaining to that condition, including the right of conquest, under which the strongest power, even though it were the aggressor, might lawfully proceed to destroy or absorb its adversary.

It was for the purpose, among others, of limiting the exercise of this right and of maintaining the independence of nations, that the European Concert, so often superficially criticized, came into being. This Concert, however, never undertook to place any theoretical limitation upon the rights of war. It represented merely a union of nations, and incidentally of their forces, to the end that the balance of power in the existing system should not be unduly disturbed. At the present day, the world is groping about for something beyond this, for a measure more radical, which will establish a reign of law among nations similar to that which exists within each individual state.

It is evident that the first condition of the establishment of such an international system is the regulation of the conception of nationality. Exaggerated to the point

where it either subordinates human rights to supposed national interests, or regards the interests of humanity as being capable of realization only through a particular national agency, there can be no doubt that this conception directly incites to the transgression of the bounds of law and of justice. This tendency, often aggravated by confused declamatory, transcendentalist teachings evolved from the emotions rather than from the observation of existing facts, has not been confined to any one nation or to any particular age. It has nowhere been more strongly manifested than among the ancient Hebrews, who, regarding themselves as the "chosen people of God," conceived themselves to be merely the instrument of the Almighty in obliterating their enemies. It was in the 137th Psalm, in the phrase "Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones," that Grotius found an unquestionable proof that the right of war permitted the slaughter of women and infants with impunity. Nor can it be denied that, in a milder form, the doctrine of the "manifest destiny" of certain nations to extend their boundaries, by force if necessary, is tinted with the same thought.

Nevertheless, when we come to analyze the conception of nationality, as expounded by philosophers, we find that its principal ingredients are largely imaginary. We have often been told, in phraseology supposed to be highly scientific, that the "nation" is an ethnographic unity within a geographic unity, or words to that effect. Except in remote, restricted areas, inhabited by savage tribes, this combination of conditions can scarcely be said fully to exist. It is found least of all in some of the most enlightened and most progressive countries of today, such as Switzerland; and with the constant movements

of population resulting from improved means of transportation, is less and less likely to continue anywhere as a stationary condition. Tried by such a theory, or definition, what should be said of our own United States, with its admixture of races from all quarters of the globe? And as for the element of geographic unity, it suffices to say that the applications of steam and of electricity have rendered it an anachronism.

Assuming, then, that our goal is the establishment among nations of a reign of law, in such sense that each nation is subject to the law, the fundamental object which it is essential to accomplish is to limit the present unrestricted right of the individual nation to declare war and incidentally to acquire the right of conquest. This object would be attained by establishing the principle that a nation before declaring war upon another must submit its grievance to the judgment of its associated nations, and that without such submission it should not be regarded as acquiring the right of conquest.

In this relation it is interesting to refer to one of the transactions of the First International American Conference, which was held in Washington in 1889-1890. On April 18, 1890, the committee on general welfare, acting upon a motion submitted by the Argentine Republic and Brazil, recommended the adoption of resolutions declaring that the principle of conquest should not thereafter be recognized as admissible under American public law; that in the future cessions of territory should be void if made under threats of war or in the presence of an armed force; that a nation from which such cessions should be exacted might always demand that the question of their validity be submitted to arbitration; and that any renunciation of the right to have recourse to arbitration

should be null and void under all circumstances. This report was subsequently taken up in connection with the project of an arbitration adopted by the Conference. By this project all questions were to be submitted to arbitration except that of national independence, and even in this case arbitration was declared to be obligatory upon the adversary power. Combining this project of a treaty with the proposed abolition of the right of conquest, Mr. Blaine presented a plan upon which the Conference unanimously agreed, with the exception of one delegation that abstained from voting. Under this plan it was agreed that the principle of conquest should not, during the continuance of the treaty of arbitration, be recognized as admissible under American public law.

It may be doubted whether the far-reaching significance of the plan thus outlined was at the time fully grasped. The plan was in reality in advance of the times. It was not ratified by the governments concerned, and never became effective. But it clearly presented the fundamental principle upon which nations must unite if they would place their relations upon a thoroughly legal basis.

Far more difficult than the statement of the object to be attained is the formulation and application of measures to carry it into effect. Here again it is of the first importance to grasp in its details the problem with which we are dealing. During the past ten years we have, for instance, often been assured that what the world needs is an arbitration tribunal and an "international police" to enforce its awards. This statement seems to disclose both a misconception of fact and an incomplete grasp of conditions. The misconception of fact is the supposition that the evil from which the world today suffers is

the disregard of arbitral awards. In reality, arbitral awards have been remarkably well observed, in spite of the indulgence now and then lately shown to the vicious notion, by which the domestic administration of justice is so much enfeebled and impaired, that every sentence of a judicial tribunal ought to be subject to some kind of an appeal. The actual problem with which the world is confronted is how to induce nations to accept not the results but the process of arbitration.

The proposal for an "international police" requires a more extended examination. As originally advanced, it seems to have contemplated the maintenance by a certain number of the larger powers of an international force for the purpose of correcting or restraining the misconduct of smaller or weaker states. Even in this restricted form it involves certain assumptions the correctness of which is by no means self-evident; for, while the possession of physical strength is by no means an invariable proof of virtue or of disinterested devotion to the cause of justice, it is also true that some of the finest examples of national rectitude and enlightenment are to be found in the conduct of the smaller states.

When so expanded as to embrace all nations, the underlying idea of an international police appears to be that of a force to compel all states, without regard to their strength or weakness, to observe international law; and, when so extended, the proposal is at once seen to be closely connected with the question of the limitation, or of the development, as the case may be, of national armaments. How large a force, it may be asked, would have to be maintained in order effectually to hold in check any of the great powers of Europe, if their national armaments were continued on the scale of the past twenty-five

years? History tells us that the force of a great united nation is exceedingly difficult to overcome. Without recurring to earlier examples, it suffices to point to the fact that for almost twenty-three years preceding the close of the Napoleonic Wars, France fought and at times seemed to vanquish the vast European combination formed against her, and yet in the end emerged from the contest with her boundaries little diminished. It is manifest that an international force, organized to assure the preservation of peace, would have to be, as against any individual national organization, far stronger, in numbers and in equipment, than anything we are accustomed to think of under the term "police." It would need to be practically overwhelming, unless it were merely to have the effect of the great armaments of Europe today in involving in hostilities a larger number of men and making armed conflict more bloody and more costly. And it is equally manifest that, unless national armaments were greatly reduced, a proportionate contribution to such an international force would require on the part of the United States a development of its military resources far beyond that which has usually been contemplated. I mention this not as an argument but only as a fact.

These considerations are equally important and vital, whether the force which it is proposed to employ is to be in a strict sense international, or whether it is to be composed of the forces of united nations, combined for the attainment of a common end. In the present state of the world, the latter conception would appear to be simpler and more immediately practicable. But, viewed in either aspect, continuous union and coöperation would be the first and essential requisite of the success of the plan.

The fact cannot be too often or too strongly stated that, for the preservation of order, national or international, we cannot rely upon force alone. Force is not an end; it is merely the means to an end. Situations often arise in which the resort to forcible measures tends to provoke conflict rather than to prevent it. Economic pressure may in many instances be far more efficacious than attempts at direct coercion; nor are proofs wanting that forbearance may sometimes be more effective than either, even leading to the eventual acceptance of wise solutions which were in the heat of controversy rejected. We must not forget that, back of all effort, moral or physical, lie the feelings, the sentiments, the aspirations of humanity; and it is only by the organization of forces, moral and physical, in such manner as to assure justice and contentment through coöperation, that widespread outbreaks of violence can be avoided.

In order to attain this end, it would be necessary to provide for the employment of three different kinds of agencies, which may be designated by the titles Arbitration, Conciliation, Legislation. We may briefly consider them in this order.

1. *Arbitration*.—This represents the judicial process. As defined in The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, "international arbitration has for its object the settlement of differences between states by judges of their own choice, on the basis of respect for law." With the object of facilitating the "immediate recourse" to this process, the convention provided for the establishment of a "Permanent Court of Arbitration, accessible at all times" and proceeding in accordance with definite rules. This court was duly organized. It is still in existence. It has dealt with a

number of cases, some of which were important, and its decisions have been carried into effect. Proposals have been made for its improvement or alteration, as well as for the establishment of another or additional tribunal differently constituted. Into the discussion of these proposals it is not my purpose now to enter. Some criticisms of the present court have, as in the case of its decision upon the preferential claim of the blockading powers in Venezuela, disclosed a defective appreciation either of the law and the facts or of the proper functions of a judicial tribunal. But, speaking for myself individually, I would support any measure that tended to render the resort to international arbitration easier, more general, and more efficacious.

2. *Conciliation.*—The fact is generally admitted that for the preservation of peace and order judicial methods will not alone suffice. Even though it be demonstrable that international arbitration may be carried, because it has been carried, far beyond the limits set in some of our general treaties of arbitration, it is nevertheless true that the judicial process is not adequate to all the needs of international life. It often happens that differences can be effectually adjusted only by the removal of their causes, and this may require the exercise of a power and discretion beyond the application of existing rules. The exercise of such a power would properly be vested in a tribunal of conciliation.

Under the supervision of such a body there could be carried on the process of investigation which is properly entrusted to joint commissions, and which may be essential to the success of arbitration as well as of conciliation. With this object in view, provision was made in The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-

national Disputes for mediation and for international commissions of inquiry. Investigation by means of joint commissions formed a conspicuous part of the unratified treaties concluded by the United States in 1911 with France and Great Britain. It also forms the chief means provided for in the so-called peace pacts concluded during the past two years between the United States and various powers; for, although these agreements have often been criticized as unlimited treaties of arbitration, they do not in fact provide for arbitration at all, but merely require an investigation and report, and expressly reserve to the contracting parties, when the report shall have been received, full liberty of action.

The defect in all measures for investigation and report is one which it is difficult to meet by a prior formal agreement. This is the case of a continuing injury which one nation may seek to inflict upon another, an injury of such a nature that human interests or human feelings are not likely to tolerate its continuous imposition for a continuous space of time. Such a situation might have to be met by a *modus vivendi*, and the attempt to employ such an expedient would again bring us face to face with the fact that, without the spirit of coöperation and the willingness to observe the limitations of law and justice, the use of force cannot be avoided.

3. *Legislation.*—In the formation of an international organization, provision for the definition and improvement of the rules of international intercourse would form an important and essential part. A step in this direction was taken in the Peace Conference at The Hague, but it fell far short of what is necessary to make the legislative process effective. This is particularly the case in respect of the power to enact rules of law. In The Hague Con-

ferences unanimity was necessary to the establishment of a rule binding on all the powers ; and even in the treaties relating to the conduct of war, it was provided that they should not be obligatory unless all the parties to the particular conflict had ratified them. It is probably true, that, if there were allowed to each independent state, as has heretofore been done, a single vote, a mere majority rule would be quite unacceptable. While I am not so much disturbed, as many persons seem to be, by the apprehension that small states would be found systematically to unite against larger states, yet the rule of a mere numerical majority of nations would necessarily meet with strong opposition. The requirement of unanimity must, however, be done away with before an international law-making power can be effectually established, and there should be no difficulty in abolishing it, when the principle, so essential to international organization, is once accepted, that no nation is so high or so powerful as to be above the law.

THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW

OPENING ADDRESS BY ELIHU ROOT AS PRESIDENT OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE
NINTH ANNUAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON, DE-
CEMBER 28, 1915.

Gentlemen of the Society:

The incidents of the great war now raging affect so seriously the very foundations of international law that there is for the moment but little satisfaction to the student of that science in discussing specific rules. Whether or not Sir Edward Carson went too far in his recent assertion that the law of nations has been destroyed, it is manifest that the structure has been rudely shaken. The barriers that statesmen and jurists have been constructing laboriously for three centuries to limit and direct the conduct of nations toward each other, in conformity to the standards of modern civilization, have proved too weak to confine the tremendous forces liberated by a conflict which involves almost the whole military power of the world and in which the destinies of nearly every civilized state outside the American continents are directly at stake.

The war began by a denial on the part of a very great power that treaties are obligatory when it is no longer for the interest of either of the parties to observe them.

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The denial was followed by action supported by approximately one-half the military power of Europe and is apparently approved by a great number of learned students and teachers of international law, citizens of the countries supporting the view. This position is not an application of the doctrine *sic stantibus rebus* which justifies the termination of a treaty under circumstances not contemplated when the treaty was made so that it is no longer justly applicable to existing conditions. It is that under the very circumstances contemplated by the treaty and under the conditions for which the treaty was intended to provide the treaty is not obligatory as against the interest of the contracting party.

This situation naturally raises the question whether executory treaties will continue to be made if they are not to be binding, and requires consideration of a system of law under which no conventional obligations are recognized. The particular treaty which was thus set aside was declaratory of the general rule of international law respecting the inviolability of neutral territory; and the action which ignored the treaty also avowedly violated the rule of law; and the defense is that for such a violation of the law the present interest of a sovereign state is justification. It is plain that the application of such a principle to a matter of major importance at the beginning of a long conflict must inevitably be followed by the setting aside of other rules as they are found to interfere with interest or convenience; and that has been the case during the present war. Many of the rules of law which the world has regarded as most firmly established have been completely and continuously disregarded, in the conduct of war, in dealing with the property and lives of civilian non-combatants on land and

sea and in the treatment of neutrals. Alleged violations by one belligerent have been asserted to justify other violations by other belligerents. The art of war has been developed through the invention of new instruments of destruction and it is asserted that the changes of conditions thus produced make the old rules obsolete. It is not my purpose at this time to discuss the right or wrong of these declarations and actions. Such a discussion would be quite inadmissible on the part of the presiding officer of this meeting. I am stating things which, whether right or wrong, have unquestionably happened, as bearing upon the branch of jurisprudence to which this Society is devoted. It seems that if the violation of law justifies other violations, then the law is destroyed and there is no law; that if the discovery of new ways of doing a thing prohibited justifies the doing of it, then there is no law to prohibit. The basis of such assertions really is the view that if a substantial belligerent interest for the injury of the enemy come in conflict with a rule of law, the rule must stand aside and the interest must prevail. If that be so it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that for the present at all events in all matters which affect the existing struggle, international law is greatly impaired. Nor can we find much encouragement to believe in the binding force of any rules upon nations which observe other rules only so far as their interest at the time prompts them. Conditions are always changing and a system of rules which ceases to bind whenever conditions change should hardly be considered a system of law. It does not follow that nations can no longer discuss questions of right in their diplomatic intercourse, but upon such a basis it seems quite useless to appeal to the authority of rules already agreed upon as

just and right and their compelling effect because they have been already agreed upon.

When we recall Mansfield's familiar description of international law as "founded upon justice, equity, convenience, the reason of the thing, and confirmed by long usage," we may well ask ourselves whether that general acceptance which is necessary to the establishment of a rule of international law may be withdrawn by one or several nations and the rule be destroyed by that withdrawal so that the usage ceases and the whole subject to which it relates goes back to its original status as matter for new discussion as to what is just, equitable, convenient and reasonable.

When this war is ended, as it must be some time, and the foreign offices and judicial tribunals and publicists of the world resume the peaceable discussion of international rights and duties, they will certainly have to consider not merely what there is left of certain specific rules, but also the fundamental basis of obligation upon which all rules depend. The civilized world will have to determine whether what we call international law is to be continued as a mere code of etiquette or is to be a real body of laws imposing obligations much more definite and inevitable than they have been heretofore. It must be one thing or the other. Although foreign offices can still discuss what is fair and just and what is expedient and wise, they can not appeal to law for the decision of disputed questions unless the appeal rests upon an obligation to obey the law. What course will the nations follow?

Vague and uncertain as the future must be, there is some reason to think that after the terrible experience through which civilization is passing there will be a ten-

dency to strengthen rather than abandon the law of nations. Whatever the result may be, the world will have received a dreadful lesson of the evils of war. The sacrifice of millions of lives, millions homeless and in poverty, industry and commerce destroyed, overwhelming national debts,—all will naturally produce a strong desire to do something that will prevent the same thing happening again.

While the war has exhibited the inadequacy of international law, so far as it has yet developed, to curb those governmental policies which aim to extend power at all costs, it has shown even more clearly that little reliance can be placed upon unrestrained human nature, subject to specific temptation, to commit forcible aggression in the pursuit of power and wealth. It has shown that where questions of conduct are to be determined under no constraint except the circumstances of the particular case the acquired habits of civilization are weak as against the powerful, innate tendencies which survive from the countless centuries of man's struggle for existence against brutes and savage foes. The only means yet discovered by man to limit those tendencies consist in the establishment of law, the setting up of principles of action and definite rules of conduct which can not be violated by the individual without injury to himself. That is the method by which the wrongs naturally flowing from individual impulse within the state have been confined to narrow limits. That analogy, difficult as it is to maintain in view of the differences between the individual who is subject to sovereignty and the nation which is itself sovereign, indicates the only method to which human experience points to avoid repeating the present experience of these years of war consistently

with the independence of nations and the liberty of individuals. The Pax Romana was effective only because the world was subject to Rome. The Christian Church has been urging peace and good-will among men for nineteen centuries, and still there is this war. Concerts of Europe and alliances and ententes and skilful balances of power all lead ultimately to war. Conciliation, good-will, love of peace, human sympathy, are ineffective without institutions through which they can act. Only the possibility of establishing real restraint by law seems to remain to give effect to the undoubted will of the vast majority of mankind.

In the effort to arrange the affairs of the world so that they will not lead to another great catastrophe men will therefore turn naturally towards the re-establishment and strengthening of the law of nations. How can that be done? How can the restraints of law be made more effective upon nations?

It is not difficult to suggest some things which will tend in that direction.

Laws to be obeyed must have sanctions behind them; that is to say, violations of them must be followed by punishment. That punishment must be caused by power superior to the law breaker; it can not consist merely in the possibility of being defeated in a conflict with an enemy; otherwise there would be no law as between the strong and the weak. Many states have grown so great that there is no power capable of imposing punishment upon them except the power of collective civilization outside of the offending state. Any exercise of that power must be based upon public opinion. It can not rest merely upon written agreements or upon the accidental dictates of particular interests. It must proceed from

general, concurrent judgment and condemnation. When that exists punishment may be inflicted either by the direct action of governments, forcible or otherwise, or by the terrible consequences which come upon a nation that finds itself without respect or honor in the world and deprived of the confidence and good-will necessary to the maintenance of intercourse. Without such an opinion behind it no punishment of any kind can be imposed for the violation of international law.

For the formation of such a general opinion, however, questions of national conduct must be reduced to simple and definite form. Occasionally there is an act the character of which is so clear that mankind forms a judgment upon it readily and promptly, but in most cases it is easy for the wrongdoer to becloud the issue by assertion and argument and to raise a complicated and obscure controversy which confuses the judgment of the world. There is but one way to make general judgment possible in such cases. That is by bringing them to the decision of a competent court which will strip away the irrelevant, reject the false, and declare what the law requires or prohibits in the particular case. Such a court of international justice with a general obligation to submit all justiciable questions to its jurisdiction and to abide by its judgment is a primary requisite to any real restraint of law.

When we come to consider the working of an international court, however, we are forced to realize that the law itself is in many respects imperfect and uncertain. There is no legislature to make laws for nations. There is no body of judicial decisions having the effect of precedent to declare what international laws are. The process of making international law by usage and general acceptance has been necessarily so slow that it has not kept

pace with the multiplying questions arising in the increasing intercourse of nations. In many fields of most fruitful controversy different nations hold tenaciously to different rules, as, for recent example, upon the right of expatriation, upon the doctrine of continuous voyages, upon the right to transfer merchant vessels after the outbreak of a war. Yet any attempt to maintain a court of international justice must fail unless there are laws for the court to administer. Without them the so-called court would be merely a group of men seeking to impose their personal opinions upon the states coming before them. The lack of an adequate system of law to be applied has been the chief obstacle to the development of a system of judicial settlement of international disputes. This is well illustrated by the history of the Second Hague Conference treaty for an international prize court. The Conference agreed to establish such a court and provided in article 7 of the treaty that in the absence of special treaty provisions governing the case presented "the Court shall apply the rules of international law. If no generally recognized rule exists the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity." When the question of ratifying this treaty was presented to the powers whose delegates had signed it some of them awoke to the fact that upon many subjects most certain to call for the action of a court there was no general agreement as to what the rules of international law were, and that different nations had different ideas as to what justice and equity would require and that each judge would naturally follow the views of his own country. Accordingly the Conference of London was called, and met in December, 1908. In that Conference the delegates of the principal maritime

powers came to agreement upon a series of questions and they embodied their agreement in the 71 articles of the Declaration of London. If that Declaration had been ratified by all the Powers in the Conference it would doubtless have been accepted as a statement of the international law upon the subjects covered. But it was not ratified, and so the Prize Court treaty remains ineffective because the necessary basis for the action of the Court is wanting. It is plain that in order to have real courts by which the legal rights of nations can be determined and the conduct of nations can be subjected to definite tests there must be a settlement by agreement of old disputes as to what the law ought to be and provision for extending the law over fields which it does not now cover. One thing especially should be done in this direction. Law can not control national policy, and it is through the working of long continued and persistent national policies that the present war has come. Against such policies all attempts at conciliation and good understanding and good-will among the nations of Europe have been powerless. But law, if enforced, can control the external steps by which a nation seeks to follow a policy and rules may be so framed that a policy of aggression can not be worked out except through open violations of law which will meet the protest and condemnation of the world at large, backed by whatever means shall have been devised for law enforcement.

There is another weakness of international law as a binding force which it appears to me can be avoided only by a radical change in the attitude of nations towards violations of the law.

We are all familiar with the distinction in the municipal law of all civilized countries between private and public

rights and the remedies for the protection or enforcement of them. Ordinary injuries and breaches of contract are redressed only at the instance of the injured person, and other persons are not deemed entitled to interfere. It is no concern of theirs. On the other hand, certain flagrant wrongs the prevalence of which would threaten the order and security of the community are deemed to be everybody's business. If, for example, a man be robbed or assaulted the injury is deemed not to be done to him alone but to every member of the state by the breaking of the law against robbery or against violence. Every citizen is deemed to be injured by the breach of the law because the law is his protection and if the law be violated with impunity his protection will disappear. Accordingly, the government, which represents all its citizens, undertakes to punish such action even though the particular person against whom the injury was done may be content to go without redress. Up to this time breaches of international law have been treated as we treat wrongs under civil procedure, as if they concerned nobody except the particular nation upon which the injury was inflicted and the nation inflicting it. There has been no general recognition of the right of other nations to object. There has been much international discussion of what the rules of law ought to be and the importance of observing them in the abstract, and there have been frequent interferences by third parties as a matter of policy upon the ground that specific, consequential injury to them might result from the breach, but, in general, states not directly affected by the particular injury complained of have not been deemed to have any right to be heard about it. It is only as disinterested mediators in the quarrels of others

or as rendering good offices to others that they have been accustomed to speak if at all. Until the First Hague Conference that form of interference was upon sufferance. In the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, concluded at that Conference, it was agreed that in case of serious trouble or conflict before an appeal to arms the signatory powers should have recourse to the good offices or mediation of foreign powers, and article 3 also provided: "Independent of this recourse the signatory powers recommend that one or more powers strangers to the dispute should on their own initiative and as far as circumstances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the states at variance. Powers strangers to the dispute have a right to offer good offices or mediation even during the course of hostilities. The exercise of this right can never be regarded by one or other of the parties in conflict as an unfriendly act." These provisions are a considerable step towards a change in the theory of the relation of third powers to an international controversy. They recognize such an independent interest in the prevention of conflict as to be the basis of a right of initiative of other powers in an effort to bring about a settlement. It still remains under these provisions, however, that the other powers assert no substantive right of their own. They are simply authorized to propose an interference in the quarrels of others to which they are deemed to be strangers. The enforcement of the rules of international law is thus left to the private initiative of the country appealing to those rules for protection and the rest of the world has in theory and in practice no concern with the enforcement or non-enforcement of the rules.

If the law of nations is to be binding, if the decisions

of tribunals charged with the application of that law to international controversies are to be respected, there must be a change in theory, and violations of the law of such a character as to threaten the peace and order of the community of nations must be deemed to be a violation of the right of every civilized nation to have the law maintained and a legal injury to every nation. When a controversy arises between two nations other nations are indeed strangers to the dispute as to what the law requires in that controversy; but they can not really be strangers to a dispute as to whether the law which is applicable to the circumstances shall be observed or violated. Next to the preservation of national character the most valuable possession of all peaceable nations great and small is the protection of those laws which constrain other nations to conduct based upon principles of justice and humanity. Without that protection there is no safety for the small state except in the shifting currents of policy among its great neighbors, and none for a great state, however peaceable and just may be its disposition, except in readiness for war. International laws violated with impunity must soon cease to exist and every state has a direct interest in preventing those violations which if permitted to continue would destroy the law. Wherever in the world the laws which should protect the independence of nations, the inviolability of their territory, the lives and property of their citizens, are violated, all other nations have a right to protest against the breaking down of the law. Such a protest would not be an interference in the quarrels of others. It would be an assertion of the protesting nation's own right against the injury done to it by the destruction of the law upon which it relies for its peace and security. What would

follow such a protest must in each case depend upon the protesting nation's own judgment as to policy, upon the feeling of its people and the wisdom of its governing body. Whatever it does, if it does anything, will be done not as a stranger to a dispute or as an intermediary in the affairs of others, but in its own right for the protection of its own interest. Upon no other theory than this can the decisions of any court for the application of the law of nations be respected, or any league or concert or agreement among nations for the enforcement of peace by arms or otherwise be established, or any general opinion of mankind for the maintenance of law be effective.

Can any of these things be done? Can the law be strengthened and made effective? Imperfect and conflicting as is the information upon which conjecture must be based, I think there is ground for hope that from the horrors of violated law a stronger law may come. It was during the appalling crimes of the Thirty Years War that Grotius wrote his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* and the science of international law first took form and authority. The moral standards of the Thirty Years War have returned again to Europe with the same dreadful and intolerable consequences. We may hope that there will be again a great new departure to escape destruction by subjecting the nations to the rule of law. The development and extension of international law has been obstructed by a multitude of jealousies and supposed interests of nations each refusing to consent to any rule unless it be made most favorable to itself in all possible future contingencies. The desire to have a law has not been strong enough to overcome the determination of each nation to have the law suited to its own special circumstances; but when this war is over the desire to

have some law in order to prevent so far as possible a recurrence of the same dreadful experience may sweep away all these reluctances and schemes for advantage and lead to agreement where agreement has never yet been possible. It often happens that small differences and petty controversies are swept away by a great disaster, deep feeling, and a sense of common danger. If this be so we can have an adequate law and a real court which will apply its principles to serious as well as petty controversies, and a real public opinion of the world responding to the duty of preserving the law inviolate. If there be such an opinion it will be enforced. I shall not now inquire into the specific means of enforcement, but the means can be found. It is only when opinion is uncertain and divided or when it is sluggish and indifferent and acts too late that it fails of effect. During all the desperate struggles and emergencies of the great war the conflicting nations from the beginning have been competing for the favorable judgment of the rest of the world with a solicitude which shows what a mighty power even now that opinion is.

Nor can we doubt that this will be a different world when peace comes. Universal mourning for the untimely dead, suffering and sacrifice, the triumph of patriotism over selfishness, the long dominance of deep and serious feeling, the purifying influences of self-devotion, will surely have changed the hearts of the nations, and much that is wise and noble and for the good of humanity may be possible that never was possible before.

Some of us believe that the hope of the world's progress lies in the spread and perfection of democratic self-government. It may be that out of the rack and welter of the great conflict may arise a general consciousness

that it is the people who are to be considered, their rights and liberties to govern and be governed for themselves rather than rulers' ambitions and policies of aggrandisement. If that be so our hopes will be realized, for autocracy can protect itself by arbitrary power, but the people can protect themselves only by the rule of law.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-85 (April, 1907, to December, 1914). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

86. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. IV.
 - I. Turkish Official Documents. November, 1914.
 - II. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag. December 2, 1914.
 - III. The Belgian Gray Book. (July 24, August 29, 1914.) January, 1915.
87. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. V.

The French Yellow Book, Translated and Prepared for Parliament by the British Government. February, 1915.
88. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. V.

The French Yellow Book, Translated and Prepared for Parliament by the British Government. March, 1915.
89. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VI.

The Austrian Red Book, Official Translation Prepared by the Austrian Government. April, 1915.
90. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VII.

The Serbian Blue Book. May, 1915.
91. The Fundamental Causes of the World War, by Alfred H. Fried. June, 1915.
92. To the Citizens of the Belligerent States, by G. Heymans. July, 1915.
93. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VIII.

Italy's Green Book, Translation approved by Royal Italian Embassy, Washington, D. C. August, 1915.
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Official Correspondence Between the United States and Germany.

 - I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914—October 24, 1914.
 - II. Contraband of War, September 4, 1914—April 26, 1915.
 - III. Restraints of Commerce, February 6, 1915—September 7, 1915.
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 - I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914—October 22, 1914.
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 - III. Restraints of Commerce, December 26, 1914—July 31, 1915.
 - IV. Case of the Wilhelmina, February 15, 1915—April 8, 1915. October, 1915.
96. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XI.
 - I. Secretary Bryan's Letter to Senator Stone Regarding Charges of Partiality Shown to Great Britain, January 20, 1915.
 - II. The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Penfield, June 29, 1915.
 - III. The Secretary of State to Ambassador Penfield, August 12, 1915. November, 1915.
97. Referendum on the Report of the Special Committee on Economic Results of the War and American Business. Reprinted by permission of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. December, 1915.
98. The Land Where Hatred Expires, by Albert Léon Guérard. January, 1916.
99. America's Opinion of the World War, by Eduard Bernstein. Translated by John Mez. February, 1916.
100. International Coöperation, by John Bassett Moore. The Outlook for International Law, by Elihu Root. March, 1916.

Special Bulletins:

- A Brief Outline of the Nature and Aims of Pacifism, by Alfred H. Fried. Translated by John Mez. April, 1915.
- Internationalism. A list of Current Periodicals selected and annotated by Frederick C. Hicks. May, 1915.
- Preparedness as the Cartoonists See It, with introduction by Charles E. Jefferson. May, 1915.
- Spirit of Militarism and Non-Military Preparation for Defense, by John Lovejoy Elliott and R. Tait McKenzie. June, 1915.
- Existing Alliances and a League of Peace, by John Bates Clark. July, 1915.
- Is Commerce War? by Henry Raymond Mussey. January, 1916.
- Peace Literature of the War, by John Mez. January, 1916.

Up to the limit of the editions printed, any one of the above will be sent postpaid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation, Postoffice Sub-station 84, New York, N. Y.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second-class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS BEARING UPON THE EUROPEAN WAR, SERIES XII

STATEMENT OF MEASURES ADOPTED TO INTERCEPT THE SEA-BORNE COMMERCE OF GERMANY

Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command
of His Majesty, January, 1916

GREAT BRITAIN'S MEASURES AGAINST GERMAN TRADE

A Speech Delivered by the Rt. Hon. Sir E. Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, in the House of Commons, on the 26th of January, 1916.



APRIL, 1916

No. 101

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City
1916

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

It is the aim of the Association to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on pages 42 and 43.

STATEMENT OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED TO INTERCEPT THE SEA-BORNE COMMERCE OF GERMANY

1. The object of this memorandum is to give an account of the manner in which the sea power of the British Empire has been used during the present war for the purpose of intercepting Germany's imports and exports.

I.—*Belligerent Rights at Sea.*

2. The means by which a belligerent who possesses a fleet has, up to the time of the present war, interfered with the commerce of his enemy are three in number:—

- (i.) The capture of contraband of war on neutral ships.
- (ii.) The capture of enemy property at sea.
- (iii.) A blockade by which all access to the coast of the enemy is cut off.

3. The second of these powers has been cut down since the Napoleonic wars by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, under which enemy goods on a neutral ship, with the exception of contraband of war, were exempted from capture. Enemy goods which had been loaded on British or Allied ships before the present war were seized in large quantities immediately after its outbreak; but for obvious reasons such shipments ceased, for all practical purposes, after the 4th August, 1914, and this particular method of injuring the enemy may therefore, for the moment, be disregarded.

No blockade of Germany was declared until March, 1915, and therefore up to that date we had to rely exclusively on the right to capture contraband.

II.—*Contraband.*

4. By the established classification goods are divided into three classes:—

- (a.) Goods primarily used for warlike purposes.
- (b.) Goods which may be equally used for either warlike or peaceful purposes.
- (c.) Goods which are exclusively used for peaceful purposes.

5. Under the law of contraband, goods in the first class may be seized if they can be proved to be going to the enemy country; goods in the second class may be seized if they can be proved to be going to the enemy Government or its armed forces; goods in the third class must be allowed to pass free. As to the articles which fall within any particular one of these classes, there has been no general agreement in the past, and the attempts of belligerents to enlarge the first class at the expense of the second, and the second at the expense of the third, have led to considerable friction with neutrals.

6. Under the rules of prize law, as laid down and administered by Lord Stowell, goods were not regarded as destined for an enemy country unless they were to be discharged in a port in that country; but the American prize courts in the Civil War found themselves compelled by the then existing conditions of commerce to apply and develop the doctrine of continuous voyage, under which goods which could be proved to be ulti-

mately intended for an enemy country were not exempted from seizure on the ground that they were first to be discharged in an intervening neutral port. This doctrine, although hotly contested by many publicists, had never been challenged by the British Government, and was more or less recognized as having become part of International Law.

7. When the present war broke out it was thought convenient, in order, among other things, to secure uniformity of procedure among all the Allied forces, to declare the principles of international law which the Allied Governments regarded as applicable to contraband and other matters. Accordingly, by the Orders in Council of the 20th August and the 22d October, 1914, and the corresponding French Decrees, the rules set forth in the Declaration of London were adopted by the French and British Governments with certain modifications. As to contraband, the lists of contraband and free goods in the Declaration were rejected, and the doctrine of continuous voyage was applied not only to absolute contraband, as the Declaration already provided, but also to conditional contraband, if such goods were consigned to order, or if the papers did not show the consignee of the goods, or if they showed a consignee in enemy territory.

8. The situation as regards German trade was as follows: Direct trade to German ports (save across the Baltic) had almost entirely ceased, and practically no ships were met with bound to German ports. The supplies that Germany desired to import from overseas were directed to neutral ports in Scandinavia, Holland, or (at first) Italy, and every effort was made to disguise their real destination. The power which we had to deal

with this situation in the circumstances then existing was:—

- (i.) We had the right to seize articles of absolute contraband if it could be proved that they were destined for the enemy country, although they were to be discharged in a neutral port.
- (ii.) We had the right to seize articles of conditional contraband if it could be proved that they were destined for the enemy Government or its armed forces, in the cases specified above, although they were to be discharged in a neutral port.

9. On the other hand, there was no power to seize articles of conditional contraband if they could not be shown to be destined for the enemy Government or its armed forces, or non-contraband articles, even if they were on their way to a port in Germany, and there was no power to stop German exports.

10. That was the situation until the actions of the German Government led to the adoption of more extended powers of intercepting German commerce in March, 1915. The Allied Governments then decided to stop all goods which could be proved to be going to, or coming from, Germany. The state of things produced is in effect a blockade, adapted to the condition of modern war and commerce, the only difference in operation being that the goods seized are not necessarily confiscated. In these circumstances it will be convenient, in considering the treatment of German imports and exports, to omit any further reference to the nature of the commodities in question as, once their destination or origin is established, the power to stop them is com-

plete. Our contraband rights, however, remain unaffected, though they, too, depend on the ability to prove enemy destination.

III.—*German Exports.*

11. In carrying out our blockade policy great importance was from the outset attached to the stoppage of the enemy's export trade, because it is clear that to the extent that his exports can be stopped, and his power to establish credits for himself in neutral countries curtailed, his imports from such neutral countries will more or less automatically diminish. The identification of articles of enemy origin is, thanks to the system of certificates of origin which has been established, a comparatively simple matter, and the degree to which the policy of stopping German and Austrian oversea exports has been successful can best be judged by looking at the statistics of German and Austrian imports into America.

12. The normal imports into the United States of America from Germany and Austria, before the war, for the seven months' March to September inclusive, are valued approximately and in round figures at 124,000,000 dollars (24,800,000*l.*). From March to September inclusive, this year's imports into the United States of America from those countries were valued at approximately 22,000,000 dollars (4,400,000*l.*). This sum includes the goods which were already in neutral ports in the way of shipment or in transit when the further measures adopted by the Allied Governments were announced in March, and also a considerable proportion of those which have been allowed to pass in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 14. A certain amount

is also to be accounted for by goods received from Germany and Austria by parcel post, which it was not originally possible to stop effectively. Steps have now been taken to close this channel to enemy exports. The latest returns available, those for September, show that over 92 per cent. of the German exports to the United States of America have been stopped.

13. The above figures allow of but one conclusion: the oversea exports of Germany and Austria are very near extinction. It is of special interest to note that in the main these exports have not been merely diverted to the neutral countries adjacent to Germany. The imports which those countries have received from Germany have not in fact exceeded the normal quantities of previous years.

14. The object of the policy being to injure the enemy, the Allied Governments have in certain cases permitted the export of goods which had been ordered before the 1st March, and had been either paid for prior to that date or ordered before that date on terms which rendered the neutral purchaser liable to pay whether the goods reached him or not. It is clear that in these cases no harm would be done to the enemy, or pressure put upon him, by not allowing the goods to pass. On the contrary, he would, if that were done, both receive his price and retain the goods and their possible use. The total value of the goods with which the Allied Governments have undertaken not to interfere in such cases up to the end of 1915 is approximately 3,000,000*l*. If the goods allowed to pass under this arrangement were deducted from the total enemy exports to the United States of America, it would be seen that the amount

of German exports which serve to increase the resources of the enemy is almost negligible.

IV.—*German Imports.*

15. As regards German imports, however, the problem is much more complicated. Its central difficulty is that of distinguishing between goods with an enemy destination from those with a genuine neutral destination. A belligerent who makes use of his naval power to intercept the commerce of his enemy has to justify his action in each particular case before a Prize Court, which is bound by international law and not by the ordinary law of the country in which it sits. It is not sufficient for him to stop a neutral vessel and remove from her such articles as he may believe to be intended for his enemy; it is necessary subsequently to demonstrate in a court of law that the destination of the goods was such as to justify the belligerent in seizing them. If this is not proved, the goods will be released, and damages may be awarded against the captor. It must also be remembered that, in order to justify the seizure of a particular consignment, it is necessary to satisfy the Prize Court of the enemy destination of that consignment, and evidence of a general nature, if unaccompanied by proofs directly bearing on a particular case, is not enough. All this applies as much to goods seized as contraband as it does to those seized for breach of blockade.

16. In earlier wars the production of the necessary proof was a comparatively simple matter. Owing to the difficulties of inland transport before the introduction of railways, goods for the enemy country were

usually carried to ports in that country and the ship's papers showed their destination. When, therefore, the ship had been captured, the papers found on board were generally sufficient to dispose of the case. In the old cases of contraband, the question at issue was usually not where the goods were in fact going to, but whether their nature was such as to make them liable to condemnation in view of the destination shown on the ship's papers. Even in the American Civil War the difficulty of proving destination was usually not serious, because the neutral harbours through which the supply of goods for the Confederate States was carried on were in normal times ports of comparatively small importance, and it could be shown that in normal times there was no local market for goods of such quantities and character.

17. The case has been far different in the present war. The goods which Germany attempts to import are consigned to neutral ports, and it need hardly be said that the papers on board convey no suggestion as to their ultimate destination. The conditions of modern commerce offer almost infinite opportunities of concealing the real nature of a transaction, and every device which the ingenuity of the persons concerned, or their lawyers, could suggest has been employed to give to shipments intended for Germany the appearance of genuine transactions with a neutral country. The ports to which the goods are consigned, such as Rotterdam and Copenhagen, have in peace time an important trade, which increases the difficulty of distinguishing the articles ultimately intended to reach the enemy country from those which represent importation into the neutral country concerned for its own requirements. If action had to be taken solely on such information as might be

gathered by the boarding officer on his visit to the ship, it would have been quite impossible to interfere to an appreciable extent with German imports, and the Allied Governments would therefore have been deprived of a recognized belligerent right.

18. In these circumstances, unless the Allied Governments were prepared to seize and place in the Prize Court the whole of the cargo of every ship which was on her way to a neutral country adjacent to Germany, and to face the consequences of such action, the only course open to them was to discover some test by which goods destined for the enemy could be distinguished from those which were intended for neutral consumption.

19. The first plan adopted for this purpose is to make use of every source of information available in order to discover the real destination of sea-borne goods, and to exercise to the full the right of stopping such goods as the information obtained showed to be suspect, while making a genuine and honest attempt to distinguish between *bonâ fide* neutral trade and trade which, although in appearance equally innocent, was in fact carried on with the enemy country.

20. For this purpose a considerable organization has been established in the Contraband Committee, which sits at the Foreign Office, and works in close touch with the Admiralty, Board of Trade, and War Trade Department. Nearly every ship on her way to Scandinavian or Dutch ports comes or is sent into a British port for examination, and every item of her cargo is immediately considered in the light of all the information which has been collected from the various sources open to the Gov-

ernment, and which, after nearly a year and a half of war, is very considerable. Any items of cargo as to which it appears that there is a reasonable ground for suspecting an enemy destination are placed in the Prize Court, while articles as to the destination of which there appears to be doubt are detained pending further investigation.

21. If, however, this were all that could be done, there is little doubt that it would be impossible to effect a complete cutting off of the enemy's supplies. For instance, there are many cases in which it would be difficult to establish in the Prize Court our right to stop goods, although they or their products, perhaps after passing through several hands, would in all probability ultimately reach the enemy. To indicate more plainly the nature of these difficulties would obviously be to assist the enemy and the neutral traders who desire to supply him; but the difficulties exist, and, in order to meet them, it has been necessary to adopt other means by which neutral may be more easily distinguished from enemy trade, and the blockade of Germany made more effective than it would be if we relied solely on the right to stop goods which could be proved to be intended for the enemy.

V.—*Guarantees by Importers.*

22. Importers in neutral countries adjacent to Germany have found that the exercise of our belligerent rights to some extent impedes the importation of articles which they genuinely need for the requirements of their own country, and consequently they have in many cases shown willingness to make agreements with this country

which on the one hand secure their receiving the supplies which they need, while on the other guaranteeing to us that goods allowed to pass under the terms of the agreement will not reach the enemy. The neutral Governments themselves have as a rule considered it inadvisable to make agreements on such points with His Majesty's Government; they have on the whole confined their action to prohibiting the export of certain articles which it was necessary for them to import from abroad. Inasmuch, however, as in most cases they reserved the right to grant exemptions from such prohibitions, and as trade between the Scandinavian countries themselves was usually excluded from the scope of such measures, the mere fact of the existence of such prohibitions could not be considered a sufficient safeguard that commodities entering the country would not ultimately reach Germany.

23. In some neutral countries, however, agreements have been made by representative associations of merchants, the basis of which is that the associations guarantee that articles consigned to or guaranteed by them, and their products, will not reach the enemy in any form, while His Majesty's Government undertake not to interfere with shipments consigned to the association, subject to their right to institute prize proceedings in exceptional cases where there is evidence that an attempt has been made to perpetrate a fraud upon the association, and to pass the goods ultimately through to Germany. The first of these agreements was made with the Netherlands Oversea Trust, and similar agreements, either general or dealing with particular commodities of special importance, such as rubber and cotton, have been made with bodies of merchants in Sweden, Norway,

Denmark, and Switzerland. The details of these agreements it is impossible to give more fully, but the general principle is that the associations, before allowing goods to be consigned to them, require the would-be receivers to satisfy them, by undertakings backed by sufficient pecuniary penalties, that the goods will not leave the country, either in their original shape or after any process of manufacture, and notwithstanding any sales of which they may be the subject.

In some cases these agreements provide that the associations shall themselves be bound to detain or return goods believed by His Majesty's Government to be destined for the enemy; so that it does not follow that cargoes allowed to proceed to a neutral port will necessarily be delivered to the consignees.

24. The existence of such agreements is of great value in connection with the right of seizure, because the fact of articles not being consigned to or guaranteed by the association, or being consigned to it without the necessary consent, at once raises the presumption that they are destined for the enemy.

VI.—*Agreements with Shipping Lines.*

25. Delays caused by the elaborate exercise of the belligerent right of visit and search are very irksome to shipping; and many shipping lines who carry on regular services with Scandinavia and Holland have found it well worth their while to make agreements with His Majesty's Government under which they engage to meet our requirements with regard to goods carried by them, in return for an undertaking that their ships will be delayed for as short a time as possible for examination in

British ports. Several agreements of this kind have been made; the general principle of them is that His Majesty's Government obtain the right to require any goods carried by the line, if not discharged in the British port of examination, to be either returned to this country for Prize Court proceedings, or stored in the country of destination until the end of the war, or only handed to the consignees under stringent guarantees that they or their products will not reach the enemy. The companies obtain the necessary power to comply with these conditions by means of a special clause inserted in all their bills of lading, and the course selected by the British authorities is determined by the nature of the goods and the circumstances of the case. In addition to this, some of these companies make a practice, before accepting consignments of certain goods, of enquiring whether their carriage is likely to lead to difficulties, and of refusing to carry them in cases where it is intimated that such would be the case. The control which His Majesty's Government are in a position to exercise under these agreements over goods carried on the lines in question is of very great value.

VII.—*Bunker Coal.*

26. Much use has been made recently of the power which the British Government are in a position to exercise owing to their ability to refuse bunker coal to neutral ships in ports in the British Empire. Bunker coal is now only supplied to neutral vessels whose owners are willing to comply with certain conditions which ensure that no vessels owned, chartered, or controlled by them trade with any port in an enemy country, or carry

any cargo which proceeds from, or is destined for, an enemy country. The number of owners who accept these conditions increases almost daily. The use of this weapon has already induced several shipping lines which before the war maintained regular services between Scandinavian and German Baltic ports to abandon their services.

VIII.—*Agreements in respect of Particular Commodities*

27. Special agreements have been made in respect of particular articles the supply of which is mainly derived from the British Empire or over which the British Government are in a position to exercise control. The articles covered by such agreements, the object of which is to secure such control over the supply of these materials as will ensure that they or their products will not reach the enemy, are rubber, copper, wool, hides, oil, tin, plumbago, and certain other metals.

IX.—*Rationing.*

28. Though the safeguards already described do much to stop entirely all trade to and from Germany, yet, in spite of all of them, goods may and do reach our enemies, and, on the other hand, considerable inconvenience is caused to genuinely neutral trade. It is to avoid both evils that His Majesty's Government have for months past advocated what is called rationing, as by far the soundest system both for neutrals and belligerents. It is an arrangement by which the import of any given article into a neutral country is limited to the amount of its true domestic requirements. The best way of carrying this arrangement into effect is probably by agreement

with some body representing either one particular trade or the whole commerce of the country. Without such an agreement there is always a risk that, in spite of all precautions, the whole rationed amount of imports may be secured by traders who are really German agents. These imports might go straight on to Germany, and there would then be great practical difficulty in dealing with the next imports destined, it may be, for genuine neutral traders. If they were to be stopped, there would be great complaint of injustice to neutrals, and yet unless that be done the system would break down. Accordingly, agreements of this kind have been concluded in various countries, and His Majesty's Government are not without hope that they may be considerably extended in the future. Even so the security is not perfect. An importer may always let his own countrymen go short and re-export to Germany. The temptation to do so is great, and as our blockade forces prices up is increasing. But the amount that gets through in this way cannot be large, and the system is in its working so simple that it minimises the delays and other inconveniences to neutral commerce inseparable from war. Of the details of these arrangements it is impossible to speak. But their principle appears to offer the most hopeful solution of the complicated problems arising from the necessity of exercising our blockade through neutral countries.

X.—*Results.*

29. As to the results of the policy described in this memorandum, the full facts are not available. But some things are clear. It has already been shown that the export trade of Germany has been substantially de-

stroyed. With regard to imports, it is believed that some of the most important, such as cotton, wool, and rubber, have for many months been excluded from Germany. Others, like fats and oils and dairy produce, can only be obtained there, if at all, at famine prices. All accounts, public and private, which reach His Majesty's Government agree in stating that there is considerable discontent amongst sections of the German population, and there appear to have been food riots in some of the larger towns. That our blockade prevents any commodities from reaching Germany is not, and under the geographical circumstances cannot be, true. But it is already successful to a degree which good judges both here and in Germany thought absolutely impossible, and its efficiency is growing day by day. It is right to add that these results have been obtained without any serious friction with any neutral Government. There are obvious objections to dwelling on the importance to us of the good will of neutral nations; but anyone who considers the geographical, military, and commercial situation of the various countries will certainly not underrate the value of this consideration. There is great danger when dealing with international questions in concentrating attention exclusively on one point in them, even if that point be as vital as is undoubtedly the blockade of Germany.

XI.—*Conclusion.*

30. To sum up, the policy which has been adopted in order to enforce the blockade of Germany may be described as follows:—

- (i.) German exports to oversea countries have been almost entirely stopped. Such exceptions as

have been made are in cases where a refusal to allow the export of the goods would hurt the neutral concerned without inflicting any injury upon Germany.

- (ii.) All shipments to neutral countries adjacent to Germany are carefully scrutinised with a view to the detection of a concealed enemy destination. Wherever there is reasonable ground for suspecting such destination, the goods are placed in the Prize Court. Doubtful consignments are detained until satisfactory guarantees are produced.
- (iii.) Under agreements in force with bodies of representative merchants in several neutral countries adjacent to Germany, stringent guarantees are exacted from importers, and so far as possible all trade between the neutral country and Germany, whether arising overseas or in the neutral country itself, is restricted.
- (iv.) By agreements with shipping lines and by a vigorous use of the power to refuse bunker coal, a large proportion of the neutral mercantile marine which carries on trade with Scandinavia and Holland has been induced to agree to conditions designed to prevent goods carried in these ships from reaching the enemy.
- (v.) Every effort is being made to introduce a system of rationing which will ensure that the neutral countries concerned only import such quantities of the articles specified as are normally imported for their own consumption.

A SPEECH DELIVERED BY
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR E. GREY
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE 26th JANUARY, 1916.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (SIR EDWARD GREY): The Right Hon. Gentleman who has just spoken (Mr. Leverton Harris) has made a most interesting speech, full of knowledge, and founded upon personal experience. The Right Hon. Gentleman is one of those, of whom there are several in the House and many outside, who have been giving most devoted service on committees in carrying out the policy of the Government with regard to contraband. There have been from the beginning of the War a number of people of great knowledge and experience who have given their services voluntarily on these various committees, and whose services have been of enormous value. I think the House will have gathered from the Right Hon. Gentleman's speech that the subject with which we are dealing is not really so simple, and cannot be made so simple, as might appear from some of the speeches that are made upon it and some of the articles which appear outside. It is a most difficult and complicated subject. I gather from the Debate, as far as it has gone, that there is real misapprehension in the House as to what is the present state of things with regard to the amount of trade passing through neutral countries to the enemy, and also real misapprehension, and a vast underestimate,

of what the Government is doing through its various agencies to prevent that trade. In the first place, I must deal with some of the figures scattered broadcast lately in some organs of the Press, which have created a grotesque and quite untrue impression of the amount of leakage through neutral countries—figures which will not bear examination, but the conclusions founded upon which have undoubtedly done great harm. The figures consist, as far as I have seen them, of statistics from the official returns of the United States giving the amount of exports to certain neutral countries in Europe in a normal year of peace. Figures are then given which purport to be the excess figure for those same neutral countries at the present time, these figures being greatly in excess of the peace figures. The peace figures are then subtracted from the figures of last year, and the conclusion is drawn that the whole of that surplus has gone to Germany. On that are founded various attacks upon the Government. These figures published in this way, do a great injustice—or rather attacks founded upon these figures do a great injustice—to the Government. The figures take no account of the fact that in the case of many of these articles in time of peace neutral countries do not draw the whole of their supplies from the United States. They draw them from enemy countries, or from sources which are not available to them in time of war. Therefore, to take the exports from the United States into these countries, and to assume that, because these exports have risen therefore the large surplus which has been imported into neutral countries has gone into enemy countries, entirely leaves out of account the fact that in very many cases the increased exports from the United States have been for

real consumption in those neutral countries, and have taken the place of the supplies which in peace time have been drawn from other sources than the United States, and are not now available.

In the next place, the figures of exports from the United States give the amount of stuff which left the ports of the United States. These do not necessarily correspond with the amount of stuff which arrives in the neutral ports. What is the cause of all the trouble and the very great friction that there has been with the meat-packers of the United States? It is because a large amount of the produce coming from the United States consigned to neutral ports, which we believed was destined for the enemy, never reached the neutral ports. It is in the Prize Court here. So at one and the same time the Foreign Office, or the Government, is having a very warm contention indeed with neutral Governments, or groups of people in neutral countries, on the ground that we have put their produce into the Prize Court here and detained it and at the same time we are being attacked in this country on the ground that that very same produce has gone through neutral countries into the enemy countries! Some figures have been published in the Press to-day giving a very different impression of the true state of the case as regards the neutral countries and the enemy—figures published by the War Trade Department. I recommend that those figures should be studied, for they, at any rate, reduce the thing to very different proportions.

But I have had some other figures supplied to me, out of which I am going to take two striking instances. The statement has been made in one organ of the Press, in regard to wheat, that the exports of wheat from the

United States to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands collectively, rose from 19,000,000 bushels in the first ten months of 1913—that is, the year of peace—to 50,000,000 bushels in the corresponding period of 1915—that is to say, an excess of 31,000,000 bushels. The conclusion is drawn that that has all gone to the enemy through those neutral countries. It is almost incredible, if the figures supplied to me are reliable—and I believe they are—that a statement of that kind should have been made. Those 50,000,000 bushels from the United States are the figures given under a collective heading in the United States Returns, which comprises, not merely these four Scandinavian countries, but “other Europe,” including Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta; so that these 50,000,000 bushels not only go to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, but also include the exports to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta. The exports to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta alone amounted to 23,000,000 bushels. That is a very large part of the whole increase. Why do these countries take so much? Because no doubt they depended, I presume, in ordinary years, very largely on grain coming from Black Sea ports which has ceased to be available. Therefore there is no need to assume that Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta were importing wheat in order to pass on to the enemy; they wanted it to supply the grain which they would have got in normal years from other sources.

From the figures that remain some millions more bushels must be deducted which have been allowed to go through under special international arrangements to the Belgian Relief Fund. When you have deducted those you find that these four countries—the three Scan-

dinavian countries and Holland—which were supposed to have sent 31,000,000 bushels on to the enemy, had not, as a matter of fact, imported at all in excess of their normal requirements, and there is no reason to suppose that any of these bushels got to the enemy. Then I take the figures quoted in the Press for wheat-flour. The figures quoted suggest an increase in the exports of wheat-flour from the United States to Holland and the three Scandinavian countries in the first ten months of 1915, over the corresponding period of 1913, of 3,700,000 barrels; the assumption again being that that had all gone to the enemy. This increase includes not merely what went to those four countries, but also includes an increase to France of 1,400,000 barrels, and to Italy of 250,000 barrels. In addition, there was something over 1,000,000 allowed to go through to the Belgian Relief Fund, making, with the increase to France and to Italy, a total of 3,000,000 barrels. Out of, therefore, 3,700,000 barrels supposed to have gone to the enemy there is accounted for 3,000,000 barrels. The actual increase to the three Scandinavian countries is, therefore, reduced from 3,700,000 barrels to only 650,000 barrels. In view of the deficiency of the whole production of wheat in Scandinavia in 1914, this increase, according to the information supplied to me, cannot be regarded as excessive. That puts the thing in a very different light.

Leakage, of course, through neutral countries there has been, and will be. Whatever you do, if you adopt every suggestion made in this House, you cannot prevent some leakage. You cannot take over the administration of neutral countries. You cannot prevent smuggling taking place even against the regulations of the neutral countries themselves. It is not in our power to

do that under whatever system you have, whether you call it blockade, or whatever name you give to it. You have still to let through to neutral countries the things which they really require for their own consumption. You have, therefore, to distinguish between the things which they need for their own consumption and the things which they import with a view to their being passed on to the enemy. You have to make that distinction. Nobody could have listened to the speech of my Right Hon. Friend the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Harris) without realising how impossible it is to do that perfectly. You have every sort of ingenuity brought to bear to make it difficult for you to distinguish—to make it absolutely impossible, whatever the Navy may do, whatever strict provision there may be, to make sure that in no case will a cargo, or part of a cargo which is apparently destined for consumption in a neutral country, but really is destined for the enemy, go through to that neutral country. Some leakage there will always be. We have been anxious about that leakage. We have done what we can to get real information as to what is going on. The other day Lord Faringdon, who a short time ago was well known in this House as Sir Alexander Henderson, went over to make inquiries on the spot. He is, at least, as well qualified by ability, knowledge and experience to ascertain the facts as anyone who could be sent on behalf of any unofficial agency. He has produced a report. That report does not say that there is no leakage, but I think, on the whole, it is a very satisfactory report. In my opinion it shows that the amount of leakage in the trade passing from overseas through these neutral countries to the enemy is, considering all the facts of the case,

much less than might have been supposed. The general tendency of the report is to show that the maximum which can be done is being done without serious trouble with neutral countries, founded upon the idea that you are really interfering with their supplies.

SIR H. DALZIEL: Can we see that report?

SIR E. GREY: No, the report cannot be published. You cannot make these inquiries and publish the information obtained without its being known to the enemy. If it is known to the enemy your power of getting further information, and of watching what is going on—the actual facts even of what is going on are useful to the enemy—will be diminished. I do not, however, see any objection to the report being shown in a way in which knowledge of it cannot get to the enemy. There is nothing in the report to conceal from people who are looking at the matter, and examining it from the point of view from which the House is examining it this afternoon. All that there is to be concealed is from the opposite point of view—that is, the enemy point of view.

I pass from those figures to another charge which is made, not, I understand, in the Debate here, not in all the Press, but in some organs of the Press, and by some persons outside, in a most offensive form, which is grossly unfair and untrue. It is that the Navy is doing its utmost to prohibit goods reaching the enemy, and that the Foreign Office is spoiling the work of the Navy. When ships are brought in by the Navy to a port with goods destined for the enemy, the Foreign Office, it is alleged, orders those ships to be released, and undoes the work which the Navy is doing. I must give the House an account of what is exactly the machinery. I do not say that in the first three months of the War,

before we had got our organisation complete, there was not a certain amount of confusion and overlapping, and that things were so well done as now. I will take the whole of last year up to the present date. What is the procedure? One of the ships under the Admiralty brings into port a neutral merchant vessel carrying a cargo which the naval officers think may be destined for the enemy. They have no adequate means of searching that cargo on the high seas; it has to be done in port. Until you have got that vessel in port you cannot really form an opinion of what is the probable destination of the cargo. The ship is brought into port by the Navy. If that ship turns out to have goods destined not merely for a neutral port, but for *bonâ fide* consumption of a neutral country, without which that country would be starved of some supplies which it has every right to have, that cargo obviously ought to be released, and not put in the Prize Court at all. If, on the other hand, there is reason to suppose that that cargo is not destined for *bonâ-fide* neutral use, then undoubtedly it ought to be put in the Prize Court. That is settled by the Contraband Committee.

The Contraband Committee is presided over at present by the Hon. and Learned Member for Leamington (Mr. Pollock), who, again, is one of those giving invaluable service to the State. Before he undertook the chairmanship it was presided over by my Right Hon. and Learned Friend who is now the Solicitor-General, who, of course, had to give up that position when he became Solicitor-General, because it was impossible to combine it with his official work. How is the Committee composed? Besides the Chairman, it is composed of one representative of the Foreign Office, one who represents

the Board of Trade and Customs combined, and two representatives of the Admiralty, and that Committee, which has acquired very great experience in the course of its work, settles the question of whether the ship, or any part of the cargo in the ship, ought to be put in the Prize Court, or whether it ought to be released and go forward. I believe that Committee has done its work admirably, and that neither the country nor the Navy has any reason but to be exceedingly grateful for the knowledge and ability it has shown and the pains it has taken. Can the decision of that Committee be interfered with? Of course it can be interfered with. The Government can in any case say if such-and-such a ship, which the Committee thinks ought to be detained ought for special reasons to be released. I have made what inquiry I can, and, in accordance with my own recollection, I think in the last year there have been three cases when ships have been dealt with or undertakings about ships have been given without consulting the Committee. Two of those ships were cases of ships which were released and sent back. Those two cases were discussed twice by the Cabinet, and those two particular ships were released for special reasons. The third case is that of a ship which was brought into port the other day—the “Stockholm,” a Swedish vessel. It is a ship to which the Swedish people attach great importance. It is, I believe, the first ship of a new line, a passenger vessel. The detention of it must cause great inconvenience, but it had on board a cargo which, I understand, the Contraband Committee had reason to suppose—I think rightly—was not all destined for use in Sweden, and might be sent on to the enemy. Anyhow, the detention of the vessel caused great inconvenience, and a

special appeal was made from the Swedish Government in regard to that particular vessel, and with regard to one part of the cargo a special assurance was given. Of course these things have to be done rapidly if they are to be done at all. If you are to release a vessel, and wish to avoid inconvenience, you must release it quickly; and, after consulting the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, I sent a telegram to Stockholm saying that if we could receive assurances from the Swedish Government that the cargo, which seemed to us suspect, was destined for *bonâ-fide* use in Sweden, and that none of it would go on to the enemy, or set free an equivalent amount of corresponding material to go on to the enemy, the ship, in order to avoid inconvenience, was to be released at once. That undertaking was given without consulting the Contraband Committee. I am sorry to say, as far as I am concerned, we have not received an assurance, and, therefore, no action has been taken. That is the sort of case in which, unless you are to forfeit entirely the good will of neutrals, unless you are to take what I consider an unduly high-handed and provocative action, you ought to say to a neutral country which makes a special case of inconvenience caused in regard to a ship, "Give us assurances with regard to that cargo, and, rather than cause that inconvenience, we will be prepared to release the ship." That, I believe, represents the extent of interference with the Contraband Committee with regard to the release of ships in the last twelve months.

Now I would ask, really, is it not time after that that these reckless figures and these reckless statements should not be made with regard to the action of the Foreign Office or any Department of the Government? What,

is it supposed, is the effect upon the Navy of making charges of that sort?

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. BALFOUR): Hear, hear!

SIR E. GREY: If the charges made were true, and I was a naval officer, I should want to shoot the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But that is not the thing that matters. The thing that matters is the dispiriting effect it has on our seamen. There never was a time in the whole history of this country when we—and when I say “we,” I mean our Allies, too—have owed a greater tribute of gratitude and admiration to the Navy than for the work done during this War. To those of us who have to bear the brunt of much work, and face much difficulty, the knowledge of the efficiency, the courage, the spirit and the patriotism which animate the whole Navy is an upholding and a supporting thought, and there ought not to be statements of that kind, entirely unfounded as they are, put about, leading the Navy to suppose that the work which they are doing for the country, or any part of their work, is being undone by the Government, or any Department of the Government.

The task of the Foreign Office in this matter is a much more complicated one and much more burdensome than people know. The Foreign Office is not burdened as a Department with deciding about the release of particular ships. That, as I have shown, if it is not done by the Contraband Committee, is done by the Cabinet, or, in a very special case, by Ministers; but it is not done departmentally now. What is the work the Foreign Office has to do? The Foreign Office has to do its best to retain the good will of the neutrals. Now, supposing

you know at the Foreign Office that the War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Munitions, and perhaps one or more of our Allies are specially anxious that you should maintain open communication with some particular neutral country for strategical reasons, or for the sake of supplies which you get from them. We are constantly being told that certain supplies which come from abroad are absolutely essential for the Ministry of Munitions. The Board of Trade know that certain other supplies from abroad are absolutely necessary to carry on the industries of this country. The business of the Foreign Office is to keep the diplomatic relations such that there is no fear of these supplies being interfered with, and we have got at the same time to defend, to explain, and to justify to neutral countries all the interference that has taken place with trade destined for the enemy, which cannot be done without some direct or indirect interference also with neutral countries. That is, not an easy matter. It is one in which the Foreign Office is constantly engaged, and I think the House must recognise, when Members are pressing, as they are quite right in pressing, this question of supplies to the enemy, and saying, quite rightly, that the interests of this country come first, that you must also be very careful that you do not unduly or wrongfully interfere with the rights of neutrals to get supplies which are necessary for their own consumption. You have no right to make neutrals suffer. I would like to consider—and it is rather germane to the case—what more can be done than is being done consistently with the rights of neutrals and also with effect? The Hon. Member who moved this Motion sketched out what he thought ought to be done, and I think the Hon. Member who

seconded the Motion agreed with him. The suggestion was that there should be three lines of blockade, one extending to the coast of Norway, one across the Channel, and one across the Straits of Gibraltar. If you establish those lines of blockade you must do it consistently with the rights of neutrals. You cannot establish those lines of blockade and say that no ships shall go through them at all, or you will stop all traffic of every kind to the neutral ports inside. You would stop all traffic to Christiania, Stockholm, Rotterdam, Copenhagen—all traffic whatever. Well, of course, that is not consistent with the rights of neutrals. You cannot shut off all supplies to neutral countries. You must not try to make the grass grow in the streets of neutral ports. You must let through those lines vessels *bonâ-fide* destined for the neutral ports with *bonâ-fide* cargoes. Nor can you put every cargo in your Prize Court, and say it is not to go on to a neutral port until the Prize Court has examined it. The congestion in this country would be such that you could not deal with it if you did that, and you have no right to say that the British Prize Court is to be the neck of the bottle through which all trade has to pass. If we had gone, or attempted to go, as far as that, I think the War possibly might have been over by now, but it would have been over because the whole world would have risen against us, and we, and our Allies too, would have collapsed under the general resentment of the whole world. If you establish those lines, then the ship to neutral ports with a *bonâ-fide* neutral cargo must be allowed to go through. Therefore what I understand is meant when you say blockade is that you are going to discriminate, and not stop everything that is going through your lines, but only stop

what is destined to the enemy and let go through what is for neutrals. That is what is being done at the present time, and that is actually the action of the Admiralty to-day. The ships when brought in are dealt with by the method which I have described, and no ships are going through to German ports at all. Therefore that is actually being done. We are, as I think one Hon. Member said, filtering the trade which passes through with the object of stopping all the enemy trade. We are stopping the trade coming out, and we are also stopping the imports; more than that you cannot do. You cannot do more than stop all imports into the enemy country and all exports coming out.

We are applying the doctrine of continuous voyage, and it is being applied now. On what other ground are goods to neutral ports held up but on the ground of continuous voyage? Do not let it be supposed by adopting the actual proposal made this afternoon we are going to prevent goods reaching Germany more effectually than at the present time, except in one respect. If you had established the old technical blockade you would no doubt have been entitled to confiscate more largely ships and goods than at the present time. While you stop now and detain them, and do not let the goods go through, you do not confiscate as largely as you would if you had had the old technical blockade. One of the reasons why this change is recommended is that it is going to be more palatable to the neutrals, but you are not going to make it more palatable by making the penalties more severe. What we want to do is to prevent goods reaching or coming from the enemy country, and that is what we are doing. We want to do it, and we believe that under the Order in Council it is being done.

Do not let it be supposed that the Order in Council does something special either to validate or invalidate. The Mover of this Motion spoke as if an Order in Council was one thing and a blockade was another. What would have happened if we had adopted his plan would be that we should simply substitute one Order in Council for the present one. The blockade would be established by the Order in Council. An Order in Council does not make a thing good or bad. It is merely our way under our form of Constitution of announcing to the world what we are doing.

MR. S. BENN: Will the Right Hon. Gentleman deal with the point that the Allied nations should declare the blockade, rather than England by an Order in Council?

SIR E. GREY: That is a very pertinent question, but it again shows a misapprehension. If we all declared a blockade the French Government would declare a blockade in their own way, according to their Constitution, and we should declare it in our way. What is happening at the present moment, to carry out the policy of last March, is that certain instructions are issued to the British Navy. The French Government issued precisely the same instructions to their Navy, and so, if we and the Allied nations declared a blockade they would issue their own Proclamation of a blockade, and we should issue ours. That is the way it would be done, precisely the same as now. The French have issued exactly the same Proclamation on their behalf as we have in regard to our Proclamation of March. The only thing is that you have under the British Constitution to call it an Order in Council, although other people may call it whatever they please. You would not have any change in that respect. I quite agree that you want

common action with your Allies, and that is precisely what we have been having ever since last March with the French Government. If anyone wishes to realise the justification for our present policy they have only got to read the correspondence which has been published with the United States already. If they wish to read the objections taken to it, and the objections which any sort of policy might lead to, they can read the Notes from the United States Government to this country, especially the last Note which has been published, and which has not yet been answered.

We are going to answer the last Note of the United States Government, but we are considering the whole question, and we are going to do it in consultation, in the first instance, with the French Government, who are concerned in this matter. That consultation is taking place at the present time with a view to pursuing not merely the same policy, but justifying it with the same arguments, and putting the same case before the world. We may also consider it, perhaps with some of the other Allies, who may have to be actively concerned in carrying out the policy. At present we are in consultation with the French Government on the subject. I can only say, with regard to neutrals, that we are perfectly ready to examine any method of carrying out the policy of last March, that is what we believe is the belligerent right of stopping enemy trade, either to or from. We are ready to examine any other method of carrying that out, than the one we are now adopting, which we are convinced will be effective, and which in form is likely to be more agreeable to neutrals, or in practice less inconvenient to them, so long as it will be effective. But do not let us hastily adopt changes of form unless

we are quite sure that they are not going to impair the effectiveness of what we are doing, and that they are not going to involve us in legal difficulties more complicated than those which at present exist.

I must say to the House that at the present moment one of the greatest concerns of the Government is to explain and justify to neutrals what we are doing to avoid friction with them, and to get such agreements, not with their Governments, but with the various people interested in trade, as will make it easy to distinguish between goods destined for the neutrals, and goods intended for the enemy. I said just now that we have not any right to make neutrals suffer. By that I mean that you have no right to deprive neutrals of goods which are genuinely intended for their own use. Inconvenience it is impossible to avoid, and you cannot help it. What I would say to neutrals is this:—We cannot give up this right to interfere with enemy trade; that we must maintain and that we must press. We know, and it has always been admitted, that you cannot exercise that right without in some cases considerable inconvenience to neutrals—delay to their trade, and in some cases mistakes which it is impossible to avoid. What I would say to neutrals is this: There is one main question to be answered by them. Do they admit our right to apply the principles which were applied by the American Government in the War between North and South? Do they admit our right to apply those principles to modern conditions and to do our best to prevent trade with the enemy through neutral countries? If they say “Yes,” as they are bound in fairness to say, then I would say to them, “Do let chambers of commerce, or whatever it may be in neutral countries, do their best to

make it easy for us to distinguish." Take the case of the "Stockholm," the Swedish ship, the other day. When it was pointed out what great inconvenience we were causing by detaining that ship it was also suggested that in order to avoid detention in future there should be some understanding or some means of making it sure to us that the cargo was *bonâ fide* a Swedish cargo and not going to the enemy. That is the sort of thing we welcome.

What we ask of them, as we cannot avoid causing inconvenience and in some cases loss, is that they will help us to distinguish by making the distinction *bonâ-fide* trade and thereby minimise the inconvenience. If, on the other hand, the answer is that we are not entitled to do that, or to attempt to prevent trade through the neutral countries to the enemy, then I must say definitely that if neutral countries were to take that line it is a departure from neutrality. I do not understand that they do take that line. It is quite true that there are things in the last Note from the United States Government which, if we were to concede them, would make it in practice absolutely impossible to prevent goods, even contraband, going wholesale through neutral countries to the enemy. If you were to concede all that was asked in the last Note of the United States you might just as well give up trying to prevent goods, even contraband goods, going through neutral countries to the enemy, but I do not understand that that is the intention or attitude of the United States Government or of any other Government. After all, I would say this: If there was a war in which a belligerent was entitled to use to the utmost every power, or every fair development of a power which has been exercised by any belligerent in

previous wars, and recognised by international law, that applies to our Allies and ourselves in this War. As to the complaints as to our interference with trade, what has Germany done? She has declared arbitrarily a part of the high seas a war zone, and in that zone she has continually sunk merchant vessels without notice or warning, with no precautions for the safety of the crews, sowing it with mines which sink merchant vessels, neutrals as well as belligerents. The sinking of merchant vessels is not confined to belligerents. A neutral vessel is sunk again and again by German submarines without warning, without inquiry as to the nature of its cargo, and without regard even to its destination, because they have been sunk proceeding from one neutral port to another neutral port and not coming to this country at all. In view of the criticism made to-day upon the action of the British Government and its Allies in interfering with trade, I would ask what would have been said by neutrals if we had done that? What would have been said if, instead of bringing cargoes into our Prize Court, bringing in the ship with the crew perfectly safe, the ship undamaged, the cargo untouched, examining it, and in some cases letting it go forward when satisfied that it is not destined for the enemy, and even in the worst case putting it into our Prize Court, so that if it turns out that we have made a mistake there can be a claim for compensation and the whole of the evidence can be examined—if, instead of doing that, we had sunk neutral vessels without regard to the character of their cargoes and without regard to the safety of the lives of innocent and defenceless crews? [AN HON. MEMBER: "And passengers!"] Well, of course, in regard to passengers, as the House knows, there has been consider-

able controversy between the United States Government and the enemy Government. They have taken up the point with regard to passengers where their own interests are concerned, but, with regard to the rest, the sinking of even neutral merchant vessels in this way, so far as I know nothing like the kind of protest has been made by neutral Governments that has been made with regard to some part of our own procedure which we believe to be perfectly justifiable in law, and which is, beyond all doubt, perfectly humane.

I understand that Germany justifies her action of that description by saying that it is retaliation upon us for stopping her food supply. The great case of stopping food supplies which Germany made the starting-ground for her illegal and inhuman policy being the fact that we detained the "Wilhelmina" early last February with foodstuffs to Germany. Was that the first instance of interfering with food supplies destined for the civil population in this War? Before that Germany had sunk two neutral vessels with cargoes of foodstuffs coming to open ports for the civil population of this country. She had requisitioned the food supply of the civil population of Belgium, and I understand that to-day confiscation goes on in the occupied districts of Poland. It was not till a powerful international organisation came into force to relieve the starvation of Belgians, whose food had been requisitioned by Germany in their own country—not till then—that there was any protection for the food of the civil population in the districts occupied by Germany. What right has Germany to complain of measures taken to interfere with her food supplies when, from the beginning of this War, her armed cruisers, so long as they could keep the seas, sunk neutral merchant

vessels with food for the civil population of this country, and in effect treated food where they found it as absolute contraband? That being so, what we say to neutrals is that we are entitled to claim the utmost rights to which we can fairly found a claim upon the recognised practice—practice which we ourselves have recognised—of other belligerents in previous wars.

Let us also bear this in mind. I do not say that we are exercising these measures of blockade the least bit more for our Allies than for ourselves. If we had no Allies I have no doubt that we should have done precisely the same thing, and, as the House says, it is our duty to this country to do it as effectively as possible. But do not let us forget that it is our duty to our Allies as well. We are in this War with Allies, a War forced upon Europe after every effort had been made to find a settlement which could perfectly easily have been found either by conference as we suggested, or by reference to The Hague Tribunal, as the Emperor of Russia suggested. Prussian militarism would not have any other settlement but war. We are now in this War with our Allies. I say nothing of what the actual conditions of peace will be, because those are things which we must discuss with our Allies and settle in common with them. But the great object to be attained—and, until it is attained, the War must proceed—is that there shall not again be this sort of militarism in Europe, which in time of peace causes the whole of the Continent discomfort by its continual menace, and then, when it thinks the moment has come that suits itself, plunges the Continent into war. The whole of our resources are engaged in the War. Our maximum effort, whether it be military, naval, or financial, is at the disposal of our

Allies in carrying on this contest. With them we shall see it through to the end, and we shall slacken no effort. Part of that effort is and must remain—whether it be in the interests of ourselves, or of our Allies—in the interests of the great cause, the great transcending cause which unites us all together, which makes us feel that national life will not be safe, that individual life will not be worth living, unless we can achieve successfully the object of this War,—that in that common cause we shall continue to exert all our efforts to put the maximum pressure possible upon the enemy; and part of that pressure must be and continue to be doing the most we can to prevent supplies going to or from the enemy, using the Navy to its full power, and in common with our Allies sparing nothing, whether it be military, naval, or financial effort, which this country can afford to see the thing through with them to the end.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-85 (April, 1907, to December, 1914). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

86. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. IV.

I. Turkish Official Documents. November, 1914.

II. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag. December 2, 1914.

III. The Belgian Gray Book. (July 24, August 29, 1914.) January, 1915.

87. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. V.

The French Yellow Book, Translated and Prepared for Parliament by the British Government. February, 1915.

88. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. V.

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89. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VI.

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92. To the Citizens of the Belligerent States, by G. Heymans. July, 1915.

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I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914—October 24, 1914.

II. Contraband of War, September 4, 1914—April 26, 1915.

III. Restraints of Commerce, February 6, 1915—September 7, 1915.

IV. Case of the William P. Frye, March 31, 1915—July 30, 1915. September, 1915.

95. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. X.

Official Correspondence Between the United States and Great Britain.

I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914—October 22, 1914.

II. Contraband of War, August 5, 1914—April 10, 1915.

III. Restraints of Commerce, December 26, 1914—July 31, 1915.

IV. Case of the Wilhelmina, February 15, 1915—April 8, 1915. October, 1915.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

SUPER-RESISTANCE



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MAY, 1916

No. 102

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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

It is the aim of the Association to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on pages 21 and 22.

Harold Goddard was born in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1878. He graduated from Amherst College in 1900 and taught mathematics there for the next two years. He then studied English at Columbia University, receiving the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1908. He taught English at Northwestern University and at Swarthmore College, where, since 1909, he has been Professor of English. He is the author of "Studies in New England Transcendentalism," and has contributed from time to time to the magazines.

SUPER-RESISTANCE

I

A NEW NAME FOR AN OLD REALITY

Non-resistance is at present the most misleading word in the English language. Since the outbreak of the war, it has deceived thousands. During the discussion of preparedness in this country, it will deceive thousands more. Great is the power of words. In the beginning is the word. And in the end, too, generally, is the word. For the simple reason that ninety-nine men out of a hundred take every word at its face value.

The origin of the term non-resistance is the English Bible, and the English Bible is usually infallible in things poetic. But this is the exception. For the word non-resistance is negative, while the thing itself is the most positive thing in the world. Fooled by its appearance, friends and foes of the idea it is supposed to embody vie with each other in diluting a mighty reality into an excellent substitute for nothing. They persist, for instance, in setting non-resistance over against force—as if it were not itself the most powerful of forces! They dwell on its passivity—as if it were not activity incarnate! They insist on its submissiveness (its enemies branding it as servility, its friends extolling it as a kind of high patience that stands meekly aside while material forces sweep to their destruction)—as if its one great end were not the reduction of other forces, the bending of other wills, to its own! And so they continue heap-

ing up its negative qualities until we come to conceive it as a cowed, spiritless, anaemic creature little fitted to inhabit this proud, pulsing, red-blooded world. Indeed we are lucky if we do not come to identify it with its exact opposite: cowardice.

What is needed is a fresh nomenclature. For my present purpose, then, I intend to surrender the unhappy term non-resistance to one set of its misinterpreters, letting it stand for the false, abject, cowardly type of non-resistance; while the true non-resistance I will call, what it is, super-resistance. An illustration will render the distinction clear.

THE THREE METHODS OF RESISTANCE

If you come home and find your youngest child shrieking at the top of his lungs for no apparent reason, there are, roughly speaking, three methods of handling the situation. First, you may turn him over and spank him, shut him up in the closet, threaten him with bears, bogies, or policemen; and so silence or attempt to silence him by assertion of your superior strength. That, whether the force be physical or spiritual, I call the method of resistance. Secondly, you may offer no opposition to his uproar, accept it passively by making no comment, paying no attention, retreating into the next room, thus leaving him in full possession of the floor, to cry himself out or otherwise solve his own difficulty. That, in our new nomenclature, I call the method of non-resistance. Thirdly, putting all irritation out of your heart and all sarcasm out of your voice, you may (if you are able) turn into a child yourself for a moment and sweep buoyantly into the room with the proposal that the two of you join forces and see if you can together make a sound loud enough to knock the clock off the mantel—with

that or whatever more ingenious burst of imagination you can command on the spur of the moment. That, if it succeeds in turning tears to smiles, I call the method of super-resistance.

(I do not assert, of course, that in this particular sphere of life the third method is always possible or best. The time, the place, and the child must be taken into account. But who can doubt that in general it represents the highest form of resistance of the three?)

The illustration I have used is a trivial one and it cannot be put on all fours (I chose it because nations are children, and the key to their conduct is in that fact), but it embodies principles that are far-reaching, and it exposes at once the absurdity of speaking of this third kind of resistance as passive, submissive, or lacking force. So far from lacking force, it is nothing but force itself further evolved, refined, etherealized. In moments of high physical well-being and in the face of trifling opposition, the normal man practices it spontaneously. To practice it at critical and nerve-trying moments and in the face of great obstacles is a mark of the highest order of humanity.

The test of super-resistance is its success—not its success in any vulgar sense but its success in turning into its own direction the force which it resists. Passive non-obedience may often thwart the power that commands, but it rarely converts it. Usually it only infuriates and so intensifies it. The person, man or child, who, when you ask him to do something, sits still and says nothing, is vastly more exasperating than the one who says, "I won't," or otherwise hits back. If your request was reasonable, his lack of consideration maddens you. If it was unreasonable, you feel your guilt and are inwardly perturbed. In either case, if you imi-

tate the noble example before you and hold your tongue, the non-resistance on both sides is complete. But the problem is not solved. It is only aggravated. You know, both of you, in your hearts, that you had better have come to blows. A symbol, and at the same time a *reductio ad absurdum*, of passive resistance is the case, of which there have been many instances, of the man and wife who live half a lifetime under the same roof without speaking to each other. Such, with rare exceptions, is the futility of non-resistance. Precisely the opposite of all this is true of super-resistance, which works by winning over the opposing will until it freely acquiesces. But the secret of its method cannot be explained. It is a matter of personality. It can only be observed, and, peradventure, caught.

EXAMPLES OF SUPER-RESISTANCE

If we could but free them from their mist of inherited associations, the supreme instances of this power would still be found in the life of Christ. Christ, with one glance, sending Peter out to weep bitterly; Christ working in the heart of Judas until, "he repented himself . . . and cast down the pieces of silver in the temple, and departed, and went and hanged himself;" Christ disturbing the peace of Pilate so that at last, if we may accept the spirit of tradition, he, too, took his own life; Christ, after death, overturning the Roman Empire itself;—these are examples, not of a power that did not resist, but of one that resisted miraculously and supremely.

For modern illustrations of the same power, the American turns instinctively to the life of Lincoln: Lincoln encountering selfish ambition and treachery in

his own cabinet and transforming the scorers and plotters into ardent admirers and loyal co-workers; or, most marvellous of all, Lincoln a potent presence at work behind the material resistance of the Northern armies with the result that the American Civil War has become one of the few wars of history the wounds of which bid fair to heal completely.

But it is literature even more than biography that abounds in examples of super-resistance, for it is the poets who seize and incarnate forces toward which the rest of humanity are vaguely groping. Some people seem to imagine that the literary vogue of this subject begins with Tolstoi. They could hardly be more mistaken. To go no further back or farther afield, English literature from Chaucer's tale of Patient Griselda (the most misunderstood of stories) to Shaw's *Androcles and the Lion* (which bids fair to rival Chaucer's work in befuddling the critics) never loses its interest in the higher modes of resistance. Shakespeare's "mercy," for example, is almost an Elizabethan synonym for super-force. Of his tragedies, the most sublime, *Lear*, and the most pathetic, *Othello*, are in a peculiar sense studies in super-resistance. It was super-resistance that transformed Lear from a tyrant into a saint. It was super-resistance that extorted from the dying villain, Edmund, the cry:

"I pant for life: some good I mean to do
Despite of mine own nature."

It was super-resistance that made the distracted Othello beg to be washed in gulfs of liquid fire.

And I mentioned Bernard Shaw. The heroes and heroines of Shaw's plays—Dick Dudgeon, Julius Cæsar, Lady Cicely, Major Barbara—walk like gods and god-

desses through their worlds, doing what they will and bending others to their wills as by enchantment, to the utter bewilderment of the ordinary men and women who fail to understand the super-force by which these amazing characters have their way. "I can see," says Captain Brassbound to one of the most purely delightful of them, Lady Cicely, "I can see that you have some clue to the world that makes all its difficulties easy to you; but I'm not clever enough to seize it. . . . I'm stupid. . . . Since you saw me for the first time . . . I've heard you say nothing that didn't make me laugh, or make me feel friendly, as well as telling me what to think and what to do." There is no secret about Lady Cicely's clue to the world. It was simply her abounding love for everybody. The secret is not what it was but how to get it. I imagine the best first step toward getting it is to come in contact with a few Lady Cicelys.

SPURIOUS VS. GENUINE FORMS OF SUPER-RESISTANCE

For super-resistance, as these examples show, does not consist in the physical act but in the personal relationship between the actors. Slaves and heroes often act in the same way. You can turn the other cheek to all eternity without being a Christian, without being anything but a snivelling coward. Super-resistance does not consist in letting the man who took away your coat have your cloak also. It consists in a genuine desire that he may be warm. It does not consist in going two miles with the man who compelled you to go one. It consists in striking up such an intimacy with him that you both forget to mark the mile-stones.

Now to do these things is exceedingly difficult. But to do things that externally resemble them is relatively easy. It is easy, for instance, to return good for evil

for the sake of making your enemy feel mean—if you are a hypocrite. It is easy to return good for evil out of a sense of “duty”—if you are a prig. It is easy to make no return at all for evil—if you are a dead man. (In this last case, all you have to do is to close your eyes and fold your hands as if you were in your coffin, locking the lid on the inside if the strain becomes too great.) To practice any one of these spurious forms of super-resistance requires no exceptional endowment. But to practice super-resistance itself calls for angelic qualities. The result is that he who attempts to practice it without the power succeeds only in producing a forgery—as, for centuries, ordinary human beings have attempted to be Christians and have succeeded too often only in becoming slaves. Non-resistance, indeed, might be defined as super-resistance that fails. Super-resistance might be defined as the true coin of which non-resistance is the counterfeit. Super-resistance means mastery. Non-resistance means lying down, falling under the Juggernaut, letting the powers that possess the world trample their victim in the mire. Perhaps the most tragic delusion of Christian history has been the belief that non-resistance can regenerate the evil-doer. If it could, the slave-drivers of the world would be its most regenerate class: American capitalists would be angels, Prussian junkers and Russian bureaucrats archangels, and Oriental priests and despots gods. It cannot do it. The force that can regenerate the evil-doer is super-resistance.

A present-day illustration of the confusion that comes out of a failure to make this distinction is what we may call the paradox of the “pardoning governor.” Why is it that one governor by a copious use of the pardoning power increases crime through a community while an-

other governor helps to wipe it out by the same method? Because, generally, the first is practicing non-resistance while the second is practicing super-resistance. But a better example still is the prison warden. There have been a number of wardens in the United States who have had conspicuous success in relaxing the rigors of prison discipline, extending the use of parole, bringing about the moral reform of individual prisoners. Each has been hailed as the discoverer of the penal system of the future. But the system tried elsewhere does not work—or works indifferently. Why? Because the secret lies not in the system but in the man.

SUPER-RESISTANCE A FORM OF LIFE AND NOT A CREED

Just here resides the central delusion on this whole subject, for it is precisely this idea—the supposition that because one man can practice super-resistance therefore anyone else can readily pick up the trick—that would dilute the mighty reality of super-resistance into the impotent creed of non-resistance.

Super-resistance is not to be had from any rule or formula. None of the worth while things of life is, though all of them are supposed to be, by little minds. Such *open-sesames*, indeed, can be made to sound very plausible. A sure formula for learning to swim, for example, is to jump into deep water and feel no fear. A certain rule for walking a narrow path on the edge of a precipice is to walk it just as you would a path of the same width across a pasture. Both prescriptions are absolutely infallible. But the average man will try them at his peril. The fact is, of course, that they are not rules to be followed at all. They are powers, skill, arts, to be achieved. The exceptional individual attains

them at a leap; the ordinary man must make them his by determined and laborious practice.

It is perfectly true that it is better, especially at a crisis, to fail through putting too high than through putting too low an estimate upon our powers. But it is better yet to succeed by estimating those powers aright. There may be no limit to the power of that faith that can remove mountains. But there are very strict limits to the power of you and me and the next man to command that faith at any given moment. These two truths are frequently confused. The man who, possessing no fear, throws away his stick in the presence of an enemy often makes the mistake of supposing that that act, which in reality is the mere sign and result of his fearlessness, is its cause. He leaps therefore to the conclusion that whoever else will throw away his stick will be endowed with like fearlessness. But it will not always work. Not that the powerful effect of bodily acts and attitude upon the mind is denied. Quite the contrary! But these, to reach in and permanently affect character, must usually be long persisted in. And the crisis may come before the habit is fixed. The lion-tamer may know that any man who keeps calm and looks the lion in the eye is safe in his cage, and he may be able to carry his knowledge into practice. But that does not mean that, on the strength of that knowledge, he should advise any casual by-stander to try the same experiment. It would be a counsel of lunacy.

II

PEACE-PREACHERS AND PEACE-MAKERS

And yet counsels of just this sort are abroad in the land today. Indeed, I have dwelt on these different

modes of individual resistance, not for their own sakes, but because they contain the key, I believe, to any intelligent discussion of the questions of preparedness and international peace.

Nations, like men, have open to them three fundamental methods of meeting a force that menaces them from without: resistance—the attempt to overwhelm that force by a greater force acting in the opposite direction; non-resistance—the attempt to frustrate that force by letting it exhaust itself through encountering no obstacles; and super-resistance—the attempt to convert that force by turning it into the opposite direction through the attraction of an imaginative substitute. The advocates of the first method, in its pure form, are called militarists. The advocates of the second and third methods are called, indiscriminately, pacifists. But if the first part of our discussion has been of any avail the identity of name will not blind us to the fact that the advocates of national non-resistance and the advocates of national super-resistance are diametrically opposed. Indeed, the abyss that divides them is far profounder than that which separates either of them from the militarist.

The average non-resistant pacifist prides himself on the doctrine that national morality should differ in no way from the best individual morality. It is true. But it is precisely this type of pacifist who forgets that truth most grievously in fashioning his own philosophy. As in the sphere of personal morality, he pins his faith to the belief that an end can be put to conflict by certain acts or refusals to act, forgetting that peace with honor and without clash of arms can come to a nation, as the corresponding state can come to an individual, only

through a clear ascendancy in super-force over the nations that would attack it.

And even if he escape the first error of the believer in non-resistance, he generally falls into the second. He preaches pacifism as if it were a truth that could be had for the asking, a rule that could be followed, a power that could come from the mere act of subscribing to a creed. He talks about its "acceptance" or "adoption," when, if he talk at all, he should talk about its practice or attainment. He advocates a dogma, when he should be creating a spirit. He attempts to turn into a principle what should remain a form of life. Let him look up his own name in the dictionary and he will discover that it is his part to make, not to preach, peace. Would we could always keep that distinction clear—between the peace-makers and the peace-preachers! As of old, it is the peace-makers that shall be called the children of God.

The peace-preacher is fond of declaring that it is righteousness that exalteth a nation—which is true and admirable. But he generally manages to imply that if a nation will only scrap its navy, it will thereby be exalted—which does not follow at all. Righteousness is no such negative thing. The mistake is exactly the mistake of supposing that the mere act of throwing away his gun will endow even a coward with a personal magnetism that can look down a wild beast or charm the heart of a highwayman. It is a delusion. These miraculous powers, national or individual, do not come at any such waving of a wand.

We have heard more than once since the outbreak of the war that if the Belgians and the French instead of resisting the invasion of the Germans had offered no obstacles, but had welcomed them hospitably to their cities, all would have been well with Belgium and France.

Now such an observation is arrant nonsense or profound wisdom according to the interpretation placed upon it. If the statement is purely hypothetical, if it means that two whole nations meeting a third invading nation in a spirit of complete human understanding and brotherly love would be sufficient to disarm it, the observation is true, though it is no more practically helpful than the observation that if France and Belgium had been inhabited solely by men of the type of Christ, St. Francis, and Shelley, there would have been no war. If, however, the statement is practical, if it means that it was within the power of the Belgian and French nations of August, 1914, to receive the invaders in this hospitable spirit and that they should have done so, the remark is the merest insanity. You might as well say that France should have had an army of 15,000,000 to meet the invader. The unanswerable retort in both cases, though in different senses, is the same: *France didn't have the men.*

All this is not to imply for a moment that the pacifist who uses this argument may not himself be a man in this higher sense. I have the honor of knowing more than one Quaker, who, if this country were wholly unarmed, would, I am confident, stand up in the face of a foreign invader and be shot, not like a slave but like a hero, if the alternative were to spill human blood himself. (What he would do if he saw his wife and children lined up to be shot, or worse, I prefer not to ask.) All honor to the man who can live up to such a creed, provided, always, as I believe he would, he could unnerve the soul of his enemy by his act. But surely such power of self-control should constitute for that Quaker no excuse to ask that this country should disarm itself, if he has to confess to himself that, under circumstances

like those just imagined, all but a handful of his countrymen would be transformed, not into heroes like himself, but, at worst, into shrinking cowards or clawing beasts, at best into creatures whose hearts and hands would reach out instinctively for the most blood-thirsty revenge. And even if he could conceivably justify casting his own vote toward disarmament, that would not justify his urging his weaker fellow-citizens to vote as he does. Not till he has imparted to them the secret of acting as he can!

NON-RESISTANCE AND MILITARISM EXTREMES THAT MEET

The pacifist who counts on the fact of disarmament does not perceive that he has gone clear around the circle and clasped hands with the militarist who counts on the fact of armament. But it is so. The militarist puts his faith in guns and powder. The pacifist puts his faith in their absence. They are equally deluded. *To rely on the absence of armed force is just as materialistic as to rely on its presence.* The things to rely on are national good-will, national imagination, national self-control. The things to fear are national greed, national ignorance, and national passion.

Why! it is intellectually paralyzing to hear extremists of either party talk on this subject. "An army is insurance against war." "An army is a standing provocative of war." "A navy is a species of police force." "A navy is a powder magazine awaiting ignition from the first chance spark." "Europe exploded because it was all so overarmed." "Europe exploded because the rest of Europe was not so well armed as Germany." "The lesson of the war is that preparedness will not keep the peace." "The lesson of the war is that the unpre-

pared nation will be crushed." Such talk is nonsense. As if ships sailed and guns went off of themselves! Armaments, like pistols and the police, are dangers or protections only in reference to the powers behind them, and the same navy might be insurance to one people and a constant menace to another.

To a hair-trigger nation or to a boldly avaricious nation a high degree of preparedness is manifestly a peril. To a self-controlled nation of high humanitarian ideals surrounded by powerful nations of lower standards, reasonable preparedness is plainly a wise precaution. Only when such a nation attains a clear ascendancy in super-force (to what that consists in I will come in a minute) is complete unpreparedness a possibility. The problem, in other words, instead of being the absurdly simple one that the average pacifist or militarist would make it, is staggeringly intricate, involving, as it does, not only an attempted calculation of the super-force of the nation but of the degree of susceptibility of the other nations to that type of resistance—for among nations, as among individuals, types of arrested development or of insanity may appear that not the most miraculous super-force can control.

NATIONAL SUPER-FORCE AND ITS MOBILIZATION

But in what does national super-force consist?

The power of super-resistance of a nation cannot be defined any more than can that of the individual. We might say it is the sum of the separate powers of super-resistance of its inhabitants in so far as those powers are nationally vocal and effective. We might say it is measured by the degree of dedication of its government to the growth and welfare of every human being within

its borders and thus of its dedication to the growth and welfare of humanity as a whole. We might call it simply a nation's international good-will. Such generalities would mean little. But that does not alter the fact that national super-resistance is a reality as actual as is the personal magnetism of a strong and sympathetic individual. Furthermore, it is only the presence of this force in its fullness that can take the place of arms. It is only the presence of this force in some measure that can render arms safe to the nation that bears them.

Does anyone need to be told, for instance, that if the United States really were the democracy, the refuge for the oppressed, the land of equal opportunity, which in popular cant it is supposed to be, and which in actual fact it feebly tries to be—does anyone need to be told that such a United States could stand in absolute safety among the nations of the world, utterly unarmed? Does anyone need to be told, either, that such a United States could be armed to the teeth quite without danger to herself or to her neighbors?

Does anyone suppose that if Belgium had been a little Utopia, a model society for the world, Germany would have dared to trample her into the mire? Not for a moment. Not if Germany were twice the brute that her bitterest enemies would make her out.

Remote as these extreme cases may be from present reality, they point out the only real road to peace. National super-force, like personal super-force, works through the method of the compelling imaginative substitute. Nations are like children, especially when they are on the edge of war. (Persons who put supreme faith in arbitration should try reasoning with a child in a fit of the tantrums.) And a nation in an ugly mood must be overruled by a power to which, willingly or

unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously, it looks up. It must be managed by distracting its attention to something more interesting than war. The only power adequate to the super-resistance of the Prussian war-game is the Utopian state-game.

Now if any man is fatuous enough to suppose that the United States can rely for its safety on its present progress toward Utopia, he would do well to expose himself for a time to prevalent European opinion of our materialism and greed. False and exaggerated as most of that opinion is, it would act as a salutary corrective of his moral complacency. To awaken from complacency, indeed, is the first step the United States must take if it desires peace for itself and to help bring peace to the world. That step taken, it must cease squandering its inheritance and set about the task of mobilizing its disintegrated forces of super-resistance—social, industrial, political, educational and religious. It must wipe out the stigma of dollar-worship by fashioning a creative national purpose. It must focus on itself the admiration of the world by making an America where men are free in fact as well as in name. The program for that work must be bold and imaginative. No half-measures will suffice at this crisis of world history. And the working-relation that the political part of that program should bear to the question of military preparedness is this: *No increase in armament that is not coupled with some social amelioration, some enhancement of genuine democracy, is entitled to a moment's consideration from the American people.* That is the crux of the whole matter. Only as a nation's power of super-resistance is increased can that nation with impunity increase the size of the stick that it carries.

It is not enough to say: we will strengthen the nation's

right arm first; and *afterward* we will teach the nation itself not to abuse its strength. The second step rather should be the indispensable condition of the first—for on it depends the tremendous question whether the nation shall dominate or be dominated by the instruments of war. We may well take a lesson here from the recent attitude of English labor. English labor demanded as a condition of its participation in the European war, a fuller recognition of its place and power. English labor was precisely and profoundly right in that demand. (Indeed, the rational sympathy for the Allies in this country is grounded on the belief that such things can happen more readily in England and France than in Germany.) Every worker in America, be his work manual, mental, or imaginative, should place himself on a similar platform with regard to the military future of this country. And there are, at the outset, two very concrete openings for such demands—openings that fortunately can be made a test and touchstone of the character of every representative of the people now in public life. In the first place, hand in hand with new armaments must go the taxation that is to pay for them. If it is decided that new armaments are necessary to ward off dangers from without, let it be demanded at the very least that the new taxation make for greater equality and justice within. And a second condition of added armament should be the abolition, or the beginning of the abolition, of private profit in the manufacture of the instruments of war. To win immunity from foreign attack at the price of subjugation to Kruppism would be for the American people a humiliation far profounder than the most crushing defeat at the hands of Germany or Japan that the nightmares of the most panic-stricken militarist ever conjured up.

III

THE PACIFIC PARADOX

And so the end of the whole matter is a paradox: the paradox that he who would seek peace must seek something else first. For peace—like those other ultimate things, beauty and happiness—must be wooed indirectly. It is written that he only shall attain beauty who loves life more than he loves art. It is written that he only shall obtain happiness who loves labor more than he loves pleasure. It is written that that nation only shall gain peace that loves humanity more than it loves the absence of strife and bloodshed.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second-class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN WAR. SERIES No. XIII.

Memorandum of the Imperial German Government on the
Treatment of Armed Merchantmen



JUNE, 1916

No. 103

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

It is the aim of the Association to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on pages 28 to 30.

MEMORANDUM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON THE TREATMENT OF ARMED MERCHANTMEN

[Translation.]

I

1. Even before the outbreak of the present war the British Government had given English shipping companies the opportunity to arm their merchant vessels with guns. On March 26, 1913, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, made the declaration in the British Parliament (Exhibit 1) that the Admiralty had called upon the shipowners to arm a number of first-class liners for protection against danger threatening in certain cases by fast auxiliary cruisers of other powers; the liners were not, however, to assume the character of auxiliary cruisers themselves. The Government desired to place at the disposal of the shipowners the necessary guns, sufficient ammunition, and suitable personnel for the training of the gun crews.

* 2. The English shipowners readily responded to the call of the Admiralty. Thus Sir Owen Philipps, president of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, was able to inform the stockholders of his company in May, 1913, that the large steamers of the company were equipped with guns; furthermore, the British Admiralty published in January, 1914, a list, according to which 29 steamers of various British lines carried guns aft.

3. As a matter of fact, German cruisers ascertained soon after the outbreak of the war that British liners were armed. For example, the steamer *La Correntina*, of the Houlder Line, of Liverpool, which was captured by the German auxiliary cruiser *Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm* on October 7, 1914, had two 4.7-inch guns aft. On February 1, 1915, a German submarine was shelled in the Channel by an English yacht.

II

1. With regard to the legal character of armed merchantmen in international law, the British Government took the position in respect of its own merchantmen that such vessels retain the character of peaceable merchant vessels as long as they carry the arms for defensive purposes only. In accordance with this, the British Ambassador at Washington, in a note dated August 25, 1914 (Exhibit 2), gave the American Government the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels were never armed for purposes of attack, but solely for defense, and that they consequently never fire unless first fired upon. On the other hand, the British Government set up the principle for armed vessels of other flags that they are to be treated as war vessels. Number 1 of Order 1 of the Prize Court Rules, promulgated by the Order in Council of August 5, 1914, expressly provides "ship of war shall include armed ship."

2. The German Government has no doubt that a merchantman assumes a warlike character by armament with guns, regardless of whether the guns are intended to serve only for defense or also for attack. It considers any warlike activity of an enemy merchantman contrary to international law, although it accords consideration to the opposite view by treating the crew of such a vessel not as pirates but as belligerents. The details of its position are set forth in the memorandum on the treatment of armed merchantmen in neutral ports (Exhibit 3) communicated to the American Government in October, 1914, the contents of which were likewise communicated to other neutral powers.

3. Some of the neutral powers have accepted the position of the British Government and therefore permitted armed merchantmen of the belligerent powers to stay in their ports and on their roadsteads without the restrictions which they had imposed on ships of war through their neutrality regulations. Some, however, have taken the contrary view and subjected armed merchantmen of belligerents to the neutrality rules applicable to ships of war.

III

1. During the course of the war the armament of British merchantmen has been more and more generally carried out. From reports of the German naval forces numerous cases became known in which British merchantmen not only offered armed resistance to the German war vessels, but proceeded to attack them on their own initiative, and in so doing they frequently even made use of false flags. A list of such cases is found in Exhibit 4, which, from the nature of the matter can include only a part of the attacks which were actually made. It is also shown by this list that the practice described is not limited to British merchantmen, but is imitated by the merchantmen of England's allies.

2. The explanation of the action of the armed British merchantmen described is contained in Exhibits 5 to 12, which are photographic reproductions of secret instructions of the British Admiralty found by German naval forces on captured ships. These instructions regulate in detail artillery attack by British merchantmen on German submarines. They contain exact regulations touching the reception, treatment, activity, and control of the British gun crews taken on board merchantmen; for example, the crew are not to wear uniform in neutral ports and thus plainly belong to the British navy. Above all, it is shown by the instructions that these armed vessels are not to await any action of maritime war on the part of the German submarines, but are to attack them forthwith. In this respect the following regulations are particularly instructive:

a. The "Instructions for Guidance in the Use, Care, and Maintenance of Armament in Defensively Armed Merchant Ships" (Exhibits 5 and 6) provide in the section headed "Action," in Number

4: "It is not advisable to open fire at a range greater than 800 yards, unless the enemy has already opened fire." From this it is the duty of the merchantman in principle to open fire without regard to the attitude of the submarine.

b. The "Instructions Regarding Submarines Applicable to Vessels Carrying a Defensive Armament" (Exhibits 9 and 10) prescribe under Number 3: "If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship, by day, and it is evident to the Master that she has hostile intentions, the ship pursued should open fire in self-defense, notwithstanding the submarine may not have committed a definite hostile act, such as firing a gun or torpedo." From this also the mere appearance of a submarine in the wake of a merchantman affords sufficient occasion for an armed attack.

In all these orders, which do not apply merely to the zone of maritime war around England, but are unrestricted in their applicability (see Exhibit 12 for the Mediterranean), the greatest emphasis is laid on secrecy, plainly in order that the action of merchantmen, which is in absolute contradiction of international law and of the British assurances (Exhibit 2), might remain concealed from the enemy as well as the neutrals.

3. It is thus made plain that the armed British merchantmen have official orders to attack the German submarines treacherously wherever they come near them; that is to say orders to conduct relentless warfare against them. Since England's rules of maritime war are adopted by her allies without question, the proof must be taken as valid in request of the armed merchantmen of the other enemy countries also.

IV

1. In the circumstances set forth above enemy merchantmen armed with guns no longer have any right to be considered as peaceable merchantmen. Therefore the German naval forces will receive orders within a short period, paying consideration to the interests of the neutrals, to treat such vessels as belligerents.

2. The German Government brings this status of affairs to the knowledge of the neutral powers in order that they may warn their nationals against continuing to entrust their persons or property to armed merchantmen of the powers at war with the German Empire.

BERLIN, February 8, 1916.

EXHIBIT 1

DECLARATION OF THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, WINSTON CHURCHILL, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS MARCH 26, 1913.

(Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, 3d Session of the 30th Parliament, House of Commons, 1913, vol. 1, pp. 1776 and 1777.)

I turn to one aspect of trade protection which requires special reference. It was made clear at the second Hague Conference and the London Conference, that certain of the great powers have reserved to themselves the right to convert merchant steamers into cruisers, not merely in national harbors, but if necessary on the high seas. There is now good reason to believe that a considerable number of foreign merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed ships by the mounting of guns. The sea-borne trade of the world follows well-marked routes, upon nearly all of which the tonnage of the British mercantile marine largely predominates. Our food-carrying liners and vessels carrying raw material following these trade routes would in certain contingencies meet foreign vessels armed and equipped in the manner described. If the British ships had no armament, they would be at the mercy of any foreign liner carrying one effective gun and a few rounds of ammunition. It would be obviously absurd to meet the contingency of considerable numbers of foreign armed merchant cruisers on the high seas by building an equal number of cruisers. That would expose this country to an expenditure of money to meet a particular danger, altogether disproportionate to the expense caused to any foreign power in creating that danger. Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found, will be covered and met by British ships of war, but the proper reply to an armed merchantman is another merchantman armed in her own defense.

This is the position to which the Admiralty have felt it necessary to draw the attention of leading shipowners. We have felt justified in pointing out to them the danger to life and property which would be incurred if their vessels were totally incapable of offering any defense to an attack. The shipowners have responded to the Admiralty invitation with cordiality, and substantial progress has been made in the direction of meeting it by preparing as a defensive measure to equip a number of first-class British liners to repel the attack of armed foreign merchant cruisers. Although these vessels have, of course, a wholly different status from that of the regularly commissioned merchant cruisers, such as those we obtain under the Cunard agreement, the Admiralty have felt that the greater part of the cost of the necessary equipment should not fall upon the owners, and we have decided, therefore, to lend the necessary guns, to supply ammunition, and to provide for the training of members of the ship's company to form the guns crews. The owners on their part are paying the cost of the necessary structural conversion, which is not great. The British mercantile marine will, of course,

have the protection of the Royal Navy under all possible circumstances, but it is obviously impossible to guarantee individual vessels from attack when they are scattered on their voyages all over the world. No one can pretend to view these measures without regret, or without hoping that the period of retrogression all over the world which has rendered them necessary may be succeeded by days of broader international confidence and agreement than those through which we are now passing.

EXHIBIT 2

ABSTRACT FROM THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

"European War No. 2, Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Duties." Page 41.

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

No. 289.]

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Washington, August 25, 1914.

SIR: With reference to Mr. Barclay's notes Nos. 252 and 259 of the 4th and 9th of August, respectively, fully explaining the position taken up by His Majesty's Government in regard to the question of armed merchantmen, I have the honour, in view of the fact that a number of British armed merchantmen will now be visiting United States ports, to reiterate that the arming of British merchantmen is solely a precautionary measure adopted for the purpose of defence against attack from hostile craft.

I have at the same time been instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to give the United States Government the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes of attack, that they are merely peaceful traders armed only for defence, that they will never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never under any circumstances attack any vessel.

I have, etc.,

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

EXHIBIT 3

PROMEMORIA OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON THE TREATMENT OF ARMED MERCHANTMEN IN NEUTRAL PORTS OF OCTOBER 13, 1914.

According to an official announcement of the *Westminster Gazette* of September 21, 1914, the State Department in Washington has decreed that ships of a belligerent Power, provided with armament and ammunition are nevertheless in American ports to be treated as merchantmen in so far as the armament is to serve exclusively for purposes of defence. This decree does not take the principles of neutrality sufficiently into consideration.

The purpose of the artilleristic armament of the British merchantmen is armed resistance against the German cruisers. Such a resistance is contrary to international law, because a merchantman is not permitted military defence against a man-of-war; such action would entitle the man-of-war to sink the merchantman with her crew and passengers. It is open to doubt whether ships armed in this manner may be received at all in the ports of a neutral State. At any rate, such ships cannot enjoy in neutral ports any better treatment than genuine men-of-war intended for the legitimate prosecution of war; hence they would at least be subject to the rules which the neutral State has issued in restriction of the stay of the men-of-war of belligerent States.

If the American Government believes it is fulfilling its duty of neutrality by confining admission of armed merchantmen to ships exclusively equipped for defence, it must be pointed out that in order to establish the warlike character of a ship the distinction between arms of attack and arms of defence is of no moment; what is decisive is rather the question whether the ship is intended for any warlike activity whatever. Moreover, limitations in the extent of the armament offer no guarantee that ships armed in that manner will not in a given case be used for purposes of attack.

EXHIBIT 4

[Translation.]

LIST OF CASES IN WHICH ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPS HAVE FIRED ON GERMAN OR AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SUBMARINES.

Date.	Place.	Nationality and name of the ship.	Details Concerning the Circumstances.
1915. Apr. 11	South North Sea, near the Nordhinder lightship.	Unknown steamer.	Steamer without flag. Steamer saw periscope, opened gun-fire at about 3,000 meters and turned toward U . . . Explosion of shells could be heard near the submarine (about 15 to 20 shots).
Apr. 28	North Sea, about 60 nautical miles NE. of the mouth of the Tyne.	Unknown steamer of medium size.	Steamer was sighted coming toward submarine, suddenly opened fire at about 3,000 meters without hoisting flag. On account of her head-on position it could not be seen whether she bore neutral marks. From the impact of the projectiles the guns were from 5 to 7 centimeters. U . . . escaped the well-directed fire by speedily submerging.
May 29	West entrance to the English Channel, near Ouessant (Ushant Island).	British S. S. <i>Demetera</i> .	U . . . chased the steamer and tried when 4,500 meters off to stop her by warning shots. Steamer turned off and answered the fire.
June 3	West entrance to the English channel, 50 sea miles south of the Scilly Isles.	Unknown steamer.	U . . . tried to stop steamer after warning shot by fire from her guns. Steamer returned the fire with a poop gun.
June 14	West of the Hebrides (about 30 sea miles off Lewis).	Two unknown steamers.	The two steamers were running close together. When at a distance of about 4,000 meters both opened fire on U . . . with small calibre poop guns. Shots fell badly sideways. Submarine submerged, ran deep since submarine attack hopeless.

Date.	Place.	Nationality and name of the ship.	Details Concerning the Circumstances.
1915. Aug. 14	Irish Sea.....	Large British steamer of the Royal Mail Line.	U . . . was suddenly fired on by steamer without any provocation. Shots fell short. No attack had been attempted on steamer.
Aug. 18	Bristol Channel....	Unknown steamer.	Tried after warning to stop steamer by gun-fire. When latter saw that U-boat waited, she suddenly fired from a gun on her promenade deck.
Sept. 10	West Mediterranean.do.....	Steamer was called upon to show her flag. She turned off without hoisting flag and opened fire from a poop gun of about 10 centimeters. The U-boat escaped fire, speedily submerging.
Oct. 7	Middle Mediterranean.	French S. S. <i>Amiral Hamelin</i> .	U . . . stopped steamer by signal. She turned and ran away in a zigzag course. The U-boat tried to stop her by gun-fire. Steamer at 3,000 meters' distance replied to fire. Steamer stopped only after some time and was sunk later.
Nov. 3	Western Mediterranean.	British transport steamer <i>Woodfield</i> .	Steamer did not stop after warning shot. At 6,000 meters replied to fire with small calibre gun. Compelled to stop by gun-fire and sunk later. Her crew list showed that she had a gun captain and a gun crew from the navy among her crew.
Nov. 5	Western Mediterranean.	Unknown steamer.	The large steamer was chased by U . . . after fruitless warning. She returned fire with a large calibre gun. Chase had to be abandoned.

Date.	Place.	Nationality and name of the ship.	Details Concerning the Circumstances.
1915. Nov. 6	Eastern Mediter- ranean.	British tank steamer <i>Lumina</i> .	Steamer was summoned to stop by warning shot. Turned off, ran away and returned fire with a poop gun. Was stopped by gun-fire and sunk later.
Nov. 23	Western Mediter- ranean.	British S.S. <i>City of Marseilles</i> .	U . . . tried after warning shot to stop large freight steamer by artillery fire. Steamer turned off and replied to fire with two guns of 10 centimeters' calibre. The U-boat had to abandon chase, because steamer escaped. A newspaper telegram from Bombay of January 1, 1916, confirmed the incident in detail; steamer told she had sunk the U-boat.
Nov. 30	Middle Mediter- ranean.	Unknown steamer.	U . . . after warning shot tried to stop a large steamer without flag by gun-fire. Steamer turned and replied to fire by a small calibre gun.
Dec. 8	Eastern Mediter- ranean.do.....	Steamer was approached under water. She fired from a poop gun at the periscope as soon as it emerged.
Dec. 13	Middle Mediter- ranean.	Unknown British steamer.	U . . . tried to stop a large steamer with poop guns, carrying no flag, by artillery-fire. Steamer hoisted British flag and replied to fire from two guns.
Dec. 14do.....	Unknown steamer.	U . . . approached steamer, which stopped when sighting U-boat, and ordered her to show her flag. Steamer ran away at top-speed, keeping up a brisk fire from a poop gun.
1916. Jan. 17do.....do.....	U . . . ordered a steamer, apparently in ballast, sighted on a westerly course to stop. Steamer turned off, ran away and fired from a poop gun.

Date.	Place.	Nationality and name of the ship.	Details Concerning the Circumstances.
1916. Jan. 17	Middle Mediter- ranean.	British S. S. <i>Melanie</i> .	U . . . signaled a flush-decked freight steamer of about 3,000 tons, sailing under the Dutch flag, to send a boat in order that the ship's papers might be examined. This was done after a while. When U . . . , which had submerged for safety's sake emerged about 1,000 meters from the steamer near the ship's boat, the steamer opened a violent fire from two guns of medium calibre and from machine guns, U . . . barely succeeding to save herself by quickly submerging. Throughout the action the steamer flew the Dutch flag; she bore the name of <i>Melanie</i> , which is not found in the Dutch but in the British marine list.

EXHIBIT 5

Found on the English Steamer Woodfield

Confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GUIDANCE IN THE USE, CARE, AND MAINTENANCE OF ARMAMENT IN DEFENSIVELY ARMED MERCHANT SHIPS.

General.

1. Ratings embarked as gun's crew will sign the ship's articles at the rate of pay communicated.
2. They are to obey the orders of the Master and Officers of the ship. If they think it necessary to make a complaint against any order they are to obey the order and make their complaint in writing, asking that it may be forwarded to the proper authorities.
3. The ratings are not required for duties unconnected with the armament except in case of emergency, but they are to assist at all times in the welfare of the ship and look after the cleanliness of their berths.
4. They are to keep watch and watch at sea, and also when the ship is anchored in any place liable to attack by submarines.
5. They will receive their pay through the Master of the ship. They will not mess with the crew, but in one of the Officers' messes as the Master may decide.
6. Uniform is not to be worn in neutral ports.
7. A brief report is to be rendered by the senior rating on the 1st of each month, countersigned by the Master, and sent to:—
The Director of Trade Division,
Admiralty, Whitehall, S. W.

Drill and Maintenance of Gun.

8. The ratings embarked are entirely responsible for the efficiency in all respects of the gun and ammunition, which should be ready day and night.
9. The senior rating is to arrange with the Master to detail the necessary additional men to complete the gun's crew up to the numbers required by the drill book.
10. One of the ratings is to act as gunlayer and the other as breech worker. The remaining numbers should be told off to act as sightsetter, projectile loader, and cartridge loader, etc.
11. Arrangements are to be made with the master to detail a sufficient number of hands, over and above the gun's crew, to supply ammunition to the gun on going into action.

12. A ready supply of 10 complete rounds, with percussion tubes in the cartridges, is to be kept at the gun day and night. Care should be taken that a supply of one percussion tube to each cartridge is kept aside for action, and this supply of tubes is never to be encroached on for practice firing.

13. The senior rating should arrange with the Master for the instruction of the ratings told off as gun's crew and ammunition supply party.

14. A drill book is supplied for information, but it is not necessary that the gun's crew should be burdened with details, provided that they understand what is required when the gun is to be fought.

15. Percussion firing should always be used, as it is the most certain means of discharging the gun and therefore—

(a) Cartridges, in ready supply only, should be kept ready tubed with percussion tubes. Tubes not required for ready supply of cartridges should be retained in their sealed boxes to preserve them from damp.

(b) Aiming practice with a percussion lanyard should be carried out daily. It is not necessary to fire a tube in this practice but the breechworker should be exercised at the same time in cocking the striker while the breech is open, and in hooking on the firing lanyard and passing it to the gunlayer.

NOTE.—The present allowance of percussion tubes is one per cartridge. Electric firing mechanism and batteries are therefore to be kept efficient in every respect in case the supply of percussion tubes becomes insufficient, from damp or other causes.

16. Great attention is to be paid to the ready supply of ammunition, to keep it clean and dry. If tubes and cartridges are not kept dry there is considerable danger of hanging fire. The projectiles are to be lightly oiled. In case the cartridges are suspected to have become wet, they should be laid aside until return to harbour.

17. For the maintenance of the gun and mounting it is to be borne in mind that "lubrication is the secret of efficiency in gun machinery." All oil channels should be seen clear of vaseline and filled with oil. It is to be remembered that vaseline is a preservative only; oil is a lubricant.

Each morning and evening the bore is to be seen clear, recoil cylinders filled, striker protrusion gauged, and the gun trained and elevated to both extremes.

The gun is to be cleaned twice a day, gear being supplied by the master.

Brickdust is *not* to be used on machined surfaces.

Action.

The master is responsible for handling the ship and for opening and ceasing fire. He has been furnished with instructions which will enable him to do this to the best advantage. The duty of the gun's crew is to fight the gun under the general direction of the master, who will communicate to them so much of the instructions as he may consider necessary to enable them to fight the gun to the best advantage.

In action the following instructions should be carried out:

(1) When in submarine waters, everything should be in a state of readiness, but the gun should not be kept actually loaded.

(2) When the enemy is engaged—

(a) The point of aim should be the centre of the water line.

(b) It is to be remembered that "over" shots are useless. A short shot by causing a splash confuses the enemy. It may ricochet into the enemy. If the shell bursts on striking the water—as it usually does—some fragments are likely to hit the enemy. To get the best result, at least half of the shots fired should fall short.

(3) The master will probably keep the submarine astern so that little deflection will be necessary.

(4) It is not advisable to open fire at a range greater than 800 yards, unless the enemy has already opened fire, for the following reasons—

(a) The ammunition supply is limited.

(b) Accurate shooting under probable existing conditions cannot be expected at greater range.

(5) When in action and a miss-fire occurs with a percussion tube, the following procedure is to be adopted—

(a) The B. M. lever is to be tapped to ensure it is closed.

(b) The striker is to be recocked.

If the gun does not then fire: The striker is to be taken out to ensure that the point is not broken. If unbroken the breech is to be opened and the cartridge is to be thrown overboard, it having been ascertained that the percussion tube has been inserted.

The gun is then to be reloaded.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CARRYING OUT FIRING PRACTICE

1. In order to ensure that the gun is maintained in an efficient condition, one round is to be fired every two months.

2. In order to prevent false alarms it is essential that the firing referred to in paragraph 1 shall take place in clear weather and out of sight of land *and of other ships.*

3. If convenient a cask or other suitable object should be dropped as a target and the gun should be fired when the range is about 800 yards.

4. The gun's crew and ammunition supply party should be exercised on the day previous to the practice, and also immediately before firing.

5. Before practice firing the following procedure is to be carried out:

(a) Recoil cylinders and tanks are to be seen filled.

(b) Bore is to be seen clear.

(c) Moveable objects in the way of blast from the gun are to be removed.

(d) The striker is to be examined to see—

(1) That sheath net is screwed up and keep pin in place and intact.

(2) That needle set and check-nuts are screwed up.

(3) That striker does not protrude with B. M. lever in open position.

(4) That striker does not move forward till marks on breech block and gun are in line.

(5) That safety stop is correct and keep-screw is in place.

ADMIRALTY,

May 7, 1915.

EXHIBIT 6

Found on the English Steamer Woodfield

Confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GUIDANCE IN THE USE, CARE, AND MAINTENANCE OF ARMAMENT IN DEFENSIVELY ARMED MERCHANT SHIPS.

General.

1. Ratings embarked as gun's crew will sign the ship's articles at the rate of pay communicated.
2. They are to obey the orders of the Master and Officers of the ship. If they think it necessary to make a complaint against any order, they are to obey the order and make their complaint in writing, asking that it may be forwarded to the proper authorities.
3. The ratings are not required for duties unconnected with the armament except in case of emergency, but they are to assist at all times in the welfare of the ship and look after the cleanliness of their berths.
4. They are to keep watch and watch at sea, and also when the ship is anchored in any place liable to attack by submarines.
5. They will receive their pay through the Master of the ship. They will not mess with the crew, but as the Master may decide.
6. Uniform is not to be worn in neutral ports.
7. A brief report is to be rendered by the senior rating on the 1st of each month, countersigned by the Master, and sent to:—
The Director of Trade Division,
Admiralty, Whitehall, S. W.

Drill and Maintenance of Gun.

8. The ratings embarked are entirely responsible for the efficiency in all respects of the gun and ammunition, which should be ready day and night.
9. The senior rating is to arrange with the master to detail the necessary additional men to complete the gun's crew up to the numbers required by the drill book.
10. One of the ratings is to act as gun layer and the other as breech worker. The remaining numbers should be told off to act as sight setter, projectile loader, and cartridge loader, etc.
11. Arrangements are to be made with the Master to detail a sufficient number of hands, over and above the gun's crew, to supply ammunition to the gun on going into action.
12. A ready supply of 10 complete rounds, with percussion tubes in the cartridges, is to be kept at the gun day and night. Care should be taken that a supply of one percussion tube to each cartridge is kept aside for action, and this supply of tubes is never to be encroached on for practice firing.

13. The senior rating should arrange with the master for the instruction of the ratings told off as gun's crew and ammunition supply party.

14. A drill book is supplied for information, but it is not necessary that the gun's crew should be burdened with details, provided that they understand what is required when the gun is to be fought.

15. Percussion firing should always be used, as it is the most certain means of discharging the gun; and therefore—

(a) Cartridges, in ready supply only, should be kept ready tubed with percussion tubes. Tubes not required for ready supply of cartridges should be retained in their sealed boxes to preserve them from damp.

(b) Aiming practice with a percussion lanyard should be carried out daily. It is not necessary to fire a tube in this practice, but the breech worker should be exercised at the same time in cocking the striker while the breech is open and in hooking on the firing lanyard and passing it to the gun layer.

NOTE.—The present allowance of percussion tubes is one per cartridge. Electric firing mechanism and batteries are therefore to be kept efficient in every respect in case the supply of percussion tubes becomes insufficient from damp or other causes.

16. Great attention is to be paid to the ready supply of ammunition to keep it clean and dry. If tubes and cartridges are not kept dry there is considerable danger of hanging fire. The projectiles are to be lightly oiled. In case the cartridges are suspected to have become wet they should be laid aside until return to harbour.

17. For the maintenance of the gun and mounting it is to be borne in mind that "lubrication is the secret of efficiency in gun machinery." All oil channels should be seen clear of vaseline and filled with oil. It is to be remembered that vaseline is a preservative only; oil is a lubricant.

Each morning and evening the bore is to be seen clear, recoil cylinders filled, striker protrusion gauged, and the gun trained and elevated to both extremes.

The gun is to be cleaned twice a day, gear being supplied by the master.

Brickdust is *not* to be used on machined surfaces.

Action.

The master is responsible for handling the ship and for opening and ceasing fire. He has been furnished with instructions which will enable him to do this to the best advantage. The duty of the gun's crew is to fight the gun under the general direction of the master, who will communicate to them so much of the instructions as he may consider necessary to enable them to fight the gun to the best advantage.

In action the following instructions should be carried out:

(1) When in submarine waters everything should be in a state of readiness, but the gun should not be kept actually loaded.

(2) When the enemy is engaged—

(a) The point of aim should be the centre of the water line.

(b) It is to be remembered that "over" shots are useless. A short shot by causing a splash confuses the enemy. It may ricochet into the enemy. If the shell bursts on striking the water, as it usually does, some fragments are likely to hit the enemy. To get the best results at least half of the shots fired should fall short.

(3) The master will probably keep the submarine astern, so that little deflection will be necessary.

(4) It is not advisable to open fire at a range greater than 800 yards, unless the enemy has already opened fire, for the following reasons:

(a) The ammunition supply is limited.

(b) Accurate shooting under probable existing conditions can not be expected at greater ranges.

(5) When in action and a miss fire occurs with a percussion tube, the following procedure is to be adopted:

(a) The B. M. lever is to be tapped to insure it is closed.

(b) The striker is to be recocked.

If the gun does not then fire, the striker is to be taken out to insure that the point is not broken. If unbroken, the breech is to be opened and the cartridge is to be thrown overboard, it having been ascertained that the percussion tube has been inserted.

The gun is then to be reloaded.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CARRYING OUT FIRING PRACTICE

1. In order to ensure that the gun is maintained in an efficient condition, one round is to be fired every two months.

2. In order to prevent false alarms it is essential that the firing referred to in paragraph 1 shall take place in clear weather and out of sight of land *and of other ships*.

3. If convenient a cask or other suitable object should be dropped as a target, and the gun should be fired when the range is about 800 yards.

4. The gun's crew and ammunition supply party should be exercised on the day previous to the practice, and also immediately before firing.

5. Before practice firing the following procedure is to be carried out:

(a) Recoil cylinders and tanks are to be seen filled.

(b) Bore is to be seen clear.

(c) Moveable objects in the way of blast from the gun are to be removed.

(d) The striker is to be examined to see—

(1) That sheath net is screwed up and keep pin in place and intact.

(2) That needle set and check-nuts are screwed up.

(3) That striker does not protrude with B. M. lever in open position.

(4) That striker does not move forward till marks on breech block and gun are in line.

(5) That safety stop is correct and keep-screw is in place.

(6) In guns fitted with "A" breech mechanism, the mechanism is never to be taken apart.

Paragraphs (1), (2), and (5) do not apply, but the following should be seen to:

(i) The nut retaining striker must be seen screwed up and keep-screw in place.

(ii) The needle retaining-nut should be seen screwed up taut.

ADMIRALTY,

7 May, 1915.

EXHIBIT 7

Found on the English Steamer Woodfield

Confidential.

ADDENDA TO INSTRUCTIONS FOR GUIDANCE IN THE USE, CARE, AND MAINTENANCE OF ARMAMENT IN DEFENSIVELY ARMED MERCHANT SHIPS.

1. The Master should arrange wherever possible that the space in the immediate vicinity of the gun is railed off, and passengers and other unauthorized persons should not be allowed near the gun.

2. A notice to this effect should be posted up near the gun.

3. When the ship is in harbour, one of the two Ratings is always to be on board to keep guard on the gun and ammunition, and the Master is to use his discretion as to keeping both Ratings on board, should he consider such a course to be desirable.

4. The gun is to be kept covered at all times when not in use.

5. Whenever the ships anchor in the vicinity of a man-of-war, a request should be made to the commanding officer of the man-of-war for an armourer to inspect the gun and mounting.

ADMIRALTY,

27 May, 1915.

EXHIBIT 8

Found on the English Steamer Woodfield

DRILL BOOK

FOR

12-PR. Q. F. GUNS

ISSUED TO

DEFENSIVELY ARMED MERCHANT SHIPS

ADMIRALTY,

GUNNERY BRANCH.

(G. 6118/15. MAY, 1915)

[TRANSLATION]

*NOTE: THE CONTENTS OF THIS WHITE BOOK
ARE ONLY OF MILITARY INTEREST*

EXHIBIT 9

Found on the English Steamer Woodfield

Confidential.

No. 45.

IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS PAPER TO BE ALLOWED TO FALL
INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

This paper is for the master's personal information. It is not to be copied, and when not actually in use is to be kept in safety in a place where it can be destroyed at a moment's notice.

Such portions as call for immediate action may be communicated verbally to the officers concerned.

25th February, 1915.

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SUBMARINES APPLICABLE TO VESSELS CARRYING A DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT

1. Defensively armed vessels should follow generally the instructions for ordinary merchant ships.

2. In submarine waters guns should be kept in instant readiness.

3. If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship, by day, and it is evident to the Master that she has hostile intentions, the ship pursued should open fire in self-defence, notwithstanding the submarines may not have committed a definite hostile act, such as firing a gun or torpedo.

4. In view of the great difficulty in distinguishing a friend from an enemy at night, fire should not be opened after dark unless it is absolutely certain that the vessel fired at is hostile.

5. Before opening fire, the British colours should be hoisted.

It is essential that fire should not be opened under neutral colours.

EXHIBIT 10

Found on the English Steamer Woodfield

Confidential.

No. 291.

IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS PAPER TO BE ALLOWED TO FALL
INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

This paper is for the master's personal information. It is not to be copied, and when not actually in use is to be kept in safety in a place where it can be destroyed at a moment's notice.

Such portions as call for immediate action may be communicated verbally to the officers concerned.

April, 1915.

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SUBMARINES APPLICABLE TO VESSELS CARRYING A DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT

1. Defensively armed vessels should follow generally the instructions for ordinary merchant ships.

2. In submarine waters guns should be kept in instant readiness.

3. If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship, by day, and it is evident to the Master that she has hostile intentions, the ship pursued should open fire in self-defense, notwithstanding the submarines may not have committed a definite hostile act, such as firing a gun or torpedo.

4. In view of the great difficulty in distinguishing a friend from an enemy at night, fire should not be opened after dark unless it is absolutely certain that the vessel fired at is hostile.

5. Before opening fire the British colours must be hoisted.

It is essential that fire should not be opened under neutral colours.

6. If a defensively armed vessel is pursued by a submarine the master has two alternatives:

(a) To open fire at long range immediately it is certain that the submarine is really in pursuit.

(b) To retain fire until the submarine has closed to a range, say 800 yards, at which fire is likely to be effective.

In view of the very great difficulty of distinguishing between friendly and hostile submarines at long range (one British submarine has already been fired at by a merchant vessel which erroneously supposed herself to be pursued by the submarine), it is strongly recommended that course (b) should be adopted by all defensively armed ships.

7. A submarine's flag is no guide to her nationality, as German submarines frequently fly British colours.

8. Vessels carrying a defensive armament and proceeding to neutral ports must not be painted in neutral colours or wear a neutral flag.

9. It is recommended that in neutral ports, particularly those of Spain, the armament should be concealed as far as possible. A canvas cover is recommended for this purpose.

EXHIBIT 11

Found on the English Steamer Woodfield

Secret.

MEMORANDUM FOR ISSUE TO MASTERS OF TRANSPORTS CARRYING TROOPS

Use of Rifle and Machine Gun Fire by Troops on Board Transports against Enemy Submarines or Torpedo Craft.

(1) In daylight a submarine will probably attack while submerged with only her periscope showing.

At night, in moonlight, a submarine may attack while on the surface or with only her conning tower above water owing to the difficulty of seeing through the periscope at night.

(2) In either case heavy rifle or machine-gun fire will make it more difficult for a submarine to make a successful shot with a torpedo. If submerged, no injury will be done to her, but a good volume of fire falling just short of the periscope will make splashes which will render it difficult for the observer to see clearly through the periscope.

(3) When a destroyer escort is accompanying a transport, troops should not open fire on a submarine, as it may prevent a destroyer from ramming her, nor should their weapons be loaded, in order to avoid the possibility of an escorting vessel being fired on by mistake, especially at night.

(4) When no escort is provided, machine guns should be in readiness to open fire, and a strong party of riflemen should also be on duty.

(5) Military officers should be in command both of the machine guns and riflemen to control the fire.

(6) A military officer of the watch should be in command of the troops on deck. He should not order fire to be opened on a hostile submarine or torpedo vessel without the previous assent of the master or his representative—the ship's officer of the watch.

(7) The object of those controlling the fire should be to keep the centre of the pattern just short of the hostile vessel.

(8) Machine-gun tripods can be lashed to the rails or other deck fittings. If there is motion on the ship and machine guns are fitted with elevating or training gear, it is advisable to disconnect it and point the gun by hand.

(9) Field guns with recoil mountings might possibly be secured on deck in such a manner as to permit of their being fired, but their arc of training would be very restricted, and it is unlikely that gun layers, without previous training afloat, could make satisfactory practice from a ship with motion on. Their use is not, therefore, recommended.

(10) In men-of-war it has been the practice for very many years to station sentries with ball cartridge on deck opposite the boats in the event of fire, collision, or other serious emergency likely to lead to the boats being required. Their duties are to prevent anyone getting into the boats or attempting to lower the boats without orders from the captain or his representative. This practice should be followed in Transports.

ADMIRALTY,

31st May, 1915.

EXHIBIT 12

Found on the English Steamer Linkmoor

ADMIRAL SUPERINTENDENT'S OFFICE,
MALTA, June, 1915.

INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH MERCHANT VESSELS PASSING THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

It is now certain that there are enemies submarines at sea in the Mediterranean.

In order to avoid attack you are to keep out of the track of shipping.

You are to darken ship at night and are not to show navigation lights except, at discretion, to avoid collision, and all lights are to be extinguished when necessity is passed.

You are to carry out the procedure recommended by the Admiralty in their printed instructions if a hostile submarine is sighted.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-85 (April, 1907, to December, 1914). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Series I.
 - I. The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia.
 - II. The Servian Reply.
 - III. The British White Paper.
 - IV. The German White Book. October, 1914.
84. Additional Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Series II.
 - I. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to Reichstag, August 4, 1914.
 - II. Speech of the Prime Minister to House of Commons, August 6, 1914.
 - III. The Russian Orange Book.
 - IV. The Original Texts of the Austrian Note of July 23, 1914, and the Servian Reply of July 25, 1914, with annotations. November, 1914.
85. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. III.
 - I. The Neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg.
 - II. Address of the President of the Council to the French Senate, August 4, 1914.
 - III. Official Japanese Documents.
 - IV. Address to the People by the Emperor of Germany. December, 1914.
86. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. IV.
 - I. Turkish Official Documents. November, 1914.
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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN WAR. SERIES No. XIV.


Speech of Imperial German Chancellor Before the Reichstag,
on April 5, 1916.

Translation furnished through German Embassy



JULY, 1916

No. 104



American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

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SPEECH OF IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR BEFORE THE REICHSTAG

ON APRIL 5, 1916

When I addressed you a quarter of a year ago I drew a sober picture based on sober facts of our military situation. Subsequent events have justified the confidence with which I spoke. The Dardanelles enterprise of the enemy has ended in failure. After the successful Serbian campaign in which the Bulgarian army, fighting at the side of Germany and of Austria-Hungary, won everlasting glory, Montenegro and Northern Albania are now in the hands of our allies. The British are still attempting to relieve the army shut in in Kut-el-Amara. The Russians have succeeded, it is true, in occupying Erzerum with superior numbers, but strong Turkish forces are checking their further advance. The Russian offensive in East Galicia, as well as the constantly renewed attacks of the Italians against the Isonzo positions, have been beaten back by the Austrian troops. Along an extended front the Russians also have driven their columns with great force against our lines, but their assaults have broken down with tremendous losses before Hindenburg and his brave soldiers.

MILITARY STRENGTH GREATER

Gentlemen, the governments of the enemy countries have told their people that our military strength was nearly spent, that we had no more troops and that the morale of our army was beginning to crumble. I think, gentlemen, that the battle of Verdun is telling another story. In carrying out the operations, which were superbly conceived and carefully prepared, our brave troops are winning one advantage after another from an enemy fighting with self-sacrificing bravery. Thus the military situation is very favorable at all fronts and meets all our expectations.

Gentlemen, if it is meet for us to express them here at home, what greater thanks must we send out to our soldiers and their leaders at the front who are protecting their country with life and limb with as much *élan* and dauntlessness in the twentieth month as they showed on the first day of the war.

MEETING THE BLOCKADE

Gentlemen, our enemies believe that that which they cannot achieve by means of their arms they can attain by blockade and starvation. While in 1915 I could understand why our enemies would not relinquish this hope, I cannot conceive how, after the experiences of that year, cool heads can still cling to it. Our enemies forget that

—thanks to the organizing powers of our entire population—Germany is equal to the difficult task of the distribution of food supplies; they forget that the German nation is in possession of moral reserves great enough to enable it to reduce the standard of living which has risen considerably in the past years. I imagine that it is not unbearable if in the consumption of meat, for example, and in other items as well, we return temporarily to the standards of the seventies, and I think that our enemies recollect that the German generation of those days was strong enough to deal heavy blows.

The months through which we are passing now—I speak frankly—are hard. They bring restrictions to many a household, care to many a family. But this makes all the greater and more deeply grateful our admiration for the self-sacrifice, for the devotion to the fatherland with which the poor and the people of moderate means are meeting the difficulties, ready to take a heavy burden on their shoulders in this struggle for our existence. Such, gentlemen, are the reports which come from all over the country. They inform us at the same time that the work of those who have remained at home will bear fruit if heaven blesses our fields. The reports are unanimous that the winter crop is good and it is many years since the crop reports were so favorable at this time of the year, as is the case at present. The grain harvest of 1915 was one of the poorest for many decades,

nevertheless the stock of bread grain will not only be sufficient, but will provide for a considerable reserve with which to begin the new harvest year. Germany's agricultural strength has been proved anew. We shall not run short of anything in the future, just as we have not in the past.

NEUTRAL RIGHTS IGNORED

In the effort to blockade us and starve us out, to extend the war to the entire German nation, to our women and our children, Great Britain and her allies have ridden roughshod over all neutral rights of trade and intercourse with the Central European states. The American note of November 5, 1915, which contains a true description of the British violations of international law has, as far as I know, not been answered by the British Government up to the present day. Like this, all the other protests of neutrals to our enemies have led to nothing but further violations of neutrality. England went so far as to forbid even such humane acts on the part of American philanthropists as the sending of milk to German children! The last order in Council threatens trade to neutral ports with new unlawful aggravations of the blockade rules, against the previous violations of which the American Government has already protested. No fair-minded neutral, no matter whether he favors us or not, can contest our right on our part to take measures of defense against this war of starvation, which is contrary to international

law. No one can expect us to permit the arms of defense at our disposal to be wrested from us. We use them, and must use them. We respect the legitimate interests of neutrals in trade and commerce, but we expect that this respect be appreciated and that our right and our duty be recognized to use all means possible for retaliating against this policy of starvation which sets at defiance not only international law but the plainest duties of humanity.

ENGLAND'S HAND IN PORTUGAL

Gentlemen, since I spoke here last we have been forced to declare war on Portugal. You have heard of the long list of violations of neutrality of which Portugal has been guilty. The contemptuous act of robbery committed against our ships while salutes were fired was the climax. Portugal acted under England's influence. England has again exercised her loving protection of the small nations.

ASQUITH AND PEACE

Gentlemen, when on December 9th I declared our readiness to discuss peace, I said that I could observe no such readiness on the part of the governments of the enemy countries. That I was right has been proved by all that has occurred in the meanwhile and all that we have heard from the lips of the leading statesmen of the

enemy countries. The speeches which were delivered in London, Paris, St. Petersburg and Rome are so unequivocal that I need not go into any further details. Only a word in regard to the British premier, Mr. Asquith. I will refrain from answering his personal invectives, because even in war I consider personal vilification of an opponent as unworthy. But in regard to the subject-matter I will answer in brief. For Mr. Asquith the complete and final destruction of Prussia's military power is prerequisite for any peace negotiations. At the same time, Mr. Asquith fails to find German peace offers in my speech. Every party was ready, so he said, to discuss peace offers made by the other side. Let us suppose, gentlemen, that I suggest to Mr. Asquith that he sit down with me at a table and examine the possibilities of peace and Mr. Asquith begins with the definite and complete destruction of Prussia's power—the conversation would be ended before it began. To such peace conditions only one answer remains and this answer is given by our sword. If our enemies wish to continue the bloodshed, the slaughter of human beings and the devastation of Europe, theirs is the guilt. We will stand our ground and our arm will deal ever stronger blows. At the outbreak of the war I recalled Moltke's words that we would have to defend what we had won in 1870 in another sanguinary conflict. For the preservation of Germany's unity and freedom the entire nation went to war

to a man. And it is this united and free Germany that our enemies wish to destroy. Germany is again to be as impotent as she was in past centuries, is again to be exposed to her neighbors' lust for power—Europe's scapegoat, and even after the war the development of her economic faculties is to be chained down forever. That is what our enemies mean by the annihilation of Prussia's military power. They beat against a wall!

SAFETY MUST BE ASSURED

Gentlemen, as against this, what are our intentions? For us the meaning and goal of this war is a Germany so firmly knit, so strongly protected, that no one will ever again feel the temptation to annihilate us, that every one in the world shall recognize our right to the free exercise of our peaceful activities. Such a Germany is what we wish to attain, not the destruction of other nations. That aim means at the same time the salvation of the European continent, which is now shaken to its very foundation.

Gentlemen, what can the coalition of our enemies offer Europe? Russia—the fate of Poland and Finland. France—the pretension to that hegemony which once caused our misery. Great Britain—disruption, a state of everlasting friction which she pleases to call the balance of power on the European continent and which was

the final and innermost cause of the whole disaster which has befallen Europe and the whole world in this war. Had these three powers not joined forces against us, had they not attempted to turn the wheel of history back to times long past, the peace of Europe would gradually have been secured through the power of quiet development. To attain this end was the aim of the German policy before the war. We could obtain what we wanted through peaceful labor. Our enemies chose war!

Now the peace of Europe must arise out of a flood of blood and tears, out of a million graves.

THE FUTURE OF POLAND

To defend ourselves we went to battle. But what was, is no longer. History has advanced with iron tread; there can be no turning back. It was not the intention of Germany and Austria-Hungary to open up the Polish question, but the fate of battles has done that. Now this problem stands before us and awaits solution. Germany and Austria-Hungary must and will solve it. After such gigantic events as have taken place history knows no *status quo ante*. Belgium after the war will no longer be the Belgium of before. The Poland from which the Russian *tchinovnik* fled, extorting bribes as he went, the Poland from which the Russian cossack retreated, burning and pillaging, that Poland is no more. Even mem-

bers of the Duma have frankly admitted that they cannot imagine the return of the *tchinovnik* to the place where meantime the German, Austrian and Pole have honestly labored for the unfortunate land.

Mr. Asquith, in his conditions of peace, refers to the principle of nationality. In doing so, if he places himself in the position of the unconquered and invincible opponent, can he possibly expect Germany of her free will to hand over again to the rule of reactionary Russia the peoples between the Baltic Sea and the Volhynian swamps, whether they be Poles, Lithuanians, Balts or Livonians, all these peoples which the Central Powers have liberated? No, gentlemen! Russia must not be allowed a second time to array her armies along the unprotected border of East and West Prussia, nor to turn once more the Vistula lands, with the aid of French money, into a gate through which to invade unprotected Germany.

BELGIUM MUST BE NEUTRAL

And again, gentlemen, can anybody believe that we shall abandon the territory which we have occupied in the West and on which the blood of our people has been flowing, without complete safeguard for our future? We shall procure real guarantees that Belgium is not to become an Anglo-French vassal-state, nor to be made a military and economic outpost against Germany. Here,

too, is no *status quo ante*. Here, too, fate takes no step backward. Here, too, Germany cannot allow the long-suppressed Flemish race again to be exposed to efforts to make Frenchmen of them; Germany will secure for them a sound development which does justice to their rich gifts and which is based on their Dutch speech and characteristics. We do not want neighbors who will again combine against us to throttle us. We want neighbors who will co-operate with us and with whom we can co-operate for mutual benefit.

Can it be said that we were Belgium's enemies before the war? Has not rather peaceful German labor and peaceful German industry in Antwerp conspicuously co-operated in the welfare of the country? Are we not even during the war endeavoring to resuscitate national life in Belgium as far as conditions permit? The sadly afflicted country will stir with the memory of this war for a long time to come. But we cannot, in the interest of both countries, permit the possibility of new wars arising therefrom.

Gentlemen, at this point I should like to touch on another question. Since the beginning of the war, the Russian Government has done its utmost to rob and expel Germans of Russian as well as German nationality. We have the right and duty to demand that the Russian Government shall redress the wrong committed in defiance of all laws of humanity, and let down the bars of

that Russian servitude that now hold our exiled and tortured countrymen in thrall.

PEACE MUST BE LASTING

The new Europe which will arise from this most gigantic of all crises will in many respects differ from the old one. The blood which has been shed can never return, and the spent fortune only slowly. But whatever that new Europe may be, it must become a Europe of peaceful labor for all the nations that inhabit it. The peace which will end this war must be a lasting one and must not contain the seeds of new wars, but rather of a new, final and peaceful order of European things.

In that long brotherhood of arms we have coalesced, ever more firmly, with our allies. Our faithful war comradeship must and will be followed by a community of peaceful labor in the service of the economic and cultural welfare of the ever more closely knitted Central Empires. In that respect, too, we pursue a road different from that of our opponents. I have already touched upon that point. England does not want to stop the war even after the conclusion of peace, but wants to wage economic warfare against us with redoubled severity. First of all our military and then our economic strength is to be crushed. Everywhere we observe a brutal rage of destruction and annihilation, and the foolhardy purpose to

cripple a nation of seventy million people. That threat, too, will prove a bubble. But let the statesmen who utter such words remember that the more violent their language is, the fiercer our blows will be.

CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Gentlemen, let us now look beyond Europe. Severed from every connection with the homeland, our troops and countrymen have doggedly defended our colonies and are even now heroically disputing every inch of East African soil against the enemy. But, as Bismarck said, the final destiny of the colonies is not to be decided there, but here on the European continent. Through our victories on this continent we shall again secure colonial possessions and open up new and fruitful fields for the indestructible spirit of German enterprises.

With frank and open mind we face the future with ever greater confidence. We are not self-deluded or arrogant, but full of gratitude to our soldiers and full of sacred faith in ourselves and in our future.

FACES FUTURE FEARLESSLY

A mighty mass of deceit, self-delusion and grim hatred oppresses the minds of our enemies. That the spell cast upon the people may not be broken, the hostile statesmen

again and again put their heads together to invent new magic phrases to add to the old ones. We have no time for rhetoric. The facts which we let speak for themselves are stronger, and one of those facts is the difference which distinguishes our aims in this war from those of our opponents. Germany is the only warring power which is threatened by her enemies, through the mouths of their statesmen, with annihilation, dismemberment of her realm, and destruction of both her military and economic strength. Lust of conquest, lust of revenge, and jealousy, the motive powers which prompted the coalition against us before the war, have remained dominant with the various governments during the war despite all their defeats. London, Paris and Petersburg are agreed on that general war aim. We confront this fact with the other, that when the catastrophe befell Europe—in distinction from 1870 when every German regarded Alsace-Lorraine and the Empire as the indispensable price of victory—our sole object was to defend ourselves and maintain our position, to keep the enemy out of our homeland and to drive him as quickly as possible from where he had so monstrously shown his rage of destruction. We had not wished the war, we needed no change of frontiers, when war was started against our will. It was not we who threatened to crush another people out of existence and destroy its national entity..

FORTITUDE PROVES CHARGES LIES

And whence are we getting the strength to endure at home all the difficulties connected with the blockade of our oversea traffic, and at the front to overcome our superior enemies, to continue the battle and add to our victories? Can anybody seriously believe that it is lust of land that animates our storming columns before Verdun to new deeds of heroism again and again? Or is it possible that a people that has bestowed so many intellectual gifts on the world and has been the most peace-loving of all nations for forty-four years should have turned Hun and barbarian over night? No, gentlemen, such are the inventions of the evil conscience of those who are guilty of the war and who fear for their power at home.

Gentlemen, the latest fruit of that endeavor to vilify us is the statement that after our victory we would make a rush for the American Continent and would try to conquer Canada as our first province. That is as fantastic as the allegation of our desiring Brazilian or other South American territory. Unconcernedly let us lay these foolish and malicious imputations aside with the rest.

FIGHT FOR GERMANY ONLY

This is a fight for our existence and future. Each of us knows it, and that is why our hearts and nerves are strong.

Germany's sons do not bleed and die for a piece of foreign earth, but for Germany.

Gentlemen, let me conclude with a personal reminiscence. The last time that I was at Headquarters I was standing with the Emperor on the spot where I had accompanied His Majesty exactly a year before. The Kaiser remembered the circumstance and referred with deep emotion to the great change through which we had lived in the present year. Then the Russian army was still as far advanced as the Carpathian ridges. The breach near Gorlice and the great Hindenburg offensive had not yet taken place. To-day we are deep in Russia. Then the English and French were assailing Gallipoli and hoped to fan the Balkans into a blaze against us. To-day Bulgaria firmly stands by our side. Then we were fighting the hard, defensive battle in Champagne. This time, as the Kaiser spoke, the thunder of the guns at Verdun sounded in our ears. Profound gratitude to God, the army and the nation, filled the Emperor's heart and I may say that in that hour the gigantic achievements performed by the army and navy for us in this year came before my soul with a greater force and intensity than ever before.

THE SPIRIT OF GERMANY

Gentlemen, your and our common labor bears a double responsibility in grave times. No other thought can ani-

mate us but the one: How can we best assist and support our soldiers who risk their lives at the front for the homeland? One mind and one will is leading them. May this spirit which unites us all also lead us. It is the spirit which, through the warfare of their fathers, will lead our children and grandchildren into a strong and free future.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-85 (April, 1907, to December, 1914). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Hinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Series I.
 - I. The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia.
 - II. The Servian Reply.
 - III. The British White Paper.
 - IV. The German White Book. October, 1914.
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85. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. III.
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 - II. Address of the President of the Council of the French Senate, August 4, 1914.
 - III. Official Japanese Document.
 - IV. Address to the People by the Emperor of Germany. December, 1914.
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 - I. Turkish Official Documents. November, 1914.
 - II. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag. December 2, 1914.
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90. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VII.

The Serbian Blue Book. May, 1915.

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Official Correspondence Between the United States and Germany.
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II. Contraband of War, September 4, 1914—April 26, 1915.
III. Restraints of Commerce, February 6, 1915—September 7, 1915.
IV. Case of the William P. Frye, March 31, 1915—July 30, 1915. September, 1915.
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Official Correspondence Between the United States and Great Britain.
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III. Restraints of Commerce, December 26, 1914—July 31, 1915.
IV. Case of the Wilhelmina, February 15, 1915—April 8, 1915. October, 1915.
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II. The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Penfield, June 29, 1915.
III. The Secretary of State to Ambassador Penfield, August 12, 1915. November, 1915.
97. Referendum on the Report of the Special Committee on Economic Results of the War and American Business. Reprinted by permission of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. December, 1915.
98. The Land Where Hatred Expires, by Albert Léon Guérard. January, 1916.
99. America's Opinion of the World War, by Eduard Bernstein. Translated by John Mez. February, 1916.
100. International Coöperation, by John Bassett Moore. The Outlook for International Law, by Elihu Root. March, 1916.
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Statement of Measures Adopted to Intercept the Sea-Borne Commerce of Germany. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, January, 1916.
Great Britain's Measures Against German Trade. A Speech Delivered by the Rt. Hon. Sir E. Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons, on the 26th of January, 1916. April, 1916.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS—*Continued*

- 102. Super-Resistance, by Harold C. Goddard. May, 1916.
- 103. German White Book on Armed Merchantmen. June, 1916.
- 104. Speech of Imperial German Chancellor before the Reichstag, on April 5, 1916.
July, 1916.

Special Bulletins:

A Brief Outline of the Nature and Aims of Pacifism, by Alfred H. Fried. Translated by John Mez. April, 1915.

Internationalism. A list of Current Periodicals selected and annotated by Frederick C. Hicks. May, 1915.

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Vol. 50
I

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

INTER ARMA VERITAS



BY

WILLIAM ALLAN NEILSON
PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

AUGUST, 1916

No. 105

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

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INTER ARMA VERITAS¹

Near the beginning of the present academic year, I listened to an address by an American professor before a group of American graduate students. He was speaking of the effect of the war upon scholarship, and of the opportunity and the duty that would lie before the universities of America in consequence of the European catastrophe. The situation he described is one of intense interest to all of us. For while we work here peacefully in our libraries and laboratories, what is it that is happening to our colleagues and fellow-students in the Old World? The weaklings and slackers and conscientious objectors that the voluntary system had left in the cloisters of Oxford are even now being arraigned before conscription tribunals. For eighteen months, the students of the Sorbonne have been reduced to a handful of women and the derelicts of the foreign colonies of Paris. And in the lecture-rooms of Bonn and Heidelberg, of Freiburg and Berlin, the few remaining men attend in the field gray of the German army, and hourly expect their summons to the front. Into their places will dribble back a

¹ An address delivered before the Columbia University Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa, June, 1916.

stricken handful, lame or blind or with hanging sleeves, or with the livid face that tells of the gas that still corrodes their lungs. The older professors—those of them not drafted into the laboratories of munition factories—will lecture half-heartedly, making pathetic efforts to throw themselves into the task of keeping alight the flickering lamp of human learning. Meanwhile, in the field, the wastage goes on, and the scholars of the coming generation, the young dons and doctors and docents, are falling by thousands. And the end is not yet.

In addition to this loss of men, the speaker I have cited recalled the inevitable reduction of the funds at the disposal of the European universities, the reduction that is bound to accompany the efforts of the governments to re-establish their finances; and in the face of all these he drew a glowing picture of the chance offered to the universities of America to snatch the intellectual leadership of the world.

I suppose that he was largely right. I suppose that we are now, or are about to be, in a position to out-distance the European countries in productive scholarship. Before the war we were already abreast in material equipment; after the war, it would seem that we ought to be ahead in men. Yet we cannot be sure. The great contributions to intellectual progress have not always come from superb laboratories or vast libraries, with highly organized corps of workers; the lone enthusiast in garret or

cellar is as familiar and as glorious a figure in the annals of scholarship and science as the chief of a staff.

But whether this anticipation of America's future leadership is sound or no, I confess to a lack of enthusiasm at the prospect. A true sportsman has little satisfaction in winning a race against an opponent who has broken his leg. And those who had cherished the loftiest hopes for our future academic development would, I believe, prefer that we should wait a generation or two longer before we win to a place commensurate with our numbers and resources, rather than that we should align ourselves with the commercial interests that are ranged like carrion vultures round the battlefields of Europe.

Yet, leaving out of account this chance to steal a march upon our intellectual rivals, the war *has* brought to us a duty and an opportunity, a duty and an opportunity—much harder to rise to than that of which I have just spoken—the duty I have meant to indicate in the title announced for this address.

For some decades before the outbreak of the great war the world had seen a vast growth of international and cosmopolitan sentiment. In some respects this was not so great an advance in breadth as might appear, since often it consisted merely in the substitution for the vertical divisions between nations of horizontal divisions between social and industrial classes. But in the field of scholarship and scientific research there was no such sub-

stitution. More and more through journals and congresses and the interchange of students and teachers, the learned world was recognizing its essential unity and was organizing an intricate and vital co-operation for the advancement of human knowledge. Provincialism in learning was disappearing; the wasteful duplication of effort in isolated centres was being reduced, and scholars were granting to foreign scholars an increasingly generous recognition. So far had this gone that when the storm broke in August, 1914, the first thought of thousands in the learned world was that, however the diplomatic and military heathen might rage, the children of light had nothing to do with their quarrels, and the territory of the Muses at least was inviolate and inviolable.

But alas for human hopes! Hardly had a few weeks gone by when these illusions received a rude shock. Ninety-three of the leaders of the intellectual life of Germany issued an "Address to the Civilized Nations" in which they gave the lie to all the main charges against their government, and demanded that their denial be accepted. Of the justice of that denial we have here nothing to say: the causes and the conduct of the war are not my theme. But into their right to make that demand we, their colleagues in a neutral country, had in duty to inquire. The result of this inquiry left us gasping and astounded. Men trained in close scientific reasoning, like Ostwald and Roentgen and Haeckel, philos-

ophers like Wundt and Eucken, imaginative artists like Hauptmann and Sudermann in letters, Klinger and Liebermann in painting, Humperdinck and Weingartner in music, laid aside their sense of evidence, laid aside their power of putting themselves in other men's places, accepted the *ipse dixit* of their government, and with inconceivable naïveté asked that the rest of the world should accept their verdict on an issue on which they themselves had had no opportunity of investigating or weighing the facts. Let me be perfectly clear: I am passing no judgment on the question as to whether their government was right or wrong. The disastrous fact for the spiritual life of Europe is that these leaders of thought abdicated their thrones, surrendered their intellectual independence, and led the way for a general capitulation before the forces of national prejudice and hatred. That so many of their enemies have followed their example makes them less conspicuous but not less guilty.

For the contagion soon spread. In country after country of their enemies, scholars hastened to retort to the German manifesto. These retorts, it must be admitted, were seldom as crude as the original manifesto. The reception given to the German document taught their enemies something of the tactics of controversy. But too often these also were ill-informed, illogical, the product of minds blinded by passion, minds that had lost all the

judicial quality which it ought to have been their pride to preserve.

This perverted nationalism soon extended far beyond the field of war and politics. The magnificent interdependence which had promised so much for the future of thought began to be ignored and then denied. French philosophers who a few months before the war had been celebrating the anniversaries of German thinkers and warmly acknowledging their discipleship, suddenly discovered that they never really owed anything to Germans, that German philosophy was muddy, not deep, and had only led the minds of men into mazes of confusion. Germans who had been eager to admire the lucidity of French thought now found that it was clear only because it was shallow, and that it had never really touched the depths. Sir William Ramsay pointed out that all the main discoveries, all the germinal ideas of modern science, were due to England or France or Russia; Ostwald countered by proposing an organization of international science after the war, under the leadership of the German Emperor, since all non-German science was subsidiary or negligible. The French purged their concert programs of all German composers to their own impoverishment, while the modistes of Berlin and Leipzig spent their ingenuity in devising fashions that would owe nothing to Paris and London. So far did this reactionary tendency go that it began to provide its own cure. The sense of humor

helped to accomplish what intellectual discipline had failed in; and when the restaurateurs substituted new German coinages for the familiar French of the bill-of-fare, hearty Teutonic laughter broke forth and for a moment restored sanity.

Underlying all this miserable breakdown of the cosmopolitan intelligence there are two main causes which it is worth while to consider. One of these is the fallacy of rivalry. There is no more persistent source of waste in the world than the idea that another man's gain must be our loss, that our elevation must involve another's degradation. The great saving fact, on the other hand, in the progress of the world is the infinite differentiation of human nature. Because no two of us are precisely alike, there is always the possibility of each of us reaching his full development without hampering the other. If the energy spent in defeating the other man's (or nation's) efforts were devoted to finding out what we ourselves are chiefly good for, and then doing it, the chances of harmonious co-operation would be vastly increased. Two men or two nations, of course, often do want the same thing when both can't have it; but that does not imply that both ought to want it, that their best interests really require it. And the higher one goes in the scale of values, the harder it is to make out a case for the necessity of rivalry, the clearer it is that mutual benefit lies in co-operation rather than competition. In normal cir-

cumstances it is comparatively easy for intelligent men to realize all this, but in passionate times of war the fallacy runs riot, the emotions blur the vision, and in a kind of fury men lay grasping hands on everything for their own side and its supposed advantage.

The other main cause is the will to hate. I suppose that every man in certain circumstances is capable of taking great satisfaction in hating. In ordinary life it is fairly well restrained. Alongside of it lie benevolent impulses that counteract it in whole or in part; and, while we think with clearness, we are conscious of a multitude of conflicting considerations that prevent our giving way to any such unmixed emotion. But most of us have at times yearned for an opportunity free from such considerations, for a perfectly clear issue, for a chance to let ourselves go with a free rein. There is a promise of some fierce joy in at last letting an elemental passion have its way with us. Such an opportunity the war seemed to offer. Guided, or misguided, by their respective governments, almost every national of the continent of Europe believed that his country was fighting for its existence, that in facing the enemy he was facing an unprovoked assassin. He let himself hate that enemy because he believed him the enemy of all that he valued most in his fatherland, but still more he believed this because he had let himself hate. All the thrill of patriotic devotion, of comradeship, of sacrifice, of the lust to kill,

were more enjoyable if one could believe that the foe was wholly evil, that hate at last was fully justified, that there was no place for scruples, intellectual or moral. Civilization began to give place not only to the mood of the primitive savage, but to that of the den and the lair.

Not all were thus swept away; but of those who resisted the current many believed that it was best not to seek to check the others. They feared that moderation in hating, that a just appreciation of the enemy, that a remnant of human sympathy for the other side, would interfere with a soldier's effectiveness. They valued their own intellectual integrity, but were willing to have others lose theirs that they might the more mercilessly destroy the common enemy. They would let another lose his intellectual manhood that they might be the better shielded. As if those who gave their lives had not a right to the truth! As if those in the ranks did not learn, even in the filth and horror of the trenches more than those at home who would keep them blind! For it is not among the men who come home battered and maimed that one finds the greatest bitterness. Those one discovers to be comparatively moderate, discriminating, humane, often even kindly towards the foe, in contrast with the poisonous fanatic who stays at home and sets him on.

Still others have resisted the current, some openly and some in silence. In England, with its tradition of free

speech, they have not scrupled to speak and write, undeterred by a jingo press, undisturbed by the interruptions of rowdies. In France and Germany those who found they could not risk consent by silence have gone into exile, and men like Hermann Hesse and Romain Rolland have found an asylum in Switzerland where they could say what they would in the intervals of their humanitarian labors. By word and deed these men have wrought month after month to uphold their belief that the cause they cherish does not need the support of lies or exaggeration, and to keep the wounds of war unpoisoned by injustice and hatred. Others have found their place at home, in silent effort to heal the wounded, to comfort the desolate, to feed the orphans, to shelter the homeless—friend or enemy. And still others live in the midst of the tumult and the shouting, watching their chance to speak their word on behalf of justice, throwing what weight they have on the side of the nobler traditions of their country, striving that the peace when it comes may be a good peace.

So far I have sought to indicate the fortunes of truth in the midst of war in the belligerent countries. I turn now to the countries still at peace, to our own country, to our own duty.

Let me say at once that I am no advocate of mental neutrality. I should be ashamed to appear before an audience such as this, and urge the rising generation of

American scholars to abstain from a judgment on the most momentous issue in the history of the modern world. You must not only watch this war; you must study its causes and conduct, and you must make up your minds. You must not bring upon your heads the judgment delivered to the angel of the church of Laodicea, "because you are neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth." The quest of truth in the midst of war which I am here to urge upon you has nothing in common with indifference or that intellectual indolence which takes a false pride in coming to no conclusion.

But to us it is possible, on us it is incumbent, to consider and to conclude by different methods and in a different spirit from those who nearly two years ago were called to march to defend the frontiers of their countries. They had to take their part and take it at once. We have had time to reflect, yet we also must take our part. It is a mistake to suppose that, because we are not fighting, we are not influencing the conduct of this war and helping to decide its outcome. If it is true that organized military force was never before employed on so vast a scale, it is equally true that never before have belligerents been so concerned about external and internal public opinion. The machinery for moulding the thought of the people in Germany performs its function with scarcely less skill and thoroughness than the machinery of the army; and the governments of all the warring nations

have flooded the neutrals with the literature of their cause. The steadying hand of our own government, exerted through the young men of our embassies who have visited the prisoners of all the nations, has prevented untold misery and has checked the operation of the brutal and senseless law of reprisals. In spite of the sufferings of non-combatants from attacks on land, on sea, and from the air, it is probable that these have been less than in previous wars in proportion to the magnitude of the struggle and the number of men involved. The "atrocities" of which we heard so much from both sides in the early weeks of the war have enormously abated, largely because of the effect produced on neutral nations. Public opinion is still powerful, and will continue to exert its influence in proportion as it is just, and it is our business to see that it is as just as possible.

Our duty, so long as we are outside the struggle, is to truth—truth to the past, in the present, and for the future.

Truth to the past. Whatever our judgment be as to the immediate issues, to us is entrusted for the time the memory of what nations have done for one another and for humanity in the past. If we are pro-Ally, it is our affair to see that we do no injustice to the past services of Germany. We of the universities dare not forget that it is largely on German models that we have built our advanced scholarship; that it is to the results of German

industry and organization in their Zeitschriften, Annalen, Jahresberichte, and the rest, that we have to turn to gain a knowledge of the results of the scientific work of the whole word. Are we interested in music, we have but to consider what would happen if we dropped the works of German genius from the repertories of our opera houses and symphony concerts. Are we philosophers, let us try to think of the history of modern metaphysics, psychology, or æsthetics without the German contribution. No censure we can pass on the German government or the German army of to-day can justify us in forgetting Goethe and Schiller, Bach and Beethoven, Kant and Hegel. And let us be assured that it is not Germany but we who shall suffer if we show ourselves ungrateful or unjust, it will be not Germany but we who, when this period of strife has passed, shall have shamefacedly to set about restoring standards and taking back slanders.

If we are pro-German, it is no less our affair to preserve our intellectual perspective as to what we owe to France, to Britain, to Italy, to Russia. This country least of all can afford to forget France's achievements on behalf of political liberty, England's great legacy of constitutional government and the common law. For France there is perhaps least need to speak, since even her enemies do not refuse her admiration and sympathy. Yet we must not think only of her gallantry. In the

Paris of the first winter of the war, when the guns of the invader were hardly out of earshot, it was still impossible not to feel that *there* still was the home of ideas, there still lay the brain of the world, the great nerve centre of its intellectual life. And for England, what need to speak to you

. . . who speak the tongue
That Shakespeare spake; the faith and morals hold
Which Milton held——?

Yet our very nearness is a source of blindness, and, we in moments of anger or irritation, can forget our debt, as we forget to be thankful for the air we breathe. Even though we side with her, we may judge harshly her blundering, her slowness to realize a situation, her apparent distraction, just because we know these faults too well at home. And for Italy—if she seems to you faithless and futile, remember her past——

Italia! oh Italia! thou who hast
The fatal gift of beauty, which became
A funeral dower of present woes and past,
On thy sweet brow is sorrow plough'd by shame,
And annals graved in character of flame.
Oh, God! that thou wert in thy nakedness
Less lovely or more powerful, and couldst claim
Thy right, and awe the robbers back, who press
To shed thy blood, and drink the tears of thy distress!

To Russia there is, perhaps, most danger of injustice.
Vast, mysterious, remote, corrupt and misgoverned,

oppressor and oppressed, she commands even from her friends only a halting reverence. Politically we will have none of her, yet as we turn from her brutal bureaucracy let us remember that the Russia that matters for civilization, the Russia of the great painters, the great musicians, the great scientists, and the great novelists, has never been the Russia of the knout and the pogrom. The body of Russia has never yet expressed the soul, and as we glance at the contributions each of these nations has made in the past to the common treasury of mankind, it is with their souls that we are concerned.

These things that I seek to recall to you are, I am aware, matters of commonplace and superficial observation; yet I enumerate them because in the heat and anger of these days it is precisely our obvious obligations that we are apt to dishonor and deny. The belligerents have the excuse of a desperate emergency: to us at peace—woe to us if we forget.

Our duty is to truth in the present. The external reason for our pursuit of truth in the midst of the crisis, I have spoken of in what I have said of the power of the public opinion of the neutral nations, and of the necessity of keeping that public opinion just and fair. But there are internal reasons also, reasons affecting ourselves.

To be fair in times such as these is a great and difficult intellectual task; it is an even greater and more difficult

moral task. The case you are called upon to judge is a highly complicated one, the evidence is offered by interested parties, the atmosphere in which it is heard is not a judicial one. You must resist prejudice, acquire information, sift and weigh statements. The social or academic or family environment in which each of us moves is almost sure to incline us to one side or the other, and having induced us to take a side, to close our eyes and surrender ourselves to mere feeling. Most of us like to be in harmony with our surroundings: it is more comfortable, it calls for less thinking, we do not have to exert ourselves to resist. Some of us, however, enjoy being in a minority, find zest in making others uncomfortable, are not satisfied unless we have the sensation of rowing against the social current. Each disposition has its risk if we care about devotion to truth. But so profoundly have these events moved the world to-day, that it is not merely a matter of accepting complacently, or opposing whimsically, the prevailing opinion: it is a matter of being carried away on winds of passion. The positive enthusiasm for the cause of our choice is not so dangerous; it is the prevailing contagion of hatred for the other side that threatens us both intellectually and morally.

Nothing is more common than to hear contemptuous condemnation of the thought or behavior of this one or that of the warring peoples. But it is not for us to hurl charges of this sort. The comparative unanimity with

which the peoples on the two sides hold contrary views is not surprising; and the tendencies we have already noted and deplored among them are more easily explained and excused than the fanaticism which is only too common among us. Any people at war is naturally inclined to believe its own government, and governments naturally are reluctant to give out statements likely to cause distrust or discouragement. The few enemy publications that filter into belligerent countries are in a foreign language and reach a mere handful. Enemy dispatches published in the newspapers are neutralized by the news surrounding them, or are "corrected" by editorial comment pointing to the "true" version issued by the home government. In Germany especially there is an extraordinary unanimity in the attitude taken by the press on all important external issues, and it needs uncommon independence of judgment to resist the pressure of the daily supply of news edited with "tendenz" of editorial comment, and of the conversation that one hears everywhere around, the tone of which is in turn determined by the newspapers. To a far greater extent than is necessary the war anecdotes in all countries are selected to cast discredit on the enemy; and what is not accounted for by these external considerations is explained by the will to believe the best of your own side. The reaction of the mass of the peoples to all these influences, if in many ways deplorable, is natural enough. Those of us who, before the war, have

enjoyed the graceful hospitality of the French or have been warmed by the genial friendliness of the Bavarian or the Rhinelander, need not fear that they will find the characteristic qualities of these peoples undermined. It is our own attitude about which we need to be concerned—our danger of harsh judgments, of violent prejudices, of the harboring of passions that leave a scar—and for which we have not even the justification of danger or panic. Against these we have need of all our mental and moral energy and determination if we care to maintain the attitude of seeking truth in the present.

Our duty is to truth for the future. The war will not last forever. The wheels of commerce will begin to turn again and we shall re-learn our material interdependence. Learning will take up its task again, with depleted ranks and impoverished resources, it is true, and we shall re-learn our intellectual interdependence. But there is a grave risk that the license given to emotion while the struggle goes on will have so distorted our thinking, and the distorted thinking will in turn have so perverted our feelings, that kindness between the peoples will be long postponed. For the physical wounds incurred in the war the neutral peoples have done much, and the scores of nurses and surgeons that have gone from our hospitals have nobly spent themselves to sterilize these wounds and hasten their healing. The duty which the thinking

men of the countries at peace owe to the belligerents is that of a kind of spiritual and intellectual antiseptis. Into the more honest animosity and even rage that normally springs up between men in war it is possible to introduce a more deadly virus, the virus of lies, of exaggeration, of the hiding from either side of the generousities of the other. In this diabolical work the press has been busy ever since the outbreak, and we have seen how men who ought to have stood objectively for truth have been as guilty as any sensational or chauvinistic journalist. We ourselves have not been innocent; but for the sake of the future of civilization, if not for our own honor, let us have done with it; let us emulate our colleagues of the hospitals in keeping clean the wounds of the nations, and give them a chance to heal without disfiguring scars. I do not plead for silence before outrageous wrong. The truth may be painful, and it must be, it will be told. It is not truthful reproach but injustice that rankles and keeps the sore open from generation to generation. And however passionately we feel on behalf of either side, we can never help its cause by the slander of its enemy. Let us remember for the sake of the future that even the man who gives himself mistakenly for a bad cause deserves our sympathy:

Toll! Let the great bells toll
Till the clashing air is dim.
Did they wrong this parted soul?
We will make it up to him.

Toll! Let him never guess
What work they set him to.
Laurel, laurel, yes;
He did what they bade him do.

Praise, and never a whispered hint but the fight he fought was good;
Never a word that the blood on his sword was his country's own
heart's blood.

A flag for the soldier's bier
Who dies that his land may live.
Oh, banners, banners here,
That he doubt not nor misgive!
That he heed not from the tomb
The evil days draw near
When his nation, robed in gloom,
With its faithless past shall strive.

Let him never dream that his bullet's scream went wide of its
island mark,
Home to the heart of his darling land where she stumbled and
sinned in the dark.

I have spoken so far of our duty to truth as it affected Europe. It has bearings also nearer home. We also as a nation stand at a critical point in our history; our traditional policies are being called in question, and in some fundamental matters we stand at the parting of the ways. Here again clear thinking is as important as it is difficult. At every turn we are liable to be swayed by feelings rather than by facts and principles. We send a punitive expedition into Mexico, and let the question of our withdrawing it become confused and blurred by petty considerations of saving our face, instead of considering merely what is wise and just. We come to the

verge of a foreign war, and when we ought to discuss the question of arming ourselves, either for defence or for more aggressive championship of what we may decide is right, we let ourselves be swayed by personal considerations, by the traditional bonds of party, or, basest of all, by prospects of pecuniary advantage. We let ourselves be entangled by catch-words and distracted from the point at issue. Our whole behavior in the present matter of military preparation is like that of a man who rushes into a gunshop to buy a weapon, but does not know whether he wants to use it against a burglar, a cat, or a grizzly bear. I have nothing to say against those who wish to put themselves in readiness and offer their personal services to their country; any of us may well be convinced that there lies our duty. But the peculiar contribution which you owe to the nation, you who have been trained to think, is to help her to think—clearly, honestly, wisely.

There are some still larger questions which in the near future will call for solution more loudly than ever before: the question of war and peace in general, the question of race, the question of nationalism. In spite of the impression which the horror and waste of the present struggle has made upon the imagination of the world, we are far from a universally pacifist sentiment. Distinguished writers, such as Thomas Mann, have not hesitated in the midst of the carnage to glorify war. "In peace," he

cries, "man deteriorates. Idle rest is the grave of courage. Law is the friend of the weak, and aims at reducing the world to a common level; but war brings out strength." Others, less brutal, cannot resist the evidence of the benefits of war. A candid judgment must admit that these are great. No one who has noted the spiritual regeneration of France, the cleansing of the Augean stables of political corruption, the purifying of art and letters from a hundred abnormalities and trivialities; no one who has watched in Germany the countless instances of generosity, devotion to the common cause, self-sacrifice; the growth of kindliness between classes; the improved relations between officers and men; the patience under privation and suffering; no one, I say, who has seen these things, even if he ignores the heroism of the battlefield, can believe that the results of war are totally evil. And peace is not without its evils. There is an appalling danger for anyone who finds himself profiting from the calamities of others. And, though I cannot pretend to have any doubt that the world must finally put down war, I confess that the futile babblings of some pacifists make one want to cry with Tennyson:

This huckster put down war! Can he tell
Whether war be a cause or a consequence?
Put down the passions that make earth hell!
Down with ambition, avarice, pride,
Jealousy, down! cut off from the mind
The bitter springs of anger and fear!

Down, too, down at your own fireside,
With the evil tongue and the evil ear,
For each is at war with mankind!

The question of race we had thought settled. The scientists had told us that there were no pure races in Europe, and that consequently war on racial grounds was absurd. But I have heard Germans indignantly reproach England for siding with Belgium because Englishmen and Germans were of the same stock. And the journals of Paris have abounded in articles contrasting the Latin races with the Teuton, forgetful of the Germanic blood in their British allies, the Lombards in Italy, and the Celtic and Frankish elements in France itself. It is especially for us, compounded as we are of almost all the races of the world, to think this out too, and end the absurdity of racial jealousy.

The question of nationality and patriotism is the most difficult of all. I began by referring to the growth of internationalism before the war. Whatever the war may have done to make us revise our opinions on nationalism in politics, nothing has occurred that need shake our faith in the internationalism of the intellect. We can afford to recognize what we gain in richness and variety from the contrasts of national cultures, national temperaments, national manners, without losing sight of the loftier unity of the spirit in which all these merge. The solution of this problem has been indicated by the writer

who, among all the leaders of thought in Europe, has alone risen to the height of this great occasion, by the Frenchman who, though for the moment exiled and decried, is destined to be recognized as one of the permanent glories of France, by that great lover of truth who has in the midst of war abated no jot of his allegiance to truth or to France, Romain Rolland.

“For the finer spirits of Europe,” he writes, “there are two dwelling-places: our earthly fatherland, and that other City of God. Of the one we are the guests, of the other, the builders. To the one let us give our lives and our faithful hearts; but neither family, friend, nor fatherland, nor aught that we love, has power over the spirit. The spirit is the light. It is our duty to lift it above tempests and thrust aside the clouds that threaten to obscure it; to build higher and stronger, dominating the injustice and hatred of nations, the walls of that city wherein the souls of the whole world may assemble.”

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-85 (April, 1907, to December, 1914). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

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 - I. The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia.
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 - III. The British White Paper.
 - IV. The German White Book. October, 1914.
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 - I. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to Reichstag, August 4, 1914.
 - II. Speech of the Prime Minister to House of Commons, August 6, 1914.
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III. Restraints of Commerce, February 6, 1915—September 7, 1915.
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IV. Case of the Wilhelmina, February 15, 1915—April 8, 1915. October, 1915.
96. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XI.
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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE PROPOSAL FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

AFFIRMATIVE—WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

NEGATIVE —WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1916



SEPTEMBER, 1916

No. 106

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

It is the aim of the Association to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on pages 36 to 38.

THE PROPOSAL FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE—AFFIRMATIVE

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It is a great pleasure to be one of this Conference. I know I am not fitted to preside over it, but I have already discovered, having attended a business meeting, that political experience in the study of machines has not been lost on the Managing Committee connected with this Conference and therefore, I expect to be guided as fully and completely as the exigency may require, and if I overstep the boundary, I hope I may be properly rebuked.

I want to speak to you of something that has come from this Institution and others like it, devised with the hope that it contains something constructive in its features, not new, perhaps, but formulated in such a way in its platform as to approve itself to a great many who have been aroused by the present war to the necessity of doing something and providing some means that shall be affirmative—to make less likely a recurrence of the dreadful cataclysm that we have witnessed and are witnessing in Europe. The League to Enforce Peace is an association organized through the activities of three or four gentlemen who were first dazed with the defeat of their hopes by the outbreak of the war and who, after they recovered themselves, thought it was wise to bring together as many interested in the subject as they could within the cosy limits of the Century Club at dinner. There is

something about a dinner that always helps to promote agreement. It creates a desire to be unanimous. Much to the surprise of the twenty gentlemen who were there, we did agree, and then, lest we might not hide our light under a bushel or lose for lack of appreciation of the importance of our own work, we shrunk from the public gaze by gathering at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, and there we agreed upon the platform with very few changes.

I only recite in general what the platform is, not because I think that most who are here do not know it, but merely for the purpose of refreshing their recollection and making it the basis of my remarks, which are directed toward some controverted features in the practical working of the plan. The plan contemplates an international agreement signed by as many powers as can be induced to sign it. The first provision is for a permanent Court of Justice international, with jurisdiction to consider and decide all controversies of a justiciable character arising between two or more members of the League, the power of the Court to be extended to passing upon questions finally and in a binding way upon whether the issue presented is a justiciable one and therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court. The second provision is that all questions not of a justiciable character, leading to differences between two or more members of the League, are to be presented to a Commission, before which evidence is to be introduced, arguments are to be made and then the Commission is to recommend something in the nature of a compromise. The third provision is that if any one member of the League, violating its pledged faith, shall begin hostilities against any other member of the League before the questions creating the trouble have been submitted either for decision by the

Court or for recommendation by the Commission, then all the other members of the League agree to defend the member prematurely attacked against the one who begins the hostilities; and to use, first, economic means, and then military force for that purpose. The fourth plank provides that International Congresses shall be convened with representatives from all members of the League, who shall consider the subject of International Law, shall extend it in a Legislative way and submit the changes thus agreed upon to the nations constituting the League. If there is no objection within a year, then the rules changing or extending existing International Law shall be considered as rules for the decision of the permanent Court.

Now, one of the things that has been very gratifying to those who have been connected with the League, has been the eagerness with which, in very many quarters, the propositions have been accepted and approved. Of course there have been criticisms the character of which can be noted when I tell you that in England the objection to the title was that we have "Peace" in it at all. They wished us to strike that out and just call it a League of Nations, whereas from Oregon we got the proposition that we should strike out the word "Enforce." If we had struck out "Peace" and struck out "Enforce," it would be what Governor Allen used to call a "damn barren ideality." But we thought if we left out Peace we would be leaving Hamlet out of the play, so we concluded that in England they might call it a League of Nations if they retained its real features, and that that gentleman who declined to come in because we had force in it—we would have to consent to let him stay out. It would seem that many had been waiting for the formulation of some such proposals, and if I may judge from the comments on them, what attracts is its

affirmative and constructive quality in the proposition that physical force be added to the weight of moral force in order to prevent a general war, with the hope that the threat will be enough without actual resort to military or economic means.

Now I want to emphasize in this plan a number of its features, with a view of taking up some of the objections. First, I would like to emphasize the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable. That has led to the division into a court and a commission, the court to consider justiciable questions, the commission to consider non-justiciable questions. Non-justiciable questions are those which cannot be settled according to the principles of law or equity. The justiciable ones are those that can be so settled. There are a great many non-justiciable questions that can arise between nations that may well lead to war, and in that respect is not so different in our domestic life. Take the case of Mrs. A., who has a lawn upon which she allows the children of Mrs. B. to play, Mrs. B. being a neighbor, and Mrs. C. is the neighbor on the other side and she does not let Mrs. C.'s children play on that lawn because she has had some previous experience with Mrs. C.'s children and she finds that they are young mustangs and dig up the lawn and tear the flowers and everything of that sort. Now she has a perfect right to say who shall come on that lawn and who shall not, but there well may be an issue between Mrs. C. and Mrs. A. growing out of that discrimination. It is non-justiciable; you cannot settle it in court, unless perhaps Mr. C. comes home and Mrs. C. tells Mr. C. about it and asks him to go over and see Mr. A. about it; then you may have a justiciable question. [Laughter.] But the issue then is not whether Mrs. A. was right in her judgment of Mrs. C.'s children and her dis-

crimination against them in favor of Mrs. B.'s; the justiciable issue usually settles down to the ultimate fact whether Mr. A. or Mr. C. hit first.

This is a domestic illustration, but we are having just such a situation with respect to Japan and China. We have a right to exclude the Japanese if we please; we have a right to exclude the Chinese. We are a bit inconsistent; we wish the Chinese trade but we do not care for the Chinese. We have a color scheme in our immigration and naturalization laws; it is limited to black and white and we are very fastidious about the browns and yellows. Such a question may very well lead to friction and lead to something worse. I only give that as an illustration of a non-justiciable question which in some way or other must be provided for. You can arbitrate a non-justiciable question if both parties are willing to it; you can leave any question of any sort to a Board of Arbitration or a single arbitrator if you are willing to do it and abide his decision, but you cannot submit such a question to a court, because a court has to proceed according to rules of law and there are many questions that you cannot dispose of according to rules of law. You can see that in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. It has under the Constitution the power to sit as in a National Tribunal and the duty to sit, because its judicial power extends to controversies between two or more States. Now the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Bradley and other of the Justices, has said a number of times that there are controversies between States that the court cannot consider because they are non-justiciable; they cannot be settled on principles of law or equity. In such a case, of course, if a State may not have a remedy through the court, it cannot have any remedy at all, because if it attempted to

enforce its remedy, to use force to establish what it believes its rights or interests to be, then Uncle Sam would step in to restrain that State by force. This is the difference between the Supreme Court as an instance of an international tribunal and a commission of arbitration between independent States.

Objection has been made to giving to the Permanent Court the power to decide whether the question before it is justiciable or not; in other words, the power to decide upon its own jurisdiction. This is not giving it any executive power. Every domestic court has it. The question whether an issue is one of law or equity is a question that such a court is entirely competent to decide. If such a question arises, the person against whom the complaint is filed or the nation against which the complaint is filed ought not, it seems to me, to be given the opportunity to say, "I decline to submit to this jurisdiction because in my judgment this question is non-justiciable and cannot be settled on the basis of law or equity." I think if we are establishing a permanent court, we ought to establish it so that a party may be brought in against his will. That is the case with us in a domestic court. The court issues its summons, brings in a party whether he thinks the court has jurisdiction or not. If the party chooses to raise the question, the court passes on it, and when the court has passed on it, that settles it.

Now I think therefore, with respect to that kind of a question, it ought not to be voluntary with the parties. Nations are much more willing to make agreements in the future to submit abstract questions than they are to submit a burning issue in respect to which, while they may feel that the law is against them, they have some sort of an equity in the back of their heads that could not be expounded

or would not be tolerated in court. We should take advantage of this willingness and bind them by agreement as to general jurisdiction to be interpreted and applied by the court itself. Objection is made to this on the ground that it surrenders too much of a Nation's sovereignty. I do not think so. It may encounter opposition when it is brought up in a world's conference, but I think we here ought to stand for it and press it as far as we can in order that the agreement which shall be made shall cover as much ground and be as effective as possible.

The reason why we have not one body to dispose of both legal and non-legal questions—we might have a commission of arbitration that could dispose of legal questions and also non-legal questions—but the reason why we make a division is important. We wish to settle legal questions by a court that proceeds on principles of law and equity, and decides without regard to the will of the parties. A commission of arbitration is a continuance of the diplomatic function of negotiation. The commission of arbitration usually has a representative of each party on it, and such representatives are not regarded. You may say they are, but really they are not regarded as judges; they are regarded as advocates of the parties who go into the conference room with the other members of the Board of Arbitration and there continue the arguments. The result in an arbitration is generally what a negotiation is for; namely, a compromise, and the Board of Arbitration seeks to please, as near as it can, both parties. Well, that does not lead to exact justice, so that a nation that has a real claim against another may feel loath to go into such an arbitration when the law and equity justify.

Another feature that I wish to emphasize is that while

the establishment of the permanent court would doubtless create an obligation on the part of those who entered into litigation to abide that judgment, the third clause for enforcing the agreement only goes to the extent of enforcing the agreement by using economic and military means to compel the submission, and the delay of any action until there has been a decision by the court or by the commission. In other words, A and B are brought into court; A is the complainant, B the defendant; the court decides against B and renders a judgment. Now, being parties to the League, B is bound by that judgment to A, but when D and E and F are called upon to comply with their limited obligation under the League, they may say B submitted the case, he waited until the judgment, he did not institute hostilities until after judgment was rendered, and we, under this agreement, are under no obligation to enforce the judgment by using our military forces to bring it about.

Now that has been the subject of criticism. It has been suggested that we ought to have the military forces of all those connected with the League, not only to prevent a hasty beginning of war before submission, but that we ought to have all bound to use their economic and military forces to enforce the judgment rendered. Well, that was made the subject of very considerable thought, but it was finally concluded that we ought not to be over-ambitious. It was thought that if we could stop hostilities until there had been a full hearing of a dispute, the introduction of evidence and the argument and delay incident to all that, that we might reasonably count on some settlement between the parties after they had had the time to think which was necessarily given by the discussion, the hearing and the delay. Some time we hope that it may come to the use of the Sheriff to enforce the judgment as well as

to keep peace until the judgment is rendered, but up to this time we have not been ambitious to that extent.

Now, so much for the judgment. What about the compromise? Ought we to enforce the compromise? Can we do more with respect to the compromise than merely to have the hearing, recommendation and delay? The Allies might enforce a judgment because that follows according to the rules of law and equity, but could we enforce a compromise? Would not that be going too far and compelling parties to abide the exercise of discretion in matters that are difficult to decide because there are no rules for decision? That is the question that troubled us. It is easy to hold them off until the compromise has been recommended; that makes a definite day, but when it comes to enforcing the compromise recommended in a matter that cannot be decided on legal principles, it seems to us that it is a little too ambitious to undertake it.

Now it is said that this leaves something too open and that war may creep in. I agree; it does, and anybody that says that he has got a machine that will work every time to keep away war, says something that I cannot credit. I believe he is sincere if he says it, but I think his conclusion impeaches his judgment some. I feel that we cannot make progress if we are going to attempt the impossible, because I think the whole plan will break down and the breaking down will be worse than if we attempted less and succeeded in it. Now the opportuneness of these proposals is growing more and more apparent to those who are charged with the duty of carrying on the work of the League to Enforce Peace. I do not know how near the end of the war we are, but we are certainly very much nearer the end than we were in 1914. That is a proposition that we can establish; and there are

indications that people are getting tired on the other side and there are suggestions that point to a possible collapse, certainly to a trend toward peace. Under these conditions the opportuneness of the proposal seems to press itself on the men most concerned with the struggle.

A gentleman came to see me the other day who had had conferences with Sir Edward Grey, with Monsieur Briand and with Mr. von Jagow, in which he discussed the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. He reported to me that Messrs. Grey and Briand did not see how a satisfactory peace could be established unless it was on condition of some such international agreement as this of the League to Enforce Peace. Mr. von Jagow thought the plan was a good one but he doubted whether it could be adopted. Of course this is a working hypothesis. In detail it may be changed, but the general proposal that by the united force of all the powers of Europe the hot-heads in two nations shall be restrained from involving the whole of the world in another such disaster, is too good to give up. That idea ought to be cultivated, and European nations look to the United States to lead in the matter of its suggestion and of its being brought to the attention of a world conference and urged. I think the views of these European statesmen very significant, and it grows more significant the more you think about it. They are discussing the question of what the end of the war shall be; they are discussing how the object of all to prevent future war shall be attained. Is not this an opportunity and a great one? If that be true, then isn't it our duty to stir up our people on the subject, to iterate and reiterate the wisdom of the proposals?

I was not so much impressed when I was earlier in politics as I am now with the necessity of repetition and

repetition and repetition and again repetition in order to spread an idea among the people—all people. When you read the New York papers for a week and hear the same thing repeated in one form and another, you conclude everybody of the hundred millions knows all about it and agrees with it. Well, it isn't true. The circle of those who know that such an issue is being mooted is small and the task of bringing the question home to the whole American people is a vast work. Professor Dounsburry of Yale was in the habit of saying that one of the remarkable things he had discovered in his career of teaching was the wonderful capacity of the under-graduate mind to resist the acquisition of knowledge. And therefore if we have something that we think is good, if we have something that we think the American people ought to approve, something which they ought to give a mandate to their representatives in a world conference to stand for, then we ought to agitate and agitate and agitate, and that is the reason why we have an organization; that is the reason why some of us seize every occasion to talk about it in season and out of season; that is the reason why you have this infliction to-night.

Now I want to consider, as I said in the opening, some of the objections that have been made. The first objection is that membership in the League is impracticable for us because it would require a great standing army for us to perform our part of the obligation in the third clause. Well, I do not think that is a considered objection. We are now engaged in a campaign for reasonable preparedness, and the limits of what that preparedness should be are gradually being hammered out. Certainly if that which seems to be regarded as a reasonable military army force and naval force is to be maintained, then it will furnish all that we need to contribute to any joint force to

carry out our part of the obligation. It must be borne in mind that we shall only be one of a number of contributors if the plan can be carried out. Now there are many who say that they are not in favor of this plan but they are in favor of an international police force. Well, what is the difference? We do not claim any patent on this plan and we are quite willing to call it an international police force, but it must be constituted in a practical way, and when the joint forces are united and are doing the police duty of the world, it is true to say that they are not carrying on war, but enforcing justice.

In the second place, there is a constitutional objection. That does not strike me as very formidable. Perhaps it is because I know something about the Constitution. At least I am trying to teach it and if there is anything that makes you know something about a subject it is to try to teach it. It is said in the first place that the provision for a permanent court is unconstitutional in that it delegates the power to a tribunal to decide questions concerning the foreign relations of this country which must be decided by the President or by the President and the Senate or by the President and Congress. Well, if that be true, then we cannot have any arbitration of any sort and agree to abide by it. That same delegation is involved in every arbitration that we have had. We have agreed when we went into an arbitration that what tribunal decides is to bind us. To that extent we yield our discretion and liberty to control our own action by the judgment of another. Now, in Jay's Treaty we had a provision for an arbitration in 1794, and Professor Scott, who is always accurate, says that we have had forty such arbitrations since. If arbitration involves delegation of delegated constitutional power, then we have violated the Constitution so many times that it

must be a very sorry thing. Some distinction is sought to be made between agreeing to arbitrate an issue in the future when it shall arise and arbitrating an issue that has already arisen. What distinction is there? What can there be? In either case we agree to arbitrate a difference, the difference to occur in the future or the difference which has already occurred. The truth is, it is not a delegation of power to agree to create a court, and abide its judgment. The nation as a sovereign agrees to consent to the creation of a court and its judgment, just as a person may consent to an arbitration. The sovereign has as much power in that regard as a person.

Now the second constitutional objection on the basis of the Constitution is that in the third clause, where it is agreed that the nations of the League not engaged in the controversy shall unite their forces, economic and military, to enforce submission, we bind ourselves to make war, and that as Congress alone has the power to declare war, we take away from Congress this power and agree to change the structure of our government. Well, the slightest analysis will show the utter lack of foundation for any such objection. The treaty-making power of the government is in the President and Senate, two-thirds of the Senate. When a treaty is made, it binds the whole government, it binds the House of Representatives, it binds the Senate, it binds the President, it binds the people of the nation, in whose behalf and name it is made. When the obligations of that treaty are to be performed, then that part of the machinery of government that discharges such a function as is involved in the performance, is, under the Constitution, to act. This part of the machinery is bound in the sense that its honor ought to compel it to do the thing that the treaty-making power agreed for the government

should be done, but the government does not and can not do the thing until that part of the machinery acts. Congress is to declare war; therefore, when the treaty-making power has made a treaty involving the United States in the obligation to declare war, it is for Congress to declare war and exercise the constitutional function that it has to declare war. It may, if it chooses; it has the power, it has the constitutional power, to break the obligation of the government and not do that which the government is in honor bound to do. It is like fore-ordination and free will; it has the power, and may exercise it constitutionally, to say we will make no war, although that part of the government that had the power to agree that we should, did so agree.

Now how does that interfere with the normal operation of the machinery as provided by the Constitution? Well, if it does, we have been violating the Constitution right along. When we entered into that arrangement with Panama in respect to the zone and acquired dominion over that zone for the purpose of building the canal, what did we agree? We guaranteed the integrity of Panama. What does that mean? It means that we bound ourselves by that treaty that if any nation attempted to take away any territory from Panama or to subvert her government, we would fight. Now who would arrange the fighting? Wouldn't it be Congress? Doesn't that bind Congress to make war? She has the right to violate the obligation if she chooses. Does that make the treaty unconstitutional? We have guaranteed the integrity of Cuba, which means that no foreign nation can come in there and take any of her territory or subvert her government. Is that constitutional? It binds Congress to make war just as this does, and it does not do any more, and Congress may violate the plighted faith of the

nation if it chooses, but it does not change the constitutional obligation and power on the part of Congress to make war. That is all "constitutional"; it fills your mouth so full that you think that the objection must be formidable.

Then, of course, there is that objection to force. I am not going to argue, I am not going into that question of pacifism. I think I could argue with them in quietness and peace. I am certainly not disposed to call those who are pacifists names, because I want to convince them of their errors and my observation is that it never helps you to convince a man when your major premise is that in his then state of mind he is a fool. Ordinarily with that major premise, he is inclined to stick to his denial of the correctness of the conclusion. The Society of Friends has always advocated non-resistance. They have not always been consistent in it, as the Connecticut people who took Connecticut grants over into Pennsylvania and tried to live on the lands under those grants found out; they found that non-resistance did not work there. Nevertheless the Society of Friends has usually been consistent and I always differ with them with the utmost reluctance, because you can look back three hundred years and find many things advocated then which seemed far away from anything that was reasonable in the views of the ordinary common-sense individual in those days and see now how they have come to be regarded as axiomatic. I feel like opposing that particular denomination, therefore, with very considerable reluctance and great respect for their views; but nevertheless I do not think that we have reached the time when force, as an aid to moral impulse, can be dispensed with.

The modern anarchist, if I understand it—I do not mean the gentleman who begins his argument with you by blow-

ing you up—but I mean him who theoretically sustains the doctrine that if we could get rid of government entirely and all restraint and bring up children with the understanding that each was to act on his own responsibility, his or her own responsibility, and was to have no restraint of any kind, that, when they became adults, they would know just exactly what they ought to do first and then they would do it—I sometimes think we have begun this practice with our children—still I do not think that human nature is so constituted that the theory will work; we still need a police force at home to enforce laws, and it seems to me that a police force, if we can arrange it with respect to nations, may be made most useful and that its existence and the threat of using it may make the use of force by one nation in controversies between nations much less frequent.

Then there is the objection to the entangling alliances against the injunction of Washington, which we have heretofore observed; still I agree this is a serious objection, one to be carefully considered. Of course when Washington talked, he had in mind that very annoying treaty he had made with France during the Revolutionary War, which of course helped us in our Revolution, but subsequently involved us in some very uncomfortable obligations to France in her war with Great Britain. He had in mind an alliance with one nation against another, perhaps. This of course is different from that, in that it is hoped that it will embrace all the nations of the world, at least all the world. Nevertheless, I agree that it is a departure from the principle as he stated it, and we can only justify it on the ground that our situation is very different from what it was when Washington spoke. He was then five times as far from Europe as we are to-day, if you can judge by the

speed of transportation, and twenty-five times in matter of communication. He was twenty-five times as far from Asia, if you can consider that Asia was any considerable quantity at all in our foreign relations at that time, as it is now. Now we are a hundred million people and reach from ocean to ocean; we have Alaska, a dominion in itself, purchased by Seward in 1867, a place where a base of operations could easily be made for an attack on the Pacific Coast. We have the Hawaiian Islands and we have the Philippines; that is, we have them up to date.

I am not going to dwell on the Philippines; I cannot in this presence. I think it is in Our Mutual Friend—my memory is sometimes defective—but my recollection is that there was a gentleman named Silas Wegg, who was reading the “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire” to the golden dust man and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Boffin, and he occasionally made a mistake in his reading and called it “The Decline and Fall of the Russian Empire,” and Mr. Boffin, with the intention of clearing up his ignorance, inquired what the distinction was between the Roman Empire and the Russian Empire, and Mr. Wegg was a bit stumped until some kind Providence helped him, and his eye hit on Mrs. Boffin and he said, “Mr. Boffin, I cannot explain that distinction in the presence of Mrs. Boffin.” I cannot tell you what I think about the present Philippine policy in the presence of the ladies. . . . We are there now; it makes us an Asiatic power; they are under the eaves of Asia, and if we stay as long as we ought to stay to carry out the pledge we in effect made when we went in there, we shall continue to be an Asiatic power until a good many of us here are gone.

Then we have the friction with Japan and China. We wish to keep the open door and it is closing a bit. Then we

have got the Panama Canal, an investment of four hundred millions, to unite the eastern and the western seaboard, to double the force of our navy, it may be; that makes us almost a South American power. Then we own Porto Rico, fifteen hundred miles out at sea from Florida. Then we do not own, but we have a relation to Cuba that is even more likely to involve us in trouble than if we did own it. We have guaranteed her integrity and we have reserved to ourselves the right to go in and suppress insurrection and we have had to do it once. Then we have Mexico; that is an international nuisance that is likely to entail, I am sorry to say, greater burdens on us than we would like. And then we have our relations to Europe. When they went into the war, we settled back, shocked, of course, but with a kind of feeling that at any rate we were so separated from the war that we could not be involved, but I think we have gotten over that feeling now in view of our recent experiences in ultimatums which show our proximity to war and the warlike things in Europe.

Now the question which I want to put to you is whether, in view of the strained relations that we have had with Germany, for instance, in view of the questions that have arisen between us and England, in pursuing the indifferent course of a neutral, as I believe we have done, and yet coming so close to war as we have, we can say that we are any more likely to be kept out of war by remaining a neutral and avoiding such an alliance as this we here propose than if we went in and availed ourselves and made ourselves part of the great power of allies in such an agreement to stop war and to prevent its involving such a disaster to human progress.

THE PROPOSAL FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE—NEGATIVE

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

Before taking up the subject which I desire to discuss, I am sure that my distinguished friend [Mr. Taft] will pardon me if I dwell for a moment upon the plans of the League to Enforce Peace, and I will say to you that, in dissenting from those who support those plans, I give myself more embarrassment than I give those who represent the views from which I dissent. I know the distinguished gentleman who is at the head of this League too well to doubt for a moment that he desires to have every possible criticism candidly stated, for I know him well enough to know that he desires the triumph of that which is right much more earnestly than he desires the triumph of any particular thing in which he may believe. [Applause.] And I think that that can be said in general of those who assemble here, for this is rather a unique organization; it is composed of those who have no pecuniary interest in the subjects which they discuss, and therefore each one speaks in a disinterested way. While he proclaims what he believes, he is at the same time a seeker after truth. The names of those who stand sponsor for this League to Enforce Peace create a very strong presumption in its favor, but it seems to me, as I view it, that there are four objections to the plan and that these objections are of such great weight and

importance that they deserve to be considered by those who have this plan in contemplation or who are inclined to support it.

The first is that it involves us in entangling alliances with Europe, and that we, therefore, cannot adopt it without abandoning the advice of Washington which has been followed thus far and I believe will continue to be followed by the American people. I have not the slightest thought that any argument that can be presented in behalf of any plan that connects us with the quarrels of Europe will ever bring to the support of that plan anything like a majority of the American people.

Now, as I understand this plan, we are to agree with other nations of the world to enforce peace and to enforce it by compelling all of the contracting parties to submit all of their controversies for investigation before going to war. I need not tell you that the plan of investigating all questions is one that I heartily approve. It is now more than ten years since I began to urge in this country and in other countries a plan which has finally been embodied in thirty treaties, which submits every question of dispute of every kind and character to investigation and gives a period of a year for that investigation, during which time the contracting parties agree that there shall be no resort to force. I am committed to the plan of investigation. The point I make is this, that, when we join with other nations to enforce that plan, we join with them in attempting to settle by force the disputes of the old world. While the chances of a resort to force may be very remote, I am not willing to speculate on a proposition about which we can know absolutely nothing; I am not willing that this nation shall put its

army and navy at the command of a council which we cannot control and thus agree to let foreign nations decide when we shall go to war. Now, if I understand this plan, you cannot agree with other nations to enforce peace by compelling the submission of all questions to investigation before war, without lodging with some power somewhere the right to decide when that force shall be employed. We cannot hope to have a controlling influence in that body; I assume that it would be impossible to secure any kind of an agreement which would leave us to decide when these nations would enforce a proposition. My first objection, therefore, is that it necessarily entangles us in the quarrels of Europe and that we would go, blindfolded, into an agreement, the extent and effect of which no human mind can know.

The second is that if we join with Europe in the enforcement of peace over there, we can hardly refuse to allow Europe to join in the enforcing of peace in the Western hemisphere. If I understand the sentiment of the American people, there is not the slightest thought in the American mind of surrendering the Monroe Doctrine, or of inviting any foreign nation to assist us in maintaining peace in the Western hemisphere. [Applause.] This is the second objection.

The third is that our Constitution vests in Congress the right to declare war and that we cannot vest the power to declare war in a council controlled by European nations without changing our Constitution. The suggestion that we so amend our Constitution as to vest in a body, whose control is across the sea, the right to declare war would not be popular in the United States. If we are to change the Constitution from what it is now,

I am in favor of putting the declaring of war in the hands of the people, to be decided by a referendum vote of the American people. This is quite different from surrendering, into the hands of a foreign body, the right to determine when this nation shall take up arms.

The fourth objection that I see to this plan is fundamental and cannot be changed by a suggestion that I shall make in a moment. The fourth objection is that when we turn from moral suasion to force, we step down and not up. I prefer to have this nation a moral power in the world rather than a policeman. Therefore, while I have no doubt whatever of the high motives and of the laudable purpose of those who stand for the doctrines of the League, I cannot bring myself to believe that it is a step in advance.

Now, three of the objections mentioned might be obviated if we divided the world into groups, the American group being entrusted with the maintenance of peace in the Western hemisphere. I would be much more willing to join with the Republics of Central and South America in any plan that would compel the submission of all disputes in this hemisphere to investigation before war; I would be much more willing to do that than to favor a plan that would bind us to enforce decisions made by nations across the ocean, or even obligate us to join European nations in *compelling* investigation before war.

And in addition to all the other objections, and there are so many that I shall not take time to give them all—in addition to all other objections that may be made to this League, when it embraces European nations and puts them in a position where they can decide questions of

war for us, there is this consideration that I think will not be treated lightly by the American people. If we are in a group of American Republics, we are associated with people having our form of government, but the moment we cross the ocean, we tie ourselves to a theory of government from which our people dissented a century and a third ago. If I understand the heart of the American people, they still believe that there is an essential difference between a monarchy and a republic. So long as the European monarchies vest in their executives the right to declare war, it seems to me that the American people can well refuse to tie themselves to these countries and become thus "unequally yoked together."

As I said, if we are going to have any change in our Constitution, I want it to be a change in the direction of democracy and not a change in the direction of monarchy. If I understand the spirit of our nation and the sentiment of our people, you will find that when this becomes a practical question and comes before them for adoption or rejection, they will consider very seriously before they will join this country to the countries with hereditary rulers and thus give to these rulers an influence over us which we refuse to give to our own executives.

Now I have presented, as briefly as I could, the objections that I see to this plan to enforce peace, and I shall be very glad if it can be so modified as to make it consistent and harmonious with the ideas of the American people and the institutions of the United States, for these gentlemen do not surpass me in the desire to do whatever can be done to make war impossible. And now let me give the remainder of my time to two or three phases of

the subject under consideration. I say the subject under consideration, for I suppose that the subject is as broad as the subject is when it is described as "the state of the Union."

We are here to consider the attitude of this nation and I ask you to bear with me for a moment while I speak of the nation's attitude on two or three phases of the subject now under consideration. First, as to whether we shall go into this war; there are very few people who say that we should. I believe they had a meeting in New York not long ago, and one in Boston, at which speakers said that it was our duty to go into this war. The virus has not yet been carried across the Allegheny Mountains; we have had no meetings in the west where anybody has suggested that we go into this war. My fear is that, following the diplomacy of the old world, we may do the things that will bring us into this war, even though we do not desire to enter it. You well remember that all the rulers who entered this war entered it *protesting that they wanted peace*, but they followed the precedents that lead to war.

My contention is that the precedents of the past have broken down, that they have involved the world in a war without a parallel; that they have made a slaughterhouse out of Europe, and that these precedents ought not to be followed in this country if they will tend to bring us into this war. And so, where I have had a chance to speak to the people—and I have been improving every opportunity for now some ten months—wherever I have had a chance to speak to the people, I have presented the alternatives which I think we can choose instead of going to war.

In the first place, if diplomacy fails, we have a peace plan. It was offered to all the world. It has been embodied in thirty treaties with one billion three hundred million of the human race. We now have three-quarters of the globe connected with us by these treaties, and three nations, exercising authority over one hundred millions of people, that have not signed the treaties have formally endorsed the principle, although they have not yet joined in treaties with us. We have almost the entire civilized world bound to us either by treaties actually made or by agreement upon the principle which the treaty embodies, providing that every dispute of every kind shall, before hostilities begin, be submitted to an international tribunal for investigation and report. Four of the belligerent nations have signed these treaties with us, Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia. Great Britain and France signed on the 15th of September, 1914, a month and a half after the war began, and Russia signed on the 1st of October, two months after the war began. Italy signed before the war commenced. Three belligerent nations, Germany, Austria and Belgium, have endorsed the principle but have not yet signed treaties. Germany was the sixteenth nation to formally endorse the principle embodied in these treaties. My contention is this, that if this plan was good enough to offer to all the world—and we have never withdrawn the offer—if it was good enough to be embodied in the treaties we have made, and good enough to be endorsed in principle by the other nations that have not yet signed treaties, it is good enough to use with any nation before we go to war with that nation.

But, my friends, in an argument it is well to cover

every possible contingency, and this is so important a question that I desire to leave no point uncovered, and so I go a step further and say that if we use the treaty plan and it fails to bring a peaceful settlement, or if we fail to use the treaty plan and reach a time when we must decide either to go into this war or to postpone final settlement of the dispute until the war is over, if we are compelled to choose between these two alternatives, I believe it will be the part of wisdom to postpone final settlement of the dispute until after this war is over. In suggesting this, I am simply applying to international affairs a principle that is applied in our courts every day. Our courts postpone hearings in the interest of justice, and if, by postponing the final settlement of a dispute until this war is over, we can secure a settlement without war, I think it is worth postponing. The only difficulty we have had in regard to any dispute with either side has been the fear of the effect of the settlement on this war; when this war is over, that difficulty will be removed and I think the chances are many to one that we can reach a settlement without a resort to arms.

But there is another contingency which should be considered. Suppose it were impossible or were believed to be impossible to secure a settlement after the war without a war; suppose the question were simply this, that we must have a war to settle the dispute and that the only thing we had to decide was whether we would have it now, while this war is on, or after this war is over. If we were compelled to choose between those two alternatives, I believe it would be the part of wisdom to have our war after this war is over. Why? In the first place,

we would still have on our side the possibility of a peaceful settlement after the war was over. Second, we would be free to act as mediator and help to bring this war to a close before we entered our war; and, third, if we have to have a war, it will be our war with the single nation with which we have the dispute, and we can have something to say about when to go into it and when to come out and the terms of the settlement; but if we go into this war, it is not our war, it is everybody's war; if we go into it, we cannot come out till the others do, and while there we must fight for the things they fight for, and God forbid that this nation shall ever entangle itself in the quarrels of the Old World or put an American army and an American navy at the command of a European monarch to be used in settling his quarrels with other European monarchs. The first point, therefore, that I ask you to consider is this, that we shall not go into this war. I shall not attempt to present all the reasons, I shall simply present three and those very briefly.

The first is that we cannot go into this war without imposing a very heavy burden upon a generation yet unborn, aye, upon many generations. If we go into this war, we cannot go in in a stingy way or as a miserly nation. If it is manly to go in, it will be manly to play a man's part and be prodigal with men and with money. If we judge the possibilities in regard to our expenses by what has already occurred in Europe, we must know that we cannot possibly take part in this war without contracting an enormous war debt. In less than two years the countries now at war have added to the war debts of the world a sum about equal to all the war debts that have come down from all the wars of history

until this time. It is no slight matter to fasten upon the generations that are to follow us the burden of such a debt. Five hundred years from now children will be born into Europe with their necks under the yoke that this generation has placed upon them. Let us not imitate their folly.

In the second place, no man can tell how many men it would cost us; it has already cost them 3,000,000 in killed and nearly ten million in wounded. If we go into it, what will be our quota? One hundred thousand men? It would be more likely to be half a million or a million. If I know the sentiment of the American people, they are not willing to make this sacrifice in either blood or money for any cause that has arisen in our disputes with either side thus far.

The third objection is, that we would forfeit an opportunity that never came to any other nation before, since time began. We are the greatest of the neutral nations; we are the one to which the world is looking to act as mediator when the time for mediation comes. If we go into this war, no matter what the cause, no matter what the excuse, no matter what the pretext, we step down from that high position and turn over to some other nation this unprecedented opportunity.

And more than that, we are next-of-kin to all the nations that are at war. They are blood of our blood, they are bone of our bone; not a soldier boy falls on any battlefield over yonder but what the wail of sorrow in his home finds an echo at some American fireside, and these people have a right to expect that we will remain the friend of all, and in God's good time play the part of friend.

Some nation must lift the world out of the black night of war into the light of that day when peace can be made enduring by being built on love and brotherhood, and I crave that honor for our nation; more glorious than any page of history that has yet been written will be that page that will record our claim to the promise made to the peace-makers.

This is the day for which the ages have been waiting. For 1900 years the gospel of the Prince of Peace has been making its majestic march around the world and the philosophy of the Sermon on the Mount has become more and more the rule of daily life. All that remains is that this moral code shall be lifted from the level of the individual and made real in the law of nations; and this, I believe, is the task that God in His providence has reserved for the American people.

And now may I devote the remainder of my time to just one more thought? It is a thought upon which I would be glad to expand, but it would not be fair to those who are to follow me to trespass upon their time. My friends, this is a place where, if anywhere, we can and ought to speak heart to heart. Let me say just a word about the false philosophy, as I regard it, that some ask this country to adopt. We have in this country a propaganda for what they call preparedness. It ought not to be called preparedness; it is unfortunate that a word with such a distinguished lineage and such high character should be dragged down to so base a use as this word is. It does not accurately describe it, because there are two kinds of preparedness, and those who ask you to adopt one kind have no right to insist upon monopolizing the meaning of that word.

The question is how best to prepare against war. My objection to the plan which is suggested and described by that word preparedness, as it is used by the friends of large appropriations, is that it will not prevent war but will provoke war, and in proof of this I point to the fact that the war in Europe was preceded by a period of preparation such as the world never knew before. If preparedness would prevent war, there would be no war in Europe, for they had spent money lavishly preparing. One side prepared on land and the other side on sea. Why did the side that prepared on land not prepare on sea? Because it thought preparation on land more effective. And why did the side that prepared on sea not prepare on land? It had as much money to use for one as the other. Why did it not use it preparing on land? Because it thought preparation on sea was more effective. Each thought it was prepared, and when the war began those best prepared went in first, after them others followed as they could prepare, and if we had been as well prepared as some now ask us to be, we would, I believe, be in the war to-day, shouting for blood as lustily as any of them. Now that is my view of it, and I understand that we are here to give expression to our own views, and not to other people's views. I know of no way of comparing views except for each one to give his own. If I tried to give yours, none of you might try to give mine, and then my view would not be presented at all. But if you present your view and I present mine, we have a chance to compare them.

This false philosophy that has brought Europe into this war will, in my judgment, bring into war any nation that adopts it. Europe has built its hope of peace upon

a false foundation, upon the foundation of force and fear and terrorism; the only hope of peace that these European nations have had rested in the belief that each could terrorize the other into peace.

It is a false philosophy; if you want to see how false it is try it on a neighborhood. The big questions between nations are settled by the very same rules that we apply to neighborhoods. I will show you what this philosophy is, and then you can judge whether it can be expected to bring anything else except war.

Suppose nearby you have two farmers living side by side, good farmers, well-meaning farmers who wanted to be friends, and suppose they tried to maintain peace on the European plan, how would they go at it? One would go to the nearest town and buy the best gun he could find, and then he would put a notice in the paper saying that he loved his neighbor and that he had no thought of trespassing upon his neighbor's rights; but that he was determined to defend his own rights and protect his honor at any cost, that he had secured the best gun in the market and that if his neighbor interfered with him, he would shoot him. Then suppose the neighbor went to town the next day and got him a better gun and, with the same frankness, consulted the newspaper and put in a similar notice explaining that he loved peace as well as his neighbor did but that he was just as determined to defend his own rights and protect his honor and that he had a better gun than his neighbor and that, if his neighbor crossed his line, he would kill him. And suppose then the first man, when he read that notice, went to town and got two guns and advertised that fact in the paper, and the second man, when he read it, went to town and got three guns, and so on, each alter-

nately buying guns. What would be the result? Every undertaker in that vicinity would go out and become personally acquainted with the two men, because he would know there would be at least one funeral in that neighborhood. That is the European plan. One country gets a battleship and announces that it can blow any other battleship out of the water; then a rival nation gets a dreadnaught that can sink the battleship; then the first nation gets a super-dreadnaught; then they go to the dictionary and look for prefixes for the names of their battleships as they build them larger and larger; and they make guns larger and larger and they equip armies larger and larger, all the time talking about how much they love peace and all the while boasting that they are ready for a fight.

Go back to the time when they commenced to pass laws against the carrying of concealed weapons and you can get all the material you want for a speech on preparedness, because the arguments made in favor of carrying revolvers can be put into the speeches made today in favor of preparedness, without changing a word. Did you ever hear of a man who wanted to carry a revolver to be aggressive? No, it was just to protect his rights and defend his honor, especially his honor, but they found by experience that the man who carried a revolver generally carried with it a disposition to use it on slight provocation and a disposition to provoke its use by others. For the promotion of peace, every state in this union has abolished preparedness on the part of individuals because it did not preserve peace. It provoked trouble, and unless we can convince ourselves there is a moral philosophy applicable to nations that is just the opposite of the moral philosophy applied to

individuals, we must conclude that, as the pistol-toting man is a menace to the peace of a community, so the pistol-toting nation is a menace to the peace of the world.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

NATIONALITY AND BEYOND

An Address delivered before the Commercial Club, San
Francisco, California, August 8, 1916,

By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER


DO WE WANT HALF THE HEMISPHERE?

By BRANDER MATTHEWS



OCTOBER, 1916

No. 107



American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

It is the aim of the Association to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on pages 27 to 29.

NATIONALITY AND BEYOND

An Address delivered before the Commercial Club,
San Francisco, California, August 8, 1916

By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

It is no small satisfaction to be able to stand for a few moments this afternoon in the presence of this great company of busy men, in order to discuss with them, however briefly and imperfectly, a matter which ought to be uppermost in the minds of every one of us.

Some weeks ago I was surprised and shocked to read in the public press the statement that with the causes and the outcome of the European War we Americans were not concerned. I am bound to assume that the words must have been used in some strange and unusual manner, for I find myself unable to believe that any intelligent American, in high station or in low, could hold the view which these words, interpreted literally, would appear to express. I should as soon expect one to say that we Americans were not interested in the revival of learning, or in the causes or outcome of the French Revolution, or in the invention of printing, or in the harnessing of science to industry, or in any one of the great, significant events in the history of free men.

For, Mr. President, unless I am wholly mistaken in the significance of these years through which we are passing, we are living in one of the great epoch-marking crises of the history of the world. We are standing at one of the watersheds from the heights of which streams of tendency and of influence will flow for generations, perhaps for centuries to come, now this way and now that.

What we are witnessing is not an ordinary international war. We are not spectators of a contest between Guatemala and Honduras over a boundary; we are standing before a struggle so stupendous, involving such incalculable sums of human treasure, that all the great contests with which history is strewn fade into insignificance before it. This contest is not between savage and barbarous and untutored and backward peoples. It is not a strong barbarian who is emerging from the jungle to extend his reach over the less powerful. This war is a clash between ideals. It is a controversy over ideals and national purposes, and it takes rank with the most magnificent events in all history; and I use the word "magnificent" in its literal sense of great-making, a great making over of issues and tendencies.

We are witnessing the nemesis of the doctrine of nationality as an end in itself. We are standing at the bloody grave of an ideal that is a thousand years old, one that has made the history of Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire. And we are witnessing the birth of a new ideal, an ideal of Nationality with new human

significance, new human service and new human helpfulness,—an ideal of Nationality higher than mere self-aggrandizement, or economic wealth, or military power. This is an ideal which calls to the heart and to the mind of every American, and stirs his soul with the hope and the desire that his nation may participate in the upbuilding of a new conception of national purpose that shall call upon us to see something in a nation that is beyond population and wealth and trade and influence, and that, whether the nation be great or whether it be small, shall give it an honorable place in the great structure which is civilization.

Just so long as every nation is regarded as an end in itself, just so long will the world be faced with the possibility of a recurrence of this soul-stirring tragedy. Just so long will the time come, at more or less frequent intervals, when national ambition, national zeal, national selfishness even, will find themselves struggling for new and forceful expression, for new and greater extension of influence, for new accomplishment and new grandeur.

I take it that the dream of one world empire has passed away forever. It was a dream that came to the ancient Persians; it was a dream that sent Alexander the Great with his troops out over the deserts of Asia; it was a dream that stirred the Roman conquerors; it was a dream that gave Charlemagne his name; it was a dream that showed us the magnificent spectacle of Napoleon trying to turn back the hands of the clock of progress only a

century ago. That dream I take it has passed forever, and we have now to deal not with the conception of a world-empire, but with the conception of clashing, conflicting, mutually antagonistic nationalities. International war at intervals is the necessary accompaniment of that stage of national politics. But, gentlemen, magnificent as was the diplomacy of Cavour, of Bismarck, of Palmerston, and of Disraeli, that diplomacy and that ideal of nationality which it pursued, have passed away forever. We are now coming to that state of international policy where whether a nation be democratic or monarchical, informed public opinion matters mightily, and little by little is becoming the responsible controller of policy. An instructed and conscientious public opinion is reaching out to take the control of international policy out of the hands of monarchs and their irresponsible ministers, and to put that control in the hands of representative ministers of government who are responsible to their several peoples and who will no longer wage wars for personal, dynastic or merely individual aims. As that democratizing of international relations, of foreign policy, takes place, the ground will be plowed and harrowed and seeded and prepared for the crop of a new ideal. This is the ideal of a great community of nations each standing, as international law says it shall stand, as the equal of every other, whether great or small, powerful or weak, engaged in the common co-operative task of advancing the world's civilization, of extending its commerce

and trade, of developing its science, its art, and its literature; all aiming to increase the standards of comfort, and to lift the whole great mass of mankind to new and higher planes of existence, of occupation and of enjoyment. In that co-operative family of nations whose institutions are now in the making, there will be a place for every people, for every race, and for every language, and there will be a place for us. The compact of the Pilgrim Fathers on the *Mayflower*, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Gettysburg Address, and Lincoln's Second Inaugural, are all one great series of steps in the development of our national purpose and of our international position and influence.

George Washington counseled this nation to beware of entangling alliances that would carry us into the martial conflicts of Europe. We have wisely maintained that policy from his day to our own; but nothing was farther from his thought than to counsel us against participation with every other nation in the solution of the great political problems common to all nations. We know, because their very names recall the knowledge to our minds, what the great nations of the ancient world and of modern times meant and still mean. We know what Italy means, what Germany means, what France means, what Holland means, what Great Britain means. We see with the eye of imagination their accomplishments, their service, and their great leaders of human influence and of action for centuries past. The question that now presses heavily

upon our American people is, what shall we make America to be? Shall America come to be merely the symbol for a busy hive of industrious bees, or a symbol for a great hill of intelligent ants? Shall it mean only a nation absorbed in daily toil, in accumulation, in individual satisfaction, or shall it mean a nation so intelligent as to its purposes, so secure in its grasp upon its ideals and so devoted to them, that it will not rest until it has carried all round this world an American message that will raise and help and succor the stricken and conflicting family of peoples? Shall we keep to ourselves the great fundamental American accomplishments that have in them lessons for the whole world, or shall we use our influence to teach to others those accomplishments and to spread them abroad?

I mean, first, our literally stupendous achievement in federation. We have shown for the first time in history on a large scale, that there may be flexibility in government combined with a single unit of ultimate control. We have shown how we can retain personal liberty and local self-government while building up a strong, powerful, united nation. Believe me, the world outside of the United States is waiting to profit by that experience. If there can be a common unity between Maine and California, Washington and Florida, uniting local self-government with membership in a great federated nation, why is not some part of that principle and why is not some part of that experience to be made ready for use

and application by Great Britain, and Italy, and France, and Hungary, and Russia and the rest?

Then, so many human conflicts arise out of differences of language, differences of religion, differences of institutional life, and so often the attempt has been made to suppress and to oppress the weak by the stronger. Men and women are told that they may not worship according to their faith; that their children may not be educated in schools where the vernacular is taught; and that there must be various differences between races and creeds and languages and types. Have we not proved to a watching world that the cure for that form of conflict is Liberty? Have we not shown that freedom of religion, freedom of education, equality of race and of language, letting all work out their several conflicts and controversies as they please subject only to the law, is the best policy? Have we not shown that out of these different elements, a strong united nation can be built? And are we not ready and anxious to teach that to those who would still try to unify by suppression and by persecution?

Are we not ready as Americans first to set in order our own house, first to make sure that we ourselves are living at home in accordance with our ideals, with our best purposes, and are learning the lessons of our own experience? And then, shall we not be ready to say to Europe, to Asia and to Africa, and to our sister republics to the South, that we feel our sense of international obligation? We have gained some information; we have proved some

things. This information and this experience we offer them. We offer it in persuasiveness, in friendship and in kindness. We offer this as our contribution to the great temple of civilization that we all would join to build.

What a day it will be, my fellow Americans, when we can take our Washington, our Jefferson, our Hamilton, our Marshall, our Webster, and our Lincoln out of the restricted class of merely American voices and American figures and American heroes, and give them to the world, to take their first place by the side of the great statesmen, the great artists, the great poets, the great seers of all time, as our contribution to a new civilization in which every nation shall find its place! Understanding this, let us press forward to a single goal for all men, the goal described and written in our own American Declaration of Independence.

That, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, is the goal that lies beyond Nationality conceived as an end in itself.

DO WE WANT HALF THE HEMISPHERE?

BY BRANDER MATTHEWS

When any inquirer into the remoter causes of the great war now raging surveys the history of the nineteenth century, he cannot fail to see four facts of indisputable importance. The first of these is the constant extension of the boundaries of the Russian Empire, which have been pushed forward year after year to the east and the south, with a momentum as irresistible as that of a steam-roller. The second is the continuous expansion of the British Empire on all the shores of all the seven seas, and more particularly in Asia and in Africa. The third is the corresponding expansion of the United States, at first by the annexing of border territories on the Mississippi, on the Gulf of Mexico and on the Pacific, and more recently by the acquisition of possessions not immediately adjacent on the original thirteen states and in fact as remote as Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines and the Canal Zone—an expansion accompanied by an equally unprecedented growth of population due to the inpouring of immigrants from all the nations of Europe. And the fourth is the establishment and the solidification of the German Empire with its masterful internal organization but with no corresponding external acquisition of

colonial possessions to be filled up in due season by the surplus of her teeming population.

The most obvious explanation of the failure of Germany to acquire outlying possessions to be administered for her own benefit is to be found in the fact that Germany did not achieve her unity until toward the end of the nineteenth century, when few waste places of the earth were left for her to scramble for. It was only natural that Germany, proud of her steadily increasing strength, should chafe against her inability to do in her turn what the older empires, British and Russian, had been enabled to do simply because they had been born earlier than the German Empire. Nor was it unnatural that she should resent her helpless position and even that she should persuade herself that her powerlessness to possess herself of territory in different parts of the globe was the direct result of a determined effort on the part of the older empires to shut her out, to deny her an equal chance and an equal share, and to refuse her "a place in the sun."

At the head of the German Empire stood Prussia, dominating the smaller kingdoms and principalities, and imposing upon them Prussian practices, Prussian theories and Prussian ideals. Now Prussia had made itself powerful mainly by its military prowess; it had expanded by conquest. It had taken Silesia by the sword; and by the sword also had it seized its share of Poland. This was in the eighteenth century; and in the nineteenth century Prussia had annexed Schleswig-Holstein as the

spoil of one war, Hanover, Nassau, Hesse and Frankfort as the spoil of another war, and had brought Alsace-Lorraine into the Empire as the spoil of a third. It is true that in taking Alsace-Lorraine Germany was only recovering German territory which had been conquered by Louis XIV nearly two centuries earlier, and therefore its enforced retrocession from France seemed to most Germans only a proper redemption of lands which were indisputably German. Probably most Germans were painfully surprised and sadly disappointed to discover that the Alsatians and the Lorrainers did not want to become Germans, that they thought of themselves as French, and that they greatly preferred to remain French.

This surprised disappointment was due to a failure to perceive that conditions had changed. When Louis XIV had conquered Alsace-Lorraine there was no united Germany to feel despoiled; the Holy Roman Empire of the German peoples was in fact what Metternich was later to call Italy—"only a geographical expression." The Alsatians and the Lorrainers had taken part in the French revolution, which had freed them from the rigors of feudalism; they had fought in the revolutionary armies, and they were proud of their share in the glories of the Napoleonic period. The people of France understood this and felt that the Alsatians and the Lorrainers were as French in spirit as were the Normans and the Bretons and the Gascons. The shrewd Bismarck saw this clearly. He questioned the policy of wresting these provinces from

France, knowing that it would leave an ever-bleeding wound and that it might forever prevent a healthy friendship between the despoiled French Republic and the new German Empire. He opposed the annexation of any French-speaking districts, and in particular, that of Metz. Bismarck yielded finally to the purely military arguments of Moltke; but the wisdom of his misgivings has been conclusively established by the course of events. If Prussia had not insisted upon the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, it is highly probable that France would never have felt herself forced into alliance with Russia and that Germany would not have thought it necessary to invade Belgium to attack France in 1914.

As Prussia owed its expansion to a persistent policy of conquest, it was natural enough for the Germans to believe that the long-continued expansion of other empires was also due to definite design, steadily held and resolutely carried out year after year. But a disinterested examination of the facts shows that there is little or no basis for this belief, except possibly in the case of Russia. It may be that Peter the Great had a prophetic vision of a mighty empire extending from the Baltic to the Pacific; but even his imagination could not have foreseen the inexorable advance of his domains, as these extended further and further into Asia. And it must always be remembered that Russia, on at least one occasion, was willing to part with a possession, when it sold Alaska to the United States.

But no Peter the Great predicted and proclaimed the equally marvellous expansion of the two English-speaking commonwealths. Neither in Great Britain nor in the United States has this expansion been the result of any plan definitely declared and logically executed. Rather has it been the unforeseen consequence of an unexpected series of accidents, the inevitable working of manifest destiny. The British Empire is like the Roman Empire in many of its aspects; and in no aspects are they more obviously alike than in their casual and piecemeal extension, decade after decade, century after century. This extension was never intended or projected or guided by principle; it simply happened, by force of circumstances, unforeseen even a few years before they began to exert their pressure. As a wise man once said, "the British Empire was built in fits of absent-mindedness."

Bismarck, the only German in the nineteenth century who had the imagination and the insight of a great statesman, with a profound understanding of international relations, did not conceal his contempt for the fickle vacillation of British statesmanship, devoid of any fixity of purpose and pursuing a hand-to-mouth policy of temporizing opportunism which seemed to him inherent in the instability of democracy. In his eyes British politics appeared pitiably parochial and only occasionally imperial. And no one who has paid attention to the history of Europe could ever believe that any group of British political leaders at the time of the Crimean War,

which England fought in defence of Turkey, could possibly be looking forward to the British occupation of Egypt, which was to happen only thirty years later. And if England had been so steadfast in acquisition as she is often accused of being, she would never have parted with Heligoland to Germany in the nineteenth century, and she would never have been on the verge of returning Canada to France in the eighteenth,—a fatal surrender which was possibly prevented only in consequence of the energetic protests of Benjamin Franklin. It is true that England took Canada by conquest, as she has taken many another of her possessions; but these possessions, when they are peopled by Europeans, have been so justly and so judiciously administered, and they have been so swiftly admitted to complete self-government (at least in local affairs), that their inhabitants are not only contented but loyal. Here again we can perceive a striking likeness between the generous government of the British and the beneficent rule of the Romans in the more settled period of the Empire. Just as the men of the remoter colonies of Rome were voluntarily enrolled in the legions, so the French-Canadians and the Dutch-Africans are now enlisted under the British colors.

Happy-go-lucky as has been the expansion of the British Empire, it has not been more unexpected and more accidental, less premeditated and less foreseen, than the corresponding increase in the domain of the United States. Our extension has been parallel to that of the

British Empire and it has been equally fortuitous, but with this emphatic difference, that it has not been directly brought about by conquest. With the doubtful exception of Porto Rico, there is scarcely a square mile of all the millions of miles over which the Stars and Stripes now float that was originally won by the sword and continuously held by arms. Texas revolted from Mexico, proclaimed its independence, applied for admission to the United States and was admitted. In like manner Hawaii came under our flag by the free choice of its inhabitants. And all the rest of our territory, beyond that in our possession when the constitution was adopted in 1789, was bought and paid for. We have never rectified our frontiers by forcible annexation. We purchased Louisiana from France in 1803; we purchased Florida from Spain in 1819; and we purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867. At the close of the war with Mexico in 1848, we purchased California and what are now its sister states on the Pacific—altho it is only honest to admit that this cession was consented to under duress. And at the close of the war with Spain in 1898, we kept Porto Rico, which we had captured, and we paid a price for the Philippines, which the Spaniards were not sorry to part with—if we may credit the report that the islands would have been sold to Germany in case we had not insisted on buying them ourselves. And then, finally, in 1904, we purchased the Canal Zone from Panama—altho it must be admitted that we were very

prompt in recognizing the independence of the revolting state.

This is a fairly clean record, in that we have taken little or nothing by forcible annexation. What we have acquired since we became a nation, we have paid for in cash. Our title to our possessions is clear, and it is not stained by breach of faith or by blood. We have every reason to be proud of our record, which is wholly unlike that of any of the other expanding empires, and which the peoples of all of these empires must respect. And the cleanness of this record is still further emphasized by our withdrawal from Cuba, which we had promised not to take, which most European nations expected us to take, and which we did not take in spite of the fact that we had to be invited to return a second time to set its affairs in order.

These successive accretions of our domain were at first only the additions of adjacent territory, Florida and Louisiana, Texas and California, then sparsely populated and necessary to our own internal development. Yet they were not the result of any predetermined plan of expansion, and they all of them came about more or less unexpectedly. What is more and what shows the abiding attitude of a large part of our population, is the significant fact that every one of these increases of territory was bitterly opposed by an influential section of the American public. The Federalists, for example, were loud and fierce in their denunciation of Jefferson for the Louisiana purchase, which, indeed, is to be credited rather to Living-

ston than to Jefferson himself. In the very boyish satire, the "Embargo" written by William Cullen Bryant when he was only thirteen and published in 1808, we can recapture the echo of the contemptuous hatred which his political opponents then felt for the author of the Declaration of Independence:—

"And thou, the scorn of every patriot's name,
Thy country's ruin and thy council's shame!
Poor servile thing! derision of the brave!
Who erst from Tarleton fled to Carter's Cave;
Thou, who when menaced by perfidious Gaul,
Didst prostrate to her whisker'd minion fall;
And when our cash her empty bags supplied
Didst meanly strive the foul disgrace to hide."

Forty years later the hostility to the admission of Texas and to the purchase of California was almost as intense. The frequent proposals made before the Civil War for the purchase of Cuba never succeeded in winning popular approval; and even after the Civil War, when President Grant negotiated the annexation of Santo Domingo, in 1870, the treaty failed of ratification. And it is within the memory of us all that the opposition to the retention of the Philippines was equally bitter and that it has been even more persistent. And here, plainly it had far more justification. It was one thing to round out our domain by the inclusion of contiguous and thinly peopled territory and by taking in Florida and Louisiana, Texas and California, and it was quite another thing to acquire a group of islands separated from us by a thousand leagues of "unplumbed, salt, estranging sea."

In Louisiana and in California we made ourselves at home almost immediately; we moved into our new lands at once; and we peopled them with men of our own stock. But in the Philippines we can never be at home, and we cannot people them. We may continue to possess these islands, and to rule their inhabitants, but we must do it always as aliens, even if we refrain from rapacious exploitation and even if we seek to govern solely for the good of the natives. We got into the islands by the fortune of war and we could not in honor turn over the Filipinos, who had aided us, to the Spaniards, whom we had ousted, or to the Germans who might wish to replace the Spaniards. Probably to this day a very large portion of the American people feel ill at ease over our ownership of the Philippines; they regret it; they wish that we were well out of it; and yet they do not see how we can honorably withdraw, surrendering our trusteeship and subjecting the islands to the internecine disorders which would speedily and inevitably follow the hauling down of our flag.

The British Empire is made up of the United Kingdom and Ireland, of self-governing Dominions beyond the seas, of crown colonies, and of dependencies of one kind or another; and the British are now trained, by tradition and by dearly bought experience, in the art of governing races of another color. We have not this experience or this tradition; we have no adequate machinery for the purpose—a purpose which we cannot help feeling to be foreign to the spirit of our institutions; and we have no

settled policy of remote acquisition inherited and consecrated by time. Perhaps these things we may come to have in the years before us; and for the moment all we can do is to do our best for the Filipinos. We can set them the example of firm and yet liberal rule. We can try to inoculate them with the antitoxin of freedom within the law, and thereby to render them immune against the alternating fever of anarchy and autocracy.

We must never allow ourselves to forget that everywhere and always men dislike being governed except by men of their own race and of their own choice, tacit or expressed. All men detest the rule of the alien, no matter how richly endowed with good intentions the foreign governors may believe themselves to be. It is wholesome for us Americans to be reminded that the British are not so popular as they might be with the natives of India and of Egypt. Nor have we reason to hope that we shall ever be any more popular with the natives of the Philippines. In holding the Filipinos in tutelage we are in a false position; and it will take all our wisdom to find a way out, fair to the islanders themselves and honorable for us. So long as we believe in the Declaration of Independence, so long as we are willing to be guided by the Farewell Address of Washington and the Second Inaugural of Lincoln, we shall find ourselves in a false position if we persist in ruling a distant and an alien people.

When all is said the fact remains that the territory of

the United States has immensely increased since the beginning of the nineteenth century and that the area of the British Empire has been mightily expanded during the same period—whereas the more recently founded German Empire has had to be satisfied with the snapping up of a few unconsidered trifles, far inferior in value. It is no wonder that there are many Germans who resent this and who ascribe the exclusion to the underhand intrigues of rival peoples. They see that the Monroe Doctrine debars them from acquiring territory in South America, where there are already tens of thousands of Germans; and they see also that the British and the Russians recently out-maneuvered them in what seems to amount almost to a partition of Persia. Yet an American may wonder whether the German desire for colonies is not largely imitative and whether it is in accord with the best interests of the Germans themselves. Germany has now no surplus population. In consequence of its soaring industrial development, emigration has almost ceased, and in 1913 half a million laborers had to be imported to gather the German harvests.

Moreover, it may be suggested that the German insistence on rigid organization is a hindrance to effective colonization. What is needed in a new country is freedom of individual initiative, liberty to turn around swiftly to meet novel conditions and little more administration than is requisite for the maintenance of peace and order. It is significant that the Germans themselves

do not flock into the existing German colonies and that the German settlers in Brazil have never been heard to express any desire to be incorporated in the German Empire. Once only in modern history has a bureaucratic colonial system been tried on a large scale and for a long time—and in the final trial it was found wanting. The story of its foredoomed failure is set forth in the series of volumes in which Parkman described the struggle between France and England for the possession of North America, a contest between the free individualism of the Anglo-Saxon stock and the bureaucratic restriction of the old régime in France. It was not Louis Napoleon that the Germans were fighting in 1870—so Bismarck told Jules Favre; it was Louis XIV. Yet, forty years later we find that Germany has centralized authority until its government is not altogether unlike the militant autocracy of Louis XIV; and it has also adopted his bureaucratic methods of colonial administration.

There is a warning here for us, and there is a little danger that we shall not heed it. We have not the political machinery for ruling alien races; and to attempt to rule them is not in accord with our political ideals, which compel us to base our form of government on the consent of the governed. So long as the people of any community are fitted for self-government by descent or by long training, we can make them welcome, as we should gladly receive the Canadians if they wished to join us and if the British were willing to release them

from their allegiance to the crown. To admit the Canadians upon an equal footing with ourselves would put very little strain upon our political fabric. But we are not likely ever to be willing to confer full citizenship upon the Mexicans, if they were to clamor at our doors for admission into the Union. That they should ever so clamor is most improbable; but it is even more improbable that we should yield to their appeal. The Mexican peon is at present as unfit or as ill-prepared for American citizenship as the Filipino. And it is for the Mexicans, as it is for the Cubans, to work out their own political salvation as best they can. Quite possibly it would be better for the Mexicans if we controlled Mexico; but it would certainly be worse for us. And in matters of so much importance we have a right to be selfish and to refuse to endanger our own political ideals for the sake of strangers without the gates, peoples toward whom we are under no immediate obligation.

Furthermore, if the opinions expressed in this paper are those of a majority of the citizens of the United States, if it is a fact that we have no desire to go on increasing our possessions, either by annexing territory adjoining our borders or by acquiring distant colonies, if we really shrink from rivalry with the European empires in the game of greedily grabbing alien lands—then it would be wise for us to let the whole world know this so plainly that there would be no doubt about our intentions. The economic competition of the leading

nations is not likely to be relaxed in the immediate future—in fact, it will probably be furiously intensified; and economic rivalry is ever an exciting cause of international jealousy and international suspicion. It is not enough that we should be resolved to keep our hands clean, as we have done in Cuba; it is needful also that we should at least try to make rival and jealous and suspicious peoples believe that our hearts are pure and devoid of vain desire to despoil any state weaker than we are.

We can find a useful model for future action in the Platt Amendment, whereby at the outbreak of the war with Spain we solemnly pledged our word not to make any profit out of our disinterested intervention in behalf of Cuba. We need to remember that Latin-America, led by Argentine, Brazil and Chile, is inclined to resent our recent extension of the Monroe Doctrine and to look upon us as a big brother, not altogether unwilling to bully his juniors, as big brothers have been known to do. We shall have to exercise the same tact toward South America that we have exercised toward British America. Three thousand miles of unfortified frontier, inland seas without naval vessels, and a hundred years of peace ought to be acceptable testimony that we can be good neighbors—just as the repeal of the exemption of American tonnage from the paying of tolls in the Panama Canal is evidence that we desire to do unto all men that which we believe to be right.

These are things of which we have reason to be proud. Yet they are only little things to set down against rivalry and jealousy and suspicion. They may be enough to make us more keenly conscious of our own rectitude of purpose; but they are not enough to make other peoples conscious of this. Perhaps it is hopeless to believe that we can ever persuade other peoples to see us as we see ourselves, and yet the attempt is worth making. The better the several nations know each other, the less likely are they to be hostile; and we owe it to ourselves to state our intentions so clearly and so emphatically that any misunderstanding will be willful. No nation really knows itself any more than any man can really know himself, and yet if we want to understand other men or other nations we had better begin by trying to find out what they believe themselves to be.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS

(Reprinted with permission from the Atlantic Monthly,
September, 1916)



By
JAMES BRYCE

NOVEMBER, 1916

No. 108

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

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WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS

BY JAMES BRYCE

I

Those who have studied the general principles that guide human conduct and the working out of these principles as recorded in history have noted two main streams of tendency. One of these tendencies shows itself in the power of Reason and of those higher and gentler altruistic emotions which the development of Reason as the guide of life tends to evoke and foster. The other tendency is associated with the less rational elements in man—with passion and the self-regarding impulses which naturally attain their ends by physical violence.

Thus two schools of philosophical thinkers or historians have been formed. One lays stress on the power of the former set of tendencies. It finds in them the chief sources of human progress in the past, and expects from them its further progress in the future. It regards man as capable of a continual advance through the increasing influence of reason and sympathy. It dwells on the ideas of Justice and Right as the chief factors in the amelioration of society, and therefore regards good-will and peace as the goal of human endeavor in the sphere both of national and of international life. Its faith in human nature—that is to say, in the possibility of improving human nature—makes it hopeful for the ordinary man, who may, in its view, be brought by education, and under a régime of beneficence, to a higher level than he has yet anywhere attained.

The other school is less sanguine. It insists on the power of selfishness and of passion, holding these to be elements in human action which can never be greatly re-

finer or restrained, either by reason or by sympathy. Social order—so it holds—can be secured only by Force, and Right itself is created only by Force. It is past force that has made what men call Right and Law and Government; it is Force and Force alone that sustains the social structure. The average man needs discipline; and the best thing he can do is to submit to the strong man—strength, of course, consisting not only in physical capacity, but in a superiority of will and intellect also. This school, which used to defend slavery as useful and, indeed, necessary,—the older among us can remember a time when that ancient, time-honored institution was still so defended,—prefers the rule of the superior One or Few monarchy or oligarchy, to the rule of the Many. Quite consistently, it has usually regarded war as a necessary and valuable form of discipline, because war is the final embodiment and test of physical force.

This opposition can be traced a long way back. It is already visible in the days of Plato, who combats the teaching of some of the Sophists that Justice is merely the advantage of the strong. From his time onward great philosophical schools followed his lead. The poets from Hesiod onward, gave an ideal expression to the love of peace in their pictures of a Golden Age before the use of copper and iron had been discovered. Virgil describes the primeval *Saturnia Regna*, the time before war trumpets were blown or the anvil sounded under the strokes of the swordsmith's hammer,—

Necdum etiam audierant inflari classica, necdum
Impositos duris crepitare incudibus enses.

This was the happy time of man, to which the Roman poet who acclaimed the restoration of peace by Augustus looked back, desiring a rest from the unending strife of the ancient world. Just after Virgil's day, Christianity proclaimed peace as its message to all mankind. Twelve hundred years later, in an age full of strife, Dante, the most imaginative mind of the Middle Ages, hoped for peace from the universal sway of a pious and disinterested Emperor; and, nearly six hundred years after him, in the

days of Frederick the Great of Prussia, Immanuel Kant, the greatest metaphysician of the modern world, produced his plan for the establishment of an everlasting peace.

These hopes and teachings of poets and philosophers, though they had little power in the world of fact (for few rulers or statesmen, even of those who rendered lip-service to pacific principles, ever tried to apply them to practice), continued to prevail in the world of theory, and seemed, especially after the final extinction of slavery fifty years ago and the spread of democracy from America to Europe, to be passing into the category of generally accepted truths.

Latterly, however, there has come a noteworthy reaction. A school of thinkers has arisen which, not content with maintaining war to be a necessary factor in the relations between states, as being the only ultimately available method of settling their disputes, declares it to be a method in itself wholesome and socially valuable. To these thinkers it is not an inevitable evil, but a positive good—a thing not merely to be expected and excused, but to be desired for the benefits it confers on mankind. This school challenges the assumptions of the lovers of peace and denounces their projects of disarmament and arbitration as pernicious. War, it seems, is a medicine which human society needs, and which must be administered at frequent intervals; for it is the only tonic capable of bracing up the character of a nation.

Such doctrines are a natural result of the system of thought which exalts the functions and proclaims the supremacy of the State. The State stands by Power. The State is Power. Its power rests upon force. By force it keeps order and executes the law within its limits. Outside its limits there is no law, but only force. Neither is there any morality. The State is a law unto itself, and owes no duty to other states. Self-preservation is the principle of its being. Its Might is Right, the only possible Right. War, or the threat of war, is the sole means by which the State can make its will prevail against other

states; and where its interest requires war, to war it must resort, reckless of the so-called rights of others.

This modern doctrine, or rather this modernized and developed form of an old doctrine, bases itself on two main arguments. One is drawn from the realm of animated nature, the other from history. Both lines of argument are meant to show that all progress is achieved by strife. Among animals and plants, it is Natural Selection and the Struggle for Life that have evolved the higher forms from the lower, destroying the weaker species, and replacing them by the stronger. Among men, it is the same process of unending conflict that has enabled the higher races and the more civilized States to overcome the lower and less advanced, either extinguishing them altogether, or absorbing them and imposing upon such of them as remain, the more perfect type of the conquerors.

The theory I am describing has, in these latest years, acquired for us a more than theoretical interest. It has passed out of the world of thought into the world of action, becoming a potent factor in the relations of states. It has been used to justify, not merely war itself, but methods of warfare till recently unheard of—methods which, though defended as promoting human progress, threaten to carry us back into the ages of barbarism. It deserves to be carefully examined, so that we may see upon what foundations it rests. I propose to consider briefly the two lines of argument just referred to, which may be called the biological and the historical.

II

Never yet was a doctrine adopted for one set of reasons which its advocates could not somehow contrive to support by other reasons. In the Middle Ages men generally resorted to the Bible, never failing to find a text which they could so interpret as to justify their views or their acts. Pope Gregory the Seventh, perhaps the most striking figure of the eleventh century, proved to the men of his time that his own spiritual power was superior to the

secular power by citing that passage in the Book of Genesis which says that the sun was created to rule the day and the moon to rule the night. The reader may not see the connection, but his contemporaries did. The sun was the Popedom and the moon was the Empire. In our own time—I am old enough to remember the fact, and the reader will find it referred to in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (which I hope is still read, for its appearance was a great event in history)—the apologists of Negro slavery justified that “peculiar institution” by quoting the passage in Genesis where Noah prophesies that Ham, or rather Canaan the son of Ham, shall serve his elder brother Shem. In the then current biblical ethnology, Ham was the progenitor of the black races of Africa, and the fact that even that ethnography did not make Shem the progenitor of the Anglo-American race was passed over. This argument had no great currency outside the slave states. But another book besides the Bible was open, and to that also an appeal was made: the Book of Nature. It was frequently alleged by the defenders of slavery in Europe, as well as in America, that the Negro was not really a man, but one of the higher apes, and certain points from his bone-structure were adduced to prove this thesis.

Less use is made of Scripture now for political purposes than in the days of Gregory the Seventh or even in those of Jefferson Davis. But attempts to press science into the service of politics are not unknown in our generation, so we must not be surprised that a nation which is nothing if not scientific should have sought and found in what is called the Darwinian Doctrine of Natural Selection a proof of their view that the elimination of the weak by the strong is a principle of universal potency, the method by which progress is attained in the social and political no less than in the natural sphere.

Their argument has been stated thus: the geological record shows that more highly developed forms have been through countless ages evolved from forms simpler and more rudimentary. Cryptogamous plants — lichens,

mosses, ferns—come first, and out of these the phanerogamous were developed. Animal life began with zoöphytes and molluscs; serpents and birds followed; then came the mammalia, these culminating in Man. Some species disappeared and were replaced in the perpetual struggle for existence by others that had proved themselves stronger. Every species fights to maintain itself against the others; there is not room enough for all; the weak disappear, the stronger prevail. So the earlier forms of man himself have succumbed to others superior in strength; and among these latter some races have shown a greater capacity, physical and mental, and have either displaced the weaker, or exterminated them, or conquered them, sometimes enslaving them, sometimes absorbing them. When the conquered survive, they receive the impress of the conqueror and are conformed to his more perfect type. Thus the white man has prevailed against the colored man. Thus the Teuton is prevailing against the Slav and the Celt, and is indeed fitted by his higher gift for intellectually creative, as well as practical organization, to be the Lord of the World, as the lion is lord of the forest and the eagle lord of the air.

As progress in the animal creation is effected by a strife in which the animal organisms possessing most force prevail and endure, so progress in the political world comes through conflicts in which the strongest social organisms, that is, the states best equipped for war, prove themselves able to overcome the weaker. Without war this victory of the best cannot come about. Hence, war is a main cause of progress.

Lest this summary should misrepresent the view I am endeavoring to state,—and it is not easy to state it correctly, for there lurks in it some mental confusion,—I will cite a few passages from one of its exponents, who puts it in a crudely brief form convenient for quotation. Others have probably stated it better, but all that need be done here is to show how some, at least, of those who hold it have expressed themselves.

“Wherever we look in Nature we find that war is a

fundamental law of development. This great verity, which has been recognized in past ages, has been convincingly demonstrated in modern times by Charles Darwin. He proved that nature is ruled by an unceasing struggle for existence, by the right of the stronger, and that this struggle in its apparent cruelty brings about a selection eliminating the weak and the unwholesome."

"The natural law to which all the laws of nature can be reduced is the law of struggle."

"From the first beginning of life, war has been the basis of all healthy development. Struggle is not merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to secure for themselves the most favorable conditions of life. The weaker succumb."

Now, let us examine this so-called argument from the biological world and see whether or how far it supports the thesis that the law of progress through strife is a universal law, applicable to human communities as well as to animals and plants.

Several objections present themselves. First, this theory is an attempt to apply what are called natural laws to a sphere unlike that of external nature. The facts we study in the external world are wholly different from those we study in human society. There are in that society certain generally observable sequences of phenomena which we popularly call laws of social development: that is, individual men and communities of men show certain recurrent tendencies which may be compared with the recurrent sequences in the behavior of inanimate substances and in the animated creation. But the human or social sequences have not that uniformity, that generality, that capacity for being counted or measured, and thereby expressed in precise and unvarying terms, which belong to things in the world of external nature. Oxygen and sulphur always and everywhere behave (so far as we know) in exactly the same way when the conditions are exactly the same. Every oak tree and every apple tree, however different the individuals of the

species may be in size, grow in the same way, and the laws of their growth can be so stated as to be applicable to all members of the species. But we cannot do more than conjecture, with more or less confidence, but never with certainty of prediction, how any given man or any given community of men will behave under any given set of conditions.

The human body no doubt consists of tissues, and the tissues of cells. But each individual in the species *Homo Sapiens Europæus* has, when considered as a human being, something peculiar to himself which is not and cannot be completely known or measured. His action is due to so many complex and hidden causes, and is therefore so incalculable by any scientific apparatus; he is played upon by so many forces whose presence and strength no qualitative or quantitative analysis can determine, that both his thoughts and his conduct are practically unpredictable. That which we call a general scientific law is therefore totally different from what it is in the world of external nature. Considerations drawn from that world are therefore, when applied to man, not arguments but, at best, mere analogies, sometimes suggestive as indicating lines of inquiry, but never approaching the character of exact science.

Secondly, that which is called the Darwinian principle of Natural Selection is a matter still in controversy among scientific men. A distinguished zoölogist, for instance, Dr. Chalmers Mitchell, whose little book entitled *Evolution and the War* may be commended as full of interest and instruction, pronounces the principle to be only a highly probable hypothesis regarding the process by which the evolution of species has taken place, but still no more, as yet, than a hypothesis. The methods by which natural selection takes place are uncertain. Higher and more complex forms do certainly come out of lower and simpler forms; and the adaptability to environment would seem to be an extremely important factor in their development. More than that—so one gathers from the biologists—one is not entitled to assert.

Thirdly, the Struggle for Life in the Darwinian sense is not so much a combat between species as a combat between individuals of the same species, which, like the seeds of plants, dispute the same bit of soil, or, like the carnivorous animals, feed on the same creatures and find there is not enough to go round. In the animal world we find nothing really like the wars of human tribes or states. Tigers or other bellicose animals do not fight either with other tigers or with such other feline tribes as leopards. Individuals may fight in those occasional cases where the possession of the same female is disputed by two males; but groups do not fight each other. Tigers kill antelopes for food; they have no impulse to dominate or to extirpate, but only to support their own life. If zoölogy furnishes any analogy to the contests of nations, it is to be found, not in the clash of Teutonic and Slavonic armies, but where there is an appropriation, by individuals possessing superior industry and skill, of the means of livelihood and opportunities for amassing wealth which trade and civilized finance offer to all alike who will address themselves to the task. Here is not war, but a competition for means of livelihood.

Fourthly, the supersession of one species by another is certainly not effected, in the external world, by fighting, but apparently by the adaptation to its environment of the species which ultimately survives. Where an oceanic island like Hawaii is overrun by new species of plants whose seeds, or seedlings, are brought from another country, what happens is that some of the new species thus introduced find in the isle an environment of soil and climate which suits them so well that they multiply and crowd out, by their natural growth in the soil, the weaker of the native species established there, till at last a mixed flora results, representing both the old natives and other species from elsewhere. In 1883, when I saw it, Hawaii had thrice been thus overrun. You may see a somewhat similar process where the turf has been cut off a piece of land, leaving it bare for seeds to settle on. Various species appear, some perhaps hardly known before in the

neighborhood; but after some years a few will be found in possession. Here we have a phenomenon to which there are parallels in the rapid growth of some trees in certain sections and the displacement of others. But there is nothing like this in human war. And on the other hand there is in the animal world no parallel to the fundamental fact that in human warfare it is not the weaker but the stronger part of the population that is drawn away to perish on the battle-field.

Fifthly, we must note in this connection two other important factors in the extension and decline of species. One of them is liability to disease. The other is fecundity. Here an analogy between plants and animals, on the one hand, and the races or sub-races of mankind, may no doubt be traced. But there is here no conflict: the causes which make some species more susceptible to maladies than others, or make some more prolific than others, exist everywhere in animated nature. But they exist in the species, or race, being due to something in its peculiar constitution. They have nothing to do with conflict between one species, or one race, and another species or race. That these physical factors have more to do with the numerical strength of a species than has its capacity for fighting, when we compare the diffusion of some predatory with non-predatory species, is so clear that it is not worth while to adduce instances. It may be noted, however, that in some of the most advanced races of man the birth-rate is so much lower than in the backward races as to threaten the ultimate supremacy of the former.

These considerations, which I have been obliged to state only in outline, seem sufficient to show how hollow is the argument which recommends war as the general law of the universe and a main cause of progress in the human as well as the natural world. It is not an argument at all, but an analogy, and an imperfect one at that. Let me add that the view which regards war as a useful factor in human development had no support from Darwin himself. So far from considering war a cause of progress, he

wrote, in the *Origin of Species*, "In every country in which a large standing army is kept up, the finest young men are taken by conscription or enlisted. They are thus exposed to early death during war, are often tempted into vice, and are prevented from marrying during the prime of life. On the other hand, the shorter and feebler men, with poor constitutions, are left at home, and consequently have a much better chance of marrying."

III

So much for the first set of grounds on which the war theorists rely. Let us turn to the second, that is to say, the argument from history. It is alleged that the record of all that man has done and suffered is largely a record of constant strife—a fact undeniably true—and that thereby the races and nations and states which are now able to do most for the further advance of mankind have prevailed. They have prevailed by war; war therefore has been the means, and the necessary means, of that predominance which has enabled them to civilize the best parts of the globe.

Before beginning this part of the inquiry, let us see what progress means. It is a term which covers several quite different things.

There is Material progress, by which I understand an increase in wealth, that is, in the commodities useful to man, which give him health, strength, and longer life, and make his life easier, providing more comfort and more leisure, and thus enabling him to be more physically efficient, and to escape from that pressure of want which hampers the development of his whole nature.

There is Intellectual progress—an increase in knowledge, a greater abundance of ideas, the training to think and think correctly, the growth in capacity for dealing with practical problems, the cultivation of the power to enjoy the exercise of thought and the pleasures of letters and art.

There is Moral progress—a thing harder to define, but which includes the development of those emotions and habits which make for happiness—contentment and tran-

quillity of mind; the absence of the more purely animal and therefore degrading vices (such as intemperance and sensuality in all its other forms); the control of the violent passions; good-will and kindness toward others—all the things which fall within the philosophical conception of a life guided by right reason. People have different ideas of what constitutes happiness and virtue, but these things are at any rate included in every such conception.

A further preliminary question arises. Is human progress to be estimated in respect to the point to which it raises the few who have high mental gifts and the opportunity of obtaining an education fitting them for intellectual enjoyment and intellectual vocations, or is it to be measured by the amount of its extension to and diffusion through each nation, meaning the nation as a whole—the average men as well as the superior spirits? You may sacrifice either the many to the few,—as was done by slavery,—or the few to the many, or the advance may be general and proportionate in all classes.

Again, when we think of progress, are we to think of the world as a whole, or only of the stronger and more capable races and states? If the stronger rise upon the prostrate bodies of the weaker, is this clear gain to the world, because the stronger will ultimately do more for the world, or is the loss and suffering of the weaker to be brought into the account? I do not attempt to discuss these questions; it is enough to note them as fit to be remembered; for perhaps all three kinds of progress ought to be differently judged if a few leading nations only are to be regarded, or if we are to think of all mankind.

Now let us address ourselves to history. Does history show that progress has come more through and by war or through and by peace? It would be tedious to pursue an examination of the question down through the annals of mankind from the days when authentic records begin; but we may take a few of those salient instances to which the advocates of the war doctrine and those of the peace doctrine would appeal as sustaining their respective theses.

Let us divide these instances into four classes, as follows:

- (1) Instances cited to show that War promotes Progress.
- (2) Instances cited to show that Peace has failed to promote Progress.
- (3) Instances cited to show that War has failed to promote Progress.
- (4) Instances cited to show that Peace promotes Progress.

I begin with the cases in which war is alleged to have been the cause of progress.

It is undeniable that war has often been accompanied by an advance in civilization. If we were to look for progress only in times of peace there would have been little progress to discover, for mankind has lived in a state of practically permanent warfare. The Egyptian and Assyrian monarchs were always fighting. The author of the Book of Kings speaks of spring as the time when kings go forth to war, much as we should speak of autumn as the time when men go forth to shoot deer. Πόλεμος φύσει ὑπάρχει πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς πόλεις, ¹ said Plato. The fact has been hardly less true since his day, though latterly men have become accustomed to think of peace as the normal, war as the abnormal or exceptional, relation of states to one another. In the ancient world, as late as the days of Roman conquest, a state of peace was the rare exception among civilized states as well as barbarous tribes. But Carthage, like her Phœnician mother-city, went on building up a mighty commerce till Rome smote her down, and the Hellenic people, in its many warring cities, went on producing noble poems and profound philosophical speculations, and rearing majestic temples and adorning them with incomparable works of sculpture, in the intervals of their fighting with their neighbors of the same and other races. The case of the Greeks proves that War and Progress are compatible. Whoever visits Sicily and the coasts of the Ægean cannot but be struck by the thought that it was in the midst of warfare that the

¹ War is the natural relation of states to one another.

majestic buildings of these regions were erected at enormous cost.

The case of Rome is still more often dwelt upon. Her material greatness was due to the conquests which made her mistress of the world. She also achieved intellectual greatness in her poets and orators and jurists, and by her literature and her laws contributed immensely to the progress of mankind. How far are these achievements to be credited to that long course of conquest?

The Temple of Janus had stood open as a sign of war for two hundred years, when it was closed by Augustus in B.C. 29 to indicate the general peace he had established. The spirit of the Roman people was sustained at a high level by military triumphs, as discipline and the capacity for organization and united national action were also engendered and sustained. But it is to be noted that, although the Romans had shown great political intelligence in creating and working their curiously complex constitution, their literary production attained no high level until Hellenic influences had worked upon it. To these influences, more than to any material causes, its excellence is due. Nor did the creative epoch last long. War continued; but production declined both in letters and in art after the days of the great warrior Trajan, though there was more fighting than ever. The waning strength of the Empire, as well as the economic decay of Italy, has been justly attributed in large measure to the exhaustion by warfare of the old Italian stock.

In the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when civilization had greatly advanced in southern and western Europe, the phenomena of ancient Greece were repeated. Incessant wars between the cities of Italy did not prevent the growth of a brilliant literature and an even more brilliant art. It is, however, to be noted that, while the fighting was universal, the literature was confined to comparatively few centres, and there were places like the Neapolitan South, in which high artistic talent was rare. There is nothing in Italian history to show any causal connection between intellectual activity and the

practice of war. The same may be said of France. The best work in literature and art was done in a time of comparative tranquillity under Louis XIV, not in the more troubled days of the Hundred Years' War with England and of the religious wars of the sixteenth century.

The capital instance of the association of war with the growth and greatness of a state is found in Prussia. One may say that her history is the source of the whole thesis and the basis of the whole argument. It is a case of what, in the days when I learned logic at the University of Oxford, we used to call the induction from a single instance. Prussia, then a small state, began her upward march under the warlike and successful prince whom her people call the Great Elector. Her next long step to greatness was taken by Frederick II, again by favor of successful warfare, though doubtless also by means of a highly organized, and, for those days, very efficient administration. Voltaire said of Frederick's Prussia that its trade was war. Another war added to her territory in 1814-15. Three successful wars—those of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71—made her the nucleus of a united German nation and the leading military power of the Old World.

Ever since those victories her industrial production, her commerce, and her wealth, have rapidly increased, while at the same time scientific research has been prosecuted with the greatest vigor and on a scale unprecedentedly large. These things were no doubt achieved during a peace of forty-three years. But it was what one may call a belligerent peace, full of thoughts of war and preparations for war. There is no denying that the national spirit has been carried to a high point of pride, energy, and self-confidence, which have stimulated effort in all directions and secured extraordinary efficiency in civil as well as in military administration. Here, then, is an instance in which a state has grown by war and a people has been energized by war.

But before drawing any conclusions from this solitary instance three questions must be asked:—

Will the present conflict be attended by such a success

as to lead the Prussian people to approve the policy which this war spirit has inspired?

Even supposing that the nation is not defeated and humbled in the struggle, may not its material prosperity be thrown back and its internal tranquillity impaired?

May not the national character turn out to have suffered a declension which it will take long to cure?

Results cannot be judged at the moment. What people was ever prouder of its world-dominion than the Romans at the time of Augustus? Yet the seeds of decline were already sown. Within two generations, men like Tacitus had begun to note the signs of a slowly approaching dissolution, and within two centuries the dissolution was at hand. To this it may be added that the advance of any single state by violent methods may involve greater harm to the world than the benefits which that state expects to gain, or than those which it proposes to confer upon its neighbors by imposing its civilization upon them.

I pass to another set of cases, those in which it is argued that the absence of war has meant the absence of progress. Such cases are rare, because so few countries have enjoyed, or had the chance of suffering from, periods of long peace. Two, however, may be referred to. One is supplied by the Spanish dominions in America from the middle of the sixteenth till the beginning of the nineteenth century, when they threw off the yoke of the mother-country. These vast countries, stretching from California to Patagonia, lay lapped in a peace disturbed only by the occasional raids of Dutch or British sea-rovers, and by skirmishes, rarely severe, with native Indian tribes. The Spanish colonies certainly did stagnate, and made no sensible advance either materially or intellectually. Was peace the cause of their stagnation? It may be easily explained by the facts that they were ruled by a government at once autocratic and incapable, and that they lived so far from the European world of ideas as to be hardly affected by its vivifying influences. Such causes were amply sufficient to arrest progress.

The other case, often cited, is that of China. She is

supposed to have become flaccid, feeble, immovably conservative, because her people, long unaccustomed to war, have contracted a pacific temper. In this statement there is some exaggeration, for there has always been a good deal of fighting on the outskirts of the Chinese Empire; and in the Tao Ping insurrection forty years ago millions of men are said to have been killed. It must also be remembered that in Art, at least,—one of the activities in which the Chinese hold a leading place,—there have been frequent changes and some brilliant revivals during the centuries of peace. China reached in comparatively early times a civilization very remarkable on its moral and intellectual as well as on its material side. That her subsequent progress was slow, sometimes hardly discernible, is mainly attributable to her complete isolation, with no nation near her from which she had anything to learn, because the tribes to the southwest and west—tribes constantly occupied in war—were far inferior to her. Lucky has it been for the rest of the world that her three hundred and fifty millions, belonging to a race both physically strong and capable of discipline, have been of a pacific temper, valuing trade and industry, artistic creation and skill in literary composition, as objects worthier of man than martial prowess.

Whoever travels among the Chinese sees that, peaceful as they are, they are anything but a decadent or exhausted race. Nor is it idle to remark that the Japanese, a really military people, had during many centuries made no more progress than their Chinese teachers, and for the same reason: that they had remained, down to our own time, cut off, by their own wish, from all the stimulating influences which the white races were exerting upon one another.

Next, let us take the cases which show that there have been in many countries long periods of incessant war with no corresponding progress in the things that make civilization. I will not speak of semi-barbarous tribes, among the more advanced of which may be placed the Albanians and the Pathans and the Turkomans, while among the

more backward were the North American Indians and the Zulus. But one may cite the case of the civilized regions of Asia under the successors of Alexander, when civilized peoples, distracted by incessant strife, did little for the progress of arts or letters or government, from the death of the great conqueror till they were united under the dominion of Rome and received from her a time of comparative tranquillity.

The Thirty Years' War is an example of long-continued fighting which, far from bringing progress in its train, inflicted injuries on Germany from which she did not recover for nearly two centuries. In recent times, there has been more fighting in South and Central America, since the wars of independence, than in any other civilized countries. Yet can any one say that anything has been gained by the unending civil wars and revolutions, or those scarcely less frequent wars between the several republics, like that terrible one thirty years ago in which Peru was overcome by Chile? Or look at Mexico. Except during the years when the stern dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz kept order and equipped the country with roads and railways, her people have made no perceptible advance, and stand hardly higher to-day than when they were left to work out their own salvation a hundred years ago. Social and economic conditions have doubtless been against her. All that need be remembered is that warfare has not bettered those conditions, or improved the national character.

Last of all we come to cases in which periods of peace have been attended by an increase in national prosperity and by intellectual development. These periods have been few and generally short, for (as already observed) war has been everywhere the rule and peace the exception. Nevertheless, one may point to instances like that of the comparative order and repose which England enjoyed after the Wars of the Roses. There were some foreign wars under the Tudors; there were brilliant achievements and adventures on the seas. There were some few internal revolts under Elizabeth. But the great bulk of the nation

was left free for agriculture and trade and thought. It was the age that produced More and Bacon and Harvey, Sidney and Spenser and Shakespeare. Two similar instances are furnished by the rapid progress of Scotland after the Revolution of 1688-89 gave her internal peace, and the similar progress of Norway from 1814 till our own days. The annals of Switzerland since 1815 and those of Belgium since her creation in 1832 have shown that a peace maintained during two generations is compatible, not only with the rapid growth of industrial prosperity, but also with the preservation of a courageous and patriotic spirit, ready to face the dangers of war.

IV

If this hasty historical survey has, as I frankly admit, given us few positive and definite results, the reason is plain. Human progress is affected by so many conditions besides the presence or absence of fighting that it is impossible in any given case to pronounce that it has been chiefly due either to war or to peace. Two conclusions, however, we may claim to have reached, though they are rather negative than positive. One is that war does not necessarily arrest progress. Peoples may advance in thought, literature, and art while they are fighting. The other is that war cannot be shown to have been a cause of progress in anything except the wealth or power of a state which extends its dominions by conquest or draws tribute from the vanquished.

In those cases, however, where the victorious state has gained materially, there are two other things to be considered. One is the possible loss to the victorious state of the good-will of other nations who may reprobate its methods or fear its aggressive tendencies. Another is the political injury it may suffer by sacrificing, as usually happens with military states, its domestic freedom to its achievements in war, or the moral injury which the predominance of warlike ideals is apt to bring to national character. And if we extend our view to take in the general gain or loss to world-progress, the benefits reaped

by the victorious state may be more than counterbalanced by the harm inflicted on the vanquished. When the Macedonian kings destroyed the freedom of Greece, did not mankind lose far more than Macedon gained?

The weakness of the argument which recommends and justifies war by the suggestion that it is by war that the foremost races and states have established their position may be very briefly stated. War has been practically universal. All the races and states have fought, some better, some worse. The best fighters have not always succeeded, for they may have been fewer in number. There is no necessary connection between fighting quality and intellectual quality. True it is that some of the intellectually gifted peoples have also been warlike peoples. The Greeks were; so are the French and the Germans. But the Turks, who are good fighters, are good for nothing else; and the dull Spartans fought better on land, at least, than the bright Athenians. Where the gift for fighting goes with the gift for thought, the success achieved by the intellectual race in war is not a result but a symptom, an indication or evidence of an exceptional natural force. Those races and states that are now in the front rank of civilization have shown their capacity in many other fields besides that of war. All that can safely be said to be proved by history is that a race which cannot fight or will not fight when a proper occasion arises, as, for instance, when it has to vindicate its independence, is likely to go down, and be subjected or absorbed. Yet the fact that a state is subjected or absorbed does not prove its inferiority. There is no poetical justice in history. The highly gifted race may be small, like Israel, or too much divided to maintain itself, like the Hellenes of antiquity. From 1490 to 1560 Italy was the prey of foreign invaders; but she was doing more for human progress in art and letters than all the other European nations put together.

So far, then, our inquiry has shown two things. One is the worthlessness of the biological analogy—for it is only an analogy—between animated nature and human so-

ciety, based upon what is called the Struggle for Life and the Survival of the Fittest. The other is the weakness of the arguments drawn from history to prove war necessary to progress.

V

Let us now, in conclusion, try to approach the question in another way. Let us ask what are the consequences which seem naturally to flow from the devotion to war of a nation's gifts and powers, whether physical or intellectual. Reverting to the distinction already drawn between Material, Intellectual, and Moral progress, let us see what are the consequences to be expected in each of these spheres from that process of killing an enemy and capturing or destroying his property which we call war, and how far they will make for the general progress of mankind.

Materially regarded, war is destruction. It is the destruction of those who are killed, and the reduction of the physical working power of the combatants who survive, by maiming or disease. It is thus a diminution of the wealth-producing capacity of the combatant nations, whether they be victors or vanquished. It is also the destruction of articles of value, such as crops, railways, bridges and other buildings, and the contents of buildings, including works of art and libraries. It is an interruption of international trade as well as of production, and therefore a cutting-off, for the time being, of that other source of gain which consists in an exchange of commodities produced better or more cheaply in one country than they can be in another. It involves a further lessening of wealth by the withdrawal from their productive activities of a large number of workers, not only during the actual fighting, but during the time spent in being trained to fight. All these results mean waste of resources and the impoverishment of a nation, with a corresponding shock to its credit.

Against these losses there may be set, in the case of a conquering country, what it acquires by seizure of property, annexation of territory, levying of contributions and

of indemnities, although these forcibly gotten gains do not always prosper. There may also be new openings to foreign trade, and victory may evoke an enterprising spirit which will push that trade with new vigor. But such possible indirect benefits are usually far outweighed by the direct loss.

Another loss is also to be considered in estimating the effects of war on a nation—not only the diminution of the population by death in battle, but also the reduced vigor and efficiency of the next generation. Those who are killed are presumably the strongest and healthiest men, for it is these who are the first to be drafted into the fighting forces; and it is the best regiments that suffer most, because they are selected for the most critical and perilous enterprises. Thus, that part of the nation which is best fitted to have a vigorous progeny perishes, and the births of children during, and long after, the war will be chiefly from a male parenthood of a quality below that of the average as it stood before the war. The physique of the French people is said to have suffered palpably from the tremendous drain of the strongest men into the armies of the Revolution and of Napoleon.

In the sphere of intellectual life, the obvious effect of war is to turn the thoughts of a large part of the nation toward military and naval topics. Inventors busy themselves with those physical and chemical researches which promise results profitable for war. Such researches may incidentally lead to discoveries of value in other fields, just as the practice of military surgery in the field may advance surgical science in general. But the main effect must be to distract from pure science, and from the applications of science to industry, minds that might have done better work for the world in those fields of activity. In general, the thought of a people that delights in war will be occupied with material considerations; and while the things of the body will be prized, the things of the mind will be disparaged, save in so far as they make for military success. A fighting caste will be formed, imposing its peculiar ideals on the people; the standards

of value will become more and more practical, and the interest in pure truth and in thought and art for their own sake may decline.

These are conditions not favorable to progress in the higher forms of literary or scientific work. Against them is to be set that stimulus which a great war is held to give to the whole life of a people. When it rouses them to the maximum of effort, and gives them the strongest consciousness of national unity, it may also—so we hear it argued—invigorate them for intellectual creation. It would be rash to deny this possibility, but no one seems to have succeeded in tracing any causal relation between war and the production of great work in art and letters. They have often coincided, but each has often appeared without the other.

As respects the ethical side of life, soldiering and the preparation for soldiering produce a type of character marked by discipline and the habit of obedience. The Spartans were in the ancient world the example of a people who excelled in these qualities, uniting to them, however, an equally marked insensibility to the charms of poetry and art. They produced no literature, and seemed to value none except martial songs. Discipline is valuable, but it implies some loss of individuality; obedience is useful, but (except with the highly intelligent) it involves some loss of initiative. If it increases physical courage, it may depress that moral courage which recognizes allegiance to Right rather than to the Might of the state. War gives opportunities for the display, by those serving in the field, of some exalted virtues, as courage, self-sacrifice, devotion to the common cause. So, likewise, does religious persecution. Tennyson, writing his *Maud* at the beginning of the Crimean War, seems to have expected these virtues to be evoked by that war, to pervade the whole people, and to effect a moral regeneration of Britain. Did that happen? And if it happened, did it endure? Did it happen in other countries where it was expected, as, for instance, in the United States after the Civil War? Is such regeneration a natural fruit of war?

The courage and the patriotism of those who fight are splendid, but we have to think of the nation as a whole, non-combatants as well as combatants. May not much depend on the causes which have brought about an appeal to arms and the motives which inspire the combatants? A war of oppression, stimulated by national pride and ambition, may have a different moral effect from one that is undertaken to repel a wanton attack, to defend an innocent neutral state, to save peaceful peoples from a danger to their liberties, and protect the whole world from a menace to the sacred principles of justice and humanity.

Believing the war we are now waging to be such a war, we cannot but hope that the unspeakable sufferings and sorrows it has brought to nearly every home in Britain may be largely compensated by a purifying of the heart, an increased spirit of self-sacrifice, and a raising of our national and personal ideals.

On a review of the whole matter, it will appear that war, since it is destruction, does not increase, but reduces, national wealth, and therefore cannot be a direct cause of material progress. As it exalts physical strength and the principle of Force as against the mind and the love of truth and the pleasures of thought and knowledge, war, except so far as the particular department of military science is concerned, cannot be deemed a cause of intellectual progress. As it depresses the individual and exalts the State, the thing we call Militarism places the conception of Might above that of Right, and creates a type of character in which the harsher, and what one may call the heathen, virtues are exalted above those which the Gospel has taught and through which the moral elevation of the world has been secured.

What, then, are the causes to which the progress of mankind is due? It is due partly, no doubt, if not to strife, to competition. But chiefly to thought, which, as we have seen, is more often hindered than helped by war. It is the races that know how to think, rather than the far more numerous races that excel in fighting rather than in

thinking, that have led the world. Thought, in the form of invention and inquiry, has given us those improvements in the arts of life and in the knowledge of nature by which material progress and comfort have been obtained. Thought has produced literature, philosophy, art, and (when intensified by emotion) religion—all the things that make life worth living. Now, the thought of any people is most active when it is brought into contact with the thought of another, because each is apt to lose its variety and freedom of play when it has worked too long upon familiar lines and flowed too long in the channels it has deepened. Hence, isolation retards progress, while intercourse quickens it.

The great creative epochs have been those in which one people of natural vigor received an intellectual impulse from the ideas of another, as happened when Greek culture began to penetrate Italy, and, thirteen centuries later, when the literature of the ancients began to work on the nations of the mediæval world.

Such contact, with the process of learning which follows from it, may happen in or through war, but it happens far oftener in peace; and it is in peace that men have the time and the taste to profit fully by it. A study of history will show that we may, with an easy conscience, dismiss the theory of Treitschke—that war is a health-giving tonic which Providence must be expected constantly to offer to the human race for its own good. Apart altogether from the hopes we entertain for the victory in this war of a cause which we believe to be just, we may desire in the interests of all mankind that its issue should discredit by defeat a theory which is noxious as well as baseless. The future progress of mankind is to be sought, not through the strifes and hatreds of the nations, but rather by their friendly coöperation in the healing and enlightening works of peace and in the growth of a spirit of friendship and mutual confidence which may remove the causes of war.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY



By
THEODORE RUYSSSEN

Translated by John Mez

DECEMBER, 1916

No. 109



American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek co-operation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on pages 27 to 29.

INTRODUCTION

In order to present to the readers of this series an adequate picture of the progress of thought regarding international matters throughout the world today, it is necessary from time to time to print articles from the pens of individuals frankly favoring one side or another in the present European conflict. It is the desire of the editors, however, to include only such papers of this kind as make positive contributions to the discussion of the intricate questions involved. The present paper, which will be printed in instalments, seems to be of this character.

The author is Theodore Ruysen, who was born in Clisson, France, in 1868. After leaving school in 1889, and after a study trip through Germany he took up the profession of teaching in 1896. He taught philosophy in various schools and graduated as Doctor of Philosophy with a thesis on "l'Evolution psychologique du Jugement" in 1903. He has lectured successively in the universities of Aix-en-Provence, Dijon and Bordeaux. At present, he occupies the chair of History of Philosophy at the University of Bordeaux.

His principal philosophical publications are:

Kant, published in Paris, 1904 (which was awarded
the prize of the French "Institut"),

La philosophie de la Paix, 1904,

Schopenhauer, Paris, 1909,

and numerous articles in the "Revue de Metaphysique et
de Morale."

He is the President of the Association *La Paix par le
Droit*, the most important peace organization in France,
which is widely known throughout the world through its
official organ "La Paix par le Droit," and a member of
the International Peace Bureau in Berne.

THE WORLD WAR AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

In his speech delivered before the House of Commons on August 6, 1914, in justification of the participation of the British Empire in the European War, Mr. Asquith, the English prime minister, expressed himself to this effect: "We are fighting to vindicate the principle that the small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power." On several occasions, members of the British and the French cabinets have emphasized the same idea, that the small nations, even the weakest among them, have an equal right to existence with the greatest, and that it is in defense of this right, violated to the injury of Serbia and of Belgium, that the allies are risking the lives of hundreds of thousands of men. "The people are resolved to dispose of themselves in freedom," proclaims M. Viviani. In terms yet more precise, Mr. Lloyd George thus defines the object of the war: "This," he declares, "is a war of nationalities." No utterance, I

think, could better characterize the gigantic struggle deployed before our eyes throughout the entire European continent.

It is not, or rather it is no longer, only Serbia and Belgium which are at stake in the fighting at Artois, in the Vosges, and along the Dvina, the Dniester and the Isonzo. By far the most striking feature of this war is the way in which it has raised, one after another, most of the "national" questions of Europe and even of the Orient, not only those which yesterday menaced the equilibrium of Europe, such as the Balkan problems, but even the most ancient of them, slumbering in the obscurity of the past, and in regard to which public opinion has retained only an academic and, so to speak, a conventional interest. As a matter of fact, who save a few special students concerned himself in June, 1914, about the Polish question or that of Syria? Even among those who maintain the honorable tradition of according their sympathy to unjustly treated peoples, how many were aware of a Ukrainian, a Ruthenian, a Lithuanian question?

Thus, through a long train of successive events which should be recognized as something more than a mere series of accidents, manifold national questions, which

statesmen and diplomats had attempted to disregard because they interfered with their political schemes, have entered the war. Already on the 26th of July, 1914, the uncompromising ultimatum addressed to Serbia by Austria-Hungary gave notice that the Hapsburg Empire had determined to begin, beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first step of the "advance to the East" (*Drang nach Osten*), and gain a decisive start on the road to Salonica; thereby bringing into question the independence of Serbia and with it that of Bulgaria and Greece, disturbing again the intricate tangle of Balkan problems of which the treaty of Bucharest and the Convention of London had just relieved the wearied hands of the diplomats. On August 15th, the Grand Duke Constantine made a solemn promise to restore to Poland her territorial unity as well as her political autonomy. A little later, an imperial rescript informed the Russian Jews that henceforth they would enjoy an equal position in the Empire with that of Orthodox subjects. By the pretensions of certain German publicists the Finnish question was discovered as involving a branch of the Germanic stock which extends from the Baltic coast to the Adriatic.

With the entrance of Turkey into the war, all the

national questions of the Orient were again thrown open; Russia no longer conceals her intention to conquer Armenia, of which she already holds the Caucasian region; Syria and Arabia are growing restless, and, finally, with the fate of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, the very existence of the Ottoman Empire, its final expulsion from Europe, and, perhaps, its dismemberment in Asia have come into question; this would mean the parcelling out of Asia Minor into colonies or spheres of influence. More generally, the whole problem of the relation of the Moslem to the Christian world has risen anew in all its magnitude. The Germans have clearly recognized this, and from the first days of the war they tried to stir up difficulties for Russia in Persia, for England in India and Egypt, for Italy in Tripoli, for France in the whole of Northern Africa, up to the day when the Ottoman Empire itself was dragged into their quarrel.

This military alliance of the Protestant Kaiser, the Catholic Emperor at Vienna, and the Moslem Commander of the Faithful is a fact of great symbolic significance. Its importance can hardly be exaggerated. It demonstrates conclusively—despite what certain Catholic writers may have said who saw nothing in the ruins of

Belgium but an act of Lutheran vandalism—that the age of the great religious wars is past and that even where religious passion plays a part, as no one will deny it does, it is only an auxiliary to national sentiment. The alliance of Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople is no artificial arrangement, but the expression of the natural and necessary solidarity of the three European Empires which are drawn together by the one common characteristic that they have never granted nor desired to grant justice to conquered peoples. No doubt one may detect certain differences in the rule established by these empires. That of Austria-Hungary has been the least harsh; she has granted parliamentary institutions to many nationalities within the dual monarchy and, of the three divisions of Poland, Galicia has undoubtedly been the best treated. Even Germany has never, like Turkey, made wholesale massacre an instrument of government. The fact remains, however, that Austria-Hungary, Germany and Turkey are conglomerations of imperfectly absorbed and unequally treated nationalities. None of these states has been able to assimilate its conquests. In Alsace, in Lorraine, in Schleswig, and in Poland, Germany, in spite of the most indefatigable efforts, has been able to “Germanize” only by importing Germans, by

expropriating the land owners or by forcing them through persecution to expatriate themselves. In the Hapsburg monarchy, at least a dozen heterogeneous, jealous and hostile nationalities are crowded together, none of which has a decisive preponderance over the others. As for the Turks, it has been justly said that they have been contented to camp, saber in hand, among the subjected population. We must, however, do them the justice to admit that they have not attempted to impose Islamism upon the conquered, and that they have shown themselves very tolerant in one respect, that they have never made an attempt to win over to their type of civilization the Greeks, the Balkan Slavs, the Armenians, the Christian communities of the Orient. The lack of mutual understanding between victors and vanquished has remained as profound after six centuries of occupation as at the time when the first horsemen, coming down from Turkestan, directed their daring raids against the Byzantine Empire; and whenever the taxes were not paid promptly, or whenever the civil population threatened to become rebellious, great hecatombs soon restored order among the discontented and gold to the public coffers. In the absence of any real fusion of the ethnical elements in the three empires into a homoge-

neous unity or any voluntary co-operation of the nationalities remaining distinct, it has been necessary to obtain unity through force: military force to begin with, thereafter administrative. Artificial combinations of alien or mutually hostile peoples, some of which knew themselves to be deprived of the political and even of the civil rights accorded to others, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey were doomed to remain military empires, to place the army above the civil law, to perpetuate and to renew noble castes, one of whose privileges it is to monopolize the higher grades of the army, to put this caste and this army at the disposal not of the nation but of the ruler, and, finally, to make him, notwithstanding certain concessions to modern parliamentary polity, the arbiter of national destiny, the master of war and peace.

In opposition to this triptych, a view of the "allied" forces presents a remarkable unity, despite some incontestable divergences. It is doubtless necessary to avoid over-simplified generalizations and merely verbal distinctions. It would be false as well as arbitrary to divide the contending nations which dispute with each other the empire of the world into the oppressors and the defenders of nationality. Germany herself achieved her unity in the name of the nationalist principle, and it may

even be said that, in a certain sense, Pan-Germanism is nothing but a monstrous perversion of that principle. On the other hand, nobody will be apt to forget that in the tragic history of nationality, the record of the allies is far from immaculate. Nations without faults exist only in legend. The most liberal of western nations, England, has borne in her side for centuries the sore wound of the Irish question, and the admirable solidarity shown by the British Empire today cannot make us forget that on the very eve of war it was an open question whether the introduction of Home Rule in Ireland might not inflict upon the United Kingdom the horrors of a civil war. France is far from having made such efforts to elevate the dignity of her Mohammedan subjects in northern Africa as might have been expected from the country of the "Rights of Man." As for Russia, not even her best friends could forget that during the past twenty years she has continuously infringed the liberties of Finland by restrictions as unconstitutional and unjust as they were tactless, and that her attempts to Russify eastern Poland have equalled the German attempts to Germanize Prussian Poland.

. All these facts are only too true and should be frankly admitted. But these admissions only add force to the

statement that, as a whole, the group of allied powers represent in their struggle against the empires of armed force the continuity of that liberal tradition to which the nationalities which were enfranchised in the course of the nineteenth century owe their liberation. There is hardly a national movement to which France, England and Russia, separately or together, have not given the support of their political influence or even of their arms. Russia, whatever may have been her faults in respect to the Finns, Poles and Jews, has been an indefatigable helper in the liberation of the Balkan Slavs. England has aided in the freeing of Greece and Bulgaria, and has always shown herself the protectress of small states. As for France, it is needless to recall what Greece, Belgium, Roumania and Italy have owed to her in the conquest of their national independence. And where have all the patriots who have been persecuted for dreaming of the emancipation of their respective nationalities, found an asylum? Where were the committees for the protection of all the martyred nationalities organized, the "Leagues of the Rights of Peoples," the "Nationalist Headquarters"? Where are the pamphlets printed, where are the periodicals published, which are intended to defend before the tribunal of public opinion the inter-

ests, so easily forgotten, of the peoples held in bondage? Is it at Berlin? Is it at Vienna? No; but in the two capitals which have been equally hospitable to oppressed peoples and to "Kings in Exile," London and Paris. And for whom, after all, are they fighting today from the Yser to the Niemen, from the Adige to the Caucasus? In the first instance, Russia arose to defend Serbia, already sacrificed by Europe at the end of the second Balkan War, from the menaces of Austria; England and France have responded in their turn to the pathetic appeal of Belgium, crushed under the heel of one of the powers which had guaranteed by their signature her neutrality. Thus from the very outset, the European war has disclosed its original character, which has continually become more apparent up to its most recent development; it is a war of nationalities. Without question, it is also something more; it has so profoundly shaken the old structure of the European balance of power that one may well wonder what great social, political, economic, or even religious interest there is that it has not imperilled. But undeniably it raises the following question: Will there be room in Europe, in the civilized world of tomorrow, for nationalities to enjoy a political existence of their own?

II

SMALL STATES AND NATIONALITIES

Let us endeavor to state the problem with precision, and, first of all, distinguish it from another question with which it has been frequently confounded: that of the future of the small States.

That the position of the small States is, in reality, very much the same as that of the nationalities, has been clearly demonstrated by the history of the last century. In fact, many of the small States of modern Europe have been created by the coming into independent political existence of certain nationalities. This has been the case in Greece, in the Slav States of the Balkans, in the Netherlands, in Norway. As a matter of fact, those States which disregard national destinies also make no scruple of trampling on the rights of the secondary States whenever their own interest is at stake. Germany, which holds in vassalage a minority of non-German people, was only acting in accord with its political immorality when, in spite of her formal engagements, she invaded Luxemburg and Belgium to surprise France on

a slightly defended frontier. As for Austria-Hungary, whose very existence depends upon the binding together of nationalities sedulously held in subjection, who could have expected that she might have been deterred by a mere regard for right from striking a blow at Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia? With both nations—and we may add with Turkey—scorn for the weak, the entire absence of any scruples or of any generosity towards those known or believed to be incapable of resistance, the conviction that the strong are destined to exploit, to absorb or to crush the small nations as need may direct, was bound to lead to an identical policy of arrogant protection or cynical coercion with the lesser States and with still undeveloped nationalities. It is indeed probable that, should the war end with a victory for the Allies, we should witness the political aspirations of the nationalities arising with renewed vigor, and perhaps the “Society of Nations” would welcome the advent of some new States.

The fact remains, however, that the States, whether they be large or small, are different from nationalities. A State may comprise several nationalities (as is the case with Austria-Hungary) or else it may include among its subjects only a part of one nationality or

another; such is the case of contemporary Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece. Let us specify the essential distinctions.

The "Society of Nations," which might more accurately be styled "Society of States," does not number more than half a hundred members. The second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907, which was its most complete expression, consisted of exactly forty-four States, representing nearly the whole of the habitable globe. Those which were not represented we may consider negligible for our purposes: one, the Holy See, because whatever its moral authority, it has neither territory nor jurisdiction of its own; others on account of their insignificant size, such as the Republic of San Marino; still others in view of their barbaric or semi-barbaric condition, such as Abyssinia and the sultanates of Asia and of Africa. But it is true that there are a very great number of States, some of which are of considerable importance and even of a high degree of civilization, which do not figure among the States represented at the Hague. These are the States which are subordinated by their constitution to other States which represent them diplomatically, such as Finland, or federated into a single union and represented by the same

diplomatic agents: the States of the German Empire, the Swiss cantons, the States of the North American Republic, or the States of Brazil, etc. As distinguished from these States, the forty-four political units which made up the Conference of 1907 present a common attribute which may be summarized in the term *sovereignty*.

What does this term imply? To be sovereign means to be subject to no other law, internal or external, than that decreed by oneself; it means to make oneself the source of one's own rights. To the citizen, the sovereign, whether he be an absolute ruler or the "people" themselves, is that social power to which all submit, both individuals and groups of individuals, and which itself submits to no other power. No doubt there may exist certain obligations in external matters; there are treaties between States, and collective or even universal agreements, such as the Postal Convention. Obligations of this sort, however, depend entirely upon the voluntary assent of the parties concerned. Unquestionably, many a treaty of peace, the fruit of an unfortunate war, has been imposed by force and those who have signed them to their detriment have often done so from a very grave, sometimes almost irresistible moral compulsion; but, after all, one can always refuse to make peace; one may

even, following the heroic example which Belgium and Serbia have given to the world, refuse to accept the law of the victor, even when the national territory has been completely occupied and the national life practically suspended. The vanquished party who signs a pact signifying his own loss still acts as a sovereign. Whether coerced or not, it is his own will which creates the new law. It is his will also which can revoke it. A sovereign State may always "denounce" a treaty; pacifically, if the renunciation is made after a certain interval agreed upon beforehand by both parties; or violently, when it is done without previous notice, or if the treaty is couched in definite and irrevocable terms, in which case the revocation of the treaty is usually followed by war, or at least by a suspension of diplomatic relations, and, reciprocally, a war suspends any treaties which the belligerents may have concluded with one another. In international law, the power to declare war is recognized as one of the essential attributes of sovereignty. Another attribute, resulting from this, is the right to maintain diplomatic representatives in other States commissioned to oversee the mutual observance of agreements, and, as need arises, to conclude new agreements.

Thus the law between States is of a purely conven-

tional character. Nothing binds the sovereign States, but the will to observe agreements to which that same will had consented. There is no superior power to impose the law or to guarantee its observance; no regular police is organized to enforce its provisions; this is why, as has justly been remarked, international relations are in reality anarchistic, and why war, in defiance of all reason, remains at once the *ultima ratio* of sovereigns who trample upon the rights of others and of States whose rights are disregarded. Although undertaken contrary to right by the violent, war is also, for those on the defensive, the sole means of safeguarding their rights.

From these characteristics of sovereignty there follows a final attribute which will enable us to distinguish States from nationalities, the theoretical equality of sovereigns. Strange paradox! The society of nations, although it includes States unaffected by or even opposed to the principles of the Revolution, like Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey, is founded on a strictly democratic basis. There can be no hierarchy among sovereign powers. The absolute admits of no degrees, and each of these States, having the power to make its own laws without external control, is, so to speak, an entity, a

thing-in-itself, variable in extent, in material strength, but identical in essence. In the international conferences at the Hague, mighty Germany, immense Russia, the federation of the forty-eight States of North America, discussed on an equality with humble Denmark and the little republics of Central America. In the voting, each of these States had an equal voice, and, since the decisions in order to be valid had to be unanimous, the negative vote of Nicaragua, of Ecuador, or of Montenegro sufficed to set at naught the unanimity of the forty-three other powers.

This equality of the States, considered as indissoluble, moral and juridical persons, was easy to explain at a time when such a sovereign as Louis XIV could say "L'Etat, c'est moi," in the days of absolute monarchy, characterized by the personal power of a single individual, who was himself a sort of divine appointee. Then States were equal as were the sovereign persons who embodied them. This equality might still be explicable in our democratic societies, if the State might be considered as the expression of a common will at least nearly unanimous and duly ascertained. Then, indeed, it could hardly be otherwise.

But let us examine a little more closely the internal

structure of the political societies which together constitute the Society of Nations. What do we find behind the external similarity of these theoretically equal units? The most disconcerting diversity, sometimes tragic antagonisms and inexpiable quarrels. Some States have attained the most perfect unity; their external unity being an exact expression of their internal homogeneity. It is a striking fact that these States are not necessarily those which have received a common stamp from the prolonged influence of a common central power. The "United Kingdom" of Great Britain and Ireland is less homogeneous than the different American republics. Even in France it was the Revolution which consecrated the unifying work of the old monarchy and brought citizens of every race, every language and every creed together in the establishment of a common right. Today France is the most perfect example in history of a great State whose constitutional unity is the adequate expression of a solidarity of will. No doubt French political quarrels are very bitter. Five times in the course of one century the country has experienced the horrors of a civil war. But these quarrels have not assumed a sectional or racial character. The anti-revolutionary outbreaks in Lyons, Marseilles, Brittany and the Vendée

have been the last provincial struggle against the central power. For a century one may vainly search our history for any trace of a separatist or even an autonomist movement. Even the projects of administrative decentralization, elaborated by certain theorists or political groups, have never aroused more than a moderate amount of interest in the public mind. In the United States of America, where the aboriginal population, atrociously hunted down and slaughtered, has been practically exterminated, invaders from every race, detached from their native soil by emigration, have been quickly assimilated, so that all accept the same speech, the same institutions and the same system of education. Surely one of the greatest social achievements of the present time is the assimilation, in two or three generations, of Anglo-Saxon, Irish, German, Scandinavian, Slavic, Italian and Jewish elements in the great, boiling melting pot of America. However, even in these young societies, the power of assimilation has its limit. The black and yellow races have remained outside the American polity, and the rivalry between Yankees and Asiatics will doubtless be one of the most difficult problems that the twentieth century will have to solve.

But let us get back to Europe. France is the only

great State where an extreme diversity of national elements has been melted into a solid and homogeneous unity. But this unity is not complete in itself, for France has been deprived of two provinces which through centuries of union and above all by a common sharing of revolutionary enthusiasm had been marked by the indelible impress of her spirit, and at many another point the distinction between political frontiers and true national boundaries is evident.

Sometimes common frontiers enclose peoples whose different political status makes some of them privileged and others more or less humiliated subjects, deprived to a greater or less extent of their rights; such is the case of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey. On the other hand, certain kindred populations find themselves divided against their will among several States and aspire to establish themselves as a single independent group; this is true of the Poles, the Serbs and the Rumanians. Such are the two essential aspects of the problem of the nationalities which we can now proceed to define. This problem, we may say, arises every time a people conscious of its national unity aspires to consecrate this unity by securing territorial unity and national independence.

The foregoing considerations enable us to understand the great interest of the problem of the nationalities, to define its nature and to recognize its formidable difficulties.

As distinguished from States, "nationalities" are not sovereign. That is to say that they have no legal recognition, they are in the strictest sense, without rights. "Without the State, no nationality," wrote Bluntschli in his brutal fashion. The individuals who compose them may indeed enjoy full civil rights, they may even share all the political rights of the States to which they are subject; such is the case of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine and the Italians of the Trentino and of Trieste. But these rights do not correspond with their will if they are separated from the political body which they aspire to join (Alsations, Lorrainers, Italians of the Trentino, Greeks of Asia Minor), or if this political body has been forcibly destroyed (Poland), or if it exists only as a memory or as a hope (Jews, Armenians). They desire to rule themselves, to live their own life, to affirm and develop the basic character which heredity and history have given them: they cannot do this and submit to a law imposed upon them by a sovereign State. As Fichte has forcibly put it: "National life is extin-

guished as soon as it is inoculated with a foreign life; the nation perishes, it is killed, it is wiped out of existence; such a people is stricken from the list of nations."

How much suffering has been caused by the subjection of a people who wish to be free only those can realize who reflect upon the passionate struggles which the conquest of national independence has caused in history. Since the fires of the wars of religion have been extinguished, no cause has cost more blood, inspired more heroism, raised up from the soil more martyrs. To rule oneself, to commit or to refuse to commit oneself to a course of action, to unite or to refuse to unite with others, is for modern nations as it is for individuals, the supreme good, for it is the prerequisite condition of other goods, which are priceless especially if they have had to be conquered by means of a great struggle. And what aggravates the bitterness of subjection for a proud people is the fact that almost invariably it implies the repression of certain characteristics which are cherished for the reason that they are the witness and safeguard of national existence.

What are these characteristics? To determine these, we must define more closely the idea of nationality itself.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

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 - II. The Servian Reply.
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92. *To the Citizens of the Belligerent States*, by G. Heymans. July, 1915.
93. *Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VIII.*
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I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914—October 24, 1914.
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IV. Case of the William P. Frye, March 31, 1915—July 30, 1915. September, 1915.
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- Is There a Substitute for Force in International Relations? by Suh Hu. Prize essay, International Polity Club Competition, awarded June, 1916.
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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

DOCUMENTS
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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NEW YORK CITY

1918

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS LOOKING TOWARD PEACE

SERIES I



JANUARY, 1917

No. 110

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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- II. Text of the Teutonic Notes to the Neutral Powers and the Pope—*New York Times*, December 13, 1916
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Speech of Viscount Grey before the Foreign Press Association on October 24, 1916—*London Times*, October 24, 1916

I

Speech of the Imperial German Chancellor Before the Main Committee of the Reichstag on November 9, 1916

The exhaustive debates which have taken place in the chief committee during the course of the last few weeks have in the end always turned on questions regarding the prosecution and the termination of the war. On the enemy's side they usually speak about the prosecution of the war. Lord Grey also spoke of it in his speech at the banquet to the Foreign Press Association.¹ The British Minister then said that there was one thing which deserved to be kept in mind, namely, that one could not revert too often to the consideration of the origin of the war, because that origin would have its influence on the conditions of peace.

In view of the fundamental importance which Lord Grey has again recently attached to this question of peace conditions, and which we, too, have attached to it, I am obliged to state the facts in order to disperse the clouds with which our enemies endeavor to disguise the real situation.

In reply, I can only repeat what is known. The act which made war inevitable was the Russian general mobilization, which was ordered on the night of July 30-31, 1914. Russia, England, France, and the entire world knew that this step must make further waiting impossible for us. Even in England people are beginning to understand the fateful significance of the Russian mobilization. The truth is coming to light. An English professor of world fame wrote some time ago that many people would think differently about the end of the war if they were better informed about its beginning, especially about the fact of the Russian mobilization.

No wonder, then, that Lord Grey, in his recent speech, could not pass the Russian mobilization unnoticed, but felt himself obliged to speak of it. He could no longer deny that the Russian mobilization preceded the German and the Austrian mobilization, but as he desires to remove all blame for the war from the Entente, he makes

¹ See Appendix

a daring endeavor by means of quite a new version of the case, to represent the Russian mobilization as Germany's work.

Lord Grey's explanation is that Russia ordered her first mobilization only after a report had appeared in Germany that Germany had ordered a mobilization, and after this report had been telegraphed to Petrograd.

It took about two and a quarter years for Lord Grey to discover this interpretation, which is as new as it is objectively false, of the cause of the war. The occurrence to which he alluded is well known. The document which forms the basis of his proof is an extra edition of the *Berlin Lokal-Anzeiger*. You will remember, gentlemen, perhaps that on Thursday, July 30, 1914, in the early afternoon, the *Lokal-Anzeiger* issued a false report in an extra edition that the Emperor had ordered a mobilization. You also know that the sale of this extra edition was at once stopped by the police, and the available copies were seized. I can also declare that the Foreign Secretary immediately informed the Russian Ambassador, and simultaneously all other Ambassadors, by telephone, that the news issued by the *Lokal-Anzeiger* was false. The Russian Embassy was also informed as soon as possible from the *Lokal-Anzeiger's* office that there had been a mistake.

I can further confirm that the Russian Ambassador, immediately after the issue of the extra edition, telegraphed a cipher message to Petrograd, which, according to the Russian Orange Book, read as follows:

"I learn that an order for the mobilization of the German Army and fleet has just been published."

But this telegram, after Herr von Jagow's telephonic explanation, was followed by a second telegram "en clair," which read as follows:

"Please consider my last telegram canceled (nichtig). Explanation follows."

A few minutes later the Russian Ambassador sent a third cipher telegram, which, according to the Russian Orange Book, said that the German Foreign Minister had just telephoned to him that the news of the mobilization of the army and fleet was false, and that the extra edition in question had been seized. The immediate intervention of Herr von Jagow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in order to rectify the false news—an intervention which in the official Russian Orange Book is confirmed by the telegram of M. Sverbejeff, the Russian Ambassador—of itself contradicts the assertion of Lord Grey that we intentionally desired to deceive Russia for the purpose of bringing about a mobilization. I can, however, also confirm, according to investigations of the Imperial Postal Administration concerning the periods of the sending of the Russian

Ambassador's three telegrams, that these must have arrived in Petrograd almost simultaneously.

The Russian Government itself, which after all, must be best acquainted with the reasons for its mobilization, never had an idea of explaining its fateful step by appealing to the *Lokal-Anzeiger's* extra edition. Lord Grey, I assume, will not desire to reject the Czar as a witness. On Friday, July 31, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the mobilization order had already been issued to all the Russian forces, the Czar telegraphed in reply to the Kaiser's last appeal for peace:

"It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations, which have become necessary owing to Austria-Hungary's mobilization."

No mention of the *Lokal-Anzeiger*. No mention of the German mobilization.

As early as July 29, Russia had already answered this measure with the mobilization of thirteen army corps. After July 29, Austria-Hungary had taken no further military measures which could have furnished Russia with any grounds for a general mobilization, which was equivalent to a declaration of war. Only after the general mobilization had taken place in Russia did Austria-Hungary, on the morning of July 31, also proceed to a general mobilization. We ourselves even then exercised forbearance and patience to the utmost limits of consideration for our own existence and our duty toward our allies. As far back as July 29, when Russia mobilized against Austria-Hungary, we ourselves could have mobilized. The text of our Treaty of Alliance with Austria-Hungary was known, and nobody could have considered our mobilization aggressive. We did not do it.

But to the news of the Russian general mobilization we at first replied only with the announcement of a state of affairs threatening danger of war which did not yet signify mobilization. We informed the Russian Government, and added that mobilization must follow if Russia did not cease every war measure against us and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and give us a definite declaration in regard to this. We gave Russia thereby, even when war seemed already inevitable owing to her fault, another opportunity to come to her senses, and even at the last moment to save the peace. By this delay we also gave Russia's allied friends the world-historical opportunity to influence Russia in favor of peace.

It was in vain. Russia left us without a reply, and England persisted in silence toward Russia. France, through the mouth of her Premier, on the evening of July 31, simply denied to our Ambassador the fact of the Russian mobilization, and ordered her own mobilization some hours earlier than when we ourselves had proceeded to mobilize. Moreover, as regards the alleged defensive character of

the Russian complete mobilization, I will here emphatically declare that on the outbreak of war in 1914 a general instruction of the Russian Government issued in 1912 for the contingency of mobilization was in force, which, word for word, contains the following passage by the All-Highest:

"It is ordered that the announcement of mobilization is at the same time an announcement of war against Germany." Against Germany! In 1912, against Germany!

It is incomprehensible how, in view of these documentary facts, Lord Grey can come before the world and his own country with the story of a manœuvre by which we enticed the pacific Russian into mobilization against his own will by grossly deluding him about our own measures. No! The truth is, Russia would never have decided on the fateful step if she had not been encouraged to it from the Thames by acts of commission and omission.

I recall the actual situation at the time when Russia issued the order for a general mobilization. The instructions which I gave our Ambassador in Vienna on July 30 are known. Lord Grey also well knows that I retransmitted to Vienna with the most peremptory recommendation the mediation proposal which he made to our Ambassador on July 29, and which appeared to me a suitable basis for the maintenance of peace. At that time I telegraphed to Vienna:

"Should the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse all mediation we are confronted with a conflagration in which England would go against us, and Italy and Rumania, according to all indications, would not be with us; so that with Austria-Hungary we should confront three great powers. Germany as the result of England's hostility, would have to bear the chief brunt of the fight. The political prestige of Austria-Hungary, the honor of her arms, and her justified claims against Serbia can be sufficiently safeguarded by the occupation of Belgrade or other places. We, therefore, urgently and emphatically ask the Vienna Cabinet to consider the acceptance of mediation on the proposed conditions. Responsibility for the consequences which may otherwise arise must be extraordinarily severe for Austria-Hungary and ourselves."

The Austro-Hungarian Government acceded to our urgent representations by giving its Ambassador in Berlin the following instruction:

"I ask your Excellency most sincerely to thank Herr von Jagow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for the information given through Herr von Tschirschki, and to declare to him that despite the change in the situation which has since arisen through the Russian mobilization we are quite ready to consider the proposals of Sir Edward Grey for a settlement between us and Serbia. A condition of our acceptance is, of course, that our military action against Serbia

should meanwhile proceed, and that the English Cabinet should induce the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization directed against us, in which case also we, as a matter of course, will at once cancel our defensive counter-measures forced upon us in Galicia."

Against this I place the following steps of Lord Grey. On July 27, 1914, in reply to a remark of the Russian Ambassador at London that the impression in German and Austro-Hungarian circles was that England would remain quiet, he (Viscount Grey) said that that impression had been removed by the orders which "we gave to the first fleet." On July 29 Lord Grey immediately acquainted the French Ambassador with his confidential warning to our Ambassador at London, that Germany must be prepared for speedy decisions, that is, for her (England's) participation in the war against us.

Could Lord Grey suppose that such a disclosure would serve peace? Must not France thereby have been encouraged to give Russia a promise of unconditional war support, which Russia had for days urgently demanded? Must not Russia have been strengthened to the utmost in her bellicose intention by the certainty of a Franco-British alliance? The Russian reply to Lord Grey's morning conversation was in fact not long in coming. On the evening of the same day, July 29, M. Sazonoff instructed the Russian Ambassador in Paris to express his sincere thanks for the declaration made to him by the French Ambassador that Russia could rely fully upon the support of her ally, France.

Russia, therefore, during the night of July 30, was given the fact of Austro-Hungarian compliance, due to our influence, which gave an open road to the maintenance of peace. She was simultaneously faced with the certitude of Anglo-French support, disclosed by Lord Grey to M. Paul Cambon, which alone gave her the possibility of war.

She chose mobilization, and with it war. Who now is to blame for this fateful decision? We, who recommended with the greatest emphasis to the Vienna Cabinet utter complaisance and the acceptance of the English proposal for mediation, or the British Cabinet, which, in a critical hour, held out to France and Russia a prospect of its support? Lord Grey did not speak of these decisive things, but, on the other hand, he turned the attention of his audience to minor things.

The resort of [to] The Hague Tribunal which the Czar proposed sounds on first sight very important, but it was proposed after the Russian troops had already been put in motion against us. His own conference proposal (I have repeatedly pointed out this in the Reichstag) Lord Grey set aside in favor of our mediation.

And Belgium! Before a single German soldier had set foot on Belgium territory Lord Grey explained to the French Ambassador,

after the latter's report to his Government, that in case the German fleet should enter the Channel or pass from the North Sea with the intention of attacking the French Coast, or the French fleet, or disturb (beunruhigen) the mercantile fleet (I repeat the word "disturb," gentlemen,) the British fleet would interfere, and give its protection in such a manner that from this moment England and Germany would be in a state of war.

Can he who declared that our fleet's putting to sea would be a *casus belli* still seriously maintain that the violation of Belgian neutrality was the sole cause of England's entering the war against her will? And finally, with regard to the statement that, in order to keep England out of the war, we made a discreditable proposal to the British Government to shut its eyes to the violation of Belgian neutrality and allow us a free hand to take the French colonies, I challenge Lord Grey to investigate the real facts in his Blue Book and in his documents.

In an earnest endeavor to localize the war, I assured the British Ambassador in Berlin on July 29 that, on the condition of England's neutrality, we would guarantee the integrity of France. On Aug. 1 Prince Lichnowsky asked Lord Grey whether, in the event of Germany's undertaking to respect the neutrality of Belgium, England would also undertake to observe neutrality. He further held out the prospect that, in the event of English neutrality, the integrity not only of France, but also of the French colonies might be guaranteed. On my instructions he gave an assurance that we were ready to give up the idea of an attack against France if England would guarantee the neutrality of France.

At the last moment I promised further that so long as England remained neutral our fleet would not attack the French northern coast, and on the condition of reciprocity would undertake no hostile operations against French merchant ships. Lord Grey's sole reply to this was that he must finally decline all promise of neutrality. He could only say that England wished to keep her hands untied. If England had given this declaration of neutrality she would not have been exposed to the contempt of the whole world, but would have gained the credit of having prevented the war (*das Verdienst den Ausbruch des Krieges zu verhindern*).

I ask here, too, who willed the war? We who were prepared to give England every imaginable security for France and Belgium, or England, which declined all our proposals and refused even to indicate the way for the preservation of peace between our two nations (*zwischen unsern beiden Ländern*)?

Lord Grey finally dealt exhaustively with the period after peace and with the establishment of an international union to preserve peace. On that subject, too, I will say a few words. We never concealed

our doubts whether peace could be lastingly insured by international organizations such as arbitration courts. I will not discuss here the theoretical part of the problem, but in practice now and in peace we shall have to define our attitude toward the question.

When, after the termination of the war, the world shall fully recognize its horrible devastation of blood and treasure, then through all mankind will go the cry for peaceful agreements and understandings which will prevent, so far as is humanly possible, the return of such an immense catastrophe. This cry will be so strong and so justified that it must lead to a result. Germany will honorably cooperate in investigating every attempt to find a practical solution, and collaborate toward its possible realization, and that all the more if the war, as we confidently expect, produces political conditions which will do justice to the free development of all nations, small as well as great. In that case the principle of right and free development must be made to prevail, not only on the Continent, but also at sea.

Of that Lord Grey, of course, did not speak. The guarantee of peace which he has in mind appears to me to possess a peculiar character, devised especially for British wishes. During the war the neutrals, according to his desire, will have to remain silent and patiently endure every compulsion of British domination on the seas. After the war, when England as she thinks, will have beaten us, when she will have made a new arrangement of the world, then neutrals are to combine as guarantors of the new English arrangement of the world. To this arrangement of the world will also belong the following:

From a trustworthy source we know that England and France already, in 1915, guaranteed to Russia territorial rule over Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the western shore of the Dardanelles, with its hinterland, while Asia Minor was to be divided among the Entente Powers. The English Government avoided replying to the questions which were asked in Parliament on this subject, but certainly these plans of the Entente are also of interest for the International Peace Union which later is to guarantee them. These are the annexation intentions of our enemies, to which also must be added Alsace-Lorraine, while I, in the discussion of our war aims, have never indicated the annexation of Belgium as our intention.

Such a policy of force (*Gewaltpolitik*) cannot, of course, form the basis for an effective international peace union, and it is in the strongest contrast to Lord Grey's and Mr. Asquith's ideal state of things, where right governs might and all States form a family of civilized mankind, and can freely develop themselves, whether big or small, under the same conditions and in accordance with their natural capabilities. If the Entente wishes seriously to take up this position, then it should also act consistently upon it; otherwise the most ex-

alted words about peace, union and harmonious living together in an international family are mere words (Schall und Rauch).

The first condition for the development of international relations by means of an arbitration court and the peaceful liquidation of conflicting antagonisms would be that henceforth no aggressive coalitions should be formed. Germany is ready at all times to join the union of peoples, and even to place herself at the head of such a union, which will restrain the disturber of peace. The history of international relations before the war lies clearly before the eyes of the entire world.

What brought France to Russia's side? Alsace-Lorraine. Why did Russia desire Constantinople? Why did England join them?

Because Germany, in peaceful work, had become too great for her. What did we desire? Lord Grey says that Germany, with her first proposal concerning the integrity of France and Belgium, desired to purchase England's permission to take what she wanted of the French colonies. Even the most hair [hare]-brained German did not entertain the idea of attacking France for the purpose of seizing her colonies.

It was not this which was fateful to Europe, but that the English Government favored French and Russian predatory aims which were unattainable without a European war. As against this aggressive character of the Entente, the Triple Alliance had always found itself in a defensive position. No honorable critic can deny that. Not in the shadow of Prussian militarism did the world live before the war, but in the shadow of the policy of isolation which was to keep Germany down.

Against this policy, whether it appears diplomatically as encirclement, military as a war of destruction, economically as a world-boycott, we from the beginning have been on the defensive. The German people wages this war as a defensive war for the safety of its national existence and for its free development.

We have never pretended anything else; we have never intended anything different. How otherwise could this display of gigantic forces, this inexhaustible heroism, determined to fight to the last, be explained? There is no precedent for it in all human history. At the obstinacy of the enemy's will to war, at the calling up of military material and auxiliary forces from all parts of the world, our resistance hardened to still greater determination. However England may still supplement her strength—and there is a limit even to England's command of strength—it is predestined to fail before our will to live. This will is unconquerable, imperturbable. We wait for our enemies to recognize this, confident that this recognition must come.

II

Text of the Teutonic Notes to the Neutral Powers
and the Pope

TO THE NEUTRAL POWERS

BERLIN, Dec. 12—Following is the text of the note addressed by Germany and her allies to the neutral powers for transmission to the Entente Allies:

"The most terrific war experienced in history has been raging for the last two years and a half over a large part of the world—a catastrophe which thousands of years of common civilization was unable to prevent and which injures the most precious achievements of humanity.

"Our aims are not to shatter nor annihilate our adversaries. In spite of our consciousness of our military and economic strength and our readiness to continue the war (which has been forced upon us) desire to avoid further bloodshed and make an end to the atrocities of war, the four allied powers propose to enter forthwith into peace negotiations.

"The propositions which they bring forward for such negotiations, and which have for their object a guarantee of the existence, of the honor and liberty of evolution for their nations, are according to their firm belief, an appropriate basis for the establishment of a lasting peace.

"The four allied powers have been obliged to take up arms to defend justice and the liberty of national evolution. The glorious deeds of our armies have in no way altered their purpose. We always maintained the firm belief that our own rights and justified claims in no way control the rights of these nations.

"The spiritual and material progress which were the pride of Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century are threatened with ruin. Germany and her allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, gave proof of their unconquerable strength in this struggle. They gained gigantic advantages over adversaries superior in number and

war material. Our lines stand unshaken against ever-repeated attempts made by armies.

"The last attack in the Balkans has been rapidly and victoriously overcome. The most recent events have demonstrated that further continuance of the war will not result in breaking the resistance of our forces, and the whole situation with regard to our troops justifies our expectation of further successes.

"If, in spite of this offer of peace and reconciliation, the struggle should go on, the four allied powers are resolved to continue to a victorious end, but they disclaim responsibility for this before humanity and history. The Imperial Government, through the good offices of your Excellency, asks the Government of [here is inserted the name of the neutral power addressed in each instance] to bring this communication to the knowledge of the Government of [here are inserted the names of the belligerents]."

TO THE VATICAN

BERLIN, Dec. 12—The note of the German Government, as presented by Dr. von Muhlberg, German Minister to the Vatican, to Cardinal Gasparri, Papal Secretary of State, reads as follows:

"According to instructions received I have the honor to send to your Eminence a copy of the declaration of the Imperial Government today, which by the good offices of the powers intrusted with the protection of German interests in the countries with which the German Empire is in a state of war, transmits to these States, and in which the Imperial Government declares itself ready to enter into peace negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Bulgarian Governments also have sent similar notes.

"The reasons which prompted Germany and her allies to take this step are manifest. For two years and a half a terrible war has been devastating the European Continent. Unlimited treasures of civilization have been destroyed. Extensive areas have been soaked with blood. Millions of brave soldiers have fallen in battle and millions have returned home as invalids. Grief and sorrow fill almost every house.

"Not only upon the belligerent nations but also upon neutrals the destructive consequences of the gigantic struggle weigh heavily. Trade and commerce, carefully built up in years of peace, have been depressed. The best forces of the nation have been withdrawn from the production of useful objects. Europe, which formerly was devoted to the propagation of religion and civilization, which was trying to find solutions for social problems and was the home of science and art and all peaceful labor, now resembles an immense war camp, in which

the achievements and works of many decades are doomed to annihilation.

"Germany is carrying on a war of defense against her enemies, which aim at her destruction. She fights to assure the integrity of her frontiers and the liberty of the German nation, for the right which she claims to develop freely her intellectual and economic energies in peaceful competition and on an equal footing with other nations. All the efforts of their enemies are unable to shatter the heroic armies of the (Teutonic) allies, which protect the frontiers of their countries, strengthened by the certainty that the enemy shall never pierce the iron wall.

"Those fighting on the front know that they are supported by the whole nation, which is inspired by love for its country, and is ready for the greatest sacrifices and determined to defend to the last extremity the inherited treasure of intellectual and economic work and the social organization and sacred soil of the country.

"Certain of our own strength, but realizing Europe's sad future if the war continues; seized with pity in the face of the unspeakable misery of humanity, the German Empire, in accord with her allies, solemnly repeats what the Chancellor already has declared, a year ago, that Germany is ready to give peace to the world by setting before the whole world the question whether or not it is possible to find a basis for an understanding.

"Since the first day of the Pontifical reign his Holiness the Pope has unswervingly demonstrated, in the most generous fashion, his solicitude for the innumerable victims of this war. He has alleviated the sufferings and ameliorated the fate of thousands of men injured by this catastrophe. Inspired by the exalted ideas of his ministry, his Holiness has seized every opportunity in the interests of humanity to end so sanguinary a war.

"The Imperial Government is firmly confident that the initiative of the four powers will find friendly welcome on the part of his Holiness, and that the work of peace can count upon the precious support of the Holy See."

AUSTRIA'S SEPARATE STATEMENT

LONDON, Dec. 12—An official Austrian statement, referring to the peace offer, says:

"When in the Summer of 1914 the patience of Austria-Hungary was exhausted by a series of systematically continued and ever increasing provocations and menaces, and the monarchy, after almost fifty years of unbroken peace, found itself compelled to draw the sword, this weighty decision was animated neither by aggressive purposes nor by designs of conquest, but solely by the bitter necessity

of self-defense, to defend its existence and safeguard itself for the future against similar treacherous plots of hostile neighbors.

"That was the task and aim of the monarchy in the present war. In combination with its allies, well trained in loyal comradeship in arms, the Austro-Hungarian Army and Fleet, fighting, bleeding, but also assailing and conquering, gained such successes that they frustrated the intentions of the enemy. The quadruple alliance not only has won an immense series of victories, but also holds in its power extensive hostile territories. Unbroken is its strength, as our latest treacherous enemy has just experienced.

"Can our enemies hope to conquer or shatter this alliance of powers? They will never succeed in breaking it by blockade and starvation measures. Their war aims, to the attainment of which they have come no nearer in the third year of the war, will in the future be proved to have been completely unattainable. Useless and unavailing, therefore, is the prosecution of the fighting on the part of the enemy.

"The powers of the Quadruple Alliance, on the other hand, have effectively pursued their aims, namely, defense against attacks on their existence and integrity, which were planned in concert long since, and the achievement of real guarantees, and they will never allow themselves to be deprived of the basis of their existence, which they have secured by advantages won.

"The continuation of the murderous war, in which the enemy can destroy much, but cannot—as the Quadruple Alliance is firmly confident—alter fate, is ever more seen to be an aimless destruction of human lives and property, an act of inhumanity justified by no necessity, and a crime against civilization.

"This conviction, and the hope that similar views may also be begun to be entertained in the enemy camp, has caused the idea to ripen in the Vienna Cabinet—in full agreement with the Governments of the allied [Teutonic] powers—of making a candid and loyal endeavor to come to a discussion with their enemies for the purpose of paving a way for peace.

"The Governments of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria have addressed today identical notes to the diplomatic representatives in the capitals concerned who are intrusted with the promotion of enemy nationals, expressing an inclination to enter into peace negotiations and requesting them to transmit this overture to enemy States. This step was simultaneously brought to the knowledge of the representatives of the Holy See in a special note, and the active interest of the Pope for this offer of peace was solicited. Likewise the accredited representatives of the remaining neutral States in the four capitals were acquainted with this proceeding for the purpose of informing their Governments."

"Austria and her allies by this step have given new and decisive proof of their love of peace. It is now for their enemies to make known their views before the world.

"Whatever the result of its proposal may be, no responsibility can fall on the Quadruple Alliance, even before the judgment seat of its own peoples, if it is eventually obliged to continue the war."

Speech of the Imperial German Chancellor Before the Reichstag on December 12, 1916

"The Reichstag had been adjourned for a long period, but fortunately it was left to the discretion of the President as to the day of the next meeting. This discretion was caused by the hope that soon happy events in the field would be recorded, a hope fulfilled quicker, almost, than expected. I shall be brief, for actions speak for themselves."

The Chancellor said Rumania had entered the war in order to roll up the German positions in the east and those of Germany's allies. At the same time the grand offensive on the Somme had as its object to pierce the German western front, and the renewed Italian attacks were intended to paralyze Austria-Hungary.

"The situation was serious," said the Chancellor. "But with God's help our troops shaped conditions so as to give us security which not only is complete but still more so than ever before. The western front stands. Not only does it stand, but in spite of the Rumanian campaign it is fitted out with larger reserves of men and material than it had been formerly. The most effective precautions have been taken against all Italian diversions. And while on the Somme and on the Carso the drumfire resounded, while the Russians launched troops against the eastern frontier of Transylvania, Field Marshal von Hindenburg captured the whole of Western Wallachia and the hostile capital of Bucharest, leading with unparalleled genius the troops that in competition with all the allies made possible what hitherto was considered impossible.

"And Hindenburg does not rest. Military operations progress. By strokes of the sword at the same time firm foundations for our economic needs have been laid. Great stocks of grain, victuals, oil, and other goods fell into our hands in Rumania. Their transport has begun. In spite of scarcity, we could have lived on our own supplies, but now our safety is beyond question.

"To these great events on land, heroic deeds of equal importance are added by our submarines. The spectre of famine, which our enemies intended to appear before us, now pursues them without mercy. When, after the termination of the first year of the war,

the Emperor addressed the nation in a public appeal, he said: 'Having witnessed such great events, my heart was filled with awe and determination'. Neither our Emperor nor our nation ever changed their minds in this respect. Neither have they now. The genius and heroic acts of our leaders have fashioned these facts as firm as iron. If the enemy counted upon the weariness of his enemy, then he was deceived.

"The Reichstag, by means of the national auxiliary war service law, helped to build a new offensive and defensive bulwark in the midst of the great struggle. Behind our fighting army stands the nation at work—the gigantic force of the nation, working for the common aim.

"The empire is not a besieged fortress, as our adversaries imagined, but one gigantic and firmly disciplined camp with inexhaustible resources. That is the German Empire, which is firmly and faithfully united with its brothers in arms, who have been tested in battle under the Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and Bulgarian flags.

"Our enemies now ascribed to us a plan to conquer the whole world' and then desperate cries of anguish for peace. But not confused by these asseverations, we progressed with firm decision, and we thus continue our progress, always ready to defend ourselves and fight for our nation's existence, for its free future, and always ready for this price to stretch out our hand for peace.

"Our strength has not made our ears deaf to our responsibility before God, before our own nation, and before humanity. The declarations formerly made by us concerning our readiness for peace were evaded by our adversaries. Now we have advanced one step further in this direction. On Aug. 1, 1914, the Emperor had personally to take the gravest decision which ever fell to the lot of a German—the order for mobilization—which he was compelled to give as the result of the Russian mobilization. During these long and earnest years of the war the Emperor has been moved by a single thought—how peace could be restored to safeguard Germany after the struggle in which she has fought victoriously.

"Nobody can testify better to this than I who bear the responsibility for all actions of the Government. In a deep moral and religious sense of duty toward his nation and, beyond it, toward humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action toward peace. His Majesty, therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our allies, decided to propose to the hostile powers to enter peace negotiations. This morning I transmitted a note to this effect to all the hostile powers through the representatives of those powers which are watching over our interests and rights in the hostile States. I asked the representatives of Spain, the United States, and Switzerland to forward that note.

"The same procedure has been adopted to-day in Vienna, Constantinople, and Sofia. Other neutral States and his Holiness the Pope have been similarly informed."

The Chancellor then read the note and, continuing, said:

"Gentlemen, in August, 1914, our enemies challenged the superiority of power in the world war. To-day we raise the question of peace, which is a question of humanity. We await the answer of our enemies with that serenity of mind which is guaranteed to us by our exterior and interior strength, and by our clear conscience. If our enemies decline to end the war, if they wish to take upon themselves the world's heavy burden of all these terrors which hereafter will follow, then even in the least and smallest homes every German heart will burn in sacred wrath against our enemies, who are unwilling to stop human slaughter in order that their plans of conquest and annihilation may continue.

"In the fateful hour we took a fateful decision. It has been saturated with the blood of hundreds of thousands of our sons and brothers who gave their lives for the safety of their home. Human wits and human understanding are unable to reach to the extreme and last questions in this struggle of nations, which has unveiled all the terrors of earthly life, but also the grandeur of human courage and human will in ways never seen before. God will be the judge. We can proceed upon our way."

III

Replies of the Allied Nations to the Notes of the
Central Powers—Resolution of the Russian
Duma, Declaring Against Acceptance of Ger-
man Proposal, December 15, 1916

The Duma, having heard the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, unanimously favors a categorical refusal by the Allied Governments to enter, under present conditions, into any peace negotiations whatever.

It considers that the German proposals are nothing more than fresh proof of the weakness of the enemy, and a hypocritical act from which the enemy expects no real success, but by which it seeks to throw upon others the responsibility for the war and for what happened during it, and to exculpate itself before public opinion in Germany.

The Duma considers that a premature peace would not only be a brief period of calm, but would also involve the danger of another bloody war and a renewal of the deplorable sacrifices by the people. It considers that a lasting peace will be possible only after a decisive victory over the military power of the enemy, and after definite renunciation by Germany of the aspirations which render her responsible for the world war and for the horrors by which it has been accompanied.

Speech of Premier Briand Before the Chamber of Deputies on December 13, 1916

(Translation from the stenographic record of the Journal Officiel)

GENTLEMEN: At the very moment when she is proclaiming victory on every front, Germany, feeling in the bottom of her heart that she cannot win this war, sends us a message which I feel it is impossible to let pass without comment.

You have read the speech of von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire.

Regarding this address, of which I have not the authentic text, it is impossible for me to speak definitely. I cannot give you an official opinion. No government, moreover, has up to this time been impressed by these so-called offers, and it is doubtful whether those who have been asked to intervene would, at the present time and under existing conditions, accept a task which is so delicate and which might easily trouble their consciences.

In the last analysis, as in every instance, I could not bring you any official opinion until the subject had been carefully studied, debated, and a conclusion reached in full accord and in complete unanimity with our allies.

But I consider it my right and my duty forthwith to do what I can to prevent the possibility of poisoning the public opinion of my country.

When I see Germany arming herself to the teeth, mobilizing her entire civil population at the risk of ruining her commerce and her industry and of disorganizing the homes of which she is so proud; when I see her furnaces blazing to produce munitions of war; when I see her seizing men everywhere, in violation of the laws of nations, and forcing them to work for her—when I see these things, I would be very guilty if I did not cry out to my country: "Look out! Take care!"

Gentlemen, note that what comes to us from across the frontier is an invitation to negotiate for peace. It is made under conditions with which you are familiar: Belgium invaded; Serbia invaded; Rumania invaded; ten of our departments invaded.

This invitation is made in a vague and indefinite manner, expressed in solemn words, destined to confuse the minds, to upset the con-

sciences and to trouble the hearts of peoples bearing so grievous a burden of bereavement. Gentlemen, I would call your attention to the fact that this is a moment full of danger.

I discern in these declarations the same complaint which has always sought to deceive neutral nations and is trying perhaps to delude the clear-headed elements among the German people also. "This horrible war," they announce, "is not of our unchaining."

This cry is ever upon the lips of the German people: "We have been attacked, we are defending ourselves, we are the victims of this war."

To this cry, first of all, I wish to reply for the hundredth time: "No! It is you who are the aggressors. Whatever you may say, the facts are there, and they accuse you. The blood is on your heads and not on ours."

Furthermore, considering the conditions under which these propositions are made, I am justified in denouncing them as a manœuvre, as a crude trap; when, after reading such words as these: "We wish to give to our people all the liberties which they need, to offer them every means of subsistence and every opportunity for success which they can desire," I find that, in the same document, our enemies generously offer to the other nations, as a form of charity, a willingness to spare them from being crushed, annihilated, I cry out "Is it true? Do they dare, after the Marne, after the Yser, after Verdun, to make such an offer to France, erect and glorious?"

One must stop and consider such a document; one must see what it means at the time when it is sent out to the different nations of the world; one must ascertain its purpose.

I am expressing my personal feelings to this body; I should not have brought forward my impressions if it had not been my duty to put my country on her guard against the possibility of demoralization.

It is not that I doubt its clarity nor its perspicacity. I am very sure that it will not be duped.

But, nevertheless, from this place, before the proposals are presented in official form, I feel it is my duty to say that there is in this offer a ruse. There is an attempt to weaken our alliance to confuse our minds, and to lower the *morale* of the allied nations.

In closing—and you will not criticise me, I think, for having discussed this question—let me say that the French Republic of today will play her part as formerly, under similar circumstances, did the Convention.

Speech of the Prime Minister of Great Britain Before the House of Commons, December 19, 1916

I shall have to claim the indulgence of the House in making the few observations that I have to make in moving the second reading of the Bill.

I appear before the House of Commons today with the most terrible responsibility that can fall upon the shoulders of any living man. As the chief Minister of the Crown, and in the midst of the most stupendous war in which this country ever has been engaged, a war upon which its destinies depend, the responsibilities which rest upon the Government have been accentuated by the declaration of the German Chancellor, and I propose to deal with that at once.

The statement made by him in the German Reichstag has been followed by a note presented to us by the United States Minister, without any note or comment. The answer which is given by the Government will be given in full accord with all our various allies. Already there has been an interchange of views, not upon the note itself, because it has only recently arrived, but upon the spirit which impelled the note. The note is only a paraphrase of the speech, so that the subject matter of the note itself has been discussed informally with the allies, and I am glad to be able to say that we arrived separately at identical conclusions.

I am very glad that the first answer was given to the German Chancellor by France and by Russia. They have unquestionably the right to give the first answer. The enemy is still on their soil and their sacrifices have been greater. The answer they have given has already appeared in all the papers, and I stand here today on behalf of the Government to give a clear and definite support to the statement they have already made. And here let me say that any man or set of men who wantonly and without sufficient cause prolongs a terrible conflict like this has on his soul a crime that oceans could not cleanse; on the other hand, a man or set of men who from a sense of war weariness abandoned the struggle without achieving the high purpose for which we entered upon it would be guilty of the most ghastly poltroonery ever perpetrated by any statesman.

I should like to quote the well-known words of Abraham Lincoln under similar conditions:

"We accepted the war for an object, a worthy object. The war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that time."

Are we to achieve that object by accepting the invitations of the German Chancellor? That is the only question we have to put to ourselves.

There has been some talk about the proposals of peace. What are those proposals? There are none. To enter, on the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she intends to make, into a conference, is putting our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of the Germans.

This country is not altogether without experience in these matters. It is not the first time we have fought a great military despotism which was over-shadowing Europe, and it will not be the first time we shall help to overthrow it. We have an uncomfortable historical memory of these things. We can recall how one of the greatest of these despots, having a purpose to serve in the organization of his nefarious scheme, appeared in the garb of the angel of peace. He usually appeared under two conditions—when he wished for time to assimilate conquest and reorganize for fresh advances; or, secondly, when his subjects showed symptoms of fatigue and war weariness. The appeal was always made in the name of humanity. He demanded an end of bloodshed, at which he professed himself to be horrified, but for which he himself was mainly responsible. Our ancestors were taken in and bitterly did they and Europe rue it. The time was devoted to reorganizing his forces for a deadlier attack than ever upon the liberties of Europe.

Examples of the kind cause us to regard this note with a considerable measure of reminiscent disquiet. We feel we ought to know before we give favorable consideration to such an invitation that Germany is prepared to accede to the only terms on which it is possible for peace to be obtained and maintained in Europe.

What are these terms? They have been repeatedly stated by all the leading statesmen of the Allies. All I can do is to quote what the leader of the House, Mr. Bonar Law, said last week when he made practically the same statement of terms as those put forward by Mr. Asquith—"restitution, reparation, guarantees against repetition."

So that there shall be no mistakes (and it is important that there should be no mistake in a matter of the life and death of millions), let me say complete restitution, full reparation, and effectual guarantees.

Did the German Chancellor use a single phrase that would indicate

that he was prepared to accept such terms? Was there a hint of restitution? Was there any suggestion of reparation? Was there any indication of any security for the future, that this outrage on civilization would not again be perpetrated at the first profitable opportunity?

The very substance and style of the speech constituted a denial of peace on the only terms on which peace is possible. He is not even conscious now that Germany has committed an offense against the rights of free nations. Listen to this quotation: "Not for an instant had they (the Central Powers) swerved from the conviction that a respect for the rights of free nations is in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate interests." When did they discover that? Where was the respect for the rights of other nations in Belgium?

That, it is said, was for self-defense. Menaced, I suppose, by the overwhelming army of Belgium, the Germans were intimidated into invading Belgium, burning Belgian cities and villages, massacring thousands of inhabitants, old and young, carrying survivors into bondage—yea, carrying them into slavery at the very moment when the note was being written about the "unswerving conviction of the respect for the rights of other nations."

What guarantee is there that these terrors will not be repeated in the future? That if we enter into a treaty of peace, we shall put an end to Prussian militarism? If there is to be no reckoning for these atrocities by land and sea, are we to grasp the hand which perpetrated them without any reparation being made?

We have to exact damages. We have begun; already it has cost us much. We must exact it now, so as not to leave such a grim inheritance for our children.

Much as we all long for peace, deeply as we are horrified at the war, their note and speech give small encouragement to hope for an honorable and lasting peace. What hope is given in that speech? The whole root and cause of this bitterness—the arrogant spirit of the Prussian military caste—will it not be as dominant as ever if we patch up a peace now?

The very speech resounds with the boast of the Prussian military triumph; the very appeal for peace was delivered ostentatiously from the triumphal chariot of Prussian militarism.

We must keep a steadfast eye on the purpose for which we entered the war. Otherwise the great sacrifices we are making will be all in vain. The German note states that for the defense of their existence and for the freedom of national development, the Central Powers were constrained to take up arms. Such phrases cannot but deceive those who listen to them. They are intended to deceive the German nation into supporting the designs of the Prussian military caste.

Who ever wished to put an end to their national existence or to the freedom of their national development? We welcomed their development so long as it was on behalf of peace. The greater their development in that direction, the greater would humanity be enriched by that development.

That was not our design and it is not our purpose now. The Allies entered into this war to defend Europe against the aggression of Prussian military domination, and they must insist that the end is a most complete and effective guarantee against the possibility of that caste ever again disturbing the peace of Europe.

Prussia, since she got into the hands of that caste, has been a bad neighbor—arrogant, threatening, bullying, shifting boundaries at her will, taking one fair field after another from weaker neighbors and adding them to her own dominions, ostentatiously piling up weapons of offense, ready on a moment's notice to be used.

She has always been an unpleasant, disturbing neighbor to us. She got thoroughly on the nerves of Europe, and there was no peace near where she dwelt.

It is difficult for those who were fortunate enough to live thousands of miles away, to understand what it has meant to those who lived near. Even here, with the protection of the broad seas between us, we know what a disturbing factor the Prussians were with their constant naval menace. But even we can hardly realize what it has meant to France and Russia. Several times there were threats. There were two of them within the lifetime of this generation which presented an alternative of war or humiliation.

There were many of us who had hoped that internal influence in Germany would have been strong enough to check and ultimately to eliminate this hectoring. All our hopes proved illusory, and now that this great war has been forced by the Prussian military leaders upon France, Russia, Italy and ourselves, it would be a cruel folly not to see to it that this swashbuckling through the streets of Europe to the disturbance of all harmless and peaceful citizens shall be dealt with now as an offense against the law of nations.

The mere word that led Belgium to her own destruction will not satisfy Europe any more. We all believed it; we all trusted in it. It gave way at the first pressure of temptation, and Europe has been plunged into this vortex of blood. We will therefore wait until we hear what terms and guarantees the German Government offers other than those, better than those, surer than those, which she so lightly broke. Meanwhile we ought to put our trust in an unbroken army rather than in a broken faith.

For the moment, I do not think that it would be advisable for me to add anything upon this particular invitation. A formal reply will be delivered by the Allies in the course of the next few days.

* * *

There is a time in every prolonged war, in the passionate rage of the conflict, when men forget the high purpose with which they entered into it.

This is a struggle for international right, international honor, international good faith—the channel along which peace on earth and good will among men must follow. The embattlements, laboriously built up by generations of men against barbarism, were broken, and had not the might of Britain passed into the breach, Europe would have been inundated with a flood of savagery and unbridled lust of power.

The trained sense of fair play among the nations, the growth of an international consciousness for the protection of the weak against the strong, of a stronger consciousness that justice has a more powerful backing in the world than greed, the knowledge that any outrage upon fair dealing between nations, great or small, will meet with prompt and inevitable chastisement—these constitute the causeway along which humanity was progressing slowly to higher fields.

The triumph of Prussia would sweep it all away and leave mankind to struggle, helpless, in the morass of horror. That is why since this war began I have known but one political aim. For that I have fought with a single aim. That was to rescue mankind from the most overwhelming catastrophe that has ever yet menaced its well-being.

Reply of the Entente Allies to the Central Powers

PARIS, December 30

The allied Governments of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, and Serbia, united for the defense of the liberty of their peoples and faithful to engagements taken not to lay down their arms separately, have resolved to reply collectively to the pretended propositions of peace which were addressed to them on behalf of the enemy Governments through the intermediary of the United States, Spain, Switzerland, and Holland.

Before making any reply, the allied powers desire particularly to protest against the two essential assertions of the notes of the enemy powers that pretend to throw upon the Allies responsibility for the war and proclaim the victory of the Central Powers. The allied Governments cannot admit an affirmation doubly inexact and which suffices to render sterile all tentative negotiations. The allied nations have sustained for thirty months a war they did everything to avoid. They have shown by their acts their attachment to peace. That attachment is as strong today as it was in 1914. But it is not upon the word of Germany, after the violation of its engagements, that the peace broken by her may be based.

A mere suggestion without a statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace. The putting forward by the Imperial Government of a sham proposal lacking all substance and decision would appear to be less an offer of peace than a war manœuvre. It is founded on calculated misinterpretation of the character of the struggle in the past, the present, and the future.

As for the past, the German note takes no account of the facts, dates, and figures, which establish that the war was desired, provoked, and declared by Germany and Austria-Hungary.

At The Hague Conference it was a German delegate who refused all proposals for disarmament. In July, 1914, it was Austria-Hungary, who, after having addressed to Serbia an unprecedented ultimatum, declared war upon her in spite of the satisfaction which had at once been accorded.

The Central Empires then rejected all attempts made by the Entente to bring about a pacific solution of a purely local conflict. Great Britain suggested a conference; France proposed an international commission; the Emperor to go to arbitration, and Russia and

Austria-Hungary came to an understanding on the eve of the conflict. But to all these efforts Germany gave neither answer nor effect.

Belgium was invaded by an empire which had guaranteed her neutrality and which had the assurance to proclaim that treaties were 'scraps of paper', and that 'necessity knows no law'.

At the present moment these sham offers on the part of Germany rest on the war map of Europe alone, which represents nothing more than a superficial and passing phase of the situation and not the real strength of the belligerents. A peace concluded upon these terms would be only to the advantage of the aggressors who, after imagining that they would reach their goal in two months, discovered after two years that they could never attain it.

As for the future, the disasters caused by the German declaration of war, and the innumerable outrages committed by Germany and her allies against both belligerents and neutrals demand penalties, reparation, and guarantees. Germany avoids mention of any of these.

In reality these overtures made by the Central Powers are nothing more than a calculated attempt to influence the future course of war and to end it by imposing a German peace. The object of these overtures is to create dissension in public opinion in the allied countries. But that public opinion has, in spite of all the sacrifices endured by the Allies, already given its answer with admirable firmness, and has denounced the empty pretense of the declaration of the enemy powers.

They [the peace overtures] have the further object of stiffening public opinion in Germany and in the countries allied to her—one and all severely tried by their losses, worn out by economic pressure, and crushed by the supreme effort which has been imposed upon their inhabitants.

They endeavor to deceive and intimidate public opinion in neutral countries, whose inhabitants have long since made up their minds where the initial responsibilities lie and are far too enlightened to favor the designs of Germany by abandoning the defense of human freedom.

Finally, these overtures attempt to justify in advance in the eyes of the world new series of crimes—submarine warfare, deportations, forced labor and forced enlistment of the inhabitants against their own countries, and violations of neutrality.

Fully conscious of the gravity of this moment, but equally conscious of its requirements, the allied Governments, closely united to one another and in perfect sympathy with their peoples, refuse to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere.

Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationality, and of the free existence of small States, so long as they have not brought about a settlement

calculated to end once and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world.

In conclusion, the Allied Powers think it necessary to put forward the following considerations, which show the special situation of Belgium after two and a half years of war. In virtue of the international treaties signed by five great European powers, of which Germany was one, Belgium enjoyed before the war a special status, rendering her territory inviolable and placing her, under the guarantee of the powers, outside all European conflicts. She was, however, in spite of these treaties, the first to suffer the aggression of Germany. For this reason the Belgian Government think it necessary to define the aims which Belgium has never ceased to pursue while fighting side by side with the Entente Powers for right and justice.

Belgium has always scrupulously fulfilled the duties which her neutrality imposed upon her. She has taken up arms to defend her independence and her neutrality violated by Germany and to show that she remains faithful to her international obligations.

On the 4th of August, 1914, in the Reichstag the German Chancellor admitted that this aggression constituted an injustice, contrary to the laws of nations, and pledged himself in the name of Germany to repair it. During two and a half years this injustice has been cruelly aggravated by the proceedings of the occupying forces, which have exhausted the resources of the country, ruined its industries, devastated its towns and villages, and have been responsible for innumerable massacres, executions and imprisonments.

At this very moment, while Germany is proclaiming peace and humanity to the world, she is deporting Belgian citizens by thousands and reducing them to slavery.

Belgium before the war asked for nothing but to live in harmony with her neighbors. Her King and her Government have but one aim—the re-establishment of peace and justice. But they only desire peace which would assure to their country legitimate reparation, guarantees and safeguards for the future.

IV

German Note Concerning the Reply of the Entente to the German Peace Proposals

BERLIN, Jan. 11 (by wireless to Sayville.)—Germany today handed to the neutral Governments a note concerning the reply of the Entente to the German peace proposals, the Overseas News Agency announces.

It is first stated, says the news agency announcement, that the German Government has received the reply of the Entente to the note of December 12, containing a proposition to enter at once into peace negotiations. The note then continues:

"Our adversaries declined this proposition, giving as the reason that it is a proposition without sincerity and without importance. The form in which they clothe their communication excludes an answer to them, but the Imperial Government considers it important to point out to the Governments of neutral powers its opinion regarding the situation.

"The Central Powers have no reason to enter into any discussion regarding the origin of the world war. History will judge upon whom the immense guilt of the war shall fall. History's verdict will as little pass over the encircling policy of England, the revengeful policy of France, and the endeavor of Russia to gain Constantinople as over the instigation of the Serbian assassination in Sarajevo and the complete mobilization of Russia, which meant war against Germany.

"Germany and her allies, who had to take up arms for defense of their liberty and their existence, consider this, their aim of war, as obtained.

"On the other hand, the hostile powers always went further away from the realization of their plans, which, according to the declarations of their responsible statesmen, were, among others, directed toward the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and several Prussian provinces, the humiliation and diminution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the partition of Turkey, and the mutilation of Bulgaria. In the face of such war aims, the demand for restitution, reparation and guarantee in the mouth of our adversaries produces a surprising effect.

"Our adversaries call the proposal of the four allied (Teutonic) powers a war manœuvre. Germany and her allies must protest in the most energetic fashion against such a characterization of their motives, which were frankly explained. They were persuaded that a peace which was just and acceptable to all the belligerents was possible; that it could be brought about by an immediate spoken exchange of views, and that, therefore, the responsibility for further bloodshed could not be taken. Their readiness was affirmed without reservation to make known their peace conditions when negotiations were entered into, which refutes every doubt as to their sincerity.

"Our adversaries, who had it in their hands to examine the proposition as to its contents, neither attempted an examination nor made counter-proposals. Instead, they declared that peace was impossible so long as the re-establishment of violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationalities, and the free existence of small States were not guaranteed.

"The sincerity which our adversary denies to the proposals of the four allied powers will not be conceded by the world to these demands, if the world holds before its eyes the fate of the Irish people, the destruction of the liberty and independence of the Boer Republic, the subjugation of Northern Africa by England, France and Italy, the suppression of Russian alien nations, and also the violation of Greece, which is without precedent in history.

"Against the pretended violations of the laws of nations by the four allies (Teutonic) those powers are not entitled to complain, which from the beginning of the war trampled on justice and tore to pieces the treaties upon which it is built. England already during the first weeks of the war had repudiated the London Declaration, the content of which had been recognized by its own delegates as a valid law of nations, and in the further course of the war violated in the most severe fashion also the Paris Declaration, so that by her arbitrary measures for warfare a condition of lawlessness has been created.

"The war of starvation against Germany and the pressure exercised in England's interest against neutrals are not less scandalously conflicting with the rules of the laws of nations than with the commands of humanity.

"Likewise, contrary to the laws of nations and incompatible with the usages of civilization, are the use of colored troops in Europe and the extension of the war into Africa which was done by a breach of existing treaties and which undermines the prestige of the white race on that continent. The barbarous treatment of prisoners, especially in Africa and Russia, and the deportation of the civilian population from Eastern Prussia, Alsace-Lorraine, Galicia, and Buko-

wina are further proof of how our adversaries respect justice and civilization.

"At the end of their note of December 30, our adversaries point out the special situation of Belgium. The Imperial Government is unable to acknowledge that the Belgian Government has always observed the duties which were enjoined upon her by her neutrality. Already before the war Belgium, under England's influence, sought support in military fashion from England, and France, and thus herself violated the spirit [of the treaty] which she had to guarantee her independence and neutrality.

"Twice the Imperial Government declared to the Belgian Government that it did not come as an enemy to Belgium, and asked it to spare the country the terrors of war. Germany offered to guarantee the integrity and independence of the kingdom to the full extent and compensate for all damages which might be caused by the passage of the German troops. It is known that the Royal British Government in 1887 was resolved not to oppose the use of the right of way through Belgium under those conditions. The Belgian Government declined the repeated offer of the Imperial Government. Upon her and those powers which instigated her to this attitude falls the responsibility for the fate which befell Belgium.

"The accusations about the Germans' warfare in Belgium and the measures taken there in the interest of military safety have been repeatedly refuted by the Imperial Government as untrue. Germany again offers energetic protest against these calumnies.

"Germany and her allies have made an honest attempt to terminate the war and open the road for an understanding among the belligerents. The Imperial Government asserts the fact that it merely depended upon the decision of our adversaries whether the road toward peace should be entered upon or not. The hostile Governments declined to accept this road. Upon them falls the full responsibility for the continuation of the bloodshed.

"Our allied powers, however, shall continue the struggle in quiet confidence and with firm trust in their right, until peace is gained which guarantees to their nations honor, existence and liberty of development, and which to all the nations of the European Continent gives the blessing to coöperate in mutual respect and under equal rights together for the solution of the great problems of civilization."

APPENDIX

Speech of Viscount Grey Before the Foreign
Press Association on October 24, 1916

Let me say to you all that, in a time of war such as this, we all value the presence amongst us of a body of men belonging to other countries, both Allied and neutral, who will faithfully represent what they find to be our feeling; who will send out to the world a faithful picture of this country in the great struggle through which it is passing, who will speak the truth and who, if they can succeed not only in speaking the truth, which is comparatively easy, but in getting the truth believed through the world at large, will have rendered the greatest possible service we can ask of them.

The President said I was going to make an historic speech. I doubt whether any historic speech can be made while the war is still in progress. After the war, very likely, but while the war is in progress the real historic work is being done in the offices of the General Staffs of the Allied countries and on the battlefield, where our soldiers are fighting. Words can do but little. The work done by the General Staffs at headquarters, or by the armies in the field and the navies on the sea—that is the real work which is making history. We have had, since the autumn began, two or three notable speeches—first of all, a great speech by M. Briand in the French Chamber; then, next in time, an interview given by Mr. Lloyd George to a Press correspondent in this country; then a speech by Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons; and lately we have had a note struck just as firmly in Petrograd by an official *communiqué*, I think, under the auspices of the Minister of the Interior. Those speeches have given to the world the note and the tone and the feeling of the Allies at this moment. I endorse all that they have said, but this afternoon for a few moments I would like to talk, not about the conditions of peace, which can only be stated and formulated by the Allies, all together and not by any one of them separately, but about the general object, which the Allies must secure in this war.

To do that I would ask you to recall that we must never forget how the war came about. If we are to approach the subject in a proper spirit it can only be by recalling, and never for one moment forgetting, what was the real cause of the war. Some people say you need not

go back on the old ground now; everybody knows it! You cannot go back on it too often. It affects the conditions of peace. Germany talks of peace. Her statesmen talk of peace today, but what sort of peace do they talk of? Oh, they say, Germany must have guarantees against being attacked again. If this war had been forced upon Germany that would be a logical statement. It is precisely because it was not forced upon Germany, but forced by Germany upon Europe, that it is the Allies who must have guarantees for future peace. In July, 1914, no one thought of attacking Germany. It is said that Russia was the first to mobilize. That, I understand, is what is represented in Germany as a justification for the statement that the war was not an aggressive war on Germany's part, but was forced upon her. Russia never made the mobilization of which Germany complained until after Germany had refused the conference, and she never made it until after a report had appeared in Germany that Germany had ordered mobilization and that report had been telegraphed to Petrograd. As a matter of fact, it was the story of 1870 over again—preparation for war, not only the preparation of material, but the preparatory stages all advanced in Berlin to a point beyond that of any other country, and then when the chosen moment came a manœuvre was made to provoke some other country to take a defensive step, and when the defensive step was taken, then to receive it with an ultimatum which made war inevitable.

The same thing with the invasion of Belgium. Strategic railways had been made in Germany, and the whole plan of campaign of the German staff was to attack through Belgium, and now it is represented that they had to attack through Belgium because other people had planned to attack through Belgium. I would like nothing better than to see those statements—that the Russian mobilization was an aggressive and not defensive measure, and that any other Power than Germany had trafficked in the neutrality of Belgium or planned to attack through Belgium—I would like to see those statements investigated before any independent and impartial tribunal.

German organization is very successful in some things, but in nothing more successful than in preventing the truth from reaching their own people, and succeeding in presenting to them a point of view which is not that of the truth—the statement that the war was forced upon Germany. When England proposed the conference Russia, France and Italy accepted the conference; when four Powers offer a conference and one Power refuses it, is it the Powers who are offering the conference which are forcing war, or the Power which refuses it? The Emperor of Russia offered The Hague Tribunal. One Sovereign offers The Hague Tribunal and another ignores it. Is it the Sovereign who offers reference to The Hague who is forcing war? On the very eve of war France gave her pledge to respect the

neutrality of Belgium if Germany would not violate it. We asked for such a pledge. Was it the Power which asked for the pledge and the Power which gave the pledge which were responsible for the violation of the neutrality of Belgium or the Power which refused to give the pledge? Belgium knows, as well as every Frenchman and Englishman, that never at any time was there suggestion that French or English soldiers should enter Belgium unless it were to defend Belgium from the violation of her neutrality, which had first been undertaken by Germany.

Why was it that all the efforts to avoid the war in July, 1914, failed? Well, because you cannot have peace without good will, and because in Berlin there was the will to war and not the will to peace. Now just lately, I think to an American, the Crown Prince has deplored the loss of life caused by this war. Yet it was because we knew what the suffering of war must be, because we knew how terrible a thing war, let loose in Europe, would be, that we tried to avoid it in 1914. Then was the time to have been penetrated with a sense of all that war would mean. After we have had this terrible experience, our Allies and ourselves are determined that the war shall not end till we can be sure, at any rate, that the generations which come after us and our nations in future are not to be subjected to such a terrible trial again.

What was the German plan? I saw some statement in the Press the other day that a German officer had recognized that Germany had failed this time, but that in ten years she was going to succeed. What was the plan; what was the failure? It was to be a short successful war. There was a time-table—so long to get to Paris; so long to defeat France; so long afterwards to defeat Russia—and as to England, the plan was that England should be kept out of the war, but if England did enter the war it was not thought that the Expeditionary Force we had available would be enough to upset the enemy's plans. People who are militarists, whose ideas and thoughts run solely on military considerations, wholly material, forget to estimate and cannot estimate the spirit and the soul which exists in nations when they are attacked and are fighting for their lives. The plan was that France and Russia were to be defeated, England was to be isolated—and disgraced.

We must never forget, as we go through this war, that an offer was made to us to keep out of the war. We were asked by the German Government to engage to remain neutral on certain conditions. We were asked to condone the violation of the neutrality of Belgium—because that was what the offer came to—though they were pledged by treaty to uphold it. And we were asked to give Germany a free hand to take whatever she liked of the French Colonies. That is why I say the plan was not only to isolate us, but

to discredit us. I would ask any neutral to put it to himself, what would be the future of this country if the British Government had for a moment accepted such an offer? We might have had an Army and a Navy, but there would have been no *morale*, no spirit in the nation. We should have had the contempt of the whole world. Tactics so gross as that did not succeed, and I need not recall what the reply of the British Government was, nor what the spirit of the nation was at the opening of the war.

We should not think merely of what Germany says today; it is worth looking back to the expectations of her Government and people when the war started. Then we saw something of their real mind; there was a certain Professor Ostwald in Germany who unburdened himself, I think to an American, in August, 1914. He called himself a pacifist and this is what he described as their aims: Germany was to dictate peace to the rest of Europe, and the principle of the absolute sovereignty of individual nations must be given up.

Don't let us forget that that was the spirit in which this war was begun. What is the spirit in which the war is being carried on by the Allies and ourselves today? I take it from the words of the Prime Minister the other day: "We shall fight until we have established supremacy of right over force, free development under equal conditions, and each in accordance with its own genius, of all States, great and small, which build up the family of civilized mankind."

Into this struggle we have put, rightly and necessarily, all our resources; all our wealth; all our material; and all our labour. Now, when we have had time to equip and train a large Army, we are putting into it all the best life's blood of the nation to shed it on the Continent, side by side with our Allies, in emulation of them, stimulated by the courage and self-sacrifice which they themselves are showing in defense of their own country. We are doing it because we know that their cause and ours is one; that to the end and for the future we fall or stand together; that the separation of one from the other is the destruction of the one separated, and not its safety, and that for all of us unity is essential, not merely to victory, but to our future life and success. Germany has been trying throughout the war to separate one from the other—now one, now another. Not a week passes that does not confirm our resolve to go through with our Allies to the end, and theirs to go through with each other. I trust that the memory of the suffering we have undergone together, the memory of the joint courage which is carrying us through all that we have been through side by side, will be a perpetual bond of alliance and sympathy between our Government and peoples.

Looking to the future after the war, what is it that neutrals can do? The other day a correspondent sounded me upon the subject of what neutrals can do. I wrote in reply: "I believe the best work that

neutrals can do for the moment is to work up an opinion for such an agreement between nations as will prevent a war like this from happening again. If nations had been united in such an agreement, and prompt and resolute to insist in July, 1914, that the dispute must be referred to a conference or to The Hague, and that the Belgian Treaty must be observed, there would have been no war." I would ask neutrals to observe this—that belligerent countries engaged in war, fighting as we are today in a struggle for life and death, fighting, it is true, for victory, with increasing prospects of seeing that victory approaching nearer, but still knowing that if we stop short of victory we stop short of everything—nations engaged in such a struggle cannot be expected to have much time to spend upon developing ideas of what can be done after victory is secured. But neutrals can do it, and it is interesting to observe the attitude, not only of President Wilson, but Mr. Hughes.

In the United States a league has already sprung up, supported by various distinguished people, with the object, not of interfering with belligerents in this war, but of getting ready for some international association, after this war is over, which shall do its part in making peace secure in future. I would like to say that if we seem to have little time to give to such ideas ourselves while we are engaged in this struggle, that is a work in neutral countries to which we should all look with favor and with hope. Only bear this in mind, if the nations in the world after the war are to do something more effective than they have been able to do before, to bind themselves together for the common object of peace, they must be prepared not to undertake more than they are prepared to uphold by force, and to see when the time of crisis comes that it is upheld by force. In other words, we say to neutrals who are occupying themselves with this question that we are in favor of it. But we shall have to ask when the time comes for them to make any demand on us for such a thing, "Will you play up when the time comes?" It is not merely a sign manual of Sovereigns or Presidents that is required to make a thing like that worth while; it must also have behind it Parliaments and national sentiment.

The object of this league is to insist upon treaties being kept and some other settlement being tried before resort to war. In July, 1914, there was no such league in existence. Supposing a generation hence such a condition of things as in July, 1914, recurs and there is such a league in existence, it may, and it ought to, keep the peace. Everything will depend upon whether the national sentiment behind it is so penetrated by the lessons of this war as to feel that in the future each nation, although not immediately concerned in this dispute, is yet interested, and vitally interested, in doing something, even if it be by force, to keep the peace.

But there must be more than that. You must have some agreement after this war is over as to the methods under which the war is to be conducted. Germany complains of our methods in this war. She complains of our blockade. From the very beginning Germany did her utmost to prevent food reaching this country. In the early stages of the war she sank two neutral ships with food for this country. It does not lie with her to complain of our blockade. But what about other methods which had been introduced—the sowing of mines indiscriminately upon the high seas, a danger equally to neutrals and to belligerents; the pouring of shells into defenseless coast towns?—because you must remember that what is required according to the German official *communiqués*, to convert an Allied town on the coast into a fortress is not the position of guns in it or the presence of troops, but merely the fact that she was fired upon by a German cruiser. Then there is the use of poisonous gas in war, which nobody would have believed possible if the Germans had not begun it, which nobody thought of using till the Germans began it. In the Gallipoli Peninsula neither we nor the French used the gas, because we would not be the first to introduce it anywhere. That has been brought into the war. Then there is the sinking of merchant vessels, with the destruction of the passengers and crews; the acts committed in Belgium and other Allied territory in the occupation of Germany, some of which have been the subject of investigation and report, in breach of all the laws and conventions of war and all the most elementary dictates of humanity.

And one thing more, of which we hear little, very little, and do not know the full story. Since the outbreak of war, since Turkey entered the war, she has been the vassal of Germany. Enough has leaked through to make it clear that there has gone on and is going on, in Turkey on a scale unprecedented, and with horrors unequalled before, an attempt to exterminate the Christian population; horrors which Germany could have prevented and which could only have gone on with her toleration. Perhaps some day some neutral nation who knows the full story will make it known to the world. All these things have been happening during this war, and what a prospect it opens for the future! Are all the resources of science to continue to be devoted after this war to invent means of destroying the human race, with no restrictions upon their use? It is a prospect which threatens civilization and existence of the race itself.

Germany, in letting loose these things, has been the great anarchist who has let loose on the world a greater and more terrible anarchy than any individual anarchist ever dreamed of. In future war, unless there is some means of restraining it, will by the development of science be made even more terrible and horrible than this war has been, because Germany has thrown down all the barriers

which civilization previously built up so as to keep the horrors of war within bounds. Neutral nations have an interest in seeing that something is done to ensure that there shall be rules which shall be kept in future wars—rules which shall be so laid down and supported that it will be clear that any nation which departs from them will be regarded by the whole world as the enemy of the human race, and have the whole world against them.

The indiscriminate use of high explosives to destroy great cities, to destroy combatants and non-combatants alike, all those things which have been done in this war, the introduction of poisonous gas, the introduction, perhaps, of disease—it will need all the efforts not only of belligerents but of neutrals, after this war is over, to see that the barriers necessary to secure that the inventions of science are used in the future, in the air, on the land, in the water, and under the water, not for the destruction of mankind, but for its welfare, to see that all nations shall recognize some responsibility to prevent outbreaks of war, and that if there be war, it shall be conducted by rules at least as humane as those which our ancestors observed, and which Germany today has disregarded and thrown to the winds. This is a matter in which the whole human race is interested.

Day by day it is brought home to us that here and in the countries of the Allies there are hundreds of thousands of homes to which, indeed, victory may bring a sense of pride and satisfaction, but to which it can never bring just the same gladness and joy in life that was in these homes before the war. One young life after another goes to the front, mounts in spirit the heights of nobleness and courage, to which in ordinary times even a long life gives no opportunity of attaining. And on those heights many of them pass away, leaving often some record of the spirit with which they have met their death, which makes us doubly proud of them, although it adds to the poignancy of grief and sense of sorrow and loss. They are succeeded by others, and yet by others, and will be as long as the effort is required—a long procession from all our countries of men who die but do not fail, because their life and the manner of their death is a glorious success.

This generation in its prime is giving its life, but it is giving it that the older generation now among us may live out its years after this war in peace, freedom and honour, and that the generation which is now children, and the generations who are yet to come, may enjoy life and develop the national life, free from the stifling oppression of the domination of Prussian militarism. For years before this war we were living under the deepening shadows of Prussian militarism extending itself over the whole of Germany, and then extending itself over the whole Continent. There must be no end to this war, no peace except a peace which is going to ensure that the nations of

Europe live in the future free from that shadow in the open air and in the light of freedom. For that we are contending. We know that if mankind has any birthright, as we believe it has a birthright to peace and to liberty, then our cause is just and right, because it is for that we are fighting.

When they ask us, "How long is the struggle to be continued?" we can but reply that it must be continued till these things are secured, and if it be hard that the present generation in its prime should be called on to sacrifice all, it is for the sake of the future of the nation and the generations that come after. It is our determination, which the progress of the war but deepens, in common with our Allies, to continue the war until we have made it certain that the Allies in common shall have achieved the success which must and ought to be theirs, until they have secured the future peace of the whole Continent of Europe, until they have made it clear that all the sacrifices we have made shall not have been in vain.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS LOOKING TOWARD PEACE

SERIES No. II



FEBRUARY, 1917

No. III

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

SOURCES

- I. President Wilson's Note to the Belligerent Nations, December 18, 1916—*New York Times*, December 19, 1916
- II. German Note of December 26, 1916, Replying to President Wilson's Note of December 18, 1916—*New York Times*, December 27, 1916
- III. Reply of the Entente Allies to President Wilson's Note, January 10, 1917—*Official Copy*
Réponse des gouvernements alliés à la note américaine du 19 décembre 1916—*Official Copy*
- IV. Note from Great Britain concerning Peace Sent in Amplification of Allied Reply to President Wilson, January 13, 1917—*New York Times*, January 18, 1917
- V. President Wilson's Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917—*New York Times*, January 23, 1917

I

President Wilson's Note to the Belligerent Nations

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADORS AT THE
CAPITALS OF THE BELLIGERENT POWERS:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., DECEMBER 18, 1916.

The President directs me to send you the following communication to be presented immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government to which you are accredited:

The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to the [here is inserted a designation of the Government addressed] a course of action with regard to the present war, which he hopes that the Government will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit, and as coming not only from a friend but also as coming from the representative of a neutral nation whose interests have been most seriously affected by the war and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard those interests if the war is to continue.

[The third paragraph of the note as sent to the four Central Powers—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria—is as follows:]

The suggestion which I am instructed to make, the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time, because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has, in fact, been in no way suggested by them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.

[The third paragraph of the note as sent to the ten Entente Allies—Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, Belgium, Montenegro, Portugal, Rumania, and Serbia—is as follows:]

The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time, because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It is, in fact, in no way associated with them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.

[Thenceforward the note proceeds identically to all the powers, as follows:]

The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded, and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another, if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects, which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war, are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war. Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this and against aggression or selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amid multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity,

and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence, is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusions, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

The President therefore feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world, which all desire and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed toward undefined ends by slow attrition until the one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted; if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer; if resentments must be kindled that can never cool, and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated.

The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guaranties, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success, even, would bring the war to an end.

It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.

The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world.

LANSING

[Copies of the above will be delivered to all neutral Governments for their information.]

II

The German Note of December 26, 1916,
Replying to President Wilson's Note of
December 18

The high-minded suggestion made by the President of the United States of America in order to create a basis for the establishment of a lasting peace has been received and considered by the Imperial Government in the friendly spirit which was expressed in the President's communication.

The President points out that which he has at heart and leaves open the choice of road. To the Imperial Government an immediate exchange of views seems to be the most appropriate road in order to reach the desired result. It begs, therefore, in the sense of the declaration made on December 12, which offered a hand for peace negotiations, to propose an immediate meeting of delegates of the belligerent States at a neutral place.

The Imperial Government is also of the opinion that the great work of preventing future wars can be begun only after the end of the present struggle of the nations. It will, when this moment shall have come, be ready with pleasure to collaborate entirely with the United States in this exalted task.

III

Entente Reply to President Wilson's Note

AMBASSADOR SHARP TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Telegram)

No. 1806.]

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

Paris, January 10, 1917.

The following is the translation of the French note:

The Allied Governments have received the note which was delivered to them in the name of the Government of the United States on the nineteenth of December, 1916. They have studied it with the care imposed upon them both by the exact realization which they have of the gravity of the hour and by the sincere friendship which attaches them to the American people.

In general way they wish to declare that they pay tribute to the elevation of the sentiment with which the American note is inspired and that they associate themselves with all their hopes with the project for the creation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognize all the advantages for the cause of humanity and civilization which the institution of international agreements, destined to avoid violent conflicts between nations would prevent; agreements which must imply the sanctions necessary to insure their execution and thus to prevent an apparent security from only facilitating new aggressions. But a discussion of future arrangements destined to insure an enduring peace presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the actual conflict; the Allies have as profound a desire as the Government of the United States to terminate as soon as possible a war for which the Central Empires are responsible and which inflicts such cruel sufferings upon humanity. But they believe that it is impossible at the present moment to attain a peace which will assure them reparation, restitution and such guarantees to which they are entitled by the aggression for which the responsibility rests with the Central Powers and of which the principle itself tended to ruin the security of Europe; a peace which would on the other hand permit the establishment of

the future of European nations on a solid basis. The Allied nations are conscious that they are not fighting for selfish interests, but above all to safeguard the independence of peoples, of right and of humanity.

The Allies are fully aware of the losses and suffering which the war causes to neutrals as well as to belligerents and they deplore them; but they do not hold themselves responsible for them, having in no way either willed or provoked this war, and they strive to reduce these damages in the measure compatible with the inexorable exigencies of their defense against the violence and the wiles of the enemy.

It is with satisfaction, therefore, that they take note of the declaration that the American communication is in nowise associated in its origin with that of the Central Powers transmitted on the eighteenth of December by the Government of the United States. They did not doubt, moreover, the resolution of that Government to avoid even the appearance of a support, even moral, of the authors responsible for the war.

The Allied Governments believe that they must protest in the most friendly but in the most specific manner against the assimilation established in the American note between the two groups of belligerents; this assimilation, based upon public declarations by the Central Powers, is in direct opposition to the evidence, both as regards responsibility for the past and as concerns guarantees for the future; President Wilson in mentioning it certainly had no intention of associating himself with it.

If there is an historical fact established at the present date, it is the willful aggression of Germany and Austria-Hungary to insure their hegemony over Europe and their economic domination over the world. Germany proved by her declaration of war, by the immediate violation of Belgium and Luxemburg and by her manner of conducting the war, her simulating contempt for all principles of humanity and all respect for small states; as the conflict developed the attitude of the Central Powers and their Allies has been a continual defiance of humanity and civilization. Is it necessary to recall the horrors which accompanied the invasion of Belgium and of Servia, the atrocious regime imposed upon the invaded countries, the massacre of hundreds of thousands of inoffensive Armenians, the barbarities perpetrated against the populations of Syria, the raids of Zeppelins on open towns, the destruction by submarines of passenger steamers and of merchantmen even under neutral flags, the cruel treatment inflicted upon prisoners of war, the juridical murders of Miss Cavel, of Captain Fryatt, the deportation and the reduction to slavery of civil populations, et cetera? The execution of such a series of crimes perpetrated without any regard for universal reprobation fully explains to President Wilson the protest of the Allies.

They consider that the note which they sent to the United States in reply to the German note will be a response to the questions put by the American Government, and according to the exact words of the latter, constitute 'a public declaration as to the conditions upon which the war could be terminated'.

President Wilson desires more: he desires that the belligerent powers openly affirm the objects which they seek by continuing the war; the Allies experience no difficulty in replying to this request. Their objects in the war are well known; they have been formulated on many occasions by the chiefs of their divers Governments. Their objects in the war will not be made known in detail with all the equitable compensations and indemnities for damages suffered until the hour of negotiations. But the civilized world knows that they imply in all necessity and in the first instance the restoration of Belgium, of Servia, and of Montenegro and the indemnities which are due them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia and of Roumania with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe guaranteed by a stable regime and founded as much upon respect of nationalities and full security and liberty of economic development, which all nations, great or small, possess, as upon territorial conventions and international agreements suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations, the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Tcheco Slovaques from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire decidedly (* * *)¹ to western civilization. The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies. It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire above all is to insure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice, upon the inviolable fidelity to international obligation with which the Government of the United States has never ceased to be inspired.

United in the pursuits of this supreme object the Allies are determined, individually and collectively, to act with all their power and to consent to all sacrifices to bring to a victorious close a conflict upon which they are convinced not only their own safety and prosperity depends but also the future of civilization itself.

SHARP

¹Apparent omission

Réponse des gouvernements alliés à la note américaine du 19 décembre 1916

1. Les Gouvernements alliés ont reçu la note qui leur a été remise le dix-neuf décembre 1916 au nom du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. Ils l'ont étudiée avec le soin que leur commandaient à la fois l'exact sentiment qu'ils ont de la gravité de l'heure et la sincère amitié qui les rattache au peuple américain.

2. D'une manière générale ils tiennent à déclarer qu'ils rendent hommage à l'élévation des sentiments dont s'inspire la note américaine et qu'ils s'associent de tous leurs vœux au projet de création d'une ligue des nations pour assurer la paix et la justice à travers le monde. Ils reconnaissent tous les avantages que présentera, pour la cause de l'humanité et de la civilisation, l'institution de règlements internationaux destinés à éviter des conflits violents entre les nations, règlements qui devraient comporter les sanctions nécessaires pour en assurer l'exécution et empêcher ainsi qu'une sécurité apparente ne serve qu'à faciliter de nouvelles agressions.

3. Mais une discussion sur les arrangements futurs destinés à assurer une paix durable suppose d'abord un règlement satisfaisant du conflit actuel. Les Alliés éprouvent un désir aussi profond que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis de voir se terminer, le plus tôt possible, la guerre dont les empires centraux sont responsables et qui inflige à l'humanité de si cruelles souffrances. Mais ils estiment qu'il est impossible, dès aujourd'hui, de réaliser une paix qui leur assure les réparations, les restitutions et les garanties auxquelles leur donne droit l'agression dont la responsabilité incombe aux Puissances centrales et dont le principe même tendait à ruiner la sécurité de l'Europe, une paix qui permette, d'autre part, d'établir sur une base solide l'avenir des nations européennes. Les nations alliées ont conscience qu'elles ne combattent pas pour des intérêts égoïstes, mais avant tout pour la sauvegarde de l'indépendance des peuples, du droit et de l'humanité.

4. Les Alliés se rendent pleinement compte des pertes et des souffrances que la guerre fait supporter aux neutres comme aux belligérants, et ils les déplorent; mais ils ne s'en tiennent pas pour responsables, n'ayant en aucune façon ni voulu ni provoqué cette guerre, et ils s'efforcent de réduire ces dommages dans tout la mesure compatible avec les exigences inexorables de leur défense contre les violences et les pièges de l'ennemi.

5. C'est avec satisfaction, dès lors, qu'ils prennent acte de la déclaration faite que la communication américaine n'est associée d'aucune manière dans son origine avec celle des Puissances centrales transmise le 18 décembre par le Gouvernement de l'Union. Ils ne doutaient pas, au surplus, de la résolution de ce Gouvernement d'éviter jusqu'à l'apparence d'un appui même moral, accordé aux auteurs responsables de la guerre.

6. Les Gouvernements alliés croient devoir s'élever, de la manière la plus amicale mais la plus nette, contre l'assimilation établie dans la note américaine entre les deux groupes des belligérants; cette assimilation, basée sur des déclarations publiques des Puissances centrales, est en opposition directe avec l'évidence, tant en ce qui concerne les responsabilités du passé qu'en ce qui concerne les garanties de l'avenir; le Président Wilson en la mentionnant n'a certainement pas entendu s'y associer.

7. S'il y a un fait historique établi à l'heure actuelle, c'est la volonté d'agression de l'Allemagne et de l'Autriche-Hongrie pour assurer leur hégémonie sur l'Europe et leur domination économique sur le monde. L'Allemagne a, par la déclaration de guerre, par la violation de la Belgique et du Luxembourg, et par la façon dont elle a conduit la lutte, manifesté son mépris de tout principe d'humanité et de tout respect pour les petits états; à mesure que le conflit a évolué l'attitude des Puissances centrales et de leurs alliés a été un continuel défi à l'humanité et à la civilisation. Faut-il rappeler les horreurs qui ont accompagné l'invasion de la Belgique et de la Serbie, le régime atroce imposé aux pays envahis, le massacre des centaines de milliers d'Arméniens inoffensifs, les barbaries exercées contre les populations de Syrie, les raids des Zeppelins sur les villes ouvertes, la destruction par les sous-marins de paquebots et de navires marchands, même sous pavillon neutre, le cruel traitement infligé aux prisonniers de guerre, les meurtres juridiques de Miss Cavell et du Capitaine Fryatt, la déportation et la réduction en esclavage des populations civiles, etc.

L'exécution d'une pareille série de crimes, perpétrés sans aucun souci de la réprobation universelle, explique amplement au Président Wilson la protestation des Alliés.

8. Ils estiment que la note qu'ils ont remise aux Etats-Unis, en réplique à la note allemande, répond à la question posée par le Gouvernement américain et constitue, suivant les propres expressions de ce dernier, "une déclaration publique quant aux conditions auxquelles la guerre pourrait être terminée."

9. M. Wilson souhaite davantage. Il désire que les Puissances belligérantes affirment, en pleine lumière, les buts qu'elles se proposent en poursuivant la guerre; les Alliés n'éprouvent aucune difficulté à répondre à cette demande. Leurs buts de guerre sont bien connus: ils ont été formulés à plusieurs reprises par les chefs de leurs divers

Gouvernements. Ces buts de guerre ne seront exposés dans le détail, avec toutes les compensations et indemnités équitables pour les dommages subis, qu'à l'heure des négociations. Mais le monde civilisé sait qu'ils impliquent, de toute nécessité et en première ligne, la restauration de la Belgique, de la Serbie et du Monténégro et les dédommagements qui leur sont dûs; l'évacuation des territoires envahis en France, en Russie, en Roumanie, avec de justes réparations; la réorganisation de l'Europe, garantie par un régime stable et fondée la fois sur le respect des nationalités et sur les droits à la pleine sécurité et à la liberté de développement économique que possèdent tous les peuples, petits et grands, et en même temps sur des conventions territoriales et des règlements internationaux propres à garantir les frontières terrestres et maritimes contre des attaques injustifiées; la restitution des provinces ou territoires autrefois arrachés aux Alliés par la force ou contre le vœu des populations; la libération des Italiens, des Slaves, des Roumains et des Tchéco-Slovaques, de la domination étrangère; l'affranchissement des populations soumises à la sanglante tyrannie des Turcs; le rejet hors d'Europe de l'Empire ottoman, décidément étranger à la civilisation occidentale.

Les intentions de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie à l'égard de la Pologne ont été clairement indiquées par la proclamation qu'il vient d'adresser à ses armées.

10. Il va sans dire que si les Alliés veulent soustraire l'Europe aux convoitises brutales du militarisme prussien, il n'a jamais été dans leurs desseins de poursuivre, comme on l'a prétendu, l'extermination des peuples allemands et leur disparition politique. Ce qu'ils veulent avant tout, c'est assurer la paix sur les principes de liberté et de justice, sur la fidélité inviolable aux obligations internationales dont n'a cessé de s'inspirer le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis.

11. Unis dans la poursuite de ce but supérieur, les Alliés sont déterminés, chacun, et solidairement, à agir de tout leur pouvoir et à consentir tous les sacrifices pour mener à une fin victorieuse un conflit dont ils sont convaincus que dépendent non seulement leur propre salut et leur prospérité, mais l'avenir de la civilisation même.

Paris, le 10 janvier 1917.

IV

Text of New Note from Great Britain Concerning Peace Sent in Amplification of Allied Reply to President Wilson

London, January 13.

His excellency the Right Honorable Sir Cecil Spring-Rice:

In sending you a translation of the allied note I desire to make the following observations, which you should bring to the notice of the United States Government:

I gather from the general tenor of the President's note that, while he is animated by an intense desire that peace should come soon and that when it comes it should be lasting, he does not, for the moment at least, concern himself with the terms on which it should be arranged. His Majesty's Government entirely share the President's ideas; but they feel strongly that the durability of peace must largely depend on its character, and that no stable system of international relations can be built on foundations which are essentially and hopelessly defective.

This becomes clearly apparent if we consider the main conditions which rendered possible the calamities from which the world is now suffering. These were the existence of great powers consumed with the lust of domination in the midst of a community of nations ill-prepared for defense, plentifully supplied, indeed, with international laws, but with no machinery for enforcing them, and weakened by the fact that neither the boundaries of the various States nor their internal constitution harmonized with the aspirations of their constituent races or secured to them just and equal treatment.

That this last evil would be greatly mitigated if the Allies secured the changes in the map of Europe outlined in their joint note is manifest, and I need not labor the point.

It has been argued, indeed, that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe forms no proper or logical part of this general scheme. The maintenance of the Turkish Empire was, during many generations, regarded by statesmen of world-wide authority as essential to the maintenance of European peace. Why, is it asked, should the cause

of peace be now associated with a complete reversal of this traditional policy?

The answer is that circumstances have completely changed. It is unnecessary to consider now whether the creation of a reformed Turkey, mediating between hostile races in the Near East, was a scheme which, had the Sultan been sincere and the Powers united, could ever have been realized. It certainly cannot be realized now. The Turkey of "Union and Progress" is at least as barbarous and is far more aggressive than the Turkey of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In the hands of Germany it has ceased even in appearance to be a bulwark of peace, and is openly used as an instrument of conquest. Under German officers, Turkish soldiers are now fighting in lands from which they had long been expelled, and a Turkish Government controlled, subsidized, and supported by Germany has been guilty of massacres in Armenia and Syria more horrible than any recorded in the history even of those unhappy countries. Evidently the interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien races shall, if possible, be brought to an end, and we may hope that the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, or Italia Irredenta to Italy, or any of the territorial changes indicated in the allied note.

Evidently, however, such territorial rearrangements, though they may diminish the occasions of war, provide no sufficient security against its recurrence. If Germany, or rather, those in Germany who mould its opinions and control its destinies, again set out to domineer the world, they may find that by the new order of things the adventure is made more difficult, but hardly that it is made impossible. They may still have ready to their hand a political system organized through and through on a military basis; they may still accumulate vast stores of military equipment; they may still persist in their methods of attack, so that their more pacific neighbors will be struck down before they can prepare themselves for defense. If so, Europe, when the war is over, will be far poorer in men, in money, and in mutual good-will than it was when the war began, but it will not be safer; and the hopes for the future of the world entertained by the President will be as far as ever from fulfillment.

There are those who think that for this disease international treaties and international laws may provide a sufficient cure. But such persons have ill-learned the lessons so clearly taught by recent history. While other nations, notably the United States of America and Britain, were striving by treaties of arbitration to make sure that no chance quarrel should mar the peace they desired to make perpetual, Germany stood aloof. Her historians and philosophers

preached the splendors of war; power was proclaimed as the true end of the State; and the General Staff forged with untiring industry the weapons by which at the appointed moment power might be achieved. These facts proved clearly enough that treaty arrangements for maintaining peace were not likely to find much favor at Berlin; they did not prove that such treaties, once made, would be utterly ineffectual. This became evident only when war had broken out, though the sought demonstration, when it came, was overwhelming. So long as Germany remains the Germany which, without a shadow of justification, overran and barbarously ill-treated a country it was pledged to defend, no State can regard its rights as secure if they have no better protection than a solemn treaty.

The case is made worse by the reflection that these methods of calculated brutality were designed by the Central Powers, not merely to crush to the dust those with whom they were at war, but to intimidate those with whom they were still at peace. Belgium was still at peace. Belgium was not only a victim, it was an example. Neutrals were intended to note the outrages which accompanied its conquest, the reign of terror which followed on its occupation, the deportation of a portion of its population, the cruel oppression of the remainder. And, lest the nations happily protected either by British fleets or by their own from German armies, should suppose themselves safe from German methods, the submarine has (within its limits) assiduously imitated the barbarous practices of the sister service. The war staffs of the Central Powers are well content to horrify the world if at the same time they can terrorize it.

If, then, the Central Powers succeed, it will be to methods like these that they will owe their success. How can any reform of international relations be based on a peace thus obtained? Such a peace would represent the triumph of all the forces which make war certain and make it brutal. It would advertise the futility of all the methods on which civilization relies to eliminate the occasions of international dispute and to mitigate their ferocity. Germany and Austria made the present war inevitable by attacking the rights of one small State, and they gained their initial triumphs by violating the treaty guarantees of the territories of another. Are small States going to find in them their protectors or in treaties made by them a bulwark against aggression? Terrorism by land and sea will have proved itself the instrument of victory. Are the victors likely to abandon it on the appeal of neutrals? If existing treaties are no more than scraps of paper, can fresh treaties help us? If they be crowned with success, will it not be in vain that the assembled nations labor to improve their code? None will profit by their rules but Powers who break them. It is those who keep them that will suffer.

Though, therefore, the people of this country share to the full the desire of the President for peace, they do not believe peace can be durable if it be not based on the success of the allied cause. For a durable peace can hardly be expected unless three conditions are fulfilled: The first is that existing causes of international unrest should be, as far as possible, removed or weakened; the second is that the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples; the third is that behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardest aggressor.

These conditions may be difficult of fulfillment. But we believe them to be in general harmony with the President's ideas, and we are confident that none of them can be satisfied, even imperfectly, unless peace be secured on the general lines indicated (so far as Europe is concerned) in the joint note. Therefore it is that this country has made, is making, and is prepared to make sacrifices of blood and treasure unparalleled in its history. It bears these heavy burdens, not merely that it may thus fulfill its treaty obligations, nor yet that it may secure a barren triumph of one group of nations over another. It bears them because it firmly believes that on the success of the Allies depend the prospects of peaceful civilization and of those international reforms which the best thinkers of the New World, as of the Old, dare to hope may follow on the cessation of our present calamities.

ARTHUR J. BALFOUR

V

Text of President Wilson's Address to the Senate

WASHINGTON, January 22—The President's address to the Senate to-day was as follows:

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE: On the 18th of December last I addressed an identic note to the Governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy.

The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace.

The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely, and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.

We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power, which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in those days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will

be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government, ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot, in honor, withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this—to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended, but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged.

We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant, and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterward, when it may be too late.

No covenant of coöperative peace that does not include the peoples of the new world can suffice to keep the future safe against war, and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing.

The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Governments, elements consistent with their political faith and the practical conviction which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American Government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of

peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this:

Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be not only a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately, we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations, now arrayed against one another, have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implication of these assurances may not be equally clear to all, may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory, upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand.

Only a peace between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right [state of mind, the right feeling, between nations, is] ¹ as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged

¹As printed in the New York World, January 23, 1917.

must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend.

Equality of territory, of resources, there, of course, cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of rights among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.

I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace, which seem to me clearly indispensable—because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquility of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling toward a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and co-

operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto sought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them.

The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the coöperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe.

And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as those questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings and come to stay.

Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armies are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority among all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great Government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say.

May I not add that I hope and believe that I am, in effect, speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and the Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named, I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment rather of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: That no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competition of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We can stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894.

WHAT IS A NATIONALITY? (THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY)

PART II



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MARCH, 1917

No. 112

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SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

WHAT IS A NATIONALITY?¹

For one thing, the term 'nationality' is at once akin to and distinct from the term 'nation'. It is worth noting that the former term is by far the more recent. Nation is a very old word, derived from the Latin; nationality, on the other hand, appears for the first time in the dictionary of the French Academy in the edition of 1835. Significant date! At that time the word nationality was omnipresent, in the press, in literature, in parliamentary eloquence. It also took its place in history. Greece, championed by the pens of philosophers and poets, and backed by the military forces of France and England, had just won her independence. Belgium and Holland had separated from each other in order to live their own lives. In 1831 Russian Poland had risen in revolt, without, however, finding a defender in Europe, in spite of the appeals of Casimir Delavigne, Armand Carrel and Louis Blanc. Everywhere in the Balkans the people were in turmoil. Public sentiment was inspired by the general aspiration of the peoples to enter history by the side or in place of the dynasties which had for centuries at once exploited and oppressed them; and with the growth and amplification of the ideas, the words became more precise and their meaning altered. Nationality, in the abstract sense, is the characteristic of that which is national. But it is also, especially in the concrete

¹ Part I of "The Principle of Nationality" was printed as No. 109 of International Conciliation.

sense, the totality of those ethnical elements which aspire to the dignity, the risks and the thrilling experiences of national life. Nationality is the nation in power, the nation attempting to realize itself and to play a part in history. It is made of similar but dis-severed elements which would unite to form a common body and give it the functions necessary to a common life, in a word, to achieve unity and political sovereignty.

Unquestionably, the distinction between these ideas is frequently vague; 'nation' and 'nationality' may be used interchangeably to designate the same ethnic group. We may give the name of nation not only to existing states, where political unity visibly corresponds with a unity of homogeneous ethnical characteristics, but also to those states which have been deprived by the accident of history of this unity within such comparatively recent times that its memory still remains as an ideal for restoration. Poland, dismembered for a hundred and forty years, has remained a nation to exiled Poles, and its writers and journalists remain faithful to the unfortunate people. The German world, in spite of every feudal division, was conscious even under the yoke of the Napoleonic armies that it was the 'German nation' to which Fichte had addressed his fiery speeches. On the other hand, we should commonly speak of Greek, Bulgarian, Jewish or Lithuanian 'nationality', and the almost classical expression, the 'principle of nationalities' usually refers to the principle by which individuals who recognize sufficiently strong similarities among themselves aspire legitimately to become an independent political community on a common territory.

What are these similarities? They are, of course,

those which characterize the nation, since, as we have frequently insisted, the nation is the complete form—or, as we should say in philosophy, the *idea* or final cause—which the nationality desires to realize. The characteristics of nationality are, therefore, practically the same as those which are implied in the idea of a nation.

It would seem a daring venture to undertake to define a 'nation' when one remembers the remarkable conference of March eleventh, 1882, when Renan summarized all that modern consciousness has condensed in that idea. The subtle arguments of Renan resulted, after a series of eliminations, in minimizing the importance of the material and material content of the national idea and a magnificent exaltation of its moral aspects.

THE COUNTRY

The spiritual aspect of the modern nation appeared to Renan so essential that he needed but a few words in which to dismiss the question of geographical unity. On this point in particular many writers are reluctant to agree with him. Never has the conception of 'natural boundaries' been more widely accepted than today. Let us take care to avoid unwarranted negations as well as extravagant assertions. It goes without saying that an ocean, or a steep range of mountains divides communities, just as a fertile plain, furrowed with fordable and navigable waters, conduces to compact and permanent settlement. Especially during the period of the great migrations, when mankind had to reckon with the natural difficulties presented by a virgin soil, did nature mark out in advance the paths

destined to become the highways of human caravans; men followed the water courses, marched around marshes and forests, and sought out the lower mountain passes. History is not to be separated from geography. But when we endeavor to pass beyond these generalizations what uncertainties and contradictions we find! For example, the frontiers of the languages are far from following the mountain crests. French is still spoken at Sainte-Marie-aux-Mines on the eastern slope of the Vosges and across the Alps in the valleys of Vaud and Piedmont. Basque idioms and dialects are spoken on both sides of the Pyrenees. Moreover, in Switzerland, Lorraine and Belgium, the respective limits of French, German and Flemish are not marked by any natural boundary but show the most surprising sinuosities. In the vast plains extending from the Baltic Sea to the Ural Mountains, from the Caucasus to the Carpathians, the different Slavic nationalities, Russians, Ruthenians, Don Cossacks, Lithuanians and Poles are distributed without regard to the river basins. Rivers are said both to unite and to separate. The Germans claim that the Rhine is a river within the interior of the German realm; but M. Julian, a Frenchman, declares it to be a natural frontier since it is rapid, impetuous and hard to cross, as might indeed be said of our own Rhone. In fact, mountains and water courses have never permanently arrested racial movements. The Aryans were compelled to cross the Himalayas and the Indus to settle India. In Europe the Alps have not arrested the Gauls, the Teutons or the Ostrogoths; nor the Rhine the Germans, Huns and Vandals; nor the Carpathians and the Danube the Slavs; nor the sea and the Pyrenees the Arabs. It is evident that these natural barriers oppose a formidable

obstacle only to the peoples incapable of surmounting them by their skill, but they lose almost all of their significance the day when man undertakes to build a bridge, cut a tunnel, or construct a steamboat or even a raft. The Mediterranean, which served to isolate barbarians, became a bond of union and a sphere of common exploitation for seafaring peoples, the Phœnicians, Greeks and Romans. Even today it is brilliantly demonstrated by the enthusiasm that inspires all the British colonies to share in the defense of civilization how firm is the bond which unites with England the scattered members of an empire upon which the sun never sets.

Does it not seem, after all, that the 'natural boundary' theorists by an unconscious sophism mistake for a cause what is but an effect? In interpreting experience we naturally tend to explain what is changeable by what is immutable, what is variable by essential and permanent characteristics. Nothing is more misleading than to account for the life of a people by the form of their country in our atlases of historical geography. The natural features of the great historic countries, Spain, Great Britain, France, are so familiar to us, they have so completely become for us the image of these nations, that there would seem to be a necessary connection between their topography and their history; and surely no one would deny that there is much truth in this view. But it should be remembered that the geography of a nation is itself the product of its history; we need only look at an historical atlas to be assured of this. France has not always reached to the Alps and the Pyrenees, and her northeastern frontier has been subject to constant alteration. Of what existing boundary may we say that it is fixed by

the nature of things? If any country might be thought predestined 'by nature' to attain national unity, it is certainly Italy, isolated from other nations by the sea and by the highest mountains in Europe. Nevertheless, she remained for centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire but a 'geographical expression', and even today she must fight hard to conquer the frontiers which nature seemed to have assigned to her. How strange a 'nature' that the will and the hand of man must correct or realize its purposes! At bottom, the theory of natural boundaries is but a fiction which man has made to orient his activities; it is a sphere for the demarcation of his ambitions and his hopes; it is far less a natural cause of which he experiences the effect, than an aim that he wills to realize and for which he postulates in advance a kind of concrete reality. Doubtless it is true enough that in one sense the country makes the people, modifies their character and imposes on them certain habits; but, on the other hand, we may also say that the people fashion their country by their dreams and aspirations.

COMMON INTERESTS

I shall not emphasize the importance of a community of interests more strongly than Renan has done. A customs union, a Zollverein, he declares cannot constitute a country. We may say even more than this; immediate interest may favor the dissolution as well as the consolidation of a nationality. When all is said, if the yoke imposed upon a vanquished nation is not absolutely intolerable, is it to its immediate interest to live in a condition of open revolt or of silent hostility? Is it not rather to accept the law, the

religion, the language and the institutions of the victor and to merge one's identity with his? Vanquished Gaul certainly found it advantageous to permit assimilation by Rome. In very recent days was not the participation of Alsace in the material prosperity of Germany the most potent factor in turning the ancient uncompromising protest against annexation into a mere demand for autonomy within the framework of the German Empire? Frequently, moreover, the invader finds it to his interest to let himself be assimilated, both economically and spiritually, by the possessors of the soil. On the other hand, the history of nations is full of the self-sacrifice of the more valiant among them in the defense of their liberties. How explain by motives of self-interest the Polish insurrection of 1863, a movement of chivalrous folly condemned from the outset to a cruel defeat? In short, common interests may unite for a time even hostile forces, just as they may bring into opposition persons or groups otherwise sympathetic. But the national bond is of a different sort than a convenient compromise; a nation is not a syndicate of desires.

RACE

The most important part of Renan's analysis, in my opinion, is his masterly criticism of the theories which would determine nationality by race. The progress of ethnography and of anthropology in the last thirty years has not in the least weakened Renan's position. Can anyone use the term race in its strictest sense as implying a number of individuals of the same species linked together by a common ancestry? It is obvious that to do so we should have to seek out the very

origins of the human race which are lost in the uncertain distances of prehistoric times; rather a question of metaphysics than of physiology or of human geography. We believe no longer in the mythical division of the human family among the sons of Noah, and yet we do not know whether the forest of humanity has sprung from a single root or from a number of diverse stocks. Anthropology knows no instance of a pure race, nor a single example of any race unable to blend itself with another. We may, it is true, by comparing certain outstanding human characteristics, such as stature, facial angle, cephalic index, and so forth, determine the predominance of certain types in a given region and explain the variations from this by migrations or by the resurgence of very ancient homogeneous races; but, apart from the fact that no one knows whether these races are themselves pure or composite, the indications of anthropology are confirmed neither by linguistics nor history. Nowhere can the geographical distribution of languages be traced back to the division of populations into tall, blond dolichocephalic and dark, short brachycephalic types.

If, on the other hand, we mean by race the type to which a people in a given country have conformed, we are surely dealing with an incontestable reality. There undoubtedly is an Anglo-Saxon, a French, a German, a Scandinavian, a Berber and a Yankee type. But we readily perceive that in a race so considered, the factor which is considered of first importance, physiological inheritance, plays an uncertain but always secondary part, and that the truly determining factors are climate, costume, or habits of life. It will be found, for example, that peoples undoubtedly akin may become

decidedly different from each other—as with the Alsations and the Badenese—whereas populations that grow by immigration soon impose upon the newcomers a new type; for instance, the Yankee type which asserts itself in so curious a fashion after two or three generations among immigrants of every descent who have come to the United States, Anglo-Saxons, Germans, Jews, Italians, and all others. From this it follows that race, wherever it constitutes an effective social reality, is fully as much a *product of* as a *factor in* the national life. A nation is not determined by its heredity; it is a living organism which is both adapted to its environment and adapts that to itself. Or better said—for this mutual adaptation might be a wholly material process—a nation bears the imprint of its spiritual vitality on its brow and in its sinews. It may degenerate from alcohol, debauchery, overstrain, or deliberate surrender; or it may enhance, rebuild and beautify its life by good hygiene, athletics, schooling, military training, games, the arts, and the intensive development of spiritual life.

No doubt one is tempted to draw a sharp distinction among three or four main types of the human race, white men and black, yellow and red men. In the United States, for example, however rapid and easy the assimilation of Aryan elements, there is a barrier between these peoples, on the one hand, and the ‘colored people’ on the other, whether these are the descendants of negro slaves, the remnant of the ‘redskins’, or the yellow peoples, whose immigration to the United States has been made extremely difficult by federal law. Yet even in the United States the intermarriage of white men and Indians has undoubtedly occurred on a considerable scale and has con-

tributed to the making of the Yankee type; elsewhere, in Central America and in the Antilles the intermarriage of white men with black has proceeded apace. Finally, the rapid evolution of modern Japan and even of China should suffice to show how vain it is to attempt to connect in some vague fashion a given type of civilization with certain physiological characteristics. These great racial differences may at any time come to be of practical importance, and the 'Yellow Peril' may unquestionably be more than an empty phrase. But it is safe to say that the scientific basis for this theory is of the most uncertain character. And this racial factor becomes still less reliable when we try to contrast the political groupings of modern Europe. It is not race, it is history that has created the modern nations, and in them mingle victors and vanquished, invaders and natives, and the strongest of them are just those to whom invasion and war have given the greatest variety of descent. "France," says Renan, "is Celtic, Iberian and Germanic. Germany is Germanic, Celtic and Slavic. Italy is the country where ethnology is most confused. Gauls, Etruscans, Pelasgians, Greeks, not to speak of other elements, intermingle in an indescribable complexity. The British Isles, considered as a whole, show a mixture of Germanic and Celtic blood whose proportions are peculiarly difficult to determine."

It is, therefore, high time that we should cease to complicate historical questions, and especially modern politics, with this human paleontology which rests only on confused, unprovable, changing hypotheses. Do those French writers who belatedly cling to this theory of races in order to build upon it their 'integral

nationalism', or simply to reclaim such cities as Trèves and Mayence, realize that they are simply donning the mantles of the scientists across the Rhine? In fact, the race theory is, at the present time, the essential argument of Pan-German propaganda. All countries where the names of places or of persons, the color of the eyes, or the shape of the head denote an infiltration of Teutonic elements, are declared to be the domain of the German race. The Netherlands, the Flemish districts of Belgium and France, Alsace-Lorraine, Burgundy, Franche Comté, the Scandinavian nations, Finland, the Baltic provinces of Russia, Austria, in short, all central Europe from the North Cape to the Adriatic has been proclaimed the chosen land which is destined to become subject to the German Empire. And since race is not easy to determine, and since the people themselves forget their true descent, the scientists must undertake the task of apprising them of their correct allegiance according to their origin. Anthropologists dig the ground, collect flints, and measure skulls; philologists determine etymological relationships; students of folk-lore trace popular legends; historians resurrect old documents; and the whole learned world, still covered with dust from their researches, skilfully show the peoples that they are not what they thought themselves to be. "We other Germans," wrote Treitschke, "know better than the Alsatians wherein lies their true welfare. . . . We will bring them to their true selves in spite of them."¹ These trenchant affirmations of 'competent authorities' might be harmless enough, were they not backed up by imperialist politicians, armed with the verdicts of scholarship as if with title deeds, who command the

¹ Was Fordern Wir von Frankreich?

peoples to throw themselves, willing or unwilling, into the embrace of the reconstituted race. In just this fashion did the German universities prepare the way for the achievements of Bismarck and represent to their 'long lost brothers' of Alsace and Lorraine their annexation by the Empire as a return to the 'German family'. Today we see the same stratagem used with the Flemish Belgians.

Who does not feel the scandal and shamelessness of such sophistries? In the name of what Renan has termed the 'poor little conjectural sciences', in the name of history, that complaisant servant of any theory, in the name of linguistics and of anthropology, yet more uncertain and still more complaisant, attempts are made to decide the fate of peoples against their will. A few degrees more or less of the cephalic index are expected to determine a frontier. Was it not Frederick the Great who, understanding his people, remarked on the eve of the partition of Poland: "Whatever I may do, I shall always find some pedant to justify me"?

LANGUAGE

Should we say of language what we have but now said of race? To the consideration of this question Renan was able to bring his special competence as a philologist and historian. He knew that languages alter and die out more readily than races. Gaul and Spain quickly abandoned their native idioms for Latin; all northern Africa speaks the Arabic brought in by the soldierapostles of the Koran; The Slavic Prussians speak nothing but German; the Irish and the Welsh have adopted the English language; there are many Bretons

and Flemings in France who understand no language but the French. On the other hand, great communities may speak the same language without being united by any political bond. The people of the United States still speak the same language as the British from whom they have been separated for a century and a half; Latin America has kept the languages of Spain and Portugal although it has thrown off their political tutelage. All that is clear. And yet it would seem that Renan did not fully appreciate the importance of the factor of language. In the first place, is it so certain that the unity of a nation suffers nothing from diversity of speech? Renan cites the classic example of Switzerland where four languages are spoken, and to this we might add the case of Belgium where the French of the Walloon provinces and the Flemish of the west co-exist without interfering with each other. But recent events enable us to question if these examples are conclusive. In the great duel which brings into opposition two types of civilization, French and German, it should be recognized that Swiss sympathies at once divided along the frontier of language. True, Switzerland has scrupulously kept herself out of the struggle; she has observed neutrality with all due loyalty and displayed an equal generosity towards the wounded and the interned civilians whom France and Germany have exchanged through her as intermediary. But when we read the Swiss journals we realize what disturbance our neighbors have experienced. Though unanimously determined to maintain their independence, they have realized, not without surprise and anxiety, that they were by no means agreed among themselves as to the causes of the war, the initial responsibility, and the violations of human rights

which have marked its course. A 'German Swiss' and a 'French Swiss' would have met, not of course in a hostile fashion, but surprised and uneasy that they were no longer in agreement. This is because literature, the newspapers, teaching and propaganda by pamphlet have prejudiced on one side or the other the two linguistic sections. There was thus a daily infiltration of sentiments, ideas, assertions, which only a few reflective persons, capable of reading and thinking in both languages might resist, but certainly not the great mass of readers. The same thing may be seen in a lesser degree in Belgium. Everyone knows how acute the dualism of language had become there, and the resulting conflict between the two parties, each of which has its own language, its own art and its own drama. No one, to be sure, would dream of questioning the loyalty of either Flemings or Walloons. The invasion, so far from finding Belgium divided against itself, instantly stopped the national quarrels. It remains none the less true, however, that the Walloon part of Belgium has shown itself more open to the influence of the French spirit, whereas the Germans, even before the war, considered the Flemish movement as an outpost of Pan-Germanism.

For speech is not, like race, a matter which must be determined by scientific research; in the absence of other special distinctions, it is the chief concrete sign by which men recognize their solidarity as against the foreigner. It is true enough, as Renan observed in another part of his discussion, that there is much self-deception in this judgment, since languages are always changeable and are sometimes forgotten in the course of two or three generations. But what difference does it make whether the belief is an illusion or not, if it

is held wholly and sincerely? What matters it that the Prussians spoke Slavic some centuries ago if they speak only German today and therefore feel themselves at one with all who speak, think, write, sing, love or hate in German?

So essential, moreover, is unity of language to a nation, that a war of languages is today, as in the recent past, the most characteristic and constant form of national struggle. It is surely remarkable that this war should persist with such vehemence even where religious persecution has long ago ceased. The religious faith of the Poles, Finns, Danes of Schleswig, and people of Alsace-Lorraine has always been respected. The principle according to which subjects follow the religion of the ruler—*cuius regio, eius religio*—a principle still recognized in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), has practically fallen into disuse in central and western Europe. On the other hand, there is not a single form of hardship which these unhappy people have not suffered for the use of their national language; the obligatory, sometimes the exclusive, use of the official language in street signs, railway stations, public buildings, even cemeteries, on the sign-boards of shops, in the courts, in the church and, above all, in the schools. The Polish children of Prussian Poland have been free to remain Catholics, provided they would learn their catechism in German, but it should not be forgotten that children, even little girls, were whipped till they bled for asserting their right to pray in the language of their parents. Nowhere, however, has the war of language assumed such an acute form as in the Balkans. The Turks, to be sure, whose administration has always been a strange blend of harshness and tolerance, have never violently interfered with the free

usage of their language by their subject peoples, and this is undoubtedly the principal explanation of the strong survival of the Serb, Bulgar, Rumanian, Greek and Armenian nationalities. But their subjects have well understood how to use this freedom at once against the oppressor and against their companions in servitude.^c The school and the church—the church where they preach, sing and pray in their native tongue—have been, short of insurrection, the essential means of their liberation.

But this propaganda has not only been of service to the cause of resistance to Turkish tyranny, it has also been a first-class weapon in the mutual rivalries of the Balkan nationalities. In the disputed territories, that is, in the inextricable entanglement of diverse nationalities in Macedonia and in Epirus where the demographic situation is equally obscure, Bulgars, Greeks and Serbs have multiplied schools and churches, and this intensive propaganda has reached such a point as to aggravate the antagonism of nationalities for successive generations. It has happened that children, once passed through school, could no longer speak the language of their parents and grandparents. When the commission selected in 1913 by the Conference of London undertook to determine the southern boundary of the new nation of Albania, it was rather surprised to discover that in certain localities the children and young men spoke Greek while the old men and the women employed a Serb or Albanian dialect. In the United States, also, it is the English-speaking school which has brought about, in spite of the absolute liberty accorded to all religious beliefs, such a surprisingly rapid Americanization of the hundreds of thousands of immigrants that annually swell the

population of the republic. It has been observed that, as a general rule, the third generation has completely forgotten the language still understood and used in domestic conversation by the second.

These facts point to one conclusion: namely, if nations can only with difficulty dispense with linguistic unity, for nationalities which aspire to become nations it is a still more vital condition of existence and progress. Exceptional circumstances of geography and history have enabled the Swiss nation, a blend of various nationalities, to establish itself in spite of the diversity of tongues. For these cantons, which had long been independent in their Alpine retreats, had early reached a sufficiently high level of political consciousness to enable them to overcome the dissimilarities due to difference of language. The Swiss Confederation is an admirable example of voluntary association established among free communities without needing the unifying action of a dynasty as the nucleus of its growth. In Belgium a common resistance to the tyranny of a common master, Spain or Austria, unquestionably welded the national soul to unity in spite of differences of speech. Such diversity in unity is only possible in a limited territory. But how should such a vast empire as Austria-Hungary, divided into a dozen nationalities speaking as many different idioms, ever be established as a nation?

Let me add, finally, that in the small bilingual or trilingual countries, such as Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, there is an educated class which speaks the two or three national languages almost equally well, and that this class at once represents and controls the common life of the nation. But in such countries as Austria-Hungary where, over a vast area,

too many rival languages co-exist, this function of a polyglot elite becomes impossible. Among so many disparate elements there is no common bond but the person of the sovereign and a bureaucracy which secures the external agreement of the many national entities, at once contiguous and unable to influence each other.

RELIGION

Of religion we may say almost what we have said of language. A nation once established can dispense with religious unity, whenever the consciousness of national solidarity is strong enough to allow the individual conscience to free itself from any creed, or to worship in private the God within, or to adore the 'Father of all mankind'. With Stoicism and Christianity, God has been internationalized. No doubt, the words of men are often deliberately polytheistic. The Kaiser invokes the 'Old German God', and the French Catholic the God of Clovis, of Saint Louis and of Joan of Arc. But, fundamentally, it is the same Deity, successor of the biblical Jehovah and the Hellenic Zeus, to whom Europeans pray, about whom they dispute, to whom they appeal for victory; the God inscribed upon their coins, their helmets, their sword-belts, and in their national hymns: *Dieu protège la France*—*Gott mit Uns*—*God Save the King*—*Bože Tsara Krani*; and it is but too true that this worship of a common master of their destinies has in no way diminished the terrible antagonism of modern nations. This world war marks the failure of Christian internationalism as well as of the internationalism of the workers. The modern idea of the nation has developed

on quite a different plane from that of the religious consciousness. This has always tended to assume a subjective and individual form, whereas the nation cannot exist without a body of common principles and without a legal frame work comprising and including the individual. Modern States have left religious practices entirely to the individual conscience; schism and heresy are no longer public concerns, and diverse creeds may without harm co-exist in the same nation. But it is not so with nationalities, and here we must once more part company with Renan. For a people still engaged in winning their political independence or to accomplish their national unity, every rallying point is precious. In the absence of a political framework, the national churches offer their hierarchy, their administrative organization, as a rough outline of the political organization of the future. Dioceses and parishes furnish the plan for the provinces and communes of the morrow. Where constitutional representation is lacking, the priests, the bishops, the pastors, the synods are the only means of maintaining before the sovereign power the complaints and the demands of the nationalities. Wherever the spoken and the written word are restricted, the sermon is still the freest means of voicing popular aspirations. In those parts of Europe where the fate of nationalities is now debated with the greatest eagerness, religious activities have played a part which it would be idle to deny. Bulgarian and Serbian "Popes", Greek "Pappas" in Macedonia and in Epirus, Catholic missionaries from Austria and Italy in Albania are, as much or more than the school teachers, true nationalist agitators. The gaining of a Hexarchate, that is to say, the right to have a religious head other than

the Patriarch of Constantinople, was for the Bulgarians the first step in their emancipation. We may also explain in this way the fact that those modern States which have to reckon with nationalist movements interfere in religious affairs in a high-handed fashion and make use of the Church as an instrument of government. If the Austrian Emperor is the last Catholic sovereign to hold intimate relations with the Vatican and even intervene in papal elections, it is because he has need to appear, after the Pope, as a second head of the Church to the numerous Catholic nationalities of the Empire, Italians of the Trentino, Germans of Austria, Czechs of Bohemia, Magyars of Hungary, Croats and Slavonians, not to mention Albania where the government of Vienna maintains a whole army of missionaries. The Tsar is, for all the Slavs, head and champion of the Orthodox Church; the Russian Sacred Synod has always been a means of Russification in Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, and it is well known that during the temporary occupation of Galicia a cloud of priests swarmed over the country which had been promised liberty and that the Catholic bishop of the Ukraine was sent to Siberia where he still awaits his liberation.

SPIRITUAL UNITY

What, in short, is a nation? Let me repeat here the admirable answer of Renan: "A nation is a vast solidarity, established by the realization of the sacrifices which have been made and of those which may still be expected. It implies a past; in the present, however, it rests upon a tangible fact: consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life.

"The existence of a nation is a daily plebiscite, as the existence of an individual is a perpetual affirmation of existence." And, summarizing his analysis yet more concisely, Renan concludes: "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle." Nearest our own day, another philosopher, Emile Boutroux, wrote recently: "The will of a certain number of persons to live together in a country where they were born and in which their personality received its impress, to cultivate together common memories and to pursue common aims, is at once the essence and the test of nationality. Nationality is a part of the life of the human soul, and is itself a living thing."¹ These definitions are very beautiful; they are true, without doubt; they are also rich in practical consequences, inasmuch as they are based upon an incontestable reality, the right of nations to live their own lives, but are they not a little vague because incomplete? Does not that soul which is the nation need to have a body as well to come into relation with real life?

THE NATION: SOUL AND BODY

This body established nations find in the political institutions which, by bestowing sovereignty on them, make them moral entities of equal rank with all other sovereign nations, great or small. A French philosopher, Edmond Goblot, has said: "la Patrie, c'est la loi" (the fatherland is the law). The ideal nation appears to us as the close synthesis of the social soul, or collective will, with a system of political institutions. The collective will finds in the legal organism at once its expression and its support; but the legal

¹ *La Nation Comme Personne Morale, Revue* of April 15, p. 232.

organism, in turn, draws its energy and the consciousness of its growth from the collective will, and the life of the nation consists of the interaction of this soul which directs and of this body which achieves.

But can we speak of national life where there is lacking not only the independent exercise of the indispensable functions of social existence but community of religion and above all of language? Unquestionably, nationalities, like nations, possess a soul in so far as they are conscious of common aspirations which direct them to common aims; but how uncertain is this community of desires if those who experience them have no concrete bond of union which enables them to discover and to recognize each other! The collective consciousness needs the support of a continuity of language which perpetuates historic memories, transmits tradition from generation to generation, legends, ancestral deeds, poems and national songs. Nor can there be any doubt, in my opinion, that one of the chief factors in the nationalist movement, which permeated the whole nineteenth century and is shaking Europe so terribly today, has been simply the diffusion of elementary education, of books and newspapers.

In a word, nationalities are populations that aspire to become nations. Like nations they are complex collectivities, drawing their sentiment of unity from a great number of sources, among which the moral factors, traditions, religion and a common speech are the most essential. But in order to become nations in the full sense of the term they must gain that political independence through which means alone a complete social life can manifest itself.

It is to this completeness that all the nationalities

aspire which have preserved intact the sentiment of their unity in spite of their subjection. Here we meet with a final and most striking characteristic. A nation may be content to defend her acquired position; it can without limiting itself to its present bounds—a limitation that might be synonymous with death—at least be content to develop its life within certain territorial limits and under a political system that may be considered as final. A nationality, on the other hand, which wants to live, must direct its efforts wholly towards the future; it is rather a hope than a memory. The imagination of a people who aspire to national existence is therefore singularly richer than their memory. They have, as Renan ingeniously observes, a wonderful and doubtless beneficent faculty of forgetting. Examinations that have frequently been made in France, in Germany and elsewhere, prove to what degree of poverty and absurdity the memory of national history often is reduced in the brains of the majority of conscripts who have been educated in the public schools. What is remembered is rather symbols than facts, or perhaps facts and names that have become symbols. Joan of Arc, the capture of the Bastille for the French; the battles of Teutoberg, Jena and Sedan for the Germans; the battle on the Plains of Merles for the Serbians; Andreas Hofer in Tyrol; Wilhelm Tell and Winkelried in Switzerland. . . . But these symbols suffice because they preserve the past and are as guarantees for the future, appeals to action, reasons for hope. In reality, a nationality has but a very confused idea of the elements which compose it, these are hardly known even to the educated classes; on the other hand, it knows very well what it wants to become, and, above all, when

oppressed, what it does not want to remain any longer. Coercion from without results in uniting incongruous elements until at last the day comes when the nationality, however complex in its origin, united in aspirations, considers itself ready to occupy a place among the nations, and rises up against its oppressors to claim a place in the Sun of Liberty.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894.

THE BASES OF AN ENDURING PEACE



BY
FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS

APRIL, 1917

No. 113

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

THE BASES OF AN ENDURING PEACE

BY
FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS

NOTE. The American Association for International Conciliation has been requested to place before its readers different points of view with regard to the basis upon which international peace can be established at the close of the present war, and in accordance with this request, the following paper is included in its series of publications. Next month an article favoring a negotiated peace will be printed.

The first part of Professor Giddings's article was published by the Association in August, 1916, as the introduction to a volume of material collected by Randolph S. Bourne and entitled "Towards An Enduring Peace."

When the storm has gone by and the skies after clearing have softened, we may discover that a corrected perspective is the result of the war that we are most conscious of. Familiar presumptions will appear foreshortened, and new distances of fact and possibility will lie before us.

Before the fateful midsummer of 1914 the most thoughtful part of mankind confidently held a lot of agreeable presumptions which undoubtedly influenced individual and collective conduct. The more intangible of them were grouped under such name symbols as "idealism," "humanitarian impulse," "human brotherhood," "Christian civilization." The workaday ones were pigeonholed under the rubric: "enlightened economic interest." Between the practical and the aspirational were distributed all the excellent

Aristotelian middle course presumptions of the "rule of reason" order.

And why not? The nineteenth century had closed in a blaze of scientific glory. By patient inductive research the human mind had found out nature's way on earth and in the heavens, and with daring invention had turned knowledge to immediate practical account. The struggle for existence had become a mighty enterprise of progress. Steam and electricity had brought the utmost parts of the world together. Upon substantial material foundations the twentieth century would build a world republic, wherein justice should apportion abundance.

Upon presumption we reared the tower of expectation.

Yet on the horizon we might have seen—some of us did see—a thickening haze and warning thunderheads. Not much was said about them, but to some it seemed that the world behaved as if it felt the tension of a rising storm. With nervous eagerness the nations pushed their way into the domains of the backward peoples. They sought concessions, opportunities for investment, command of resources, exclusive trade, spheres of influence. Private negotiations were backed by diplomacy, and year after year diplomacy was backed by an ever more impressive show of naval and military power.

But we did not believe that the Great War impended. There would still be restricted wars here and there, of course, but more and more they could be prevented. The human mind that had mastered nature's way could master and control the ways of man. Economic interest would bring its resistless strength to bear against the mad makers of the wastes

of war. A sensitive conscience would revolt against the cruelties of war. Reason, which had invented rules and agencies to keep the peace within the state, would devise tribunals and procedures to substitute a rational adjustment of differences for the arbitrament of war between states.

The world has recovered from disaster before now, it will recover again. Presumptions that disappointed have been re-examined and brought into truer drawing. Expectation has been more broadly built, it will be more broadly built again.

There is conscience in mankind, and the war has sublimely revealed it, as it has revealed also undreamed of survivals of faithlessness and cruelty. The presumption of rational control in human affairs has been foreshortened, but not painted out. In the background stand forth as grim realities, forces of fear, distrust, envy, ignorance, and hate that we had thought were ghosts. Conscience is as strong and as sensitive as we believed it to be; reason is as effective as we presumed; but the forces arrayed against them we now see are mightier than we knew. So now we ask, By what power shall conscience and reason be reinforced, and the surviving forces of barbarism be driven back?

There is but one answer left, all others have been shot to pieces. Conscience and reason are effective when they organize material energies, not when they dissipate themselves in dreams. Conscience and reason must assemble, co-ordinate, and bring to bear the economic resources and the physical energies of the civilized world to narrow the area and to diminish the frequency of war.

But how? General presumptions will not do this time. There must be a specific plan, concrete and practical; a specific preparedness, a specific method. And what is more, plan, preparedness, method must be drawn forth from the situation as the war makes and leaves it, not imposed upon it. There must be a composition of forces now in operation.

There were academic plans aplenty for the creation of pacific internationalism before the war began. The bankers had invented theirs; the socialists, the conciliationists, and the international lawyers respectively had invented theirs. The free-traders, first in the field, had not lost hope.

It would be foolish to let ourselves think in discouragement that all these efforts to organize "the international mind" were idle. They were not ineffective. They did not organize the international mind adequately, much less did they reform its habits, but they quickened it; they organized it in part, they pulled it together enough to make it powerful for the work yet to be done.

What we have to face, then, is not the extinction or abandonment of internationalism, but the fact that the ideal, the all-embracing and thoroughly rational internationalism lies far in the future, and that before it can be attained we must have that partial internationalism which is practically the same thing as the widening of nationalism which is achieved when nations co-operate in leagues or combine in federations. An all-embracing league of nations to enforce peace, or for any other purpose, would be a "scrap of paper" understanding, but the forces that now hold the entente allies together in military co-operation against the common enemy of civilization are realities, and they

will be realities after the military war is over. There still will be tariffs, but the areas within which tariff barriers will no longer be maintained will be immensely widened. Beyond these areas will be, as now, various arrangements of reciprocity. In like manner, there will be a determination on the part of the co-operating nations to stand together for the enforcement of international agreements and to discipline a law-breaking state that would needlessly resort to arms. The internationalism of commerce, of travel, of communication, of intellectual exchange and moral endeavor will continue to grow throughout the world, but in addition there will be the more definite and more concrete internationalism of the nations that agree in making common cause for the attainment of specific ends.

Within this relatively restricted internationalism there will be, there is now, a certain yet more definite aggregation of peoples, interests, and traditions upon which rests a great and peculiar moral responsibility. The English-speaking people of the world are together the largest body of human beings among whom a nearly complete intellectual and moral understanding is already achieved. They have reached high attainments in science and the arts, in education, in social order, in justice. They are highly organized, they cherish the traditions of their common history. To permit anything to endanger the moral solidarity of this nucleus of a perfected internationalism would be a crime unspeakable.

These considerations fix the moral and expedient limits of military co-operation between the United States and other nations, and they indicate our responsibilities. They indicate also the conditions upon which peace might, conceivably, long endure; whereas

a peace that did not fulfil these conditions could never be more than a breathing spell between wars.

Peace at any price can never be an enduring peace. Peace at any price means the surrender of civilization, liberty, responsibility and self-respect. It means the exchange of a freeman's birthright for a villain's broth. In humiliation we have to inventory in our population individuals who would make such surrender and would so barter. Relatively, however, they are not numerous and never can be. They are among those extreme variates from human normality, which range from low intelligence and grotesque criminality, at one end of the frequency curve, to mad genius and martyrdom at the other end. All such variates, the good and the bad, the desirable and the undesirable, get crowded to the wall and exterminated when the struggle for existence is really severe, but when life is as soft as it has been in England and in the United States for fifty or more years past, they are able to live and to propagate. Fortunately, they have never controlled public policy on a large scale, or for a long time, and they never will control. Least of all will peace-at-any-price men control. The normal man wants peace not as an end but as a means. He wants peace because he wants to feel that his wife and children are safe while he does his day's work. He wants peace if therewith he can enjoy liberty and a good conscience; otherwise he wants to fight, and fight he will, with a joy pure and undefiled. This is not mere argument. It is statistical fact, which happens to fix and to define the possibilities of enduring peace. Variates from type are minorities, normal men are a majority. The normal majority will not accept peace at any price.

They will fight. For the purposes of peace propaganda that hope to get somewhere the peace-at-any-price man is obstructive.

There can be no enduring peace between absolutism and democracy.

The American Revolution was not taken seriously in the throne rooms of continental Europe. A desperately impoverished population of less than three million souls, dwelling three thousand miles from anywhere, could safely be let alone to indulge itself for a time in the odd conceits of republicanism. The experiment would probably fail, and, if it did not, Europe could at any time curb its power for mischief.

The French Revolution was another matter. That upheaval sent chills down royal spines. The guillotine in the Place de la Concorde was near enough to be seen and heard when one lay awake in the night. Also, it was known to be inexpensive, making no impossible demands upon the financial resources of a Third Estate, and was understood to be practical. It cut off two Bourbon heads of the first class and a plenty of others only less respectable; and yet, and this was the worst of it, its operations were only an episode, as monarchical statesmen from Westminster to Moscow quite well apprehended. The real revolution had been half accomplished before sensational occurrences began; it proceeded quietly and was relentless.

An entire people had awakened, and in coming to consciousness of itself had discovered that it was strong enough to throw off intolerable burdens. Then it found a way to put forth its strength. Ancient privileges of rank and class which had been looked upon as eternal verities of the constitution were not merely

abolished, they were annihilated, with characteristic French thoroughness, and the ground was cleared for a republican scheme of rights, liberties and laws.

From the day that witnessed the confiscation of the properties of the nobles and of the church in 1789 until the invasion of Belgium in 1914 there never was an hour when, so far as the human mind can see, any derailing of the train of events which was headed for the battle of the Marne would have been possible.

The monarchs of Europe clearly saw that unless the revolution could be stopped in France it would extend throughout Europe and sweep all the dynasties away together. Therefore, they attacked France. That attack discovered Napoleon Bonaparte and put him in power.

Bonaparte saw that his fortunes must be built upon the substantial results of the revolution and he therefore, in settling the estate, saw to it that those results were embodied and clearly defined in the Code Napoléon. In conquering Europe, however, and building an empire he imperilled the liberties for which, presumably, he never had cared save in so far as he could use them for his own purposes. His overthrow was the destruction of a personal and dangerous military absolutism, but it was also the triumph of reactionary monarchism. Democracy could not have made its way if the first empire had survived, but from the moment that the Emperor was retired to St. Helena, the war was on again between popular politics and the dynasties, all superficial appearances to the contrary, notwithstanding. The Chartist disturbances in England, revolutionary activities in France in the thirties and forties, and the abortive revolution in Germany in 1848 were the futile outbursts of democratic

forces ever increasing in strength, but not then strong enough for so tremendous a task as they had attempted.

The rest of the story is brief, and relatively uncomplicated. The human animal and his interests being what they are, the Napoleonic wars made inevitable the Prussian revenge of 1870-1871; and the creation of the German Empire by successful Prussia made inevitable the monstrous Prussian arrogance which, from the accession of William II. until Verdun, fed itself upon dreams and plans of world empire. The boastful proclamation of this purpose, and the systematic creation of the most tremendous militaristic system ever seen or imagined, with declared intent to use it aggressively, made inevitable the alliance of Great Britain with France—her foe of a century earlier—against Germany—her ally at that time against Napoleon.

So, at last, the giant democracies of Western Europe and the giant absolutisms of Central Europe confronted each other on the fields of France and Flanders in life and death grapple. The issue, always more or less confused before, became sharply defined. Democracy or dynasty will be sovereign, from this time on.

"But Russia," some one will say. Yes, Russia. The case of Russia is not less clear than the issue between France and Prussia. The man who denies that this war is a conflict between democracy and dynasty because, forsooth, Russia is governed by a dynasty, and Russia is fighting as the ally of France and of Great Britain, is one of those publicists described in Holy Writ who darken council by words without knowledge. The Russian dynasty, Teutonic in sympathy and more than half Teutonic in blood, would be fighting with

Germany if it dared. It does not dare because the Russian people, including the business classes, are ripe for revolution, and are in sympathy with the aspirations of the democratic peoples. If Germany is beaten in the war the house of Hohenzollern will fall. If the Hohenzollerns go the Romanoffs and the Hapsburgs also will go.¹

Therefore, let the blazing truth about this war be repeated, emphasized, driven home, to every mind. This war is the life and death fight of dynasty at bay. It is the most portentous as it is the most gigantic and the most dreadful conflict in all human history, because it is the last stand of the massed and organized forces of despotism against liberty, enlightenment and progress. If it is won by the democratic peoples it is won forever: the earth will never again be cursed by the impostors of "divine right."

If the democratic peoples are defeated, what then? Then fighting will continue. All the work of centuries must be done over again. Insurrections, rebellions, revolutions must once more be the chief interest of men worthy of the name. Whoso talks of peace will deserve and will get only the scorn of the brave and the just.

Here, again, it is fact, not argument, that is presented. Mankind has not tasted self-government and individual liberty for nothing. A major number of human beings in Western Europe and in America will not submit tamely to the absolutist rule from which they have for a hundred years believed themselves to have escaped. Less than ten years before the war

¹ This paragraph was written three weeks before the revolution was proclaimed, and was in type when the Czar abdicated his throne.

began everybody was predicting that the existing generation would see liberal constitutional government established over the entire earth. Turkey, Persia, China would be republics, at least in name, and under the stimulus of self-respecting liberty would rapidly become republics in fact. Perhaps this forecast was a dream, but if it was, it will be dreamed again.

These will be the inevitable reactions of the liberty-loving peoples of the world if democracy shall be defeated now in Europe and later on in America. The first consequence of defeat in Europe, if destiny has decreed it, will be a concentration of world attention upon the United States. Then we shall find out whether this people is still a liberty-loving, independent nation with convictions of right and wrong, and courage enough left to assert its Monroe Doctrine against any power attempting to plant absolutist institutions on this hemisphere. If we have become completely denatured we shall, of course, surrender and be done with it. That is too monstrous a proposition to be entertained even hypothetically, in thought. If there is a chemical trace of Americanism left in us we shall fight.

Once more, let the comment be repeated, this is not argument. It is an inventory of facts. A defeat of Great Britain and France in the present European struggle means future war for the United States, and it will be a war of unimaginable horror.

There is one more possibility to consider. If the war ends in a peace without victory, what may we expect? There are only two things that can happen then, and, therefore, only two things that a reasoning mind in that event can expect. The forces of democracy will more quickly recover and set about the

business of preparing an adequate defense against the next onslaught of absolutism, or the forces of absolutism will more quickly recover and set about the business of preparation for the next war of aggression. The two sets of forces will not long remain in equilibrium. Peace without victory will be an armistice, nothing more.

The problem is now fully before us. We may look at it from any angle. We may turn it inside out and outside in. The issue remains specific, unalterable. There can be no enduring peace on this earth until absolutism is destroyed. A peace program that does not squarely face this fact is a pipe dream.

If we do face it squarely we shall think straight about the possibilities and practicalities of all proposed leagues to enforce peace.

A universal league, including all the sovereign nations, would be nothing more nor less than the existing state of affairs under another name. It would be the most absurd perpetual-motion machine ever yet experimented with. The relations of the nations to one another, as defined and regulated by the international law of the world as it stood on July 31, 1914, constituted a world league of peace, neither more nor less, and it went to smash. A league to keep the peace presumes that its component nations will honorably keep faith with one another. A league to enforce peace must be composed of nations that will both keep faith with one another and practically act in co-operation with one another against the law-breaker. Practically, these requirements can be met, and will be met, only if the component nations of the league share a common civilization, hold a common attitude

toward questions of right, liberty, law and polity, and share a sense of common danger threatening them from nations whose interests, ambitions, moralities and politics are antagonistic to theirs.

Practically, therefore, there are now just two possibilities open to the would-be makers of leagues to enforce peace. There can be no universal league. That would be nothing but the adoption of a sounding name and a platform of pious resolutions. There can be no coherent, workable league made up of both democratic and dynastic nations. Fellowship of the wolf with the lamb has not yet been established. Peace between the hyena and the dog does not endure, and wild (or domesticated) asses have not ceased to be the prey of lions in the wilderness. But there can be a league of democratic nations to safeguard republican civilization in the world, and there can be a league of dynastic nations to safeguard dynastic authority and power.

These two leagues exist now, and into one or the other of them every nation in the world will inevitably be drawn. One of them is a league to enforce peace, because peace will come and will endure if and when the other of these leagues is crushed.

Let not the United States fatuously believe that it can stand aside and, from safe isolation, watch the titanic struggle between liberty and despotism. In the moral order of the universe it is not permitted to a nation, any more than it is permitted to an individual, to be neutral upon the great fundamental issues of conduct. He who does not dare to stand for what in his inmost soul he believes to be right must surely die the second death of those who become the craven slaves to what they once held to be wrong.

The United States will play its part in the league of the democratic peoples to safeguard those political principles which the league of the thirteen original American states was the first power to proclaim, or it will become the accomplice, and sooner or later the subject, of dynasty.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN WAR

SERIES No. XV

THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES



MAY, 1917

No. 114

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

I

Address of the President of the United States
Delivered at a Joint Session of the
Two Houses of Congress
April 2, 1917

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS:

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meagre and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government

itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any Government that had hitherto subscribed to humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside, under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the wind all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen

would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable coöperation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war of at least

five hundred thousand men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well-conceived taxation.

I say sustained so far as may be equitable by taxation because it seems to me that it would be most unwise to base the credits which will now be necessary entirely on money borrowed. It is our duty, I most respectfully urge, to protect our people so far as we may against the very serious hardships and evils which would be likely to arise out of the inflation which would be produced by vast loans.

In carrying out the measures by which these things are to be accomplished we should keep constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces with the duty—for it will be a very practical duty—of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our assistance. They are in the field and we should help them in every way to be effective there.

I shall take the liberty of suggesting, through the several executive departments of the Government, for the consideration of your committees, measures for the accomplishment of the several objects I have mentioned. I hope that it will be your pleasure to deal with them as having been framed after very careful thought by the branch of the Government upon whom the responsibility of conducting the war and safeguarding the nation will most directly fall.

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world, what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-second of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the third of February and on the twenty-sixth of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments,

backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized States.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew her best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has

been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added, in all their naïve majesty and might, to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor.

One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities, and even our offices of government, with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people toward us, (who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us, and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept the gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations, great and small, and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemn-

nities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.

I have said nothing of the governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified endorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowski, the Ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not with enmity toward a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early re-establishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us,—however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present government through all these bitter months because of that friendship, exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions toward the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live among us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will

be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

II

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION—No. 1—65TH CONGRESS.]

[S. J. Res. 1.]

SIXTY-FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

At the First Session

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the second day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventeen.

Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Government and the Government and the people of the United States and making provision to prosecute the same.

Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; Therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

CHAMP CLARK

Speaker of the House of Representatives

THOS. R. MARSHALL

*Vice President of the United States and**President of the Senate.*

Approved, April 6, 1917,

WOODROW WILSON.

III

[EXISTENCE OF WAR—GERMAN EMPIRE.]

By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation.

WHEREAS the Congress of the United States in the exercise of the constitutional authority vested in them have resolved, by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives bearing date this day "That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared";

WHEREAS it is provided by Section four thousand and sixty-seven of the Revised Statutes, as follows:

Whenever there is declared a war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted or threatened against the territory of the United States, by any foreign nation or government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, as alien enemies. The President is authorized, in any such event, by his proclamation thereof, or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States, toward the aliens who become so liable; the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject, and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of those who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any such regulations which are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety;

WHEREAS, by Sections four thousand and sixty-eight, four thousand and sixty-nine, and four thousand and seventy, of the Revised Statutes, further provision is made relative to alien enemies;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WOODROW WILSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim to all whom it may concern that a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial German Government; and I do specially direct all officers, civil or military, of the United States that they exercise vigilance and zeal in the discharge of the duties incident to such a state of war; and I do, moreover, earnestly appeal to all American citizens that they, in loyal devotion to their country, dedicated from its foundation to the principles of liberty and justice, uphold the laws of the land, and give undivided and willing support to those measures which may be adopted by the constitutional authorities in prosecuting the war to a successful issue and in obtaining a secure and just peace;

And, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and the said sections of the Revised Statutes, I do hereby further proclaim and direct that the conduct to be observed on the part of the United States toward all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Germany, being male of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, who for the purpose of this proclamation and under such sections of the Revised Statutes are termed alien enemies, shall be as follows:

All alien enemies are enjoined to preserve the peace toward the United States and to refrain from crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and of the States and Territories thereof, and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply strictly with the regulations which are hereby or which may be from time to time promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States; and towards such alien enemies as conduct themselves in accordance with law, all citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States.

And all alien enemies who fail to conduct themselves as so enjoined, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, shall be liable to restraint or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by Sections four thousand and sixty-nine and four thousand and seventy of the Revised Statutes, and as prescribed in the regulations duly promulgated by the President;

And pursuant to the authority vested in me, I hereby declare and establish the following regulations, which I find necessary in the premises and for the public safety:

- (1) An alien enemy shall not have in his possession, at any time or place, any firearm, weapon, or implement of war, or component part thereof, ammunition, maxim or other silencer, bomb or explosive or material used in the manufacture of explosives;
- (2) An alien enemy shall not have in his possession at any time or place, or use or operate any aircraft or wireless apparatus, or any form of signalling device, or any form of cipher code, or any paper, document or book written or printed in cipher in which there may be invisible writing;
- (3) All property found in the possession of an alien enemy in violation of the foregoing regulations shall be subject to seizure by the United States;
- (4) An alien enemy shall not approach or be found within one-half of a mile of any Federal or State fort, camp, arsenal, aircraft station, Government or naval vessel, navy yard, factory, or workshop for the manufacture of munitions of war or of any products for the use of the army or navy;
- (5) An alien enemy shall not write, print, or publish any attack or threat against the Government or Congress of the United States, or either branch thereof, or against the measures or policy of the United States, or against the person or property of any person in the military, naval, or civil service of the United States, or of the States or Territories, or of the District of Columbia, or of the municipal governments therein;
- (6) An alien enemy shall not commit or abet any hostile act against the United States, or give information, aid or comfort to its enemies;
- (7) An alien enemy shall not reside in or continue to reside in, to remain in, or enter any locality which the President may from time to time designate by Executive Order as a prohibited area in which residence by an alien enemy shall be found by him to constitute a danger to the public peace and safety of the United States, except by permit from the President and except under such limitations or restrictions as the President may prescribe;
- (8) An alien enemy whom the President shall have reasonable cause to believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy, or to be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety of the United States or to have violated or to be about to violate any of these regulations, shall remove to any location designated by the President by Executive Order, and shall not

remove therefrom without permit, or shall depart from the United States if so required by the President;

- (9) No alien enemy shall depart from the United States until he shall have received such permit as the President shall prescribe, or except under order of a court, judge, or justice, under Sections four thousand and sixty-nine and four thousand and seventy of the Revised Statutes;
- (10) No alien enemy shall land in or enter the United States, except under such restrictions and at such places as the President may prescribe;
- (11) If necessary to prevent violation of these regulations, all alien enemies will be obliged to register;
- (12) An alien enemy whom there may be reasonable cause to believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy, or who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety, or who violates or who attempts to violate, or of whom there is reasonable ground to believe that he is about to violate, any regulation duly promulgated by the President, or any criminal law of the United States, or of the States or Territories thereof, will be subject to summary arrest by the United States Marshal, or his deputy, or such other officer as the President shall designate, and to confinement in such penitentiary, prison, jail, military camp, or other place of detention as may be directed by the President.

This proclamation and the regulations herein contained shall extend and apply to all land and water, continental or insular, in any way within the jurisdiction of the United States.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington, this sixth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventeen, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and forty-first.

[SEAL.]

WOODROW WILSON

By the President:

ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State

[No. 1364.]

IV

Proclamation

To the Citizens of New York:

Upon just grounds and after long and patient forbearance, the President and the Congress of the United States have declared that by the act of the autocratic government which rules in the Empire of Germany war exists between the two countries, and the free people of America are about entering into the great World Conflict. Millions of the people of this city were born in the countries engaged in this great war. No part of the earth is without its representatives here.

I enjoin upon you all that you honor the Liberty which so many of you have sought in this land, and the free self-government of the American Democracy in which we all find our opportunity and individual freedom, by exercising kindly consideration, self-control, and respect to each other and to all others who dwell within our limits, that you one and all aid in the preservation of order and in the exercise of calm and deliberate judgment in this time of stress and tension.

There will be some exceptional cases of malign influence and malicious purpose among you, and, as to them, I advise you all that full and timely preparation has been made adequate to the exigency which exists for the maintenance of order throughout the City of New York; and, for the warning of the ill-disposed, I quote the statute of the United States which is applicable to all residents enjoying the protection of our laws whether they be citizens or not: "Whoever owing allegiance to the United States levies war against them or adheres to their enemies giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere is guilty of treason." The punishment prescribed by law for the crime of treason is death or at the discretion of the court imprisonment for not less than five years and a fine of not less than \$10,000. All officers of the police have been especially instructed to give their prompt and efficacious attention to the enforcement of this law.

JOHN PURROY MITCHEL
Mayor

V

President Wilson's Address to His Fellow
Countrymen

April 16, 1917

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN:

The entrance of our own beloved country into the grim and terrible war for democracy and human rights which has shaken the world creates so many problems of national life and action which call for immediate consideration and settlement that I hope you will permit me to address to you a few words of earnest counsel and appeal with regard to them.

We are rapidly putting our navy upon an effective war footing and are about to create and equip a great army, but these are the simplest parts of the great task to which we have addressed ourselves. There is not a single selfish element, so far as I can see, in the cause we are fighting for. We are fighting for what we believe and wish to be the rights of mankind and for the future peace and security of the world. To do this great thing worthily and successfully we must devote ourselves to the service without regard to profit or material advantage and with an energy and intelligence that will rise to the level of the enterprise itself. We must realize to the full how great the task is and how many things, how many kinds and elements of capacity and service and self-sacrifice, it involves.

These, then, are the things we must do, and do well, besides fighting—the things without which mere fighting would be fruitless:

We must supply abundant food for ourselves and for our armies and our seamen not only, but also for a large part of the nations with whom we have now made common cause, in whose support and by whose sides we shall be fighting.

We must supply ships by the hundreds out of our shipyards to carry to the other side of the sea, submarines or no submarines, what will every day be needed there, and abundant materials out of our fields and our mines and our factories with which not only to clothe and equip our own forces on land and sea, but also to clothe and support our people, for whom the gallant fellows under arms can no longer work, to help clothe and equip the armies with which we are

coöperating in Europe, and to keep the looms and manufactories there in raw material; coal to keep the fires going in ships at sea and in the furnaces of hundreds of factories across the sea; steel out of which to make arms and ammunition both here and there; rails for worn-out railways back of the fighting fronts; locomotives and rolling stock to take the place of those every day going to pieces; mules, horses, cattle for labor and for military service; everything with which the people of England and France and Italy and Russia have usually supplied themselves, but cannot now afford the men, the materials, or the machinery to make.

It is evident to every thinking man that our industries, on the farms, in the shipyards, in the mines, in the factories, must be made more prolific and more efficient than ever, and that they must be more economically managed and better adapted to the particular requirements of our task than they have been; and what I want to say is that the men and the women who devote their thought and their energy to these things will be serving the country and conducting the fight for peace and freedom just as truly and just as effectively as the men on the battlefield or in the trenches. The industrial forces of the country, men and women alike, will be a great national, a great international, Service Army—a notable and honored host engaged in the service of the nation and the world, the efficient friends and saviors of free men everywhere. Thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands, of men otherwise liable to military service will of right and of necessity be excused from that service and assigned to the fundamental, sustaining work of the fields and factories and mines, and they will be as much part of the great patriotic forces of the nation as the men under fire.

I take the liberty, therefore, of addressing this word to the farmers of the country and to all who work on the farms: The supreme need of our own nation and of the nations with which we are co-operating is an abundance of supplies, and especially of foodstuffs. The importance of an adequate food supply, especially for the present year, is superlative. Without abundant food, alike for the armies and the peoples now at war, the whole great enterprise upon which we have embarked will break down and fail. The world's food reserves are low. Not only during the present emergency, but for some time after peace shall have come, both our own people and a large proportion of the people of Europe must rely upon the harvests in America. Upon the farmers of this country, therefore, in large measure, rests the fate of the war and the fate of the nations. May the nation not count upon them to omit no step that will increase the production of their land or that will bring about the most effectual coöperation in the sale and distribution of their products? The time is short. It is of the most imperative importance that everything possible

be done, and done immediately, to make sure of large harvests. I call upon young men and old alike and upon the able-bodied boys of the land to accept and act upon this duty—to turn in hosts to the farms and make certain that no pains and no labor is lacking in this great matter.

I particularly appeal to the farmers of the South to plant abundant foodstuffs as well as cotton. They can show their patriotism in no better or more convincing way than by resisting the great temptation of the present price of cotton and helping, helping upon a great scale, to feed the nation and the peoples everywhere who are fighting for their liberties and for our own. The variety of their crops will be the visible measure of their comprehension of their national duty.

The Government of the United States and the governments of the several States stand ready to coöperate. They will do everything possible to assist farmers in securing an adequate supply of seed, an adequate force of laborers when they are most needed, at harvest time, and the means of expediting shipments of fertilizers and farm machinery, as well as of the crops themselves when harvested. The course of trade shall be as unhampered as it is possible to make it, and there shall be no unwarranted manipulation of the nation's food supply by those who handle it on its way to the consumer. This is our opportunity to demonstrate the efficiency of a great democracy, and we shall not fall short of it!

This let me say to the middlemen of every sort, whether they are handling our foodstuffs or our raw materials of manufacture or the products of our mills and factories: The eyes of the country will be especially upon you. This is your opportunity for signal service, efficient and disinterested. The country expects you, as it expects all others, to forego unusual profits, to organize and expedite shipments of supplies of every kind, but especially of food, with an eye to the service you are rendering and in the spirit of those who enlist in the ranks, for their people, not for themselves. I shall confidently expect you to deserve and win the confidence of people of every sort and station.

To the men who run the railways of the country, whether they be managers or operative employees, let me say that the railways are the arteries of the nation's life and that upon them rests the immense responsibility of seeing to it that those arteries suffer no obstruction of any kind, no inefficiency or slackened power. To the merchant let me suggest the motto, "Small profits and quick service"; and to the shipbuilder the thought that the life of the war depends upon him. The food and the war supplies must be carried across the seas no matter how many ships are sent to the bottom. The places of those that go down must be supplied, and supplied at once. To the miner let me say that he stands where the farmer does: the work

of the world waits on him. If he slackens or fails, armies and statesmen are helpless. He also is enlisted in the great Service Army. The manufacturer does not need to be told, I hope, that the nation looks to him to speed and perfect every process; and I want only to remind his employees that their service is absolutely indispensable and is counted on by every man who loves the country and its liberties.

Let me suggest, also, that every one who creates or cultivates a garden helps, and helps greatly, to solve the problem of the feeding of the nations; and that every housewife who practices strict economy puts herself in the ranks of those who serve the nation. This is the time for America to correct her unpardonable fault of wastefulness and extravagance. Let every man and every woman assume the duty of careful, provident use and expenditure as a public duty, as a dictate of patriotism which no one can now expect ever to be excused or forgiven for ignoring.

In the hope that this statement of the needs of the nation and of the world in this hour of supreme crisis may stimulate those to whom it comes and remind all who need reminder of the solemn duties of a time such as the world has never seen before, I beg that all editors and publishers everywhere will give as prominent publication and as wide circulation as possible to this appeal. I venture to suggest, also, to all advertising agencies that they would perhaps render a very substantial and timely service to the country if they would give it widespread repetition. And I hope that clergymen will not think the theme of it an unworthy or inappropriate subject of comment and homily from their pulpits.

The supreme test of the nation has come. We must all speak, act, and serve together!

WOODROW WILSON

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE WAR AND THE COLLEGES

From an Address to Representatives of Colleges
and Universities, Delivered at Continental Hall,
Washington, D. C., May 5, 1917



BY

HON. NEWTON D. BAKER

Secretary of War

JUNE, 1917

No. 115

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

THE WAR AND THE COLLEGES

From an Address Delivered at Continental Hall
Washington, May 5, 1917

By HON. NEWTON D. BAKER
Secretary of War

The War Department is especially anxious not to disturb unduly the educational systems of the country. I have had within the last two or three weeks a very large number of more or less intricate and difficult questions arising in the colleges, and no doubt each of you has had to face those questions probably in more acute form than I. When the call to national service arose, spirited young men everywhere of course wanted to be employed in a patriotic way, and I suppose there is scarcely a boy in any college in the country who has not very anxiously addressed to himself the question: "What can I do?" A number of college presidents have done me the honor of asking me what is the answer to that question, and I have had to confess each time that I thought there was no general answer; that even in those cases where it would be obviously better for a boy to stay at college and prepare for later and fuller usefulness, yet if the boy in so doing acquired a low view of his own courage, and felt that he was electing the less worthy course, the effect on the boy himself of that state of mind toward his own actions probably was so prejudicial that it ought not to be encouraged.

I think this, though, is more or less clear to those of us who look at it from the outside: First, that the country needs officers. - There is no preference of college men for officers, but because a man has had academic opportunities he has to start with, presumptively at least, a better foundation upon which to build the learning which an officer must have; and therefore to a very substantial extent the country desires its college graduates and its college-bred men of suitable age in the training camps in order that they may be rapidly matured into officers and used in the training of the new forces.

To the extent that the men in college are physically disqualified, or to the extent that they are too young to meet the requirements of the Department, it seems quite clear that in the present state of the emergency their major usefulness lies in remaining in the college, going forward with their academic work; and the colleges can, I think, lend some color of patriotic endeavor to their so doing by such simple modifications of their courses and curricula as will show the boys who stay that they are being directly equipped for subsequent usefulness if the emergency lasts until their call comes.

Now, as I understand it, a part of the purpose of this gathering is to discuss among you gentlemen the question of what those modifications in your curricula ought to be. The Ordnance Department of the Army and the Coast Artillery are the branches of the Army in which technical scientific training and attainments are of the most importance. Those are the two technical branches of the Army hardest to keep filled; and I think even in times of peace that it is highly desirable that the great technical schools of the country

should have a curriculum which would be adapted to train men for entrance into these scientific departments of the Army.

A number of questions have arisen with regard to the possibility of the establishment of junior training camp or training corps divisions in colleges. Pretty nearly every college in this country, when the national emergency arose, applied for training camp or training corps facilities. In some, such corps had already been established; and there was an immediate and so far as I know an almost unanimous demand on the part of the colleges of the country in which such corps had not been established for their establishment. That presented to the War Department several difficult problems which we have undertaken to solve, and I trust we have solved them wisely, though nobody could be more sensible than I am that our solution has not been satisfactory in all instances.

The problem presented by those applications was this: That we are not now dealing with an Army of two or three hundred thousand men. We are about to deal with an Army of a million and a half men; and the mills and manufactories in this country which are equipped and experienced in making Army supplies and equipment are too few to turn out the amount necessary for this larger force.

We therefore have this added burden—that instead of going out into a customary market to buy usual supplies, we must go into an unfamiliar market, go clear back to the raw material in all likelihood, and persuade persons, who have not hitherto manufactured the sort of things we desire to have, to divert their energies from their normal domestic production into

the production necessary for the War Department. That of course presented to us the problem of where we are going to get the necessary equipment of uniforms, clothing, and other sorts of supplies which this large army will need; and it necessitates a very parsimonious and husbanding treatment of such supplies as we have or which are in immediate prospect.

Therefore, on that ground, it seems wise not to encourage the present formation of junior corps which would be outside of the emergency forces which it is our first duty to provide and equip, because equipping such junior corps would to that extent delay and diminish the quantity of supplies and equipment available to the actual forces which are first to go into training.

The second aspect of this matter is with regard to officers for training purposes. We need something like 20,000 additional officers for the training of the first increment of 500,000 men to be secured under the selective process. These training camps, it is hoped, will give us a very substantial number of those. Additional officers' training camps later on may be necessary so that we can secure those officers. It must be an exceedingly intensive process; in other words, there must be a very great deal of individual attention paid to these young men who in three months are to acquire what ordinarily three years is none too much to acquire well; and therefore the Army is going, to some extent at least, to model its treatment of the problem upon the tutorial system with which colleges are so familiar, and, as far as we can, give individual treatment to the young men in these training corps. That will necessitate a very rigid devotion of the available officers for training purposes to these

training camps, and makes it impossible for us to disperse our officer talent and energy by the establishment of these junior corps widespread over the country, since these camps would, of course, require competent officers to make them succeed.

It was then suggested that there perhaps might be a few such junior camps established at certain places, and that the college men from other colleges might be centered into a few colleges—one, perhaps, in each training district—and taught in those places without too great a draft upon our officer training material. I discovered that the effect of such a process as that would be to draft off from all of the colleges at which such corps were not established their students into the colleges where such corps were established; and the effect of that seems to me to threaten a very profound disorganization of the entire academic system of the country. It seems to me that if there were forty colleges in a district, and at only one of those colleges was military training available, the other thirty-nine would find themselves, temporarily at any rate, losing a great part of their student body. They would all want to go to the one at which this instruction was possible, and then perhaps forming friendships and alliances there, being imbued with the military spirit, they would return reluctantly to the colleges which were their normal affiliation; and so it seemed to me that such a plan might prove to be destructive of the repose which it is everybody's desire to keep as far as possible in the community and common life of this country during this time of emergency.

The policy of the Department, therefore, has been to maintain in those colleges where reserve corps have been established prior to this emergency such corps as

established, but only so long as the officers there detailed can be spared from the more important duty of training the actual forces which are being fitted for actual service. No sort of promise can be made as to how long that will be maintained, but it will be maintained in previously established places just as long as it is consistent to have those officers detailed for that service. That is the best answer we have been able to give to the problem.

Gentlemen, I find myself regretting that I have taken so much time to discuss a purely technical question. The presence of a body of men like this is an inducement to talk about an entirely different thing, and I must deal with that in a sentence or two.

In a democracy, the calling together of the forces of the Nation for so unfamiliar a task as war necessarily produces a profound dislocation of practically every art and every association which in normal times is characteristic of the Nation's life. The college presidents, people who are connected with the institutions of higher learning, have a peculiar opportunity to exercise a steadying and restraining influence. I think we ought all to adopt as the daily maxim of our talk and our activity that the country shall make every sacrifice necessary break up every alliance and every activity necessary, to bring our force to bear in the most effective way, but that we ought to preserve the country for the common good against every unnecessary dislocation and against every unnecessary abridgment of the processes of our common life.

I do not know any source from which that sort of cool, helpful thinking can emanate with as much effect as from the college presidents of this country. We

do not want to chill enthusiasm. We want to preserve enthusiasm and cultivate it and use it; but we do want to be discriminating in our enthusiasm, and prevent people getting the notion that they are not helping the country unless they do something different, which very often is not the case at all. The largest usefulness may come from doing the same thing—just continuing to do it. Now, it is not unnatural that there should be these ebullitions of feeling, this desire to change occupation as a badge of changed service and devotion to ideals; but you gentlemen can exercise a very steadying influence in that regard.

One other thought: I think everybody in this country has been delighted at the freedom of our country from ill considered and impulsive action in connection with this great undertaking. I think everybody in this country has been pleased at the good feeling which our people have maintained toward one another, the freedom of the country from internal disturbance and embittered difference of opinion. I hope that will continue; I think it will continue; and yet in a country made up as ours is, it is very easy to imagine difficulty arising from an indiscretion or from an over-zealous state of mind. I can easily imagine a man whose affiliations, for instance, would be with a German ancestry and German traditions, making an indiscreet remark and arousing a very great deal of resentment, and perhaps a heady community impulse against not only him and his remark but generalized against all persons who bore the same kind of name or the same sort of traditional affiliation; and I can easily imagine a community getting itself worked up into a pretty feverish state of opinion, and feeling that it ought to resent as disloyal what was

perhaps only a thoughtless and unmeant indiscretion.

Now, we are at the beginning of this. We are going to have losses on the sea; we are going to have losses in battle; our communities are going to be subjected to the rigid discipline of multiplied personal griefs scattered all through the community, and we are going to search the cause of those back to their foundation, and our feelings are going to be torn and our nerves made raw. That is a place for physicians of public opinion to exercise a curative impulse; and you gentlemen and the young men who are in your colleges, who go to their homes from your colleges and write to their homes from your colleges, and make up a very large part of the direction of public opinion, can exercise a curative influence by preaching the doctrine of tolerance, by exemplifying the fact that it is not necessary for a nation like the United States, which is fighting for the vindication of a great ideal, to discolor its purpose by hatreds or by the entertainment of any unworthy emotion.

We are in a great enterprise, gentlemen. The world must have peace. The destruction of life and property which is now going on in the world is intolerable. We have at the end of a long and patient experience discovered that the world cannot be rescued from slaughter and destruction by any other process than a major exercise of the great martial force of this Republic; but we ought never to lose sight of the fact that the purpose of this war is not aggression, is not punishment; it is not inspired by resentments nor fed by ambitions, but it is loyalty to an ideal, and that ideal is freeing the world from an impossible international philosophy, a philosophy in which, if it should prevail, no freedom is left or is safe.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE TREATY RIGHTS OF ALIENS



BY
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

JULY, 1917

No. 116

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

THE TREATY RIGHTS OF ALIENS

By WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

We are fighting this war to make the world safe for Democracies. The issue is now between the Democracies of the world and its Autocracies. The end must be, as we all hope, the promotion of the rule of the people in all the important nations. In that case, war as between countries will not be begun without the wish of the majority of their respective peoples. It will become, therefore, even more important than heretofore in the maintenance of peace that each government representing its people in its foreign relations, and being answerable for them to another people, should be able to perform its promises promptly, and should certainly not keep them only to the ear and break them to the hope. When one nation has made an agreement with another to receive the citizens of that other hospitably and secure them in peaceful residence and the pursuit of a livelihood, and such citizens are not protected, but are killed or injured, the breach of promise may easily grow into a cause of war. A people naturally resents injustice and cruelty to their kith and kin in another country.

In one of my visits to Japan as Secretary of War, I had the pleasure of meeting and talking with Count Hayashi, one of the great statesmen and diplomats of that wonderful empire, and recently deceased. We were discussing very freely the relations between Japan and the United States, and he said that he felt

confident that I was right in saying that the United States had no desire for a war with Japan but, on the contrary, wished to avoid it by every honorable means. He expressed the hope that I credited his statement that the empire of Japan and those responsible for its government were equally anxious to make the peace between the two countries permanent and abiding. "But," said he, "my people have grown much in international stature. They have won successes, civil and military. They have a deep love of their country and of their fellow countrymen, and perhaps they have what you call 'patriotic self-conceit.' However this may be, their sensitiveness as a nation has increased, and it makes them deeply resent an injustice or an invidious discrimination against them in a foreign country by foreign people. The only possible danger of a breach between our two nations that I can imagine would be one growing out of the mistreatment of our people, living under the promised protection of the United States, through the lawless violence of a mob directed against them as Japanese."

Now what is true of the relations between the United States and Japan is true of our relations with most nations. We are party to treaties with them in which it is stipulated that the nationals of one contracting nation may reside within the jurisdiction of the other and, complying with the other's laws, may legally pursue their vocations or business and enjoy the same protection to life, liberty, and property that its own citizens enjoy.

Since 1811 we have had many cases of mob violence against aliens in which they have been killed or grievously injured. While in all of these cases we have denied liability, Congress has generally made pay-

ments to those who were injured and to the families of those who were killed. In some cases the amount paid was recited in the act of appropriation to be a gratuity without admission of liability. In other cases the amount was paid without such reservation. In no case have the perpetrators of these outrages been punished. In most cases the local authorities have evidently sympathized with the mob spirit or have been so terrorized by it that they have made no real investigation of the facts. The sequence has been: first, the mob; second, the felonious assault, or murder, and destruction of property; third, the farce of a State investigation; fourth, the indemnity to the injured and the family of the dead; and fifth, the complete immunity of the guilty. Such a list of outrages reaching clear from 1811 to 1910 without punishment is not a record in which we can take pride.

How can we remedy this state of affairs? We can do it by valid Federal legislation conferring on the Federal Government and Federal courts executive and judicial power to prevent and punish such crimes against aliens in violation of their treaty rights. This will have two results. One will be that prosecutions in the Federal Court directed from Washington will be uninfluenced by local feeling and will be often effective in bringing the guilty to punishment. The second will be that whether they are so effective or not, the fact that they can be directed from Washington by the Chief Executive of the nation will have a satisfying effect upon the feelings of the outraged country, which is now altogether wanting and which it is impossible to secure.

Our Secretaries of State, in answer to complaints of foreign governments in such cases, have called atten-

tion to the fact that our general government has no jurisdiction to direct the prosecution under Federal law of the perpetrators of these outrages. They have been content to point out that the persons killed or injured have had the same protection that citizens of this country have had under state laws. This, I may add, in all instances under examination when race hatred has been involved, has been no protection at all. In such cases the jury are generally drawn from the immediate neighborhood of the country and town in which the outrage is committed, and the result is that the grand jury and the petit jury are composed of the relatives and neighbors of the criminals and the prosecution is a farce. The situation is this, then: We make a promise and then we let somebody else attempt to perform it, and when it is not performed, as it never is, or at least, never has been, we say, "We are not responsible for this. It is somebody else's failure. Of course we promised that your citizens would be treated properly, but you ought to have known that this promise was not to be performed by our government, but by a state government independent of us. However, say no more about it. We'll salve your feeling by a little money, the amount of which we'll fix." It does not soothe one's pride of country to note the number of lynchings of our own citizens that go unwhipped of justice, and that are properly held up to us with scorn whenever we assume, as we too frequently do, a morality higher than, and a government better than, those of other people. To avoid responsibilities for lynchings of our own citizens, however, we can live in a state in which they do not occur. But when aliens are lynched anywhere in our country and our national honor is at stake, we can not escape hu-

miliation. Congressional legislation putting the protection of aliens and the prosecution of the invaders of their rights in the Federal jurisdiction should find a strong reason in our pride of country and our desire to be considered in the first rank of civilized nations observant of treaty obligations. Another reason is the danger of war that may be thrust on us by the lawless, cruel, prejudiced action of the people of a town, city, or a county in dealing with subjects or citizens of other countries. The selfishness of communities controlled by the labor unions or by farming groups on our West Coast makes them willing to involve us in an utterly needless quarrel with Japan by action likely to arouse in the Japanese at home an intense feeling of hostility to this country. Of course, every one recognizes that the Government of the United States can not guarantee the detection and arrest of the guilty in outrages upon aliens, or contract that when they are caught and tried, conviction will necessarily follow. In no civilized country can this be assured. But that necessary uncertainty does not prevent promptness and energy on the part of the executive agents of the government in its effort to identify and arrest the offenders and to find the evidence against them, or courage and efficiency on the part of the prosecuting officers in properly preparing the case for the grand and petit juries. It is the utter absence of any sincere effort of the local authorities in such cases to bring the criminals to justice that naturally angers foreign peoples when they are asking reparation for the awful results of mob violence.

We can all remember the deep feeling aroused in our whole people over the massacre of Jews in parts of Russia, and the intense indignation that manifested

itself among their co-religionists in this country, and how skeptical our people properly were concerning official denials of governmental responsibility for such outrages. Let us try to look at lynchings of aliens in this country from the standpoint of their fellow countrymen at home. In the utter absence of protection or attempted punishment of the murderers, can we wonder that there should be a deep-seated suspicion on the part of the home people that the bloody riots have been with either the connivance or acquiescence of our authorities?

The American Bar Association has proposed Congressional legislation which would work a change in the present unsatisfactory state of affairs. It would provide that any act committed in any state or territory of the United States, in violation of the rights of a citizen or subject of a foreign country secured to such citizen or subject by treaty between the United States and such foreign country, which act constitutes a crime under the laws of such state or territory, shall constitute a like crime against the peace and dignity of the United States, punishable in like manner as in the courts of said state or territory, and within the period limited by the laws of such state or territory, and may be prosecuted in the courts of the United States and, upon conviction, the sentence executed in like manner as sentences upon convictions for crimes under the laws of the United States.

There is no doubt about the validity of such legislation under the Constitution. It has been expressly recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Baldwin vs. Franks*, 120 U. S. 678. That case involved the punishment of a man for using lawless violence against Chinese aliens resident in Cali-

fornia by driving them from their residences and depriving them of their legitimate business, contrary to a treaty made between the United States and China in 1881. The Supreme Court said that the treaty-making power had been surrendered by the States and given to the United States, and that treaties made by the United States and in force were part of the supreme law of the land; and that the United States had power under the Constitution to provide for the punishment of those guilty of depriving Chinese subjects of any of the rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions guaranteed to them by the treaty. Upon examination of the statute under which the indictment had been found, however, they held that it was not so worded as to denounce as a Federal crime such a violation of alien rights. New legislation on the subject has been vigorously recommended by President Harrison, by President McKinley, by President Roosevelt, and by myself. President Roosevelt, in his annual message of December, 1906, spoke as follows:

One of the great embarrassments attending the performance of our international obligations is the fact that the statutes of the United States are entirely inadequate. They fail to give to the national government sufficiently ample power, through United States courts and by the use of the Army and Navy, to protect aliens in the rights secured to them under solemn treaties which are the law of the land. I, therefore, earnestly recommend that the criminal and civil statutes of the United States be so amended and added to as to enable the President, acting for the United States Government, which is responsible in our international relations, to enforce the rights of aliens under treaties. There should be no particle of doubt as to the power of the national government completely to perform and enforce its own obligations to other nations. The mob of a single city may at any time perform acts of lawless violence against some class of foreigners which would plunge us into war. That city by itself would be

powerless to make defense against the foreign power thus assaulted, and if independent of this government it would never venture to perform or permit the performance of the acts complained of. The entire power and the whole duty to protect the offending city or the offending community lies in the hands of the United States Government. It is unthinkable that we should continue a policy under which a given locality may be allowed to commit a crime against a friendly nation, and the United States Government limited not to preventing the commission of the crime, but, in the last resort, to defending the people who have committed it against the consequences of their own wrong-doing.

In my Inaugural Address of March 4, 1909, I brought the subject to the attention of Congress as strongly as I could, as follows:

By proper legislation we may, and ought to, place in the hands of the Federal executive the means of enforcing the treaty rights of such aliens in the courts of the Federal Government. It puts our Government in a pusillanimous position to make definite engagements to protect aliens and then to excuse the failure to perform those engagements by an explanation that the duty to keep them is in States or cities, not within our control. If we would promise we must put ourselves in a position to perform our promise. We can not permit the possible failure of justice due to local prejudice in any State or municipal government, to expose us to the risk of a war which might be avoided if Federal jurisdiction was asserted by suitable legislation by Congress and carried out by proper proceedings instituted by the executive in the courts of the national government.

This action by the four Chief Executives indicates that those having the greatest official responsibility for our foreign relations feel the crying need for such legislation.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW



BY
ELIHU ROOT

AUGUST, 1917

No. 117

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

THE EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

Opening Address by Elihu Root, as President of the American Society of International Law, at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Society in Washington, April 26, 1917.

In trying to estimate the future possibilities of International Law, and to form any useful opinion as to the methods by which the law can be made more binding upon international conduct, serious difficulties are presented in the unknown quantities introduced by the great war, which is steadily drawing into its circle the entire civilized world. Hitherto, we have been unable to form any real judgment as to which of the two warring groups of nations will succeed in the end. Our expectations and beliefs upon that question have been the products of our sympathies and our hopes and of an optimism for which it is now happily more easy to find just grounds than ever before. Nor have we been able to measure the effects of the war upon national character, and the probable results in national modes of thought and conduct.

A just estimate of such forces is not easy. The modern era of nationalities has been marked by three great convulsions which turned the minds of all civilized men towards peace, and led them to seek means to make peace secure.

The Thirty Years' War produced the Peace of Westphalia and the system of independent nationalities in

Europe, and it produced Grotius and the science of International Law; and practically every power in Europe except the Ottoman was a party to the agreement to maintain the system thus established. Yet, the century which followed exhibited the most cynical and universal disregard for the law, and for the Treaty, and for all treaties.

The Napoleonic wars produced the Treaty of Vienna and the Holy Alliance. That sincere but misguided effort sought to fix the limits and regulate the conduct of the nations of Europe in accordance with the principles which the treaty-making powers then believed to be in keeping with right and justice, and to be effective for the permanent peaceful organization of the community of nations, and it sought to maintain the *status quo* by the establishment of a League to Enforce Peace in accordance with their conception. Yet, the arrangements were conceived by minds imbued with the spirit of the past and became of no effect when tested by the changes wrought by the spirit of the future. The old bottles were filled with new wine and could not contain it; so the scheme came to naught.

Both of these efforts to secure permanent peace under the rule of law failed because the unappreciated forces working for change and growth became stronger than the gradually decreasing restraint of agreements to maintain a fixed and immutable relation of territory and opportunities among the nations. It is reasonable to infer that a similar result must follow any attempt to base a system of international law upon definite and rigid limitations devised to meet the expediency of the moment. The law of life is growth, and no generation can prevent the growth of future generations by fixing in accordance with its ideas the specific conditions

under which they are to live. As we look back, we see a multitude of ancient wrongs protected by the law of nations, naturally enough, because the law has been made by powers in possession. We have a vague impression that international wrongs are cured by time. That is not always so. There is no international statute of limitations. Time alone cures no wrong. The people to whom wrong is done may be destroyed, as the Turks are destroying the Armenians; or the wronged people may be reconciled to the new conditions, like the Saxons in England; but, for example, the unforgiven wrong of the Turk in Europe, and the unforgiven wrong of the partition of Poland, are always forces working against the law that protects them. The maintenance or the redress of such wrongs is merely a question of relative power. The rise in power of Christian Europe, and the decadence of the Ottoman Empire, make inevitable the complete reflux of the tide which once reached the walls of Vienna, and even to the valley of the Loire. No human laws or conventions could bind the forces which work through centuries to achieve such results. The futility of efforts to control such movements of mankind by the short-sighted policies of the passing day cannot be better illustrated than by the misplaced energy and sacrifice of the Crimean War and the fatuous ingenuity of the Congress of Berlin which sought to bolster up and preserve the sovereignty of the Turk.

As we consider how it may be possible to re-establish the law of nations upon a durable basis, we must realize that past experience indicates that no system of law which depends upon the physical partition of the earth dictated by the expediency of the time, no law which must be broken in order that living wrongs shall

be redressed, or in order that the new ideas of the future may find room for growth, can be permanent.

We should, therefore, inquire whether the political and social conditions to which we may reasonably look forward after the war, the forces that are to move mankind, the trend of development, will be such as to enable us in our day to escape the errors of our predecessors, and to establish upon some basis of principle a system of international law which can be maintained and enforced.

The greatest change in the conditions of national life during the past century has been in the advance and spread of democratic government, and the correlative decrease in the extent and power of autocratic and dynastic governments. It is impossible to regard the advance of democracy as being merely local or temporary. It has been the result of long-continued and persistent progress, varying in different countries according to the character of the people and the nature of the obstacles to be overcome, but, in its nature, essentially the same in all countries.

England, in her steady-going, undemonstrative way, has moved along from government by a king claiming divine right to a Commons representing popular right through the revolution of 1688, which established the nation's right to choose its king, through that civil war over the rights of British subjects known as the American Revolution, through chartism and Catholic emancipation, the Reform Bill of 1832, the franchise extension of 1867, the abandonment of the king's veto power and the establishment of the Commons' right to pass bills over the rejection of the House of Lords.

France, in her own different way, with much action and reaction, traveled towards the same goal through the States General and the Constituent Assembly, through the Reign of Terror, and her amazing defense of the first Republic against all Europe, through the heroic surgery of Napoleon's career, the Bourbon restoration, the assertion of her right to choose her own king in 1830, and the assertion of her right to dispense with a king in 1848, the plebiscite and the second Empire, the Commune and the third Republic, which has grown in stability and capacity for popular government until the steadiness and self-control and noble devotion of the French people under suffering and sacrifice have come to be one of the amazing revelations of these terrible years.

Italy, struggling out of the control of a multitude of petty tyrants sustained by foreign influence, established her newly-won unity and independence upon the basis of representative parliamentary government.

Spain has regained and strengthened the constitution of which Ferdinand VII and the Holy Alliance deprived her.

Throughout the greater part of the world constitutions have become the order of the day. Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, all Scandinavia, all Latin-America, have established their governments upon constitutional bases. Japan, emerging from her military feudalism, makes her entry into the community of civilized nations under a constitutional government. China, throwing off the domination of the Manchu, is striving to accustom her long-suffering and submissive millions to the idea of constitutional right. The great self-governing British Dominions, bound to the Mother Country only by ties of tradition and sentiment, have

shown that free democracies can respond to moral forces with a splendid power of loyalty that no coercion could inspire. And now, Russia, extirpating the government which has been for modern times the typical illustration of autocracy, is engaged in establishing the new self-control of that vast Empire upon the basis of universal suffrage and republican institutions.

The political conception of control from above by monarchs exercising divine right is not merely disputed by philosophers and reformers; it has faded and grown dim in the minds of the millions of men in the civilized nations, and in its place has spread throughout the world the political conception of constitutional government exercising control by authority of the peoples who are governed.

The persistence and extent of this change in the political and social conditions of national life forbid the idea that it is the child of individual minds or local provocations or temporary causes, and distinguish it as one of those great and fundamental movements of the human mind which no power can control, and which run their course inevitably to the end in an unknown future. The existence and assured continuance of this process of development of democracy is the great fact forecasting the future conditions under which the effort to reinstate the law of nations is to be made.

What is to be the effect of this change in conditions upon the possibility of making international law relatively permanent? In considering this question, some facts can be clearly perceived.

The substitution of a democratic for an autocratic régime removes the chief force which in the past has led nations to break over and destroy the limitations

of law; that is, the prosecution of dynastic policies. Such policies in general have in view the increase of territory, of dominion, of power, for the ruler and the military class or aristocracy which surrounds the ruler and supports his throne. The benefit of the people who are ruled is only incidentally—if at all—involved. If we turn back to the causes which destroyed the peace of the world under the dispositions made by the Treaty of Westphalia, the mind naturally rests on the War of the Spanish Succession, which drenched Europe in blood through the first decade of the eighteenth century, and ended in the Treaty of Utrecht only when Louis XIV was reduced to exhaustion. What was that about? Nothing more or less than the question what royal house should have its power increased by a marriage that would ultimately enable it to control the territory and wield the power of Spain for its own aggrandizement. The interests of the people of Spain or the people of France or of any other country furnished no part of the motive power. What caused the War of the Austrian Succession a generation later, when Frederick (called 'The Great') marched his army into Silesia to wrest that province from the feeble hands of young Maria Theresa in flagrant violation of his solemn promise to protect her title under the covenants of the pragmatic sanction, and when the nations of Europe gathered like buzzards about one dying, eager to share in the dismemberment of the possessions of the House of Austria? It was the desire of royal princes to increase their power and glory regardless of law and justice and the welfare of peoples, and, incidentally, a desire by some states to prevent that increase, lest the same rule of spoliation might more readily be applied to them.

Underlying the whole age-long struggle to maintain the balance of power in Europe has been the assumption that increased power would be used for aggression and to secure further increase of power by the conquest of territory and the subjection of its inhabitants; and the common experience of mankind under the autocratic system of government by divine right has justified the assumption. It was a perfect understanding of this characteristic of autocratic government that inspired the words of President Monroe's famous declaration: "We should consider any attempt on their part (the European powers) to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

Against the deep and settled purpose of a ruling family or a ruling aristocratic class to enlarge its power, continuing from generation to generation, usually concealed until the favorable moment for action comes, always justified or excused by specious pretexts, the advocates of peace, or justice, or humanity, or law, are helpless. All other causes of war can be reached. International misunderstandings can be explained away. Dislikes and suspicions can be dissipated by intercourse, and better knowledge, and courtesy, and kindness. Considerate justice can prevent real causes of war. Rules of action to prevent controversy may be agreed upon by diplomacy and conferences and congresses. Honest differences as to national rights and duties may be settled by arbitration, or judicial decision; but, against a deep and persistent purpose by the rulers of a great nation to take away the territory of others, or to reduce others to subjection for their own aggrandizement, all these expedients are of no avail. The Congresses of Westphalia, of Vienna, of

Berlin, and a multitude of others less conspicuous, have sought to curb the evil through setting limits upon power by treaty. They have all failed. The Peace Conferences at The Hague have sought to diminish the evil by universal agreement upon rules of action. The rules and the treaties have become 'scraps of paper'.

The progress of democracy, however, is dealing with the problem by destroying the type of government which has shown itself incapable of maintaining respect for law and justice and resisting the temptations of ambition; and by substituting a new form of government, which in its nature is incapable of proceeding by the same methods, and necessarily responds to different motives and pursues different objects from the old autocratic offenders. Only when that task has been substantially accomplished will the advocates of law among nations be free from the inheritance of former failure. There will then be a new field open for a new trial, doubtless full of difficulties of its own, but of fair hope and possibilities of success.

Self-governing democracies are indeed liable to commit great wrongs. The peoples who govern themselves frequently misunderstand their international rights, and ignore their international duties. They are often swayed by prejudice, and blinded by passion. They are swift to decide in their own favor the most difficult questions upon which they are totally ignorant. They are apt to applaud the jingo politician who courts popularity by public insult to a friendly people, and to condemn the statesman who modifies extreme demands through the concessions required by just consideration for the rights of others. All these faults,

however, are open and known to the whole world. The opinions and motives from which they proceed, the real causes of error, can be reached by reason, by appeal to better instincts, by public discussion, by the ascertainment and dissemination of the true facts.

There are some necessary features of democratic self-government which tend towards the progressive reduction of tendencies to international wrong-doing. One is that democracies are absolutely dependent for their existence upon the preservation of law. Autocracies can give commands and enforce them. Rules of action are a convenience, not a necessity for them. On the other hand, the only atmosphere in which a democracy can live between the danger of autocracy on one side and the danger of anarchy on the other is the atmosphere of law. Respect for law is the essential condition of its existence; and, as in a democracy the law is an expression of the people's own will, self-respect and personal pride and patriotism demand its observance. An essential distinction between democracy and autocracy is that while the government of an autocracy is superior to the law, the government of a democracy is subject to the law. The conception of an international law binding upon the governments of the world is, therefore, natural to the people of a democracy, and any violation of that law which they themselves have joined in prescribing is received with disapproval, if not with resentment. This is well illustrated by the attitude of the people of the separate states of the American Union toward the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States passing upon the exercise of power by state governments. Physical force has never been used to compel conformity to those decisions. Yet, the democratic people of the

United States have answered Jefferson's contemptuous remark, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." The answer is that it is the will of self-governed democracy to obey the law which it has itself established, and the decisions of the Great Tribunal which declares the law controlling state action will be accepted and observed by common consent and enforced by the power of public opinion.

Another necessary feature of democratic government is that the exercise of the power of popular self-government is a continual training of all citizens in the very qualities which are necessary for the maintenance of law between nations. Democratic government can not be carried on except by a people who acquire the habit of seeking true information about facts, of discussing questions of right and wrong, of interest, and of possible consequences, who have kindly consideration for opposing opinions, and a tolerant attitude towards those who differ. The longer a democracy preserves itself through the exercise of these qualities, the better adapted it is to apply the same methods in the conduct of its international business, and the result is a continually increasing certainty that international law will be observed in a community of democratic nations.

The most important difference, however, between the two forms of government is that democracies are incapable of holding or executing those sinister policies of ambition which are beyond the reach of argument and the control of law. A democracy cannot hold such policies, because the open and public avowal and discussion which must precede their adoption by a democracy is destructive of them; and it cannot execute such policies, because it uniformly lacks the kind

of disciplined efficiency necessary to diplomatic and military affirmatives. The settled and continuous policies of a democracy are defensive. Nearly ninety years ago De Tocqueville in his survey of 'Democracy in America' recorded what he deemed to be a weakness of our system of government in foreign affairs. He said:

"Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses, and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of the state; it tends to diffuse a moderate independence; it promotes the growth of public spirit, and fortifies the respect which is entertained for law in all classes of society; and these are advantages which only exercise an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or to an aristocracy, and they are precisely the means by which an individual people attains to a predominant position."

So long as foreign affairs were to continue as they were carried on in his day, De Tocqueville was doubtless right. It is because democracies are not fitted to conduct foreign affairs as they were conducted in De Tocqueville's day that the prevalence of democracy throughout the world makes inevitable a change in the conduct of foreign affairs. Such affairs when conducted by democratic governments must necessarily be marked by the absence of those undertakings and designs, and those measures combined with secrecy, prosecuted with perseverance, for which he declares democracies to be unfit.

This characteristic of popular governments is well illustrated by the hundred years of peace which we are all rather proud of preserving throughout the 3,000 miles of boundary between Canada and the United States without fortifications or ships of war or armies. There have been many occasions when the tempers of the men on either side of the line were sorely tried. The disputes regarding the Northeastern Boundary, the Oregon Boundary, the Alaska Boundary, were acute; the affair of the Caroline on the Niagara River, the Fenian Raid upon Lake Champlain, the enforcement of the Fisheries regulations, were exasperating and serious, but upon neither side of the boundary did democracy harbor those sinister designs of aggrandizement and ambition which have characterized the autocratic governments of the world. On neither side was there suspicion of any such designs in the democracy across the border. The purpose of each nation was merely to stand up for its own rights, and so reason has always controlled, and every question has been settled by fair agreement, or by arbitral decision; and, finally, for the past eight years a permanent International Commission with judicial powers has disposed of the controversies arising between the citizens of the two countries along the border as unobtrusively and naturally as if the questions arose between citizens of Maryland and Virginia. Such has been the course of events, not because of any great design or far-seeing plan, but because it is the natural working of democratic government.

The incapacity of democracies to maintain policies of aggression may be fairly inferred from the extreme reluctance with which they incur the expense and make the sacrifices necessary for defense. Cherishing no

secret designs of aggression themselves, they find it difficult to believe in the existence of such designs on the part of other nations. Only imminent and deadly peril awakens them to activity. It was this obstinate confidence in the peaceable intentions of all mankind which met Lord Roberts (honored, trusted, and beloved as he was) when long before the present war he vainly sought to awaken the people of England to the danger that he saw so plainly in Germany's stupendous preparation for conquest. It is well known that when the war came France was almost upon the verge of diminishing her army by a reduction in the years of service. In our own country a great people, virile, fearless, and loyal, have remained indifferent to all the voices crying in the wilderness for preparation, because the American people could not be made to believe that anything was going to happen inconsistent with the existence everywhere of those peaceful purposes of which they themselves were conscious.

There is a radical incompatibility between popular self-government and continuous military discipline, for military control is in itself despotic. As compared with military autocracies, the normal condition of democracies is a condition of inferior military efficiency. This invariable characteristic of democracy leaves it no option in its treatment of autocracy. The two kinds of government can not live permanently side by side. So long as military autocracy continues, democracy is not safe from attacks, which are certain to come some time, and certain to find it unprepared. The conflict is inevitable and universal; and it is *à l'outrance*. To be safe, democracy must kill its enemy when it can and where it can. The world can not be half democratic and half autocratic. It must be all

democratic or all Prussian. There can be no compromise. If it is all Prussian, there can be no real international law. If it is all democratic, international law honored and observed may well be expected as a natural development of the principles which make democratic self-government possible.

The democracies of the world are gathered about the last stronghold of autocracy, and engaged in the conflict thrust upon them by dynastic policy pursuing the ambition of rulers under claim of divine right for their own aggrandizement, their own glory, without regard to law, or justice, or faith. The issue today and tomorrow may seem uncertain, but the end is not uncertain. No one knows how soon the end will come, or what dreadful suffering and sacrifice may stand between; but the progress of the great world movement that has doomed autocracy can not be turned back, or defeated.

That is the great peace movement.

There the millions who have learned under freedom to hope and aspire for better things are paying the price that the peaceful peoples of the earth may live in security under the protection of law based upon all-embracing justice and supreme in the community of nations.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONALITY



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SEPTEMBER, 1917

No. 118

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONALITY¹

I do not want to impose upon the reader a wearisome chronological summary of the nationalist agitations which for a century have profoundly troubled European politics. It is more interesting to classify the nationalist movements according to the aims which they have sought to attain and which have usually determined their mode of action.

M. Seignobos distinguishes three methods by which modern nations have altered their condition: separation, agglomeration and emancipation. A fourth might, I think, be added, the pursuit of autonomy within the framework of a larger state.

The aspiration for autonomy is the most modern of nationalist claims. It has appeared chiefly within the more advanced states, where the rule imposed upon the subject national minorities was not intolerable, or where it was obviously to the interest of these minorities not to run the risk of a war of separation, but to remain associated with the economic and political life of a powerful state. Thus Catalonia, Ireland and Finland have realized that they could hardly hope to live an independent life if they should separate from Spain, Great Britain and Russia, respectively. They would be content with a régime which allowed them to administer for themselves their internal affairs, such as their schools, religion, courts of justice, public works and the free development of national language and

¹ Parts I and II of Professor Ruyssen's paper were printed as No. 109 and No. 112 of *International Conciliation*.

culture. Home Rule, the object of centuries of struggle, had just been granted to Ireland when the war suspended its operation. Finland, on the other hand, has had its constitutional liberties restricted by the irrational caprice of the Russian bureaucracy, after enjoying them since the liberal charter was granted by Alexander I in 1809. Two other nationalities enclosed within the Empire of the Czars, the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians, seem also to aspire at nothing more than autonomy. In Alsace-Lorraine a separatist movement had become very strong after the disappearance of the "protest movement," and this compromise solution of so complex and painful a problem met with like sympathy in Germany and France up to the moment when war, effacing the provisions of the treaty of Frankfort, reawakened in the people of Alsace-Lorraine the hope of a solution conforming more closely to their secret wish.

Separation has lifted three minor nations to the rank of states. Belgium, taken from the French Empire in 1814, and artificially united with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, separated from the latter in 1831-1832 with the aid of French armies. The equally artificial union of the two kingdoms of Norway and Sweden, subject to a common sovereign, was pacifically dissolved in 1905, thanks to the wisdom of King Oscar II. This is perhaps the only case in modern history of a separation of states accomplished without violence. Hungary, finally, an independent kingdom until the eighteenth century, was again separated from Austria in 1867; the two countries retaining, however, a common sovereign in a form of government known as "Dualism."

Agglomeration has within half a century created

two of the most important modern states: Italy and the German Empire. In both cases the national elements crystallized, as it were, about the realm established by a military state—Piedmont in Italy, Prussia in Germany—thanks, too, to the prestige of victory.

It was a process of emancipation, finally, which gradually detached from the Ottoman Empire the Christian nationalities upon which it had for four centuries imposed a harsh rule. The "Eastern question" has given rise to the most frequent and most violent nationalist agitations. None of these movements has succeeded in alleviating the lot of the Balkan Christians without the intervention of foreign countries. The emancipation of Greece in 1828-1829 required the military aid of France, England and Russia. Rumania was freed in 1850 with the aid of Russia and France. It was Russia again which supported the creation of Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. No great power intervened in a military way in the last Balkan War (1912-1913); but a diplomatic conference, held in London, took in hand the settlement of Balkan affairs. The Balkan nations have, by the way, paid dearly for this aid. The problem of the Balkan nationalities would unquestionably have been solved long ago, if the very real desire to free the unfortunate peoples had not been neutralized by the desire to maintain a balance of power in the Orient. In protecting the Balkan Slavs, Russia sought to secure an outpost on the road to Constantinople; but this ambition aroused the distrust of other powers, and this selfish competition gave birth to the dogma of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, so cruelly injurious to the Christian communities of the Orient.

We might comprise in a fifth group the nationalities

which are divided among several states and the realization of whose ideals would involve at once the emancipation of certain groups and the agglomeration of the detached units into a single body. Some nationalities have already achieved independence for a part of their number, and desire to extend its benefits to brothers still exiled in a foreign land. Greece lacks only certain islands of the Archipelago and cities on the Asiatic coast to accomplish her Pan-Hellenism; the Kingdom of Rumania asks the addition of the Rumanians of Transylvania, of Bukovina and of Bessarabia, in order to restore the old Dacia; Bulgaria feels herself deprived, by the Treaty of Bucharest, of the Bulgars of Macedonia, which she conquered only to lose again in a few months (1913); Serbia dreams of expansion over the Serb peoples of Austria-Hungary; Italy is fighting today to add to the Italian fatherland the "unredeemed" country of the Trentino, Carniola and Trieste. For other nations, whose future is yet more dubious, independence and unity are as yet nothing but fond hopes. The Czech nation, still subject to Austria, will feel incomplete so long as the Slovaks form part of the Kingdom of Hungary. Will Poland, dismembered for a century and a half, be reconstituted as an independent kingdom? Will the Russian Ukraine some day become complete by a union with Ruthenia and Galicia, now subject to the Austro-Hungarian Empire? Will the Zionist Jews ever gather again around Jerusalem, or will they rebuild the Temple of Solomon somewhere in Uganda?

Thus the nineteenth century, which has witnessed the growth of national consciousness, which has seen certain nationalities assume their proper place in

history, has bequeathed to the twentieth century a multitude of very serious national problems. We cannot say that the outlook for the future of the subject nationalities is very encouraging. When the history of national movements is examined more closely than we have here been able to do, we realize how full it is of bloody failures. Taken as a whole, these movements, when unsupported by foreign aid, have failed more often than they have succeeded. As M. Emile Bourgeois observes, "The states, not the nationalities, have been the true victors in the nineteenth century." We might even say that the chances of emancipation for a nationality compelled to rely solely upon its own force have never been so slight as they are today. Tragic contrast! Whereas the chain which binds the individual to the state has been bit by bit relaxed, the control exercised over alien populations by the central authorities is supported by more powerful instruments than ever before. The telegraph and the telephone, as aids to the police and the secret service, make it possible to report and repress insurrectionary movements almost instantly. The monopoly or the close supervision of the manufacture of arms and explosives, the presence of custom-houses along the frontier, facilitate the control and, when necessary, the suppression of the trade in guns, revolvers and munitions; moreover, the artillery of the armies of the state can wipe out in an instant whole bands of insurgents. Conscription makes it possible to paralyze an organized uprising by a sudden mobilization of all men eligible for military service in the district. One might venture to say that the concentration of the instruments of repression in the hands of the modern government dooms every insurrection

not supported from outside to a complete defeat, a defeat which, unfortunately, but makes harsher the lot of those who took part in the forlorn hope.

This explains why the only successful national movements have been those which were effectively supported by the arms or diplomacy of a foreign country, and it enables us at the same time to understand why the presence of dissatisfied nationalities within a composite state is always a source of serious trouble for the latter. Not only is order within the state more difficult to maintain, but the discontented nationalities are naturally invited to seek support for their cause abroad, especially in neighboring lands to which they are related by ties of blood and language. The foreign countries may be tempted on their part to exploit or even to incite nationalist passions in order to gain a pretext for intervention and to secure accomplices among the enemy. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey know what it has cost them to suppress peoples whose complaints have aroused indignant and effective sympathy beyond the frontier.

But, however strong this sympathy may have been, we must admit that it has hardly ever sufficed to cause political intervention; on the contrary, it has more often been a "holy egotism" which has inspired such interventions on the most generous pretexts.

Does not this show how tragic is the fate of nationalities which are prevented by an unjust régime from living their own life? The instruments of force are out of their reach, and the paths of diplomacy are uncertain and perilous. And the worst of it is that, with the impossibility of resorting to physical force, they have not the only resort of the weak, law. Deprived as they are of all sovereignty, as we have said, they

are not juridical persons; they have no right to enter complaint, no means of claiming justice; there is no tribunal accessible to their grievances. Whereas the smallest states can propose arbitration or invoke mediation, by appeal to the Court of the Hague, there exists neither court of justice, nor any other judicial procedure for the suppressed nationalities. They have neither force nor law. Some of these groups had hoped that the Peace Conferences of the Hague would admit them through some secret door; thus Korea sent a delegation to the Hague; but it was not received, nor did appeals made by groups from Alsace-Lorraine and Poland obtain a hearing.

Will this continue forever? Is it not conceivable that national groups, without attaining sovereignty, should be able to get a public hearing for their appeals? Perhaps it will come in the future. The evolution of law is nowadays so rapid that no one can foresee what changes may take place tomorrow. In particular, the concept of sovereignty, of which modern nations are so jealous, is susceptible of modification and attenuation in becoming subordinated to the idea of a Society of Nations which alone would exercise absolute sovereignty.

It is doubtless premature to speak of internationalism at a time when a dozen nations are struggling for existence with all the energy of despair; we will not even summarize a plan for the pacific constitution of the world. And yet, studying the most obvious lessons of the present war, it may be guessed that the war has delivered a decisive blow to the prevailing conception which makes of large and small states equally absolute sovereignties.

On the one hand, the fate of Serbia, of Belgium and of Montenegro, gives cruel evidence of the fact that a small state cannot rely upon its own power as a safeguard of its political independence, when its existence interferes with the plans of a larger state. As long as war remains the final instrument for the settlement of international disputes, small nations will necessarily be compelled to ask for or to submit to the tutelage of the stronger. The "neutral" states expect the "powers" to guarantee their inviolability; the Balkan Slavs appeal to the Czar; Portugal and, in some degree, Holland, Denmark and Norway, find their security in England's interest in the existence of small states on the west coast of Europe.

On the other hand, the European war which grew out of a conflict between Austria and Serbia and spread further and further so as to embrace more than one-half the inhabitants of the globe, which seriously affects the interests of all nations without exception,—this war has proved, better than sociologists could demonstrate it, the intimate moral and material interdependence of nations. In fact, what is actually taking place before our eyes is the formation of one, or perhaps, of two "Internationalities." The belligerents have repeatedly shared their armies and their material forces, their harvests, their coal, and above all, their credit; and at the same time, they have abolished or lowered, for each other, the tariff barriers. Without doubt, this gigantic struggle of the two warring combinations is still far from promising the dawn of world peace; it may be that a long period of wars confronts mankind. But the fact remains that in each of the opposed groups of powers the federative bond outweighs the national independence;

and it is unlikely that nothing durable should develop from this great experience.

There are two alternatives. The Central Powers might be victorious. With them imperialism would triumph. But, however complete their victory, they cannot destroy the British Empire nor the Russian Empire. The history of tomorrow would be that of a rivalry between two or three huge empires; for, between such powerful adversaries, there would be no place for sovereign and independent small nations, or even states of moderate size; they would all have to seek protection with one or the other of these empires, since otherwise they would run the risk of being absorbed; and, however liberal the spirit of these federations may be, the states joining them would have to agree upon certain military taxes and financial obligations whereby their sovereignty would be very severely impaired. In other words, as regards a large part of Europe, the same thing would take place as has happened to the German states in consequence of the creation of the Zollverein and the foundation of the empire. By renouncing their full sovereignty in favor of a small number of military empires, the states would retain for themselves nothing but their autonomy, *i. e.*, the right to organize their interior life according to their own wishes.

This hypothesis of the victory of the Central Powers allied with Turkey in the defense of a barbaric militarism, we, of course, reject. But even if it should happen to be realized, its success would still be precarious, for history from Alexander to Charlemagne, from Charles V. to Napoleon, demonstrates the instability of empires founded on military force.

Let us consider the alternative and assume a vic-

tory of the allies. It may be predicted that the solidarity come of their common hardships will not be dissolved. The influence of the liberal "International" which has grouped the democratic powers against the military empires, has been too profound to disappear. In such a case, this association of nations which will survive after the war will unquestionably take the form of a federation, and this federation will attract to itself all such neutral nations as come to realize that their true interest is where the sword was drawn for the independence of small nations.

Will this federation grow until it shall embrace all mankind? And will war, more abhorred than ever, be driven from the earth by a "United States of the World?" It is undoubtedly utopian to attempt such an assertion. But, it can be called a strong probability that the war will induce the modern states to come out of the "splendid isolation" so perilous to their own sovereignty, in order to be organized into political, economic and cultural groups. And for the good of these larger groups, they will have to sacrifice some of the attributes of sovereignty.

It will be objected that this would imply a sovereignty above that of the empire or of the federation. That is perfectly true. I do not think that the hour is near when all the nations will be absorbed into a united world empire or be willing to unite into one integral Republic of Nations. But it is very likely that even under a vast system of imperialism and, *a fortiori*, in a federation of nations, the old conception of supreme sovereignty would be subject to important changes. Once an empire embraces various nationalities which are important on account of the

number of their members, the national nucleus around which this aggregation takes place, by this very fact, loses its importance. This can be observed in a striking manner in the Empire of Austria-Hungary where the German element could not prevent the division of the monarchy in 1867 for the benefit of the Magyars; and where the Czech, Polish and Croatian elements have been able to neutralize the German influence.

The same phenomenon would repeat itself to the detriment of Prussia, and even of the Germanic states, if a victorious German Empire should succeed in annexing some departments of France, and Belgium, and, perhaps, Holland and Russian Poland. These conquered nationalities, to whom a deliberative vote would have to be given in the Reichstag and the Bundesrat, would be in a far more favorable position to claim respect for their national life, than have been the Danes of Schleswig, the Poles of Prussian Poland or the people of Alsace-Lorraine. The German Empire would inevitably become more purely federalistic in character, as has Austria so that the imperialistic tendency would finally destroy itself through its own expansion. This is the danger which the socialist minority and the League "Bund Neues Vaterland" have clearly realized, and which has inspired their energetic protests against the annexationist policy.

Whatever, therefore, may be the issue of the conflict that is dismembering the civilized world, the history of nationalities, is far from being at an end. It may be hoped that they will be the real beneficiaries of this cataclysm in which so much has been destroyed. Is it not rather significant that Poland should have been promised its autonomy simultaneously by both

the Czar and the Kaiser? Even if this pledge should not be kept, this homage paid by force to justice has a symptomatic importance. Yes, the nationalities will come out of the tempest stronger, because the spirit of nationalism, among all the other forces, like wealth, political institutions and even states, which fade away and perish, is the one force that does not die. This spirit will grow because of the inevitable weakening of the brutal powers which for centuries have been oppressing it. In the exhausted Europe of tomorrow it will be one of the most powerful forces of reorganization and resurrection.

But from the preceding it follows also that the attainment of mere political sovereignty is by no means the practical end in which nationalities are most interested, nor is it what they have the greatest chance to achieve. If the future of small states is endangered in a world where that international anarchy which has given rise to the present war persists, how much more uncertain will be the fate of nationalities taking the risks of a fully independent existence? Their greatest advantage seems to consist in conforming themselves to the evolution which carries the world towards the devolution of the great composite states into distinct political units, and at the same time towards the organization of these communities into free federations. "National independence relative to, and limited by, the conditions of life of the rest of the universe," in a word, autonomy within the society of nations, is what it seems will be the glorious and certain fate of those nationalities which are still subjected to an imperialistic yoke.

There is a final question, which puzzled the writers of the Second Empire of France. It has been asked

whether it would be advisable to welcome all the autonomist movements with equal sympathy, and to support all of them with the same devotion. It is often very difficult to reconcile one's conscience with the exigencies of an enlightened self-interest. In France, as I have said, there have been frequent conflicts between the cautious attitude of the government and the great impatience of the progressive parties. I recall, among others, the campaigns, as futile as they were eloquent, undertaken on two occasions by the liberals in order to drag the July Monarchy and the Second Empire into intervention on behalf of Poland. The present Third Republic has more than once disappointed the expectations of certain nationalities and their French friends. It may be asserted that the interventions in behalf of the Armenians lacked energy. It has been surprising that France has not made use of her title as Russia's ally to make official representations to the Czar for the defense of the Finns and the Russian Jews; nor was it comfortable to have the holding of a congress of Young Egyptians in Paris prohibited; let us also confess that she has too rarely given the world an example of disinterestedness.

On the other hand, it would be childish to overlook the dangers to which those who assume the role of patrons of suppressed peoples expose themselves. The risk of war is usually run in an official intervention; and with the present system of alliances and ententes the whole world may be set afire by the smallest incident. Was it not the moral protectorate of Russia over all the Slavs that brought her into the present war, and with her, nearly all Europe? What wonder, then, if the appeal of the oppressed nationalities and

their defenders often fails because of the "holy egoism" of the great powers and the prudence of diplomats?

Nor are these political difficulties the only ones. The question may arise whether the claims of a certain nationality are well founded, and whether those who make themselves its representatives actually represent the true desires of their compatriots. National aspirations do not always emanate from the conscience of the people. Sometimes there exists an element of calculation and delusion. It may happen that a well-educated and turbulent minority make out of whole cloth claims which find only vague response among the great masses of their fellow countrymen. Who could tell, for example, the exact meaning of certain recent movements among the highest social classes in Egypt, in Persia or in India? How should the profound aspirations of the people be distinguished from the elaborate fictions of a handful of agitators or even of foreign agents? Have not certain nationalities been oppressed in the very name of the principle of race or of language—as for example, Alsace-Lorraine?

For these difficulties some simple people offer a solution of radical appearance. Is there doubt as to the national aspirations? To solve the problem, they say, it would suffice to organize an investigation of the interested parties, a plebiscite or a referendum.

Of what avail is such a method? It is indeed tempting because of its simplicity; it is decisive where it is possible, since it gives expression to the one element of nationality which it seems to me is more important than all the others: the common will of a community. The method may be applied successfully in simple

cases: for example, in 1861 when the people of Savoy and of Nice were called upon by agreement of Piedmont and of France to express themselves regarding their reattachment to France.

But in many cases there is danger that the referendum may become a most illusory method of consulting a whole nation. How can an absolute freedom in voting be assured to the interested parties? In backward countries and countries not yet endowed with representative institutions, how can the possibility be avoided that this first vote, a very serious matter, may be won by surprise or by pressure? And especially if the country is inhabited by differing ethnic elements, will the same right to vote be accorded to the old occupants of the territory as to the immigrants of recent date, to the oppressors as to the oppressed? We would thus expose ourselves to the danger of perpetuating the very injustice which we seek to remedy. For, as I have pointed out, a nationality is not a collection of unities; it is an intimate alloy of spiritual elements which no arithmetic can express in exact figures.

But where a plebiscite is not feasible, there are other methods of procedure conceivable which have the precise object of taking these imponderables into account. The surest way, I believe, would be to send to these nationalities commissions of inquiry whose members are selected from the neutral countries. These commissions would go about freely, increase the means of investigation according to their needs; they could interrogate the accredited representatives of every profession. They would have to listen to whomsoever wished to testify before them. As a matter of fact, similar commissions have already

rendered excellent services, among others, that which was charged after the Balkan War with the difficult task of determining the frontiers of the new and ephemeral state of Albania.

However great may be the difficulties connected with the determination of the legitimate frontiers of nationalities, and of their authentic wishes, the task is not insurmountable. Moreover, these difficulties are only a secondary aspect of the problem of nationality. The difficult part is not to distinguish the legitimate from the fictitious aspirations; history assigns a special place to the strong nationalities actually worthy of liberty. The essential problem is a problem of law. It concerns itself with the question whether, lacking a tribunal and a method of procedure, those groups capable of living their own lives shall remain without recourse under the domination of sovereign states, and whether they shall be able to gain access to the Society of Nations only by war. Is it not conceivable that some day there will come into being a Court of Nationalities? Would it not be possible to constitute that tribunal as some kind of delegation of the Court of the Hague with the purpose, in the interest of general peace, of hearing the claims of subject nationalities, and of submitting them to a sort of official investigation?

These are dreams of the future, and, perhaps, chimeras. To return to the oppressive reality, it is not a legal method to day, but it is war—the war of nationalities which opens wide perspectives to nationalist aspirations. The Europe of tomorrow, whoever may be the victor, will see new countries born, and old nations long thought dead will emerge from their graves.

Does this mean that there is nothing better than to let this war continue its bloody work? In fact, for a nation to become emancipated, two conditions besides war must be realized. First, it is necessary that these nations be worthy to exist, that they assert themselves, even under persecution; and it is necessary that they religiously cultivate their past and unceasingly maintain their ideal of the future. Unfortunate those who give way, who forget, who bow down; their protests must be made everywhere and to the last moment—and they must be heard. If there is no court of justice to hear the cries of the suppressed, if the Palace at the Hague has not so much as an antechamber to receive the delegates of enslaved peoples, the public opinion of the world is a sonorous tribunal, always open, where the complaints of those who cannot plead for themselves should be unceasingly voiced by their defenders.

It is a matter of honor to the modern liberal nations that they have given refuge to the representatives of unfortunate nationalities. Paris, London, Brussels, Geneva, Lausanne, New York, Boston, have been, for a century, the chosen shelters of banished and voluntary exiles. Even when the governments did not or could not act, the countries of liberty have always accorded to the martyred populations the support of their protests; it is true, an imperfect support, but not ineffectual; for, aside from comforting the victims, it keeps before the public questions which from the viewpoint of justice, it would be dangerous to allow to be silenced and forgotten. Any iniquity committed at the expense of a country is thus subjected to revision just as are the judiciary errors of a court, as

long as there is a conscience which demands that the question be taken up.

The general leagues that have undertaken the defense of subject populations aspiring to the life of a nation, the special committees constituted for the defense of this or that nationality, the offices, the periodicals which make it their mission to keep the public informed as to these great problems, have all done very useful work, although the immediate results have often been rather discouraging.

How could, in view of all these endeavors, the "League of the Rights of Man and of Citizens" fail to take a part? Well, it has taken a part already; and it will continue to do so. It is following the traditions of its great ancestors, both the Constitution-
alists and Conventionalists who believed that by defining the Rights of "Citizen" they could also define those of "Man"; and who for a moment held the generous hope of extending the benefits of the Revolution to all the peoples of the earth. She also continues the work of the good citizen whose powerful personality has given its definitive character to the activities of the league. Nobody has better known the sufferings of the martyr-people than Francis de Gressense, in that Europe and that Orient which he had searched in its most terrible depths, its violent and painful history; nobody has taken up with more energy the defense of the Finlanders, the Armenians, the Jews of Russia. It suffices, at the conclusion of this study, devoted to the defense of nationalities, to recall this great name which in itself is a maxim of action.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS LOOKING TOWARD PEACE

SERIES No. III



OCTOBER, 1917

No. 119

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

SOURCES

- I. Message from his Holiness Benedictus XV, Pope, August 1, 1917—Official Bulletin, Washington, August 17, 1917
- II. Reply on Behalf of the United States, August 27, 1917—Official Bulletin, Washington, August 29, 1917
- III. The German Reply—*New York Times*, September 23, 1917
- IV. The Austrian Reply—*New York Times*, September 22, 1917

I

Message from His Holiness Benedictus XV, Pope

To the rulers of the belligerent peoples:

From the beginning of our pontificate, in the midst of the horrors of the awful war let loose on Europe, we have had of all things three in mind: To maintain perfect impartiality toward all the belligerents as becomes him who is the common father and loves all his children with equal affection; continually to endeavor to do them all as much good as possible, without exception of person, without distinction of nationality or religion, as is dictated to us by the universal law of charity as well as by the supreme spiritual charge with which we have been intrusted by Christ; finally, as also required by our mission of peace, to omit nothing, as far as it lay in our power, that could contribute to expedite the end of these calamities by endeavoring to bring the peoples and their rulers to more moderate resolutions, to the serene deliberation of peace, of a 'just and lasting' peace.

Whoever has watched our endeavors in these three grievous years that have just elapsed could easily see that while we remained ever true to our resolution of absolute impartiality and beneficent action, we never ceased to urge the belligerent peoples and Governments again to be brothers, although all that we did to reach this very noble goal was not made public.

About the end of the first year of the war we addressed to the contending nations the most earnest exhortations and in addition pointed to the path that would lead to a stable peace honorable to all. Unfortunately our appeal was not heeded and the war was fiercely carried on for two years more with all its horrors. It became even more cruel and spread over land and sea and even to the air, and desolation and death were seen to fall upon defenseless cities, peaceful villages, and their innocent populations. And now no one can imagine how much the general suffering would increase and become worse if other months or, still worse, other years were added to this sanguinary triennium. Is this civilized world to be turned into a field of death, and is Europe, so glorious and flourishing, to rush, as carried by a universal folly, to the abyss and take a hand in its own suicide?

In so distressing a situation, in the presence of so grave a menace, we who have no personal political aim, who listen to the suggestions

or interests of none of the belligerents, but are solely actuated by the sense of our supreme duty as the common father of the faithful, by the solicitations of our children who implore our intervention and peace-bearing word, uttering the very voice of humanity and reason, we again call for peace and we renew a pressing appeal to those who have in their hands the destinies of the nations. But no longer confining ourselves to general terms, as we were led to do by circumstances in the past, we will now come to more concrete and practical proposals and invite the Governments of the belligerent peoples to arrive at an agreement on the following points, which seem to offer the base of a just and lasting peace, leaving it with them to make them more precise and complete:

First, the fundamental point must be that the material force of arms give way to the moral force of right, whence a just agreement of all upon the simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments, according to rules and guarantees to be established, in the necessary and sufficient measure for the maintenance of public order in every State; then, taking the place of arms, the institution of arbitration, with its high pacifying function, according to rules to be drawn in concert and under sanctions to be determined against any State which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards.

When supremacy of right is thus established, let every obstacle to ways of communication of the peoples be removed by insuring, through rules to be also determined, the true freedom and community of the seas, which, on the one hand, would eliminate many causes of conflict and, on the other hand, would open to all new sources of prosperity and progress.

As for the damages to be repaid and the cost of the war, we see no other way of solving the question than by setting up the general principle of entire and reciprocal condonation which would be justified by the immense benefit to be derived from disarmament, all the more as one could not understand that such carnage could go on for mere economic reasons. If certain particular reasons stand against this in certain cases, let them be weighed in justice and equity.

But these specific agreements, with the immense advantages that flow from them, are not possible unless territory now occupied is reciprocally restituted. Therefore, on the part of Germany, total evacuation of Belgium, with guarantees of its entire political, military, and economic independence toward any power whatever; evacuation also of the French territory; on the part of the other belligerents a similar restitution of the German colonies.

As regards territorial questions as, for instance, those that are disputed by Italy and Austria, by Germany and France, there is reason to hope that in consideration of the immense advantages of durable

peace with disarmament, the contending parties will examine in a conciliatory spirit, taking into account as far as is just and possible, as we have said formerly, the aspirations of the population, and if occasion arises adjusting private interests to the general good of the great human society.

The same spirit of equity and justice must guide the examination of the other territorial and political questions, notably those relative to Armenia, the Balkan States, and the territories forming part of the old Kingdom of Poland, for which, in particular, its noble historical traditions and the suffering particularly undergone during the present war, must win, with justice, the sympathies of the nations.

These, we believe, are the main bases upon which must rest the future reorganization of the peoples. They are such as to make the recurrence of such conflicts impossible and open the way for the solution of the economic question which is so important for the future and the material welfare of all of the belligerent states. And so, in presenting them to you who, at this tragic hour, guide the destinies of the belligerent nations, we indulge a gratifying hope that they will be accepted and that we shall thus see an early termination of the terrible struggle which has more and more the appearance of a useless massacre. Everybody acknowledges on the other hand that on both sides the honor of arms is safe. Do not, then, turn a deaf ear to our prayer, accept the paternal invitation which we extend to you in the name of the Divine Redeemer, Prince of Peace. Bear in mind your very grave responsibility to God and man; on your decision depend the quiet and joy of numberless families, the lives of thousands of young men, the happiness, in a word, of the peoples to whom it is your imperative duty to secure this boon. May the Lord inspire you with decisions conformable to His very holy will. May Heaven grant that in winning the applause of your contemporaries you will also earn from the future generations the great titles of pacificators.

As for us, closely united in prayer and penitence with all the faithful souls who yearn for peace, we implore for you the divine spirit, enlightenment, and guidance. Given at the Vatican, August 1, 1917,

BENEDICTUS P. M. XV

II

Reply on Behalf of the United States

August 27, 1917

To His Holiness Benedictus XV, Pope.

In acknowledgment of the communication of Your Holiness to the belligerent peoples, dated August 1, 1917, the President of the United States requests me to transmit the following reply:

Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of His Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires; it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it.

His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the status quo ante bellum, and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan States, and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.

It is manifest that no part of this program can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the status quo ante furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished

principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master-of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.

To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by His Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments—the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination.

The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government, on the one hand, and of a group of free peoples, on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied.

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world, to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs

done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

We can not take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.

ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State of the United States of America

III

The German Reply

(As transmitted by Chancellor Michaelis to Cardinal Gasparri)

Herr Cardinal: Your Eminence has been good enough, together with your letter of August 2, to transmit to the Kaiser and King, my most gracious master, the note of his Holiness the Pope, in which his Holiness, filled with grief at the devastations of the world war, makes an emphatic peace appeal to the heads of the belligerent peoples. The Kaiser-King has deigned to acquaint me with your Eminence's letter and to intrust the reply to me.

His Majesty has been following for a considerable time with high respect and sincere gratitude his Holiness's efforts, in a spirit of true impartiality, to alleviate as far as possible the sufferings of the war and to hasten the end of hostilities. The Kaiser sees in the latest step of his Holiness fresh proof of his noble and humane feelings, and cherishes a lively desire that, for the benefit of the entire world, the Papal appeal may meet with success.

The effort of Pope Benedict is to pave the way to an understanding among all peoples, and might more surely reckon on a sympathetic reception and the whole-hearted support from his Majesty, seeing that the Kaiser since taking over the Government has regarded it as his principal and most sacred task to preserve the blessings of peace for the German people and the world.

In his first speech from the throne at the opening of the German Reichstag on June 25, 1888, the Kaiser promised that his love of the German Army and his position toward it should never lead him into temptation to cut short the benefits of peace unless war were a necessity, forced upon us by an attack on the empire or its allies. The German Army should safeguard peace for us, and should peace, nevertheless, be broken, it would be in a position to win it with honor. The Kaiser has, by his acts, fulfilled the promise he then made in twenty-six years of happy rule, despite provocations and temptations.

In the crisis which led to the present world conflagration his Majesty's efforts were up to the last moment directed toward settling the conflict by peaceful means. After the war had broken out, against his wish and desire, the Kaiser, in conjunction with his high allies, was the first solemnly to declare his readiness to enter into peace negotiations. The German people support his Majesty in his keen desire for peace.

Germany sought within her national frontier the free development of her spiritual and material possessions, and outside the imperial territory unhindered competition with nations enjoying equal rights and equal esteem. The free play of forces in the world in peaceable wrestling with one another would lead to the highest perfecting of the noblest human possessions. A disastrous concatenation of events in the year 1914 absolutely broke off all hopeful course of development and transformed Europe into a bloody battle arena.

Appreciating the importance of his Holiness's declaration, the Imperial Government has not failed to submit the suggestion contained therein to earnest and scrupulous examination. Special measures, which the Government has taken in closest contact with representatives of the German people, for discussing and answering the questions raised prove how earnestly it desires, in accordance with his Holiness's desires, and the peace resolution of the Reichstag on July 19, to find a practical basis for a just and lasting peace.

The Imperial Government greets with special sympathy the leading idea of the peace appeal wherein his Holiness clearly expresses the conviction that in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right. We are also convinced that the sick body of human society can only be healed by fortifying its moral strength of right. From this would follow, according to his Holiness's view, the simultaneous diminution of the armed forces of all States and the institution of obligatory arbitration for international disputes.

We share his Holiness's view that definite rules and a certain safeguard for a simultaneous and reciprocal limitation of armaments on land, on sea, and in the air, as well as for the true freedom of the community and high seas, are the things in treating which—the new spirit that in the future should prevail in international relations—should find first hopeful expression. The task would then of itself arise to decide international differences of opinion, not by the use of armed forces, but by peaceful methods, especially by arbitration, whose high peace-producing effect we together with his Holiness fully recognize.

The Imperial Government will in this respect support every proposal compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people.

Germany, owing to her geographical situation and economic requirements, has to rely on peaceful intercourse with her neighbors and with distant countries. No people, therefore, has more reason than the German people to wish that instead of universal hatred and battle, a conciliatory fraternal spirit should prevail between nations.

If the nations are guided by this spirit it will be recognized to their advantage that the important thing is to lay more stress upon what

unites them in their relations. They will also succeed in settling individual points of conflict which are still undecided, in such a way that conditions of existence will be created which will be satisfactory to every nation, and thereby a repetition of this great world catastrophe would appear impossible.

Only on this condition can a lasting peace be founded which would promote an intellectual rapprochement and a return to the economic prosperity of human society.

This serious and sincere conviction encourages our confidence that our enemies also may see a suitable basis in the ideas submitted by his Holiness for approaching nearer to the preparation of future peace under conditions corresponding to a spirit of reasonableness and to the situation in Europe.

IV

The Austrian Reply

Holy Father: With due veneration and deep emotion we take cognizance of the new representations which your Holiness, in fulfillment of the holy office intrusted to you by God, makes to us and the heads of the other belligerent States, with the noble intention of leading the heavily tried nations to a unity that will restore peace to them.

With a thankful heart we receive this fresh gift of fatherly care which you, Holy Father, always bestow on all peoples without distinction, and from the depth of our heart we greet the moving exhortation which your Holiness has addressed to the Governments of the belligerent peoples.

During this cruel war we have always looked up to your Holiness as to the highest personage, who, in virtue of his mission, which reaches beyond earthly things, and, thanks to the high conception of his duties laid upon him, stands high above the belligerent peoples, and who, inaccessible to all influence, was able to find a way which may lead to the realization of our own desire for peace, lasting and honorable for all parties.

Since ascending the throne of our ancestors, and fully conscious of the responsibility which we bear before God and men for the fate of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, we have never lost sight of the high aim of restoring to our peoples, as speedily as possible, the blessings of peace. Soon after our accession to the throne it was vouchsafed to us, in common with our allies, to undertake a step which had been considered and prepared by our exalted predecessor, Francis Joseph, to pave the way for a lasting and honorable peace.

We gave expression to this desire in a speech from the throne delivered at the opening of the Austrian Reichstag, thereby showing that we are striving after a peace that shall free the future life of the nation from rancor and a thirst for revenge, and that shall secure them for generations to come from the employment of armed forces. Our joint Government has in the meantime not failed in repeated and emphatic declarations, which could be heard by all the world, to give expression to our own will and that of the Austro-Hungarian peoples to prepare an end to bloodshed by a peace such as your Holiness has in mind.

Happy in the thought that our desires from the first were directed toward the same object which your Holiness today characterizes as one we should strive for, we have taken into close consideration the concrete and practical suggestions of your Holiness and have come to the following conclusions:

With deep-rooted conviction we agree to the leading idea of your Holiness that the future arrangement of the world must be based on the elimination of armed forces and on the moral force of right and on the rule of international justice and legality.

We, too, are imbued with the hope that a strengthening of the sense of right would morally regenerate humanity. We support, therefore, your Holiness's view that the negotiations between the belligerents should and could lead to an understanding by which, with the creation of appropriate guarantees, armaments on land and sea and in the air might be reduced simultaneously, reciprocally and gradually to a fixed limit, and whereby the high seas, which rightly belong to all the nations of the earth, may be freed from domination or paramountcy, and be opened equally for the use of all.

Fully conscious of the importance of the promotion of peace on the method proposed by your Holiness, namely, to submit international disputes to compulsory arbitration, we are also prepared to enter into negotiations regarding this proposal.

If, as we most heartily desire, agreements should be arrived at between the belligerents which would realize this sublime idea and thereby give security to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy for its unhampered future development, it can then not be difficult to find a satisfactory solution of the other questions which still remain to be settled between the belligerents in a spirit of justice and of a reasonable consideration of the conditions for existence of both parties.

If the nations of the earth were to enter, with a desirable peace, into negotiations with one another in the sense of your Holiness's proposals, then peace could blossom forth from them. The nations could attain complete freedom of movement on the high seas, heavy material burdens could be taken from them, and new sources of prosperity opened to them.

Guided by a spirit of moderation and conciliation, we see in the proposals of your Holiness a suitable basis for initiating negotiations with a view to preparing a peace, just to all and lasting, and we earnestly hope our present enemies may be animated by the same ideas. In his spirit we beg that the Almighty may bless the work of peace begun by your Holiness.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

By WALTER H. PAGE

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
OF NATIONS

By LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. SMUTS

AMERICA AND FREEDOM

By VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODEN



NOVEMBER, 1917

No. 120

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

Speech of the Hon. Walter H. Page, Ambassador from the United States to Great Britain, made in the Guild Hall, Plymouth, England, on the Anniversary of the Beginning of the War, August 4, 1917

MR. MAYOR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The honour you pay me by this generous reception moves me profoundly. I am glad to stand in this town and, at the beginning of this new era in the life of our race, to pledge the unwavering fellowship of free men across the sea—the sea that once separated us but that now unites us. I pay homage here to the immortal memory of your great masters of the sea and especially of those sturdy men who sailed from this harbour nearly 300 years ago, and carried to the making of our New World that love of freedom which now impels us to come to the defence of the imperilled freedom of the world. The idealism of the Republic rests on their unconquerable spirit which we keep yet, thank God, when a high duty calls us. In memory of them, and in the comradeship of this righteous war, whose awful shadow will darken the world till we win it, I greet you as kinsmen.

We are met on the most tragic anniversary in history. It is not a day to celebrate for its own sake. What we shall be glad to celebrate will be the day of victory, and its anniversary ever afterwards. But, before we achieve victory, it is fit that we meet on this dire anniversary to fortify our purpose, if it need fortifying; to pledge ourselves that the brave men who have died shall not have died in vain; and to re-assert our purpose to finish the task even if it exhaust the vast resources and take the heaviest toll of the valiant lives of the Allies in Europe and of the Republic across the sea. For what would the future of the human race be worth if the deliberate and calculated barbarism of our enemies overrun the earth? The supreme gift of free government, which this brave island gave to the world and to which all free lands chiefly owe their freedom, would be swept away. Let the darkness of death overtake us now rather than the darkness of tyranny should sweep over all free lands.

We do not need to review these terrible three years. Everyone of us is constantly doing that whether he would or not. For the war

has shut most preceding experiences and memories of normal and joyful tasks out of our minds. But there are several facts that we may profitably recall.

The chief one is the fact that the war was thrust on us. Not only did the Allied Nations not begin it; they did nothing to provoke it. They did all they could to prevent it. Documentary proof of this is abundant, and has been so clearly cited that I shall not weary you with another recital of it.

Another fact is the persistent denial by German public men and soldiers that the war was of their making. This is important not only as a measure of their moral qualities, but as an indication of their method of retreat. They will appeal to the pity of the world that they set out to subdue.

It is surely proper for us on this tragic anniversary to ponder on these large facts while we strengthen our resolve to save ourselves and the world from a degrading servitude that would be worse than death. After the war is ended and we can look back calmly at these years, they will, I imagine, stand out in our memory, in certain moods, as a horrible nightmare, in certain other moods as a time of heroic cleansing of the earth of an ancient and deadly malady. Military despotisms have ever been one of the greatest evils of human society. We have now learned, that with modern physical progress they are become far more dangerous and far more loathsome than they were in simpler times.

But after these general reflections on the nature of the great conflict, I think it more proper that I should speak, in this place of sacred historic associations for so long a part of American life, rather of one great by-product of the war, of one happy incident which may well turn out to be the best result of it: I mean the closer coming-together of the two great English-speaking parts of the world.

No American can come to Plymouth without thinking of the going of the English from these shores to the new land where they set up a new freedom and laid the foundations of the most prosperous and hopeful community on the earth. In the course of time those New World communities fell apart from political allegiance to the Old Land. But they fell apart from the Old Land *only* in political allegiance. If we had need to discuss this political divergence, I should maintain that political separation was as well for you as it was necessary for us, and that by reason of it human freedom was further advanced, and a new chapter in free men's growth opened throughout the English-speaking world.

The American Revolution was a civil war fought on each side by men of the same race. And this civil war was fought in the Colonial Assemblies, and in Parliament as well as on the battlefields in America, and it was won in the Colonial Assemblies and in Parliament as well

as on the battlefields in America; for from that day on you have regarded Colonies as free and equal communities with the Mother Country. This civil war naturally left a trail of distrust, the greater because of the long distance between us by sail. But, when the first steamship came over the ocean, and still more when the cable bound us together, a new union began to come about because these eliminations of distance set the tide of feeling in the natural course laid out by kinship and common aims.

But in the meantime the American community had developed in its own way, and our life had become more and more different from life in this Kingdom. We became so fixed and so different in our conventions and ways of life that we could not easily come back to your conventions and ways of life if we would.

In fact there is no other test that the British people have had—no test that any people has ever had—which proved its great qualities so well as the British settlement and management of America. Here were men in a new land cut off from close contact with their kinsmen at home, who took their political affairs in their own hands, and thereafter were without guidance or support from the mother country. How did the race stand such a test? No other migrating race has stood such a test so well; and those first English colonists have now grown, by natural increase and by numerous adoptions, into a people which today includes more English-speaking white men than the whole British Empire. They have not only out-grown in numbers all the British elsewhere; but they have kept what may be called the faith of the race. They have kept the racial and national characteristics. They have kept British law, British freedom, British parliaments, British character. I am not boasting, ladies and gentlemen, of my own land; I am only reciting how your race has endured and survived separation from you and your land. Our foundations were British; our political structure is British with variations; our social structure is British—also with important variations; more important still, our standards of character and of honour and of duty are your standards; and life and freedom have the same meaning to us that they have to you. These are the essential things; and in these we have always been one. Our admixture of races to make a richer American stock is similar to the admixture of races that went, in an earlier time, to the making of a richer British stock on these Islands. In most of our steps forward in human advancement we have but repeated in a larger land and under new conditions the steps that you took in these Islands in the struggling days of the making of our race and in the beginnings of its institutions.

During the long period of sailing craft and before the telegraph, we lost no racial characteristics. We lost only close personal contact. We lost personal acquaintance. We even had sharp differences

of opinion, which in fact is a quality of our race. But, if you review our history carefully, you will discover, I think, that no difference that ever arose between us was ever half as important as it got credit for being at the time. Most of them were superficial differences. Such as were more serious found settlement—once again by war and many times by patient study that led to understanding. And when they were settled, they were settled. That has always been our way with one another.

We were, under the influence of swift communication and travel, already losing our long isolation, and you were relaxing your mis-judgments when our Civil War again proved that we were made of the same stuff that had made the race on this Island; and we swung into a period of even closer understanding.

And now the day of our supreme test and of the heroic mood is come. There is now a race-reason why we should have a complete understanding; and such a complete understanding is come.

You will, I hope, pardon me for even alluding to our old differences; for they are now long forgotten far-off things. I allude to them only to clear the way. It is not the going of the Pilgrims nor the falling away of the colonies that we now celebrate, but rather the coming of American warships which symbolize the new union of the two peoples that this fierce assault on our civilization has revealed afresh. Politically two peoples, in all high aims and in the love of freedom we are one, and must now remain at one forever.

This war has swept away incidental differences between us as a harrow smooths a field. Not only are our warships come—our troop ships, too, have landed an army on the soil of our brave Ally where the enemy yet keeps the wavering line of an invader; and more warships will come and more troop ships, million-laden if need be, till that line is forever broken and till the submarines are withdrawn or are forever submerged. There is coming the greatest victory for free government that was ever won, and the day of this victory which we are both fighting for may turn out to be the most important date in our history or perhaps in all history.

And the necessity to win it has cleared the air as no other event in modern times has cleared it; and but for the millions of brave lives that are gone out, this clearing of the air would richly repay all that the war will cost.

It has revealed the future of the world to us not as conquerors but as preservers of its peace. The free peace-loving nations will have no more of this colossal armed and ordered murder and pillage; and no combination of the peace-loving nations can be made effective without both branches of the English-speaking peoples. This Empire and the Great Republic must, then, be the main guardians of civilization hereafter, the conscious and leagued guardians of the world.

It is this that the war has revealed to us. 'It is not a task of our seeking. But it is a task that we will, with the other free peoples of the world, gladly undertake.

To undertake it, our comradeship must become perpetual, and our task is to see to it that it be not broken nor even strained—our task and our children's task after us.

It is, of course, the function of governments to keep friendly nations in proper relations to one another; and both our nations fortunately can and do trust both our governments to do that. Through all the difficulties and differences that arose between our two Governments during the early stages of the war, there was no rupture of friendly dealing. When the full story of these years of delicate controversies comes to be told, it will be seen that mutual toleration and forbearance played a far larger part than a rigid insistence on disputed points. Such differences as we had were differences between friends. I am sure that I may say with propriety that the two distinguished British statesmen who were His Majesty's Chief Foreign Secretaries during this period showed a spirit in their dealings with the United States Government that put the whole English-speaking world in their debt; and I am sure that they would say the same for the Government of the United States.

But while fortunately our two Governments may be fully trusted to bind us together, governments come and governments go. In free countries they are as a rule short-lived; and they are always and properly, even in the conduct of foreign relations, the servants of public opinion if public opinion strongly assert itself. Far more important, then, than any particular Government is the temper and action of public opinion in free countries such as ours. The complete and permanent union in all large aims of our two nations, generation after generation, must, therefore, rest on the broad base of a friendly and informed public opinion in both countries.

If this argument be sound it leads us—every one of us—to a high duty. The lasting friendship of two democratic nations must rest on the sympathetic knowledge that the people of each nation have of the other—even upon the personal friendships of large numbers of people one with another. Personal friendships make a friendly public opinion. It is, therefore, the highest political duty that Britons and Americans can have to build up personal knowledge of one another and personal friendships. But we do not get far so long as we leave the subject expressed in these general terms. We must make a definite personal application of this duty. I say, then, that it is *your* duty to learn all you can about the United States—about the country, the people, their institutions, their occupations, their aims, and to make the acquaintance of as many Americans as you can. It may be that you will not like them all. It may be that you do not

like all your own countrymen. But you will at least, I think, like most Americans. Cultivate them. Most of all, make an opportunity to go and see them and see their country and get a sympathetic knowledge of their methods and ways of life—make a proper appraisal of their character and aims. And, of course, this action must be mutual. In normal times many thousands of Americans do pay visits to your kingdom. They make pilgrimages. They come for pleasure and instruction. As soon as the war ends, they will come again in still greater numbers.

But, in spite of the visits either way or both ways of large numbers of individuals, each people has a vast deal of ignorance about the other. Few merely private visitors get beneath the superficial conventions. By deliberately going about the task we may get far more thoroughly acquainted than we can get by the mere interchange of personal visits. I venture to put together a few definite suggestions.

Put in your schools an elementary book about the United States—not a dull text-book, but a book written by a sympathetic man of accurate knowledge which shall tell every child in Britain about the country, about the people, how they work, how they live, what results they have achieved, what they aim at; about the United States Government, about our greatest men, about our social structure—a book that shall make the large facts plain to any child; and require that every child shall read it. A perfunctory book will fail. Have a hundred books written, if necessary, till the right one be written. There is, as you know, one great book written by an Englishman about the United States—Lord Bryce's 'American Commonwealth'. I wish it were read by as many persons here as in America. But this is not a book for children. There ought to be a more elementary book. You have often criticised certain old text-books of American history on which American children were supposed to be brought up—you have properly criticised them for laying undue emphasis on our war of revolution and on the conflicts our forefathers had with your forefathers. Now prepare a proper book for your own children, correct any disproportions these old American school books may have had, and give the chief emphasis not to our old differences but to our present likenesses and to our necessary close understanding for the future.

On the American side, the disproportion and the wrong temper of these old text-books that have been much criticised are now, I think, fast disappearing. The newer text-books have corrected this old fault of our period of isolation. On the American side, too, I hope to see a modern elementary book about Great Britain put into schools—a book that shall tell children of the present Great Britain and point in the right spirit to the future. If we rear our children to understand the friendly similarities of our two peoples instead of

lodging old differences in their minds, we may lie down and die at ease and entrust to them the future not only of our two lands but of the whole world as well.

Then encourage the giving of popular lectures by well-informed Americans about our country and our people. If you show that you wish to hear them, they will come. There is at this moment a well-informed group of your countrymen each lecturing in the United States on some phase of British life or activity, and a well-informed group of my countrymen in this Kingdom, each lecturing on some phase of American life or activity.

I heartily hope that this form of popular instruction will continue and will grow long after the war is ended. After all, it is a commonplace to say that there is no other land so full of pleasant and useful information for Americans as this Kingdom, and no other people so well worth our intimate acquaintance as your people; and it is equally true that no other land and no other people are so well worth your sympathetic study as the United States and those that dwell there; for they have the spirit of the modern world as no others have it. I hope you will pardon me for saying that a visit to America is an excursion into the future.

We ought, too, to welcome and encourage the moving pictures of each country that are shown in the other—pictures of characteristic and instructive scenes and activities. It requires little imagination to see the immeasurable effect on public opinion I will say of ten years of such popular presentation of each land and each people to one another. Every visitor either way could then say what a friend of mine said on his first visit to England, "Oh, I know. It is so familiar. I have been here before—been here in almost all the great books that I ever read. I've not come to England. I've come *back* to England."

Another useful piece of the machinery of popular education—perhaps the most useful piece—is the Press. Many of the most energetic editors in either country have visited the other. But if visits of groups of them were frequently arranged and if definite programs were made for them to touch the real spirit of the other country, better results would follow than follow casual visits. And, if when either country or government seems to do anything contrary to a proper understanding with the other country or government, if then instead of making judgments at a distance, a group of men who control the chief organs of opinion would themselves visit the other country and make personal first-hand investigations of what had gone wrong, many of our mistakes would be instantly corrected and well nigh all misunderstandings would disappear as soon as they arise.

The thing to do is to *will* a right understanding, and then it will be hard for a wrong understanding to arise.

I believe also in the suggestion that has been made of regular personal correspondence between persons in each country. In spite of the newspapers, accurate and full information about what each country is doing to prosecute the war is very hard to get in the other country. I recently met an Englishman who told me that he was kept informed by an American correspondent. "Every important step taken by your government or people," said he, "is promptly though quite briefly explained by my American correspondent." These two men met in London by chance, and their correspondence grew out of this casual meeting. It is, of course, possible, with very little trouble, for every well-informed man and woman in each country to come to such an arrangement with some man or woman in the other country. In addition to the welcome information that can thus be conveyed, there will, of course, in many cases spring up a personal friendship that is the best bond of continual amity between peoples. I think that much pleasure and instruction would come of such personal correspondence.)

I might make many such practical suggestions. Among them I should certainly include the encouragement of British students to go to American universities and of more American students to British universities; and I should include pilgrimages both ways of large bodies of educational workers. You may say that all these things cost money. They are less costly than ignorance of one another. Besides, if our two peoples are to come together as we hope, travel must become much cheaper than it has ever been.

And, perhaps, most important of all, I would suggest frequent visits by our public men, especially those who hold high office. I need cite only the recent historic visit of Mr. Balfour to the United States and his historic reception there. I doubt if any member of the Government of any people ever made a visit to another people, since governments began, that had so great an effect.

Now none of these particular suggestions may prove practicable to you, and whether any particular suggestion be practical for any particular person or community can be tested only by trial. But some plan is practical, here in Plymouth, and about this your judgment is better than mine. My plea is that the people of every British community and the people of every American community shall find a way to inform themselves about the other country, for all such information brings with it a closer sympathy. The sympathetic understanding between any two free countries depends on the number of citizens in each country who themselves have a sympathetic understanding one with another. And even Great Britain and the United States, which understand one another better by far than any other two great countries in the world, would come much closer together if in every community in each country there were a group of men

who made the furthering of such an understanding their particular business.

There is no other task in the world so important for the security of civilization.

Most valuable of all the activities that lead to a permanent sympathy is our present fellowship in war. Americans now here confer daily with most departments of your Government, and your corresponding representatives in the United States confer with most Departments of the American Government, so that the greatest possible unity of action may be secured. Our high naval and our high military officers are in command of our forces in your waters and on the soil of France. Our fleets in your seas are constantly becoming larger, and our advance army in France receives constant additions. The most skilful American surgeons attend the Allied wounded of all armies, and American nurses in ever-increasing numbers serve them. American engineers and labourers are laying railways behind the British and French lines. American scientific men are giving their skill not only at home but at the front to perfect scientific methods of making military activities more accurate. American lumbermen are felling your forests and cutting the trees for war uses. Laborers under American engineers are building and rebuilding military roads in France. And our money is pouring into all the Allies' war coffers.

And most of all American fighting units, naval and army and air service, are come and very many more will come. They all work side by side with your men and with the French. And most of these, of course, are young men, and like your young men, the flower of our race. Now these are forming companionships that nothing can sever. Men who go forth to die together, if fate so will it, understand one another as long as they survive. Beside the comradeship of arms, formed where death comes swift, other companionships seem weak. For men's naked souls are then bared to one another. In this extremest trial that men ever underwent anywhere at any time, only the deepest emotions are at work; everything else of life is still or pushed out of consciousness. And men who come together then are forever inseparable. Already there's many a corner of a foreign field that is forever England; and presently there'll be many a corner of a foreign land that is an American grave also. Those that die and those that live hereafter alike so bind our two peoples in mutual understanding that any disturber of that understanding will but play the poor part of a sacrilegious fool, and is an enemy of the peace of the world.

In comparison with this cementing of the two great branches of our common civilization, how cheap seems my poor talk or any other man's, and how little worth while your kind and patient hear-

ing! Our common peril and our companionship in staying it have already made us one forever.

Mr. Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen, I greeted you as kinsmen. I shall leave you linked in my memory with the immortal recollection of these heroic days when the sons of the Pilgrims are come to offer their lives for our common freedom. By the sacrifices that we both make and by our sacred duty to keep the peace of the world, let us pledge ourselves to a common understanding forever.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

An address by Lieutenant-General, the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, commanding the British forces in the East African Campaign, delivered at a banquet given in his honor by members of both Houses of Parliament on May 15, 1917.¹

Ever since I have come to this country, about two months ago, I have received nothing but the most profound and charming kindness and hospitality, which has culminated in this unique banquet to-night. I appreciate it all the more because I know it is given at a time when the greatest storm in the world's history is raging, and when nobody in this country or great city feels inclined to indulge in any festivities or banquets. When I return home I shall be able to tell the people of South Africa that I have been received by you not as a guest, not as a stranger, but simply as one of yourselves. Speaking with a somewhat different accent, and laying a different emphasis on many things, as no doubt becomes a barbarian from the outer marches of the

¹ The Speech made by General Smuts on May 15 at the banquet given in his honor by members of both Houses of Parliament was one of the finest and most statesmanlike utterances that the war has produced. If the British nation did not realize fully before, it assuredly will understand now what a noble ornament and strong pillar of the Empire it possesses in the soldier-statesman who has been representing the Union of South Africa in the Imperial War Conference. Hitherto we have thought of him principally as a brilliant soldier—how brilliant the records of his campaigns in what were once German East and South-West Africa are the best witness—but, great as his military services have been, the future may well reveal political services even more valuable still. This is always a rare—and sometimes a dangerous—combination of genius, but we know from General Smuts's speeches where his dearest hopes are centered, that he hates war, though he is a master of its art, and that all his ambitions are set upon being of service to his fellow-countrymen in South Africa and to the Empire to which he is proud to belong. The British Empire is, indeed, fortunate when the soldier who but fifteen years ago was its sturdy and dangerous opponent in arms, now comes with laurels won against a common foe, and, within the walls of the British Parliament itself, delivers an address cordial in friendship, and instinct, as are few utterances of our time, with political wisdom and understanding.—London *Daily Telegraph*, May 17, 1917.

Empire—and one whose mind is not yet deeply furrowed with trenches and dugouts—I would like first of all to say how profoundly thankful I am to Lord French for the words which have fallen from his lips. Your expressions in regard to myself are largely, I feel, undeserved. At any rate, I accept them as coming from an old opponent and comrade in arms. I know they are meant in the best spirit, and I accept them as such.

Your words recall to my mind many an incident of those stirring times when we were opposing commanders in the Boer War. I may refer to two. On one occasion I was surrounded by Lord French—and was practically face to face with disaster. Nothing was left me but, by the most diligent scouting, to find a way out. I ventured into a place which bore the very appropriate name of Murderers' Gap—and I was the only man who came out alive. One account of that stated that one Boer escaped, but he probably had so many bullets in him that he would be no further danger. I survived to be your guest to-night. Two days after I broke through—blessed words in these times—and on a very dark night, I came to a railway, which I was just on the point of crossing, when we heard a train. Some of us felt inclined to wreck and capture that train, but for some reason or other I said, "No, let it pass." You can imagine my feelings when some time afterwards I learned that the only freight on that train was Sir John French with one or two A.D.C.'s, moving round from one part of his front to another to find out how I had broken through. If I had not missed that chance he would have been my guest, no doubt very welcome, though no doubt embarrassing. Fate has willed otherwise. I am his guest.

Those were very difficult and strenuous days in which one learned many a valuable lesson, good for all life. One of those lessons was that under stress of great difficulty practically everything breaks down ultimately, and the only things that survive are really the simple human feelings of loyalty and comradeship to your fellows, and patriotism which can stand any strain and bear you through all difficulty and privation. We soldiers know the extraordinary value of these simple feelings, how far they go, and what strain they can bear, and how ultimately they support the whole weight of civilization. That war was carried on by both sides in a sportsmanlike spirit, and in a clean, chivalrous way—and out of that calamity has been produced the happy state of affairs that you see today in South Africa, and which led to a new basis on which to build the larger and happier South Africa which is arising today.

I am sure in the present great struggle now being waged you will see some cause leading to lasting results. Here you have from all parts of the British Empire young men gathering on the battlefields of Europe, and whilst your statesmen keep planning a great scheme of

union for the future of the Empire, my feeling is that very largely the work is already done. The spirit of comradeship has been born in this campaign on the battlefields of Europe, and many of the men from the various parts of the Empire will be far more powerful than any instrument of government that you can elect in the future. I feel sure that in after days, when our successors come to sum up what has happened and draw up a balance-sheet, there will be a good credit balance due to this common feeling of comradeship which will have been built up. Now once more, as many ages ago during the Roman Empire, the Germanic volcano is in eruption, and the whole world is shaking. No doubt in this great evolution you are faced in this country with the most difficult and enormous problems which any Government or people have ever been called upon to face—problems of world-wide strategy, of man-power, communications, food supply, of every imaginable kind and magnitude, so large that it is almost beyond the wit of man to solve them, and it is intelligible that where you have so many difficulties to face, one forgets to keep before one's eye the situation as a whole. And yet that is very necessary.

It is most essential that even in this bitter struggle, even when Europe is looming so large before our eyes, we should keep before us the whole situation. We should see it steadily, and see it whole. I would ask you not to forget in these times the British Commonwealth of nations. Do not forget that larger world which is made up of all the nations that belong to the Empire. Bear in mind that after all Europe is not so large, and will not always continue to loom so large as at present. Even now in the struggle the pace of Europe is being permanently slowed down. Your Empire is spread all over the world, and even where the pace is slowed down in one portion it is accelerated in another, and you have to keep the whole before you in order to judge fairly and sanely of the factors which affect the whole.

I wish to say a few words tonight on this subject, because I think there is a tendency sometimes to forget certain aspects of the great questions with which we are now confronted. That is one of the reasons why I am glad the Imperial Conference was called at this time, apparently a very opportune moment, and yet the calling of this Conference at this time has already directed attention once more to that other aspect of the whole situation which is so important to us. Remember, it is not only Europe that we have to consider, but also the future of this great commonwealth to which we all belong. It is peculiarly situated; it is scattered over the whole world; it is not a compact territory; it is dependent for its very existence on world-wide communications, which must be maintained or this Empire goes to pieces. In the past thirty years you see what has happened. Everywhere upon your communications Germany has settled down; everywhere upon the communications of the whole globe you will find

a German colony here and there, and the day would have come when your Empire would have been in very great jeopardy from your lines of communication being cut.

Now, one of the by-products of this war has been that the whole world outside Europe has been cleared of the enemy. Germany has been swept from the seas, and from all continents except Central Europe. Whilst Germany has been gaining ground in Central Europe, from the rest of the world she has been swept clean; and, therefore, you are now in this position—almost providentially brought to this position—that once more you can consider the problem of your future as a whole. When peace comes to be made you have all these parts in your hand, and you can go carefully into the question of what is necessary for your future security and your future safety as an Empire, and you can say, so far as it is possible under war circumstances, what you are going to keep and what you are going to give away.

That is a very important precedent. I hope when the time comes—I am speaking for myself, and expressing nobody's opinion but my own—I feel when the time comes for peace we should not bear only Central Europe in mind, but the whole British Empire. As far as we are concerned, we do not wish this war to have been fought in vain. We have not fought for material gain, or for territory; we have fought for security in the future. If we attach any value to this group of nations which compose the British Empire, then we, in settling peace, will have to look carefully at our future safety and security, and I hope that will be done, and that no arrangement will be made which will jeopardize the very valuable and lasting results which have been attained.

That is the geographical question. There remains the other question—a very difficult question—of the future constitutional relations and readjustments in the British Empire. At a luncheon given recently by the Empire Parliamentary Association I said, rather cryptically, that I did not think this was a matter in which we should follow precedents, and I hope you will bear with me if I say a few words on that theme, and develop more fully what I meant. I think we are inclined to make mistakes in thinking about this group of nations to which we belong, because too often we think of it merely as one State. The British Empire is much more than a State. I think the very expression "Empire" is misleading, because it makes people think as if we are one single entity, one unity, to which that term "Empire" can be applied. We are not an Empire. Germany is an Empire, so was Rome, and so is India, but we are a system of nations, a community of states and of nations far greater than any empire which has ever existed; and by using this ancient expression we really obscure the real fact that we are larger and that our whole position is different, and that we are not one nation, or state, or em-

pire, but we are a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations and states, and all sorts of communities under one flag. We are a system of states, not only a static system, a stationary system, but a dynamic system, growing, evolving all the time towards new destinies.

Here you have a kingdom with a number of Crown colonies; besides that you have large protectorates like Egypt, which is an empire in itself, which was one of the greatest empires in the world. Besides that you have great dependencies like India—an empire in itself, one of the oldest civilizations in the world, and we are busy there trying to see how East and West can work together, how the forces that have kept the East going can be worked in conjunction with the ideas we have evolved in Western civilization for enormous problems within that State. But beyond that we come to the so-called Dominions, a number of nations and states almost sovereign, almost independent, who govern themselves, who have been evolved on the principles of your constitutional system, now almost independent states, and who all belong to this group, to this community of nations, which I prefer to call the British Commonwealth of nations. Now, you see that no political ideas that we evolved in the past, no nomenclature will apply to this world which is comprised in the British Empire; any expression, any name which we have found so far for this group has been insufficient, and I think the man who would discover the real appropriate name for this vast system of entities would be doing a great service not only to this country, but to constitutional theory.

The question is, how are you going to provide for the future government of this group of nations? It is an entirely new problem. If you want to see how great it is you must take the United States in comparison. There you find what is essential—one nation, not perhaps in the fullest sense, but more and more growing into one; one big State, consisting of subordinate parts, but whatever the nomenclature of the United States Constitution, you have one national State, over one big, contiguous area. That is the problem presented by the United States, and for which they discovered this federal solution, which means subordinate governments for the subordinate parts, but one national Federal Parliament for the whole.

Compare with that state of facts this enormous system comprised in the British Empire of nations all over the world, some independent, living under diverse conditions, and all growing towards greater nations than they are at present. You can see at once that the solution which has been found practicable in the case of the United States probably never will work under our system. That is what I feel in all the empires of the past, and even in the United States—the effort has been towards forming one nation. All the empires that we have known in the past and that exist today are founded on the idea of assimilation, of trying to force different human material through one

mould so as to form one nation. Your whole idea and basis is entirely different. You do not want to standardize the nations of the British Empire. You want to develop them into greater nationhood. These younger communities, the offspring of the Mother Country, or territories like that of my own people, which have been annexed after various vicissitudes of war—all these you want not to mould on any common pattern, but you want them to develop according to the principles of self-government and freedom and liberty. Therefore, your whole basic idea is different from anything that has ever existed before, either in the empires of the past or even in the United States.

I think that this is the fundamental fact which we have to bear in mind—that the British Empire, or this British Commonwealth of nations, does not stand for unity, standardization, or assimilation, or denationalization; but it stands for a fuller, a richer, and more various life among all the nations that compose it. And even nations who have fought against you, like my own, must feel that they and their interests, their language, their religions, and all their cultural interests are as safe and as secure under the British flag as those of the children of your household and your own blood. It is only in proportion as that is realized that you will fulfil the true mission which you have undertaken. Therefore, it seems, speaking my own individual opinion, that there is only one solution, that is the solution supplied by our past traditions of freedom, self-government, and the fullest development. We are not going to force common Governments, federal or otherwise, but we are going to extend liberty, freedom, and nationhood more and more in every part of the Empire.

The question arises, how are you going to keep this world together if there is going to be all this enormous development towards a more varied and richer life among all its parts? It seems to me that you have two potent factors that you must rely on for the future. The first is your hereditary kingship. I have seen some speculations recently in the papers of this country upon the position of the kingship of this country; speculations by people who, I am sure, have never thought of the wider issues that are at stake. You cannot make a Republic in this country. You cannot make a Republic of the British Commonwealth of nations, because if you have to elect a President not only in these Islands, but all over the British Empire, who will be the ruler and representative of all these peoples, you are facing an absolutely insoluble problem. Now, you know the theory of our Constitution is that the King is not merely your King, but he is the King of all of us. He represents every part of the whole Commonwealth of nations. If his place is to be taken by anybody else, then that somebody will have to be elected by a process which, I think, will pass the wit of man to devise. Therefore let us be thankful for the mercies we have. We have a kingship here which is really not very different from a heredi-

tary Republic, and I am sure that more and more in the future the trend will be in that direction, and I shall not be surprised to see the time when our Royal princes, instead of getting their Consorts among the princelings of Central Europe, will go to the Dominions and the outlying portions of the Empire.

I think that in the theory of the future of this great Empire it is impossible to attach too much importance to this institution which we have existing, and which can be developed, in my opinion, to the greatest uses possible for its future preservation and development. It will, of course, be necessary to go further than that. It is not only the symbol of unity which you have in the Royal ruler, but you will have to develop further common institutions.

Everyone admits that it would be necessary to devise better machinery for common consultation than we have had hitherto. So far we have relied upon the Imperial Conference which meets every four years, and which, however useful for the work it has done hitherto, has not, in my opinion, been a complete success. It will be necessary to devise better means for achieving our ends. A certain precedent has been laid down of calling the Prime Ministers and representatives from the Empire of India to the Imperial Cabinet, and we have seen the statement made by Lord Curzon that it is the intention of the Government to perpetuate that practice in future. Although we have not yet the details of the scheme, and we have to wait for a complete exposition of the subject from his Majesty's Government, yet it is clear that in an institution like that you have a far better instrument of common consultation than you have in the old Imperial Conference, which was called only every four years, and which discussed a number of subjects which were not really of first-rate importance. After all, what you want is to call together the most important statesmen in the Empire from time to time—say once a year, or as often as may be found necessary—to discuss matters which concern all parts of the Empire in common, and in order that causes of friction and misunderstanding may be removed. A common policy should be laid down to determine the true orientation of our Imperial policy.

Take foreign policy, for instance, on which the fate of the Empire may from time to time depend. I think it is highly desirable that at least once a year the most important leaders of the Empire should be called together to discuss these matters, and to determine a common policy, which would then be carried out in detail by the various executive Governments of the commonwealth nations. This Imperial Council or Cabinet will not themselves exercise executive functions, but they will lay down the policy which will be carried out by the Governments of the various parts of the Empire. A system like that, although it looks small, must in the end lead to very important results and very great changes. You cannot settle a common policy for the

whole of the British Empire without changing that policy very considerably from what it has been in the past, because the policy will have to be, for one thing, far simpler. We do not understand diplomatic finesse in other parts of the Empire. We go by large principles, and things which can be easily understood by our undeveloped democracies. If your foreign policy is going to rest, not only on the basis of your Cabinet here, but finally on the whole of the British Empire, it will have to be a simpler and more intelligible policy, which will, I am sure, lead in the end to less friction, and the greater safety of the Empire.

Of course, no one will ever dispute the primacy of the Imperial Government in these matters. Whatever changes and developments come about, we shall always look upon the British Government as the senior partner in this concern. When this Council is not sitting the Imperial Government will conduct the foreign affairs of the Empire. But it will always be subject to the principles and policy which have been laid down in these common conferences from time to time, and which, I think, will be a simpler and probably, in the long run, a saner and safer policy for the Empire as a whole. Naturally, it will lead to greater publicity. There is no doubt that, after the catastrophe that has overtaken Europe, nations in future will want to know more about the way their affairs are conducted. And you can understand that, once it is no longer an affair of one Government, but of a large number of Governments who are responsible ultimately to their Parliaments for the action they have taken, you may be sure there will be a great deal more publicity and discussion of foreign affairs than there has ever been.

I am sure that the after effects of a change like this, although it looks a simple change, are going to be very important, not only for this community of nations, but for the world as a whole. Far too much stress is laid upon the instruments of government. People are inclined to forget that the world is getting more democratic, and that forces which find expression in public opinion are going to be far more powerful in the future than they have been in the past. You will find that you have built up a spirit of comradeship and a common feeling of patriotism, and that the instrument of government will not be the thing that matters so much as the spirit that actuates the whole system of all its parts. That seems to me to be your mission. You talk about an Imperial mission. It seems to me this British Empire has only one mission, and that is a mission for greater liberty and freedom and self-development. Yours is the only system that has ever worked in history where a large number of nations have been living in unity. Talk about the League of Nations—you are the only league of nations that has ever existed; and if the line that I am sketching here is correct, you are going to be an even greater

league of nations in the future; and if you are true to your old traditions of self-government and freedom, and to this vision of your future and your mission, who knows that you may not exercise far greater and more beneficent influence on the history of mankind than you have ever done before?

In the welter of confusion which is probably going to follow the war in Europe, you will stand as the one system where liberty to work successfully has kept together divers communities. You may be sure the world such as will be surrounding you in the times that are coming will be very likely to follow your example. You may become the real nucleus for the world government for the future. There is no doubt that is the way things will go in the future. You have made a successful start; and if you keep on the right track your Empire will be a solution of the whole problem.

I hope I have given no offense. When I look around this brilliant gathering, and see before me the most important men in the Government of the United Kingdom, I was rather anxious that we should discuss this matter, which concerns our future so very vitally—a matter which should never be forgotten even in this awful struggle, in which all our energies are engaged. Memories of the past keep crowding in upon me. I think of all the difficulties which have surrounded us in the past, and I am truly filled with gratitude for the reception which you have given me, and with gratitude to Time, the great and merciful judge, which has healed many wounds—and gratitude to that Divinity which “shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will.” I think of the difficulties that still lie ahead of us, which are going to test all the nations fighting for liberty far more than they have ever been tested in the past, and I hope and pray that they all may have clearness of vision and purpose, and especially that strength of soul in the coming days, which will be more necessary than strength of arm. I verily believe that we are within reach of priceless and immeasurable good, not only for this United Kingdom and group of nations to which we belong, but also for the whole world. But, of course, it will depend largely upon us whether the great prize is achieved now in this struggle, or whether the world will be doomed to long, weary waiting in the future. The prize is within our grasp, if we have strength, especially the strength of soul, which I hope we shall have, to see this thing through without getting tired of waiting until victory crowns the efforts of our brave men in the field.

AMERICA AND FREEDOM

An article written by Viscount Grey of Falloden as the preface for a pamphlet entitled "America and Freedom," published in 1917, which contains President Wilson's official statements on the war and speeches by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith on the United States and the War.

Two great events there have been in this year so full of hope and ultimate good prospect that each when it occurred quickened our thoughts, raised our spirits, and even in the terrible strain and anxiety of the present made us look up and look forward to the future with confidence.

One of these events is the Russian revolution, with which this paper is not concerned and which is mentioned here very shortly only because it is too important to be passed entirely without notice, and because it is by no means irrelevant to relations between the Allies and the United States. A revolution of the magnitude of the Russian revolution cannot take place without some excesses, some dark days, and a period of great confusion. The effect of this confusion on military action is unfavourable, and we cannot and should not ignore the fact that the strain upon the armies of the other Allies has thereby been greatly increased and their task made harder than ever at one very critical moment of the war. Nevertheless, Russia free may yet become more powerful in the war for freedom and far more helpful in the making of peace than she could ever have been under a reactionary Government. And nothing should shake our confidence that in the long run the change in Russia must be a great good, not only for Russia, but for Europe, and, indeed, for the world. A free Russia is a splendid increase of freedom in the world, and whatever the immediate and passing effect upon the progress of the war, the future effect upon democracy in Europe and upon international relations generally must be most favourable and of incalculable value and benefit. The other great event is the entry of the United States of America into the war against Prussianized Germany, which is the subject of this publication.

The entry of the United States into the war is a tremendous fact, even when considered only in the limited aspect of its direct effect upon the war. Let us consider this aspect by itself first.

Before the war the United States had become potentially the strongest country in the world; not the largest in number of population—China, no doubt, has that superiority—but the strongest, if account is taken of the combined value of numbers, extent of undivided territory, unity of public spirit, power of organization, material resources, and all that goes to make effective strength. During the war the United States has gained in wealth, while the European belligerents—Germany as much as any—have spent strength, and now after three years of war, Germany in an advanced state of exhaustion, with all those whom she has attacked still in the field, has to reckon with the United States. One qualification no doubt, must be made, and it is important. The full strength of the United States is not yet mobilized for war; that will take time, and it is, therefore, true that their intervention in the war cannot be by military or naval action decisive in a short time; but it is equally true that no conceivable military or naval success of the German arms in Europe could now secure a German peace. Germany cannot get peace and the economic recovery, which she at least as much as the other great European belligerents needs, except on the conditions that the United States may consider essential to their own interests and to the future peace and freedom of the world. It is impossible to get round this fact, and it is not surprising that Germany dares not face it and turns her back upon it that she may not face it, for that is what the organized silence and contempt in Germany of the action of the United States really mean.

But there is another aspect of the entry of the United States into the War that is much greater, of deeper significance, and of more far-reaching consequence. It is to be seen in the reasons and spirit of the decision taken by the President and the nation. The public utterances of President Wilson when announcing the decision and subsequently are full of it and are inspired by it. The United States have departed from the policy of isolation not from favour to one set of combatants against another, nor even from sympathy with one side against the other, real and strong though the sympathy with some of the Allies has been in large sections of the American people since the outbreak of the war. This has not been the motive that forced the tremendous national decision, but a growing conviction, which gradually became settled, deep and paramount, that this terrible war is a desperate and critical struggle against something evil and intensely dangerous to moral law, to international good faith, to everything that is essential if different nations are to live together in the world in equal freedom and friendship. The will to power—it is a German phrase—has shown in the course of this war that it knows neither mercy, pity,

nor limits. Militarism is one quality of it, and it stands for things that all democracies, if they wish to remain free and to be part of a world that is free, must hate. This conviction and a sense that the old barriers of the world are broken down by modern conditions, that the cause of humanity is one, and that no nation so great and free as the United States could stand aside in this crisis without sacrificing its honour and losing its soul, are—so we believe—the real motive and cause of the decision of the United States. Democracies are reluctant to take such decisions until they are attacked or until their own material interests are directly and deeply involved, and the United States did not take the decision till German action in the war made it imperative; but then they took it with a clearness, an emphasis, and a declaration of principle that will be one of the landmarks and shining examples of all human history.

Comparison may be made between the entry of the United States into the war and that of the British people. There is some resemblance, but there is a difference. The outrageous invasion of Belgium, involving special and separate Treaty obligations, left Great Britain at the outset no alternative; her decision had to be sudden; the whole people felt at once that there was no honourable way of avoiding war. Articles have been written since to show that the interest of Great Britain was directly involved, that though Belgium and France were attacked she, too, was threatened; and all that is true. Numerous public utterances in Germany since the war began have disclosed that the German purpose was to subject not only Belgium and France, but also Great Britain, to German predominance. But the British people had no time at the outset to consider where their interest lay; had it not been so they would have taken time to consider and to argue, but as things were honour was so clearly and peremptorily challenged and sympathy so deeply outraged by the initial action of Germany that there was no time for consideration and no place for argument. This it was that made the decision of the British people so practically unanimous, so quick, and so thorough. The decision of the United States was slow and deliberate; it is apparently not less unanimous and thorough, and each decision will have its own impressiveness in history.

On our first entry into the war we were, as the United States now is, free to decide our own part and our own terms of peace. When Japan entered the war the obligation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to make war and peace in common came into effect; then the agreement of September, 1914, made mutual and binding agreements between ourselves and France and Russia, and our position now is that of the other nations who are parties to the agreement of September, 1914. The United States are independent of that agreement; this is a differ-

ence important and definite, though I believe it will be small in practical effect compared with the deep underlying identity of view, principle, and feeling.

President Wilson said the other day that this is a conflict for "human liberty." That is what the Allies have been made by German action in the war to feel more and more deeply, and this feeling is a greater bond of union than anything else. There is one more thing to be added. I was talking the other day to a man who had been some two years at the front and was home for ten days' leave. Of all feelings, those that have the most right to be considered with attention and deference are the feelings of the men who are risking their lives and undergoing the awful trial and suffering of trench warfare. In this man's feeling there was no hatred and no passion; there was great weariness and great longing for the end of the war, but an intense desire to see the war end in such a way that, if he survived, the rest of his life—he is a young man—should be free from war and threats of war. That, too, as I understand, is President Wilson's policy and purpose—human liberty and secure peace.

Permanent peace has hitherto been an ideal; will a League of Nations or some concrete proposal of that kind become practicable after this war? Will the ideal come within the limits of practical, effective politics? This is too large a question to be discussed here. My own hope and belief is that it will. This war will bring about a new order of things. In domestic affairs old questions will be swept off the board of politics by new problems and new questions, to which many of the old phrases, the old formulas and previous points of view will not be applicable, and new men will perhaps be needed to solve the new problems. And in international politics new ideas may prevail, and things hitherto impossible may become possible. How much becomes possible will depend upon the change effected by the experience of this war, not so much in men's heads as in their hearts and feelings, and this we shall not know fully till the millions of men who have fought at the front are settled at home again and take their places in civil and political life in free democracies. If the result of this war is to destroy in Germany the popularity of war—for before 1914 the prospect of war was popular, at any rate in books that were widely read there without resentment, if not with approval—if war is felt even in Germany to be hateful; if as a result of this war men of all nations will desire in future to stamp out the first sign of war as they would a forest fire or the plague, then the world may have a peace and security that it has never yet known. If that is not the result, then the lot of mankind in this epoch of its history will be more desperate than in the darkest and most cruel ages, for civilized nations will prepare and perfect the destructive inventions of science, and these will be used to the point of mutual extermination. Militarism and civiliza-

tion are now incompatible, and nations must attain some greater measure of international self-control than has previously been thought possible if civilization is to progress or even to be preserved.

We hear—and no doubt it is true—that the German people long for peace, but they are not yet masters in their own house; the recent political crisis in Germany produced some change of men, but no evidence of a change of the ruling spirit; the message of the Crown Prince, who seems to have played a leading part in the crisis, ended with something about compelling others to respect the German flag as the *ultima ratio regum*. There was not a word in it about respect for the rights of others. Before the world can rely on the speeches of German Chancellors it must know to whom the German Chancellor is responsible. Is it to the Reichstag, or is it solely to the Emperor? And by whose favour is he chosen and maintained in place? Is it by the Emperor, the Crown Prince, and the Military Command? We want to be sure that when this war is over Germany will not begin to prepare and to plan for the next war, and there can be no security against that so long as the Prussian military caste is the strongest power in Germany. They will never give up the will to power, and that is incompatible with peace because it is inconsistent with the freedom and equal rights of other nations.

Much has been said about the resolution passed by the Reichstag in July. It is frequently difficult to be sure exactly what Parliamentary resolutions mean. They are often drawn to enable people who do not all mean the same thing to vote together for the same words, and there was apparently not unanimity in Germany as to the exact meaning of the Reichstag resolution. There are, however, two questions to be asked about the resolution: (1) Does the German Government endorse it and interpret it in the way in which it is interpreted by those in this country who take the most favourable view of it? (2) Is it to be a principle accepted and acted upon in Germany that the Government, by which is meant the Executive Power, is responsible to the Reichstag? It is quite right that the resolution of the Reichstag should not be ignored; the fact that some resolution of the kind was found necessary or was even permitted has some importance; but until the two questions asked above can be answered clearly and satisfactorily, I do not see how discussion of the value to be attached to this resolution of the Reichstag can profitably be carried further.

It might be, no doubt, that if the war ended tomorrow in an inconclusive peace the disappointment and war weariness of the German people would subsequently bring about a real change of power in Germany. Some evidence analogous to Bismarck's disclosure about the draft of the Ems telegram—something, for instance, showing that the ultimatum to Serbia was deliberately made stiff to make war certain—might come to light and reveal to the German people that strings were

pulled in Germany in 1914 with fatal effect by persons who desired and intended war; and such revelation coming after the experience of the last three years might be so hateful to the German people as to upset the military caste. It is possible; but to make peace on this hope would be gambling upon a chance, and the things at stake are too vital and awful for gambling. There is no end yet to the official deception and self-deception of the German people about the war, and as long as they ignore or are ignorant of the real facts about the origin of the war and the awful outrages perpetrated by their own Higher Command, particularly in the occupied parts of Belgium and France, for which, in the name of all that is right and just, there must be reparation, so long, it is to be feared, will the German people do nothing of their own initiative to remove the obstacles to peace.

The root of the matter is in President Wilson's words: "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour and partnership of opinion." Let it be admitted that no such partnership will be complete or secure till Germany fulfils the conditions for it and is included in it; and when it is evident that at a peace conference table the Allies will meet German plenipotentiaries who will accept and share in letter and spirit, and will represent German authority that also accepts and shares in letter and spirit, the views of national policy and the aspirations for the future of the world that are the matter of President Wilson's public declarations, then there will rightly be the strongest movements here and in the Allied countries to discuss peace and to end the terrible destruction of life and all the horrors of war; but till this is so the war is and will remain on the part of the United States and the Allies a defensive war, a war to defend human liberty and free nations from present and future military aggression.

There is but one other point on which I would touch; it is the prospective relations between Great Britain and the United States. Mr. Balfour's mission has, we hope, done something to make it felt in the United States that there is real community of ideas, sentiments, and sympathy. This country was fortunate in having Mr. Balfour to represent it on such a mission at such a time, and he very likely did more to promote understanding of us in America than anyone else could have done in the time. And the more closely the two people come into contact, the better they get to know each other, the more I believe it will be apparent to each not only that they speak the same language, but that they use it to mean the same things, that they both have the same idea of freedom and liberty, and desire the same sort of world in which to live. There is no reason in the forms of a Constitutional Monarchy why the British people should not be as free, as truly

and thoroughly a democracy, as any republic can be. The American Colonies of the 18th century by the War of Independence established not only independence, but democracy. The States of Europe, whose internal conditions were then different from those in America, were not yet ready for the same measure of democracy. Russia is only just beginning to establish it, but the change there promises to be thorough. All the other great States of Europe, except Germany (I omit Austria-Hungary because it is more impossible than ever to define the internal conditions of that mixed Empire), are now in form and in spirit and in fact democratic. Great Britain has attained it not less surely and thoroughly than others by the processes of political evolution. In all dealings I have had with Americans, official and unofficial, I have felt that the outlook upon national and individual life was the same. No written agreement is necessary to draw the two nations together or to keep them in friendship; what is needed is that each should continually see in the utterances of representative men, and in the writings of the Press, not the eccentricities and the fringe, but the real stuff of national feeling; not the froth and eddies, but the main deep current of public opinion in both countries.

That is what we feel about President Wilson's recent announcements. They satisfy, they carry conviction, they make us feel that we really know what he thinks and why he thinks it and how firmly he grasps it; and we hope that the response from public men and from the Press on this side is making the President and people of the United States feel that we really do respond earnestly and truly; that the sentiments and principles expressed by him are ours also, and that in what he has said of this war and of his hopes for the future he has spoken what is also in our minds and hearts.

If the millions of dear lives that have been given in this war are to have been given not in vain, if there is to be any lasting compensation for the appalling suffering of the last three years, the defeat of the Prussian will to power, however it is brought about, will not by itself be enough. Out of that defeat must come something constructive, some moral change in international relations, and the entry of the United States of America into the war, in the spirit and with the principles that have inspired their action, is an invaluable and, I trust, a sure and unconquerable guarantee that in the peace and after the peace these hopes will be realized.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE CONFERENCE ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

AN EXPERIMENT IN EDUCATION

Report of the National Conference on the Foreign Relations
of the United States, held at Long Beach, New York
May 28-June 1, 1917



BY
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DECEMBER, 1917

No. 121

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

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The National Conference on the Foreign Relations
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I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

Late in June, 1902, a college instructor who had recently received his degree of Doctor of Philosophy from a great American university, appeared at the office of one of the large publishing houses of New York City armed with a letter of introduction from Professor X, one of the most eminent authorities in international law and diplomacy in the United States. His purpose was to offer his thesis on the Eastern Question for publication. The head of the publishing firm answered: "A recommendation of a book to us by Professor X ordinarily means the publication of the book, but I regret to say that in this case we cannot afford to publish this book for the simple reason that it would have no market. Outside of a few missionaries, practically no one in the United States is at all interested in the Eastern Question." He was right. Moreover, the indifference and ignorance of Americans with respect to the Eastern Question extended to foreign affairs generally. When the Great War burst upon Europe August 1, 1914, occasioned by the un-

solved Eastern Question, even intelligent Americans knew little more about that question or about international problems generally than they did in 1902, when the book firm refused to publish the instructor's thesis.

Because of the interruption of commercial relations with Europe during the War of 1812 Americans were largely thrown upon their own resources and they began to turn their attention to domestic manufactures. Then came the great movement of population to the West and the opening up of new territory. Politically, also, the problems that concerned the American people were of domestic character, such as States Rights and Slavery. The supplying of the armies during the Civil War with food, clothing, and munitions resulted in an immense development of industry of all kinds, especially manufacturing, mining, and transportation. The need of money for the support of the armies caused the imposition of a high protective tariff and when the War was over the great problem submitted to the people for decision was whether the new industries brought into being by the war tariff should continue to receive protection. Before this question received definite solution, another closely associated with it arose to occupy the attention of the people, *viz.*: the metallic basis of our currency. From the War of 1812 to the Spanish War, therefore, the attention of our people was directed almost exclusively to domestic problems of pressing importance which left little time and thought to be devoted to questions of international politics. The Spanish War drew the attention of a considerable number of the intellectuals and of some statesmen to foreign affairs, but it attracted only the temporary interest of the mass of our citizens.

They soon reverted to problems of domestic concern, especially to that of the exploitation of the natural and human resources of the country by the great corporate interests. In no presidential contest in our history were the issues between the political parties devoted more exclusively to domestic affairs than in the campaign of 1912. Hence the outbreak of the war in Europe found our citizens in great ignorance of the political, economic, and diplomatic background of the great struggle. Moreover, this isolation of the United States, due partly to geographical situation, partly to historical tradition, and partly to economic development, had also had the effect of preventing the United States from making the contribution to international organization of which it was really capable.

The feeling of security resulting from its isolation, however, received many severe shocks as the Great War continued, and by the end of two years the country was confronted by a serious situation in its foreign affairs. It was evident to thoughtful observers that there was a strong possibility that the United States might become involved in the war, hence a widespread movement for preparedness swept over the country. At first the movement was confined to military preparedness, but profiting by the experience of the warring nations, it later took on a many-sided aspect. Individuals and organizations throughout the nation considered in what way they might best help it either wisely to maintain peace, or efficiently to enter war, if that became necessary. To the Board of Directors of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, which held its annual meeting in December, 1916, it seemed that no service to the nation could be

rendered by the Academy comparable in importance to the organization of a campaign of education to create a proper attitude upon the part of our people toward the international situation. From such a campaign of education there might develop what was happily phrased by President Butler as the 'international mind', which would be a national asset of the greatest value. To organize wisely such a campaign of education, a committee of the Board of Directors of the Academy appointed for the purpose decided on December 30, 1916, to appoint a general committee of distinguished citizens who had previously shown themselves deeply interested in the problems of our foreign relations. The personnel of the general committee is given at the end of this statement.

At its first meeting the following members of the General Committee were present: Elihu Root, Alton B. Parker, Charles E. Hughes, Adolph Lewisohn, Irving T. Bush, Samuel McCune Lindsay, George A. Plimpton, Henry Raymond Mussey, William L. Ransom, William R. Shepherd, Henry L. Stimson, Munroe Smith, George Whitelock, Edward T. Devine, Frederick P. Keppel, Oswald G. Villard, and Stephen Pierce Duggan. The gentlemen present were enthusiastic in their expressions of belief in the wisdom of undertaking a campaign to create and diffuse the 'international mind' as outlined by Professor Lindsay, who presided. As the result of the discussion it was decided to hold a Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States during the last week of May at the Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. In order to make the Conference nationally representative, it was decided to invite the coöperation of the American Society of International Law, the American Bar Asso-

ciation, and the United States Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, as the aim of the Conference—the diffusion of a knowledge of international affairs among the people of our country—could only be attained by means of the hearty assistance of the press, it was decided to invite representative newspaper editors from different parts of the country to be the guests of the Conference and to participate in its proceedings. Finally, Dr. Lindsay was chosen chairman of the General Committee and authorized to appoint whatever sub-committees might be needed and Professor Duggan was chosen to be director of the Conference. The membership of the sub-committees is given below.

The director, upon the request of the Executive Committee at its first session, went to Washington to explain the object of the Conference at the annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States Chamber of Commerce. The members of the board were enthusiastically in favor of the Conference and promised that the board would be generously represented at its sessions, but stated that as the Chamber can only be committed to any project by a referendum vote of its members, it could not be associated with the Conference in an official capacity. The same friendly attitude was adopted by the American Bar Association and it may be noted here that both of these national bodies were liberally represented at the sessions of the Conference. The American Society of International Law heartily agreed to coöperate and the Conference was held under the auspices of that body and the Academy of Political Science. While in Washington, the Director visited members of both houses of Congress and officials of the departments of the national government who were known to be inter-

ested students of international affairs. Without exception they heartily approved the object of the Conference and in many cases agreed to participate in its sessions.

The program committee met at once to formulate a program to accompany the letters of invitation to the newspaper editors and other invited guests. It may be relevant to mention here that the program and executive committees held sessions weekly up to the very opening of the Conference. The program committee quickly determined that the program should fulfil certain requirements: (1) It should confine itself to the most important problems of foreign relations that either directly confronted the United States or that needed consideration for an intelligent understanding of the background of the Great War and the bases of a durable peace. (2) It should not only secure the greatest amount of knowledge possible but also avoid even the appearance of propaganda by having both sides of every controverted question represented. (3) Its addresses should be made by men and women who were thorough students of the subjects they discussed. They might be known to the public at large or they might only be known to the few as experts in those fields. (4) The number of formal addresses should be reduced to the minimum in order to secure the frankest discussion from the floor on the part of guests and delegates. The program committee have reason to feel that they were successful in attaining these objects. Reference was constantly made by those participating in the Conference to the broad and liberal spirit that characterized its program and its proceedings. When the committee decided that The Problem of the Caribbean was one that required the

immediate attention of the American people, it invited Professor William R. Shepherd of Columbia University to explain the views of those who believe in the policy that the United States should secure the colonies that still belong to European powers. It also invited Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard of the *New York Evening Post* to explain the views of the opponents of American protectorates in that region. In addition, it secured others representing intermediate shades of opinion. Similarly, when the committee decided that a problem upon which the American people would soon be required to express an opinion was Concessions and Investments in Backward Countries as Causes of International Complications, it invited Mr. Samuel Roberts of the National City Bank of New York to explain the views of those who believe that the government should protect its citizens in their investments in such regions. It also invited Dr. Frederic C. Howe, the Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of New York, to present the opposing view. Other students of the problem were invited who were known to have helpful but more conciliatory views. The result of this policy was that an unusual body of distinguished scholars, journalists, publicists, and men of affairs met at Long Beach to discuss the foreign relations of the United States.

One serious difficulty met in organizing the program definitively was the recall of an agreement to speak made by members of Congress and officials of the departments of the government at Washington. This action on their part was made necessary by the declaration of war against Germany, which compelled the constant presence of those gentlemen in Washington. Nevertheless, when the Conference was in session it

was a source of gratification to the program committee that very few of those invited to speak were absent, and hence very few substitutions had to be made at the last moment. The outbreak of war also seriously interfered with the acceptance of the invitation by many of the newspaper editors throughout the country who felt that they could not leave their posts at so critical a time when there was such a pressure of business upon them. It is worthy of note, however, that the idea of holding the Conference met with a most hearty response from the editors. Practically all of them who were compelled to decline the invitation sent a letter of approval of the Conference, and expressed their determination to attend if circumstances would afterwards permit them. One of the most gratifying features of the Conference was the large number of diplomats present, and addresses were made by the Ambassador from Brazil, the Minister from China, the Minister from Bolivia, and the Minister from Switzerland. The French High Commission which was in the United States during the sessions of the Conference sent two delegates. Despite the unfavorable circumstances occasioned by the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany, 140 persons, of whom 53 were newspaper and magazine representatives, accepted invitations to be the guests of the Conference. In addition to the national organizations already mentioned, invitations were sent to the board of directors of organizations known to be deeply interested in international affairs. The result was that representatives of the League to Enforce Peace, the World Court League, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the World Peace Foundation, the National Security League, the Women's

Peace Party, and the American Geographical Society were present at the sessions of the Conference. The total number of persons registered as members of the Conference was 287. The entire list of invited guests, delegates from organizations and members of the Academy of Political Science who attended is given below, but it will be interesting to list here the newspapers and magazines which were represented.

The <i>Albany Argus</i>	Albany, N. Y.
The <i>Atlanta Constitution</i>	Atlanta, Ga.
The <i>Baltimore Sun</i>	Baltimore, Md.
The <i>Beacon</i>	Wichita, Kan.
The <i>Burlington Free Press</i>	Burlington, Vt.
The <i>Brooklyn Daily Eagle</i>	Brooklyn, N. Y.
The <i>Birmingham Age-Herald</i>	Birmingham, Ala.
The <i>Boston Herald</i>	Boston, Mass.
The <i>Chautauqua Institute</i>	Chautauqua, N. Y.
The <i>Duluth Herald</i>	Duluth, Minn.
The <i>Evening Post</i>	Charleston, S. C.
The <i>Evening Argus</i>	Montpelier, Vt.
The <i>Galveston-Dallas News</i>	Dallas, Texas
The <i>Greek National World</i>	New York
<i>Le Temps</i>	Paris, France
<i>La Revista</i>	New York City
The <i>Lowell Courier-Citizen</i>	Lowell, Mass.
The <i>Manchester Guardian</i>	Manchester, England
The <i>Newark Evening News</i>	Newark, N. J.
The <i>New York American</i>	New York City
The <i>Evening Post</i>	New York City
The <i>New York Globe</i>	New York City
The <i>New York Herald</i>	New York City
The <i>New York Mail</i>	New York City
The <i>Sun</i>	New York City

<i>The New York Times</i>	New York City
<i>The New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung</i>	New York City
<i>The New York Tribune</i>	New York City
<i>The World</i>	New York City
<i>The Pioneer Press and Dispatch</i>	St. Paul, Minn.
<i>The Public Ledger</i>	Philadelphia, Pa.
<i>The Pittsburgh Dispatch</i>	Pittsburgh, Pa.
<i>The Sacramento Bee</i>	Sacramento, Cal.
<i>The State Journal</i>	Madison, Wis.
<i>The San Antonio Light</i>	San Antonio, Texas
<i>The Times-Picayune</i>	New Orleans, La.
<i>The Tennessean and American</i>	Nashville, Tenn.

It is obvious how representative the newspapers were from the standpoint of geography and influence. But such an enumeration tells but part of the story. The following newspaper associations were represented at all the sessions of the Conference:

The Associated Press
 The East and West News Bureau
 The Newspaper Enterprise Association
 The Noel News Service
 The Slav Press Bureau
 The Russian Information Bureau
 The United Press

The most grateful acknowledgments are due the Associated Press and the United Press which every evening wired abstracts of the proceedings of the Conference to the 2,700 newspapers throughout the country forming those associations.

In addition to the daily press, the program committee thought it wise to have representatives of the magazines, particularly the weekly magazines, which have always showed an interest in international affairs.

The following magazines were represented at the Conference, in almost every case by an editor:

The American Journal of International Law

The Atlantic Monthly

Collier's

The Independent

Leslie's Weekly

The New Republic

The Review of Reviews

The Survey

The World Court Magazine

II. PROGRAM OF THE CONFERENCE

FIRST SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
 MONDAY EVENING, MAY 28, 8:30 o'clock
Presiding Officer, SAMUEL McCUNE LINDSAY

Address of Welcome	Nicholas Murray Butler
The Future of International Law	Charles Evans Hughes

SECOND SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
 TUESDAY MORNING, MAY 29, 10 o'clock
The Need of Better Machinery for International Negotiations
Presiding Officer, OSCAR S. STRAUS

1. Open Diplomacy: Democratic Control of Diplomatic
 Negotiations Domicio da Gama, Arthur Bullard
2. Effect of Censorship in International Relations
 Frederick Roy Martin, John Temple Graves
 Henry A. Wise Wood

Discussion Paul U. Kellogg
General Discussion

THIRD SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
 TUESDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 29, 2:30 o'clock
The Attitude of the United States towards World Organization
Presiding Officer, JAMES BYRNE

1. International Arbitration John Bassett Moore

2. A World Court William I. Hull
3. International Legislation and Administration
Alpheus H. Snow
- Discussion* Felix Adler, Samuel T. Dutton, Lillian D. Wald
- General Discussion*

FOURTH SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
TUESDAY EVENING, MAY 29, 8:30 o'clock
*The Democratic Ideal in International Relations:
What the United States Stands for*
Presiding Officer, GEORGE WHITELOCK

Addresses by Hamilton Holt, Bainbridge Colby
Lincoln Colcord, B. E. Schatsky

FIFTH SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
WEDNESDAY MORNING, MAY 30, 10 o'clock
The United States and the Caribbean
Presiding Officer, IRVING T. BUSH

1. Commercial and Financial Interests of the
United States in the Caribbean Edwin Borchard
 2. The Attitude of the United States toward the
Retention by European Nations of Colonies in
and Around the Caribbean William R. Shepherd
 3. The Relations of the United States to the Republics
in and Around the Caribbean
Oswald G. Villard, J. Marshall Brown
- Discussion* Albert Bushnell Hart, Cyrus F. Wicker
- General Discussion*

SIXTH SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 30, 2:30 o'clock

Drawing Together the Americas

Presiding Officer, SAMUEL McCUNE LINDSAY

1. Commercial and Financial Facilities

Roger W. Babson, James Carson

2. Intellectual and Social Coöperation

Leo S. Rowe

Discussion

Peter H. Goldsmith, Isaiah Bowman

General Discussion

SEVENTH SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
WEDNESDAY EVENING, MAY 30, 8:30 o'clock

The Future Relations of the United States with Latin America

Presiding Officer, ALBERT SHAW

1. From the Latin-American Viewpoint

Federico A. Pezet

2. The Monroe Doctrine After the War

George G. Wilson

3. Pan-Americanism as a Working Program

Alejandro Alvarez

EIGHTH SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
THURSDAY MORNING, MAY 31, 10 o'clock
*National Policy as to Resident Aliens: State Rights
and Treaty Obligations*

Presiding Officer, WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD

1. State Interference with the Enforcement of
Treaties

James Parker Hall, Charles C. Hyde

2. Discrimination with Reference to Citizenship and
Landownership
Toyokichi Iyenaga
Hans von Kaltenborn
Discussion Sidney Gulick
General Discussion

NINTH SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
THURSDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 31, 2:20 o'clock
Newer American Concepts of International Relationship
Presiding Officer, HENRY R. SEAGER

1. Labor as a Factor in International Adjustments
Meyer London, Jane Addams
2. Suppressed Nationalities and the Consent
of the Governed Francis Hackett
3. Liberal England and International Relationships
S. K. Ratcliffe
4. Annexation and the Principle of Nationality
Stephen P. Duggan
5. Economic Access and Neutralization
of Waterways J. Russell Smith
Discussion William English Walling, Charles Pergler
General Discussion

TENTH SESSION

Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, New York
THURSDAY EVENING, MAY 31, 8:30 o'clock
The United States and the Far East
Presiding Officer, SAMUEL McCUNE LINDSAY

1. The New China Wellington Koo
2. American and Japanese Coöperation Jokichi Takamine
3. Neglected Realities in the Far East H. R. Mussey
General Discussion

ELEVENTH SESSION

Chamber of Commerce, New York

FRIDAY MORNING, JUNE 1, 10:30 o'clock

*Property Rights and Trade Rivalries as Factors in
International Complications with Special Refer-
ence to Investments and Concessions*

Presiding Officer, SIMEON E. BALDWIN

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. Dollar Diplomacy and Imperialism | Frederic C. Howe |
| 2. Trade Concessions, Investments, Conflict, and
Policy in the Far East | Stanley K. Hornbeck |
| 3. The Relation of Government to Property and
Enterprise in the Americas | Chas. W. Sutton |
| 4. International Investments | George E. Roberts |
| <i>Discussion</i> | H. A. Overstreet |

III. RÉSUMÉ OF THE DISCUSSIONS

The subjects discussed at the sessions of the Conference divided themselves naturally into two groups: (1) those that would interest our citizens primarily as Americans, *e.g.*, the Problem of the Caribbean, and (2) those that would interest them as citizens of a world power, *e.g.*, World Reorganization upon a Peaceful Basis. The Conference was organized to bring together men of different views on each subject so that no aspect of it might be left unconsidered. Nevertheless, in almost every case there was agreement either upon the fundamentals, or upon some important element or upon the constructive features of the problem. Limits of space will permit of a brief exposition of only the most vital questions, and those of world significance will be considered first.

1. *World Reorganization upon a Peaceful Basis*

Probably the most important problem discussed at the Conference, certainly the one now uppermost in the minds of thoughtful men, was how best to organize a new international order which will provide a method other than war to accomplish necessary or desirable international changes. There was unanimous agreement that unless such a system were to emerge from the present conflict, the loss of life and treasure would have, indeed, been in vain. Nevertheless, the keynote in the discussion upon this topic was the necessity for caution. Professor John Bassett Moore emphasized at the beginning of the Conference the fact that,

however numerous might be the causes of international disputes that would be removed by the settlement at the close of the present war, imperfect human nature would undoubtedly furnish others. Hence, no matter how excellent the mechanism provided for a league of nations, whereby coöperation would be substituted for competition among the nations, reliance must be placed chiefly upon the education of the masses of the people in every country in the great international problems that confront mankind and in the difficulties that other nations are meeting in trying to work out their national destinies. Only by the diffusion of the 'international mind' as a result of such a campaign of education, can we hope for the disappearance of the provincialism that characterized even leading men among the different nations at the beginning of the war and for the development of a spirit of tolerance and sympathy for the difficulties of other nations. President Butler's address on this subject met with the warmest approval.

Professor Moore was also warmly supported by former Justice Charles E. Hughes in his warning that too much reliance must not be placed upon any one method for avoiding international conflicts. Both emphasized the fact that it ought not to be assumed that any new plan looking to that end should supersede methods that have worked satisfactorily in the past. At least 240 disputes between nations have been settled by international arbitration since the Jay Treaty of 1794, and not a single award was resisted. Hence, not even in the case of the adoption of any one of the plans suggested at the Conference by the advocates of a World Court, a League to Enforce Peace, or a Parliament of Parliaments, should so successful and

well-tried a method as international arbitration be discarded. In fact, the greatest unanimity of belief was expressed in the wisdom of building upon what the experience of the past has shown was feasible, especially the experience obtained from the working of the machinery adopted at the two Hague Conferences.

Justice Hughes considered that the fundamental need is the development of a true body of international law which ought to be obtained by the holding of international conferences to agree upon what shall be accepted. But properly to serve its purposes the international conference must become a recognized and established institution to meet at stated intervals, and it must devise machinery to carry on its work between sessions. In this opinion Justice Hughes was warmly supported by Dr. Felix Adler, who believed that the international conference should be developed into a Parliament of Parliaments, a world legislature. Only by such a plan could the small nations like Belgium and Greece have a say in the way in which the world should be organized and administered. Dr. Adler believes that the members of the World Parliament should be elected by the national parliaments with provision that all the interests of a nation be represented in it. Mr. Alpheus Snow stated that the American principle of a Senate and a House of Representatives, the one representing the nations as equals and the other representing districts of equal population might be adopted to secure the adhesion of both large and small nations.

The advocates of a World Court, to which should be submitted for judicial settlement the controversies arising between nations, were opposed by some speakers who maintained that the international complica-

tions of today are of a kind that cannot be solved by a reliance upon precedent, the *modus operandi* of a court, but need new legislation. The opposing views, however, were reconciled by Justice Hughes, who maintained that if we can provide means for the development of the requisite body of international law, there ought to be no great difficulty in establishing an international court of justice which will develop a body of judicial precedents to supplement and complete the work of the international conferences. Justice Hughes believed that such a tribunal should learn from the experience of the Supreme Court of the United States by refusing to decide controversies which are merely of a political nature and do not involve issues of a justiciable character. Non-justiciable controversies should be referred to the instrumentalities of conciliation provided by the First Hague Convention to secure recommendations in the interest of peaceful settlement. It was pointed out by several of the speakers that the International Court of Arbitral Justice recommended by the Second Hague Conference had been agreed upon in all its details except the selection of the fifteen judges from the forty-six sovereign states, and that that part of the recommendation ought to be taken up as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace.

Upon the crucial question, "What sanction shall there be for international law?" there was nearly general agreement. Three of the four principles of the League to Enforce Peace advocated at the conference by Mr. Hamilton Holt, the editor of the *Independent*, had the approval in a general way of the majority of those who participated in the conference, *viz.*: (1) that the nations shall meet at stated intervals to make

international law for themselves; (2) that the nations shall unite in a league and shall settle in a court all justiciable disputes; (3) that they shall establish a council of conciliation to which all non-justiciable questions shall be referred for investigation and report. The fourth proposal, however, did not meet with general acceptance, *viz.* that the signatory powers shall forthwith use their economic and military forces against any member that goes to war before taking its case either to the court or the council. The reasons put forth by Mr. Alpheus Snow for endowing whatever international body that might be organized with only persuasive force met with the approval of such students of the problems as Dr. Samuel Dutton, Dr. Felix Adler, and Professor William I. Hull. Justice Hughes' statement that the problem could not be settled according to theory but only as a practical question and with due attention to the conditions that are likely to obtain when the war is ended met with general approval.

Mr. Bainbridge Colby drew attention to the fact that the sources of international friction are chiefly economic and, therefore, to prevent war we must establish not only a political but also an economic internationalism, a community of interests, even if qualified and incomplete, among the great nations. Mr. Frederic C. Howe followed this up with a historical survey of the diplomacy of the past two decades to show that the chief economic cause of international complications was investments made and concessions secured by citizens of the advanced nations in the backward regions of the world. He maintained that such citizens receive large returns for the risks involved and were not justified in calling upon their

home governments for protection when their profits were endangered, but should be left to shift for themselves. However, Professor Harry A. Overstreet pointed out that if some nations were to protect the investments of their nationals abroad and other nations were not, the opening up of backward regions would soon become the monopoly of a few nations. In line, therefore, with the contention of Mr. Colby, Professor Overstreet urged the necessity of some kind of international control or regulation of investments made and concession secured in weak states and backward regions by the citizens of the advanced nations. Mr. Colby thought that a first step was the general adoption of the policy of the 'open-door' in colonial administration. Professor Overstreet advocated the formation of an international commission whose specific task would be to keep investment fields open on free and equal terms to investors of all countries, and to determine whether investments in backward countries are made in terms that are decent and human or in terms that rob and oppress. Professor Overstreet maintained that the organization of such a commission would mean only to follow the precedents of the International Postal Union, the International Sanitation Commission, the International Railway Commission, and others that have so well served all nations in recent years.

2. Democratic Control of Diplomatic Negotiations

"The world will never be safe for democracy," said Mr. Oscar S. Straus, "so long as the diplomacy of states is under the cloak of secrecy." Mr. Straus made his attack upon secret diplomacy in the session of the Conference devoted to a consideration of the defects in the

machinery of diplomacy. He insisted that it is not the machinery of diplomacy but the method of employing it that needs reconstruction. The method should be democratized so that the people through their chosen representatives may have a voice in making, confirming, or rejecting their country's international engagements and policies. The low standard of morals which justified the conclusion of secret treaties between separate nations in direct conflict with general treaties made by groups of states at the end of wars involving many countries, as happened, for example, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, could not be possible if every treaty to become effective should have to be confirmed by representatives of the people.

The position of Mr. Straus in favor of open diplomacy was strongly supported by Mr. Arthur Bullard, of Washington, D. C. Mr. Bullard showed that secrecy in diplomacy is desired by a large number of people for the same reason as secrecy in business. Many valuable business deals are easier to effect if you do not have to tell everybody about them. Just as we found the necessity for publicity in industrial affairs, so we must insist upon it in foreign affairs. Mr. Bullard was of the opinion that this could easily be effected because the reason why diplomacy operates along the old monarchic lines is primarily inertia. It started that way and nobody has changed it. Now that the mass of people realize the evils of secret diplomacy, they have only to insist that statesmen devise means by which the will of the people shall be made more directly and immediately dominant in foreign relations.

Ambassador da Gama of Brazil urged a note of warning. He made a distinction between secretive diplomacy and confidential preparation of treaties or diplomatic matters requiring expert action. Like everyone who spoke at the session, he condemned unreservedly secretive diplomacy, but he insisted that diplomatic acts should not be open to public discussion while in preparation. The representative régime is based upon confidence, and popular control of diplomatic negotiations can be secured fully enough when a limited number of the representatives of the people are kept informed of their progress. The Conference was unanimous in the belief that no question was more important for the future peace of the world than the devising of methods whereby the final decision in diplomatic negotiations should be secured to the representatives of the people.

Closely associated with the need of open diplomacy is freedom of communication of intelligence. Everyone who attended the Conference was convinced by the argument of Mr. Frederick Roy Martin, Assistant Manager of the Associated Press, of the unwisdom of censorship of the press, save as to the publication of military and naval movements over which all recognize the need of censorship in war times. Mr. Martin's illustrations taken from his long experience proved conclusively that the veil of secrecy causes a great impairment of public confidence and creates distrust. His contention that that government most wants censorship that has the most to conceal, and that that chancellery is most believed which seeks to conceal the least was warmly supported by such newspaper men as Mr. Paul Kellogg, the editor of the *Survey*, and

Mr. John Temple Graves, who spoke for the Washington correspondents.

3. *The Bases of a Durable Peace*

One of the most interesting developments of the Conference was the practical unanimity of opinion as to the principles that should determine peace at the close of the Great War, and also the remarkable manner in which the independent thinking of the various speakers brought them to conclusions similar to those stated by President Wilson in his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917.

Some of the principles urged as a necessary basis of a durable peace have already been described under the topic 'World Reorganization upon a Peaceful Basis'. Moreover, the desirability of having the coming peace a democratic peace agreed to by states governed by democratic parliaments elected by universal suffrage was generally conceded. Space will permit, however, only of a brief exposition of the attitude of the Conference upon a few principles about which there was no dispute.

(a) *The Principle of Nationality.* The right of small nations to develop along self-evolved and national lines and the right of nationalities freely to choose to what state they should belong received emphatic affirmation at the Conference. It was repeatedly shown that the facts of history teach the lesson that whenever international adjustments have been made which violate the principle of nationality they have always been temporary and have been broken at the first opportune moment. Moreover, experience and reason both demand the application of the principle of the consent of the governed to such regions as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and the nationalistic areas of

the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This would, of course, result in territorial readjustments and annexations, but they would be voluntary, not forced, and would make for peace, not for war. It was agreed that for the statesmen of Europe to decide upon international readjustments which would violate a principle of such vitality and intensity as that of nationality would be merely to invite future conflicts.

(b) *Economic Access and the Neutralization of Waterways.* Professor J. Russell Smith, of the University of Pennsylvania, made an illuminating address showing that commercial development during the past century had been so complex that not merely the comfort of all civilized peoples but their physical life depend upon continued access to the sea and to lands overseas. Block a people off from the sea, and they perish. Hence the sea must be permanently accessible and permanently neutral. States containing ports like Saloniki, Trieste, Antwerp, which are the natural outlets of a great international hinterland, should not have the right to impose tariff duties upon goods coming from it which are intended for consumption overseas. Nor should connecting waterways like the Dardanelles through which the commerce of all nations must pass remain under the exclusive control of any single state. The position of Professor Smith upon the freedom of the seas, the neutralization of connecting waterways and the establishment of free ports, was warmly supported by a number of other speakers and received general approval.

4. *The Problem of the Caribbean*

The Conference was indebted to Professor Edwin M. Borchard of Yale University for a most exhaustive

and illuminating history of the growth of American commercial and financial interests in the Caribbean during the past two decades. Professor Borchard also described how, without any deliberate policy upon our part but wholly as the result of circumstances, there had taken place a corresponding development in our political control of that region. As the result of the war with Spain we had acquired ownership of Porto Rico and a practical protectorate over Cuba. We purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark and the Panama Zone from Colombia. To prevent the landing of the troops of European nations in San Domingo to enforce the payment of money claims due their nationals, we assumed control of its customs houses and financial administration. To prevent a similar landing to protect the lives and property of their nationals during a succession of revolutions in Haiti, we assumed practical sovereignty over that republic. And for both of these reasons we interfered in Nicaragua and now control its destinies.

Professor Borchard maintained that in every case of interference the result had been good for the country concerned. Law and order have never been so well preserved, production so highly stimulated, foreign commerce so carefully fostered and the investment of capital so successfully encouraged. In every way the material prosperity of the countries in question has been vastly increased. Professor Borchard stated that our policy should now be directed toward the encouragement of American capital to invest in these countries with its resultant benefits to all interests concerned. He maintained that the process of economic imperialism is bound to go on, and that all signs point to a further control by the

United States in the financial rehabilitation and the political guidance of other Caribbean countries. Hence the policy should be consciously adopted and frankly avowed by the United States.

Professor Borchard's position was vigorously upheld by Professor William R. Shepherd of Columbia University. He contended that it was the manifest destiny of the Caribbean Sea to be an American lake. Hence, it behooves American diplomacy to start taking stock of the future by securing possession of the colonies of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands in and about the Caribbean. With the opening of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean has been raised again, as it was three centuries ago, to a commanding position among the trade routes of the world. All our interests, political and economic, merge in keeping this region as an American sphere of influence, for the peace of the western hemisphere, for the welfare of its inhabitants and for the security of the Panama Canal. All these are endangered by the possession of colonies in that region by European countries, especially great powers. Professor Shepherd maintained, moreover, that it was for the benefit of all three parties concerned, the European powers, the inhabitants of their colonies, and the United States that the colonies should be absorbed by the United States. The islands are geographically and strategically a part of the United States. Both the French and Dutch colonies show a declining commerce and are dependent for their financial existence upon annual subsidies by the home government. The commerce of the British colonies is chiefly with the United States. What has been accomplished for the welfare of the people of Porto Rico in the development of education,

growth of industry, and multiplication of internal improvements is an object lesson to the inhabitants of all the other islands, who would, given an opportunity, no doubt show the same eager desire for annexation to the United States as did the people of the Virgin Islands when the proposal was made for their purchase from Denmark. Hence, argued Professor Shepherd, we ought to strive to give them the opportunity. He believes that France and England might now be willing to transfer their Caribbean possession to the United States in return for the generous assistance we are giving them in the war, and that the Netherlands might be willing to sell theirs.

The policy of imperialism advocated by Messrs. Borchard and Shepherd met with emphatic condemnation by Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard of the New York *Evening Post* and Mr. Moorfield Storey of Boston. They maintained that that policy was none other than the Prussian claim of necessity: we need those places, and we are going to get them. To maintain the justification of assuming sovereignty over the Caribbean republics just when we have entered a world war in order to uphold the right of 'small nations' to live is hypocritical. To say that proximity to the coast of America dictates the destiny of the islands in question while proximity to the coast of Asia does not interfere with our claim to the Philippines is ridiculous. To suggest that we obtain possession of those islands as a *quid pro quo* for our assistance to France and England in the war is to give the lie to our statement that we entered the war 'to make the world safe for democracy' and without desire for material reward. Finally, to launch forth

upon such a policy of imperialism would mean to rouse the suspicion, fear and animosity of the South American republics. Let the people of the United States remember the words of President Wilson, "It is a very perilous thing to determine a foreign policy in the terms of material interest" and "Morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us" in our relations with other nations. Hence, maintained Messrs. Villard and Storey, let our policy be to assist in every way possible the Caribbean republics to develop and strengthen their self-government and independence, instead of imposing upon them a government by outsiders whose culture and point of view in every fundamental are so alien.

There were certain aspects of the problem upon which there was unanimity. The first was that the policy of drift which has characterized the action of the United States in the Caribbean during the past twenty years must cease. The national interests are too great and the situation too serious to have further action upon our part determined by haphazard act instead of a well-thought-out policy. The people of the United States, of the Caribbean region, and of the European countries have a right to know our intentions. The second point of agreement was the necessity of placing all of our wards, whether temporary or permanent, under one department of the government. With Porto Rico under the War Department, Haiti and San Domingo under the Navy Department, and our relations with Cuba determined by the Department of State, we cannot look for uniformity of action. To do that much is to take the first necessary step.

5. *The Future of the Monroe Doctrine*

One of the most helpful as well as interesting discussions of the Conference was upon the Monroe Doctrine, a subject of the greatest immediate importance to American citizens. Mr. Albert Shaw, the editor of the *American Review of Reviews*, gave a penetrating analysis of what the Doctrine has really meant in the past century of American history. He showed that it was inspired not only by an exigency of statesmanship but also by a large vision. The American republic was founded upon the great conceptions of democratic self-government in the particular states, with the common interests of them all merged in the higher structure of the Union, and with a higher machinery of justice to deal with possible misunderstandings between them. Admitting some failures, we have, on the whole, made a marvelous success of the practical demonstration. It is because of the persistence of this great conception that American statesmen proclaimed the extension of the system at a crisis in our foreign relations a century ago, and are again proclaiming an extension of it in the present crisis.

Dr. Shaw maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in 1823 to make the western hemisphere 'safe for democracy', to prevent European governments extending their system of autocracy, militarism and mutual distrust to the Americas. Its observance has given opportunity to the struggling democracies of South America to secure the experience in self-government necessary to the formation of strong, free, and independent states. Because of its existence, the western world is today free from the taint of militarism, no state from the Straits of Magellan to

Baffin's Bay having founded itself upon the doctrine of military power as against its neighbors. Its existence prevented European powers from dividing South and Central America into colonies or spheres of influence with all that those terms connote of rivalry, jealousy and international complications. It has on the contrary enabled the peoples of the South American countries to work out their destinies free from the domination of alien and unfriendly influences. It has, moreover, secured the peace and safety of our own republic.

When one understands the magnificent results of the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine, he can understand, continued Dr. Shaw, why Americans have always been determined to maintain it. As President Cleveland stated in his message of December 17, 1895, the Doctrine "cannot become obsolete while our Republic endures." Though not in order that we may create or set up a position of overlordship in the western hemisphere, we have been compelled at times to assume a position of leadership in order that no small American state should be treated by any European power as Serbia was treated in 1914 by Austria-Hungary. So far as the larger and more stable republics of South America are concerned, the Monroe Doctrine is becoming increasingly a family concern, a principle of mutual help and good understanding. If the rights of small nations on this hemisphere were endangered by any European power, not only the United States but these other republics would be ready to use force to maintain the Monroe Doctrine; for they understand that its existence has brought peace, security and progress to them.

In his message of January 22, 1917, President Wilson advocated that "the nations should with one accord adopt the Doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people but that every people should be left to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." Clearly, claimed Professor Wilson of Harvard, this recently announced American policy is for the period after the war to enlarge the scope and operation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Doctrine in its new form would cease to be narrowly American and would have a world basis. Just as the Doctrine of 1823 did not make the western hemisphere 'safe for democracy' of itself, but was dependent upon the readiness of the United States to use force to maintain the rights of self-governing nations, so the new Monroe Doctrine would not of itself make 'the world safe for democracy'. Hence in the same message, President Wilson expressed the conviction that there must be 'a partnership of democratic nations' for its maintenance. The United States proposes, in other words, that after the war the powers of the world unite to guarantee for the larger area what it has guaranteed for the Americas—that democracy shall have the opportunity to develop without foreign intervention. The Monroe Doctrine will, in any event, be maintained after the war, but as Professor Wilson stated, it is to be hoped that under the broader scope of its principles, through a concert of the nations, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness may be permanently secure under governments deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. If the

Monroe Doctrine of 1823 has been regarded by our people as a choice American contribution to the well-being of the western hemisphere, would they not have reason to look with even greater pride to the adoption of the Doctrine of 1917 as a splendid contribution for the well-being of the world?

6. *Our Future Relations with the Far East*

It is not necessary to agree with the contention of several speakers at the Conference that the future of mankind is on and around the Pacific, to be willing to admit that the future of the Pacific is of vital importance to America. As Professor Henry R. Mussey of Columbia pointed out, one of the greatest political problems of this country will undoubtedly be the adjustment of relations between East and West, some of which are already causing serious concern to statesmen. To make the Pacific a lake of peace, an open highway for binding mankind together, and not an expression of the distances separating them, is worthy of the efforts of the best men of both regions. Our relations with the peoples of the East naturally divide themselves into two parts, each presenting a great problem: (1) Our attitude towards the opening up in every way of undeveloped regions, especially China, and (2) the treatment accorded in the United States to resident aliens from the Orient.

The Chinese minister to the United States, Dr. Koo, had very little difficulty in proving to his audience the remarkable progress China had made during the past fifty years in political, spiritual, and material advancement and in social reforms. And his statement that China, which has vast natural and human resources, and which is now fully awake to its national

possibilities, will sooner or later have a great deal to do with the future of the world, met with general acceptance. Dr. Koo continued that the nature of China's relation to the future of the world depends upon what policy the other nations adopt toward China and what treatment they accord to her. If they unite to help China rid herself of spheres of influence and maintain the policy of the 'open door', the principle of equal opportunity for the trade of all nations in all parts of China, then the strong and powerful China that one may naturally expect to develop will be a great force for world peace. Dr. Koo referred to the pride Americans might feel in the policy of good will and justice towards China which their country had pursued in its refusal to enter into the scramble for Chinese territory, in its insistence upon the 'open door', in its magnanimous attitude after the Boxer uprising.

That the policy urged by Dr. Koo is more possible now than ever before was disclosed in the address of Mr. Jokichi Takamine, one of the Directors of the East and West News Bureau. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan and Russia united in a policy toward China looking toward the extension of their influence at the expense of Chinese control of Chinese resources. But the Russian Revolution profoundly affected Japanese foreign policy. The Terauchi government has recently affirmed in the most public and emphatic manner its devotion to the principles of equality of opportunity in China, and of its territorial integrity, and the Japanese government has also declared that concessions henceforth must be of a non-political character. But Mr. Takamine showed that the Japanese want to go further. The visit of Baron

Shibusawa in 1916 was to secure joint action by the United States and Japan in trade and investment in China which would undoubtedly insure a durable peace in the eastern hemisphere. That is, instead of competing against each other in China, Japanese subjects or corporations and American subjects or corporations should unitedly compete against the subjects or corporations of other powers to get a share in the concessions to develop trade and industry in China. The abundance of American capital and of Japanese skilled labor, backed by the initiative and ability of both peoples, would soon secure to them a paramount position in the economic development of China.

Professor Stanley K. Hornbeck of the University of Wisconsin urged a different policy with arguments that won the Conference to his views. He denounced the present attitude of *laissez faire* which has resulted in the discredited practices of other individual nations. But he insisted that to substitute competition by groups would merely intensify rivalry by decreasing the number and increasing the strength of the competitors. He advocated instead international coöperation on the part of the governments of those states which have capital for investment. As a group, the coöperating states, including and with the consent of China, could determine the distribution and guarantee the security of capital accepted for Chinese enterprises. In case of controversy or conflict, such pressure as might need to be brought to bear against the offender should be decided upon by the coöperating powers jointly, or by an international court. Professor Hornbeck maintained that the United States is in a position now where she may take the lead in a

movement for the formulation of an international co-operative policy in this region which has long been a battleground of trade, investments, and concessions. Such a league of forces, political and economic, would go far to preserve peace.

Professor Mussey pointed out that we must not assume that the solution of the economic problem in the Far East will alone bring peace and good will between the United States and that region. Americans as well as Europeans must abandon the attitude of white superiority and the mission to rule Asia. They must understand that democracy is not to be dammed back within the confines of the Caucasian race. The peoples of the West have made concessions to the national spirit of Japan. They will have to make concessions to the rising national spirit of China and of India. Does this mean the abandonment of every restriction on Asiatic immigration? The consideration of that question brings us to the second problem of our future relations with the Far East, *viz.*, the treatment accorded in the United States to resident aliens from Asia.

Dr. Albert Shaw pointed out that in considering any concrete illustration of a political problem, we must do so in the light of the national philosophy that lies behind it. He showed that partly through express direction and leadership and partly through irresistible impulses, we have been trying in the United States to make a homogeneous American people, a great nation having common habits of speech and thought and well blended with respect to political and economic capacities and the things that go to make social solidarity. We made a terrible mistake in the importation of the negro, and as a result, we have what is

probably the greatest race problem in history upon our hands. We fortunately avoided a similar mistake fifty years ago by restricting Chinese immigration and there is little doubt among our people as to the wisdom of the general policy of restricting the immigration of oriental laborers to our Pacific coast states.

Mr. Toyokichi Iyenaga, a Director of the East and West News Bureau, asserted that were Japan to insist upon the unrestricted immigration of her laborers into the United States, the wrong would be on her side, for such a policy would create many difficult problems and introduce an element which even the wonderfully assimilative power of the United States would find it hard to cope with. But the situation is not so. Japan fully appreciated the difficulty, and in 1907 voluntarily prohibited the further emigration of Japanese laborers to the United States. The *modus vivendi*, 'the gentlemen's agreement', has been and is most rigidly kept, hence, it must be distinctly understood that the immigration question with Japan is closed. The question at issue between the two countries is this: What treatment is the United States going to accord to the eighty thousand Japanese resident in this country? Are ignorant European immigrants to be permitted to own land, to send their children to the public schools and to enjoy other privileges of residence here, and these same privileges to be forbidden the Japanese in contravention of express provisions of the treaty between the two countries? Are they always to be kept as aliens debarred from the rights, duties and functions of citizens? Mr. Takamine asserted that the charge of non-assimilation made against them is a mere assumption, as they have never been given a

chance to demonstrate their assimilative power to its fullest extent.

Professor Hornbeck maintained that land ownership or admission to American citizenship is of vital concern to only a handful of Japanese, but it is of the greatest importance that the people of California or of other western states should be satisfied as to the conditions of life under which they find themselves. They have a right to determine for themselves through their governmental machinery what those conditions of life shall be and as between the United States and Japan, our first concern should be with the wishes of the people of one or several of our own states. In making and interpreting treaties, our government should consider the principles upon which our federal union is founded: that we shall allow the people of a state, so far as compatible with the interests of the group as a whole, to determine the conditions of their lives. Any attempt of the federal government to insist upon a policy in a considerable section of the country contrary to the almost unanimous opinion of the people of that section is doomed to failure, as was proved in the South during reconstruction.

Dean James P. Hall of the University of Chicago Law School and Professor Charles C. Hyde of the Northwestern University Law School explained the great evil of a situation brought about by the interference by a state with a treaty to which the United States is a party. The seriousness of the breach of good faith is magnified by the commission of the offense, not by irresponsible persons, but by public authority on American soil. The power to contract treaties and to deal with the outside world is lodged exclusively in the federal government and it is the

duty of the federal government to secure the enforcement of the treaties it makes with foreign countries. It cannot avoid its own responsibility for local infractions of a treaty by pleading the failure of Congress to enact laws necessary to effect prevention. Such a plea is no defense in law for the consequences of such inaction. The treaty-making power should, of course, use the greatest care to safeguard the interests and the welfare of American citizens before agreeing to any treaty. But once it has decided upon a treaty it should draft the treaty with a special view to frustrating, by its very terms, state legislative or administrative interference, otherwise to be anticipated. Finally, Congress should enact the legislation necessary to give the federal courts the power to secure to aliens the rights accorded to them by treaty provisions. Otherwise, we must resign ourselves to the sad but sure expectation of witnessing repeated defiance of our treaties, described by the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, whenever hatred of resident aliens asserts itself.

The ability of the Conference at almost every session to come to a conclusion upon some aspect of the subject considered, which was generally acceptable was shown at the session devoted to the consideration of our future relations with the Far East. Moreover, the conclusion arrived at was an additional evidence of the strength with which the idea of international coöperation had seized our people. Mr. Hans von Kaltenborn, of the *Brooklyn Eagle*, pointed out that the discrimination against orientals practised in the United States was also the policy of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. He suggested, therefore, the holding of a conference in which all the

lands bordering upon the Pacific should be represented, to discuss this burning question. We should, undoubtedly, learn more of the problems, the interests, and the desires of the peoples of the Far East and they would learn more about ours. Such a conference would remove some of the misapprehensions which a race issue always creates, and would probably result in agreements making for more cordial and helpful relations.

IV. RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE

That the efforts of the projectors of the Conference to realize its broad and liberal aim were appreciated by those who attended is best shown by a few brief newspaper quotations which are typical of many that have appeared in all parts of the country. In an admirable article that appeared in the *Boston Herald* of June 11, the following statement was made:

The program fitted perfectly into the national situation of today, and even a cursory advance examination of subjects and speakers created an impression, later amply confirmed at the sessions of the Conference itself, that sincere effort had been put forth to secure addresses by men of authority upon their respective themes and to obtain the widest variety of points of view. Delegates commented frequently upon the enormous amount of labor which the program must have cost, and upon the smallness of the number of absentees and substitutes. It was clear from the outset that the delegates had come to Long Beach for business, and the lure of the splendid beach and esplanade detained but few from the sessions as they followed each other, morning, afternoon and night.

An enthusiastic article in the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* of June 6 states:

The distinguishing feature of the Conference was its liberal spirit. The committee in charge took particular pains to have every point of view on every question presented. Every speaker was encouraged to talk right out. Every member of the audience was given a chance to discuss the points raised and to approve or condemn. The result was an unusual amount of keen discussion by the best American experts in law, history and economics, all of which will soon be reproduced from shorthand notes.

While the problems which loomed up were many and serious, it became evident throughout the Conference that an increasing number of Americans are developing what President Butler of Columbia, in his address, called the 'international mind'. The very fact that so many Americans were able to participate in an intelligent discussion of the world's greatest problems proved that thinking Americans are no longer provincial.

An editorial of the *Baltimore Sun* of June 1 concludes as follows:

It was with the idea of beginning this educational process on a large scale that the Conference on Foreign Relations was conceived by the Academy of Political Science, which was its sponsor. The speakers at this Conference are leaders of public thought. They are men of many minds and varying views; they lead in different directions. That does not matter. No agreement upon foreign policies will be reached at the Conference, but trains of thought will be started, ideas will clash against ideas, and discussion of foreign affairs generally will be stimulated. In the course of time, through the newspapers and periodicals, in legislative halls and perhaps in political campaigns, the discussion will reach all classes of the people, and the formation of that matured, intelligent public opinion on foreign affairs, which is all-essential if America is to fill worthily her new place in world politics, will begin. Such, at least, is the hope of the projectors of this Conference and all patriotic Americans will be glad to see the hope fulfilled.

The statements of individuals concerning the usefulness of the Conference are just as enthusiastic as those of the newspapers. The managing editor of the *Lowell Courier-Citizen* writes:

The Conference seemed to me a most admirable experiment, certain to be stimulative of editorial intelligence in dealing with the problems which are sure to arise as a consequence of the war.

The editor of the *Review of Reviews* writes:

The interest in the Conference was genuine and well sustained to the end. The sentiments that pervaded it were at once those of practical intelligence and of a high conception of international

morality. I am convinced that the publication of the papers will have great importance as we begin to approach the peace-making period.

The general secretary of the World Peace Foundation writes:

However good conferences are, I am sorry to say I generally reach my limit of appreciation—not to say endurance—on about the third day. But, to my surprise and delight, the Conference at Long Beach was increasingly interesting and stimulating to the very end. All things considered, I think it the most satisfactory thing of the kind that I have ever had the good fortune to attend. . . . I venture to express the hope, which I know is shared by many others, that this is the first of a series of such conferences.

This statement ought not to be closed without a word of emphasis upon the thought contained in the last preceding sentence. Letter after letter has come from those who attended, making the suggestion that the Conference become a periodic affair. And the opinions of the newspapers on this point can best be summed up in the last sentence of the New York *Evening Post's* editorial on the Conference:

The Conference should be repeated, even perhaps made an annual affair, for stimulating our imagination as citizens of the world.

The country is now at war, and it is more important than ever that our people should have an understanding of the international situation, of the problems both internal and external of the different nations, and particularly, of the foreign questions that immediately confront the United States and require solution. This is essential in order that our country may adopt a wise attitude toward the question of peace, and also of the kind of world order under which we shall live after the war. The Academy of Political Science,

therefore, can render a most effective service to the nation by organizing at once a series of regional conferences throughout the United States to continue the campaign of education begun at Long Beach. We can thereby hope for the development throughout our country of the 'international mind' and of a permanent interest in international affairs which will enable Americans to make a wise contribution to world peace and to human welfare.

V. COMMITTEES OF THE CONFERENCE

GENERAL COMMITTEE

Samuel McCune Lindsay, *Chairman Ex-Officio*

Felix Adler	John Bassett Moore
J. O. Adler	Henry Morgenthau
John G. Agar	Henry Raymond Mussey
Irving T. Bush	Alton B. Parker
Nicholas Murray Butler	*George A. Plimpton
¹ Joseph H. Choate	William L. Ransom
James Byrne	Bernard H. Ridder
Edward T. Devine	Elihu Root
Stephen P. Duggan	Leo S. Rowe
Cleveland H. Dodge	Jacob H. Schiff
John H. Finley	James Brown Scott
Martin H. Glynn	Henry R. Seager
David M. Heyman	Edwin R. A. Seligman
A. Barton Hepburn	Albert Shaw
David Jayne Hill	William R. Shepherd
Charles E. Hughes	Charles H. Sherrill
Paul U. Kellogg	Munroe Smith
Frederick P. Keppel	Henry L. Stimson
Thomas W. Lamont	Ellery C. Stowell
Adolph Lewisohn	Willard D. Straight
Owen R. Lovejoy	Oswald G. Villard
Sidney E. Mezes	Henry White
John Purroy Mitchel	

¹ Deceased

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Samuel McCune Lindsay, *Chairman Ex-Officio*

Nicholas Murray Butler	James Brown Scott
Henry Raymond Mussey	Henry R. Seager
Stephen P. Duggan, <i>Ex-Officio</i>	

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Stephen P. Duggan, *Chairman*

Nicholas Murray Butler	James Brown Scott
Paul U. Kellogg	Albert Shaw
William L. Ransom	William R. Shepherd

ENTERTAINMENT COMMITTEE

Irving T. Bush, *Chairman*

John G. Agar	Henry R. Seager
David M. Heyman	Ellery C. Stowell
Owen R. Lovejoy	William R. Shepherd

RECEPTION COMMITTEE

Edwin R. A. Seligman, *Chairman*

James Byrne	Thomas W. Lamont
Edward T. Devine	Adolph Lewisohn
Frederick P. Keppel	George A. Plimpton
Willard D. Straight	

INVITATION COMMITTEE

Charles E. Hughes, *Chairman*

¹ Joseph H. Choate	Alton B. Parker
Martin H. Glynn	Albert Shaw
Henry Morgenthau	Willard Straight
Oswald G. Villard	

¹ Deceased

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
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